No, I never said that. In fact, in this thread and in many other posts in my lifetime I've made many posts, in many regards similar to the balance of yours, that show that various forms of correlation and correspondence of ontological significance support at least the necessary (the sufficient is harder to support) conditions of neural causation of qualia.
Yep, sure. That's why I said we can't directly quantify them. We can (and do) indirectly quantify them.
I think you may have lost sight of the original issue I was posting to in response to your critique of UE. The bottom line is you can make all sorts of potentially causal and correlated observations about UE's consciousness (I've simplified this to qualia) but you can't observe his consciousness as the thing in itself. That is essentially what he said you disagreed with that prompted my orginal post in this series to you. This contrasts to the physical objects like trees that you can arguably both observe.
I'm not sure what UE is talking about there.
Consciousness is not a thing in itself. It's a
process. Like a computer program - or a television program. It's an ongoing interaction of elements of a physical system arranged in a particular way. It's a behaviour. A verb, rather than a noun. We can certainly examine it, but we can't point to it as existing in a particular place and time, any more than we can for any other verb.
I meant the direct sense of experience of the color blue and that is the one aspect you left out.
What's this "direct sense of experience" then? Tell me, and I will put it in.
The qualia of blue is not the same as the physical projection of a blue image on somebody's retina, no matter how much you want to make it so.
Whoever said I wanted to make it so? I don't even consider the term
qualia to be meaningful.
It seems that qualia, whatever they are, are not the object being sensed, not the image or impulse arriving at the sensory organ, not the neural activity resulting from the activation of the senses, not the associations formed from that neural activity, and not the behaviours resulting from all of that.
So, could you please explain to me, as clearly as you can, exactly what function do qualia play?
You can't know that what you experience as the absolute appearance in your mind of the color blue is the same as what UE sees, even if he makes all the same associations of serenity, etc.
What is this "absolute appearance"? What does it do?
Even if we assume you are correct that all the associated processes are physical (UE would not agree and you have not proven it)
Sorry, but this is baloney. We know perfectly well that all the associated processes are physical.
We - as a species - have been looking for the existence of any non-physical attribute of consciousness for longer than recorded history, and we have found absolutely no evidence of any such thing. More than that, we have been able to systematically map mind function to brain function, to show what aspects of consciousness happen where and how, to trace the path of (for example) visual perception from the retina through the brain, to determine what happens at each stage and even how long it takes.
And concurrently with that, we've mapped out what happens to the mind when the brain goes wrong. Which is often very unusual and sometimes disturbing, but leaves no room for a dualism of the gaps.
Neither mapping is complete - human brains a complex, and likewise human minds - but both are advancing steadily, while not a single piece of contrary evidence has ever been presented that stood up to scrutiny.
The idea that mind is what brain does is a scientific hypothesis, and we all know that scientific hypoheses are never proven, only supported or falsified. So the argument that this hypothesis hasn't been proven is a hollow one, and the argument that therefore there is some non-physical aspect to consciousness is an out-and-out fallacy. But more than that, we have more evidence to support this hypothesis than for any other idea that mankind has ever formed about the world. And, as I said, zero evidence to the contrary.
you still haven't breached the barrier of UE's original assertion - at least at the epistemological level. Where UE goes further, and I disagree, is that this barrier extends to the ontological level too.
Actually, I don't even consider the question meaningful, until you define it properly. That's always the problem with the term
qualia, and indeed that's why the term was invented: So that the philosopher can say, no, I don't mean (any physical process or any result of a physical process), I mean the
qualia itself. It's defined negatively, but we have no reason to think that the negative is anything but an empty set.
Or you can redefine
qualia to mean something physical - in which case it is straightforward to account for it, but we'd do better yet to simply abandon the word.