Are You Conscious?

[westprog]

Easy. Consicousness is a skill or ability similar to walking or playing the piano. It isn't a "thing", it isn't a property, it isn't a process, and it certainly doesn't exist separate from a being that can learn that skill or display the usage of it any more than piano playing can exist without a pianist. Technically, consciousness as most people use the term is two skills: the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me", and the ability to recognize that ability in others. The reason consciousness becomes such a bone of contention in philosophy is that it is directly tied in with morality.

The ability to recognize consciousness in others can only be based on what Mercution calls public behavior. If an object does not display the public behavior I have learned to associate with consciousness, I consider it to be not conscious. So for example, a rock does not display the ability to recognize between itself and others, so I consider it to be not conscious. My dog does display this behavior, so I consider it to be conscious. A sleeping person doesn't display the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me" at that moment, so he or she is temporarily not conscious.

Because of this, I consider a rock to be not conscious and therefore actions taken with or against a rock are amoral (without moral consequences). I consider my dog to be conscious that therefore actions taken with or against my dog can be moral or immoral, but not amoral. With this in mind, it is fine to pound a tent stake in with a rock, but not to do so with my dog.

Like most skills, this has to be learned and some people/animals/things do not seem to be able to learn it as well as others. This is why you may see the occasional psychopath (or two year old ) trying to pound tent stakes in with the family dog.

That's a totally valid guide to how we perceive consciousness, but it's not the same as a definition.

If the definition is

the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me"

then I think it's insufficient.

Computer programs tend to fall in a gray area with some people recognizing the computer's ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me" and others failing to do so. I believe this has to do with people having varying levels of skill, maybe in a few cases having too much talent for recognizing that ability in others, such as those who subscribe to the "everything is conscious" belief.

We tend to stop talking to our teddy bears at some stage of our lives. Believing that teddy is a person just like us - just because he has a microprocessor inside - is not a sign of advanced understanding.

 

[Hokulele]

That's a totally valid guide to how we perceive consciousness, but it's not the same as a definition.

Nope, it is a definition.

If the definition is then [the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me"] I think it's insufficient.

Yup, which is why the bit you quoted is only half of my definition.

We tend to stop talking to our teddy bears at some stage of our lives. Believing that teddy is a person just like us - just because he has a microprocessor inside - is not a sign of advanced understanding.

Yup, see the other half of my definition. This is also why I consider it to be a learned skill. Some people learn faster than others, some people underdevelop or overdevelop that skill.

 

[AlBell]

You may have a cite for that.

Yep.

Thanks. Those studies, and the mechanical servers driven by brain impulses, are exploring the easy part, awareness.

Awareness of awareness: where is awareness of awareness? Hint. There isn't.

I know that computer code can be trained by observing fMRI imaging to the point that storage of color, orientation and the like can be inferred from current fMRI data. And what was private has become public in a very limited sense. We are discussing human consciousness.

And exactly the same thing applies. Human consciousness is more complicated and less direct than the primary visual cortex, but it's neurons all the way down and it can be studied using exactly the same analytical process.

Where is the point that you are suggesting that magic happens and science stops?

Magic? Lack of understanding basic mechanisms involved is the problem. We agree a brain is necessary and apparently sufficient to provide both awareness, and as we are discussing here awareness of awareness.

Whether neurons, neurons/axons, or neurons/axons/biochemistry/unknown by themselves are sufficient for awareness of awareness is unknown.

Burn your own strawman on that one. I stipulate "in principle", and with all working as intended, do-able.

So what? In principle we can examine the workings of the human brain in exactly the same way. Your objections consist solely of insisting on in principle for computers while insisting on in practice for humans. This is simply equivocation.

In reality, I think not. Computing devices and lifeforms have different standards of acceptable treatment.

Sure, other than i/o operations what a computer is doing is "private", yet is subject to inspection and duplication in ways that humans will never be.

Begging the question.

We can, of course, apply exactly the same techniques to study humans. Just wire up an electrode to each and every neuron and axon and monitor all that activity.

Actually it is the question.

And no, you cannot wire up each and every neuron and axon for both technological reasons, and most important moral and ethical reasons. Even if you did, what you were monitoring may or may not contain the effects you are searching for.

And if awareness of awareness is the search, you have one available subject to work with, yourself. When will your wiring/monitoring begin?

 

[Robin]

We know it is entirely possible to induce "experiences" by direct manipulation the brain, so in principle why wouldn't it possible to mimic the changes that occur in the brain when someone is tasting a peach (which involves many, many other things than just the brain) without ever tasting (as we usually use the word) a peach?

I never said that was not possible - in fact I said it was.

But as I pointed out before, that would be undergoing the experience, just as tasting the peach on your tongue would be undergoing the experience.

You cannot know what the taste is like without undergoing the experience in some way - that is why it is called private.

 

[Robin]

Interesting...

Why? Are you suggesting that there is a contradiction between the two quotes?

There isn't.

 

[Robin]

I've mentioned this in the past but I once had an x-ray scan that required me to be injected with a dye that was opaque to x-rays, one of the side-effects of the dye they used on me is that you get a "taste in the back of your throat", that taste is described as "rusty nails" - I'd never tasted rusty nails yet that description matched my "private experience".

Your point being?

You still had to undergo an experience in order to know what it was like.

The question was whether you could know what that experience was like by reading a brain scan or understanding a mathematical hypothesis.

 

[Robin]

That's only because you've defined it that way.

Er yes. That is the point - to illustrate what is meant by a private experience.

Say you've never seen the colour orange. If I tell you that it's something like red, and something like yellow, that will give you a pretty good idea what the experience is like.

But you've defined knowing what the experience is like as having had he experience. So your argument is at best a tautology.

Er... who is making an argument? I was illustrating what a private experience was.

And that is only because you've decied that a different point is now the point.

The point was about private experiences wasn't it? I was illustrating the point.

Yes. This is why simile and metaphor and analogy are utterly absent from human communication.

Oh, wait...

That is very relevant.

Oh, wait...

 

[AlBell]

Easy. Consicousness is a skill or ability similar to walking or playing the piano. It isn't a "thing", it isn't a property, it isn't a process, and it certainly doesn't exist separate from a being that can learn that skill or display the usage of it any more than piano playing can exist without a pianist. Technically, consciousness as most people use the term is two skills: the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me", and the ability to recognize that ability in others.

What do you think of "awareness of awareness" as a definition?

The reason consciousness becomes such a bone of contention in philosophy is that it is directly tied in with morality.

The ability to recognize consciousness in others can only be based on what Mercution calls public behavior. If an object does not display the public behavior I have learned to associate with consciousness, I consider it to be not conscious. So for example, a rock does not display the ability to recognize between itself and others, so I consider it to be not conscious. My dog does display this behavior, so I consider it to be conscious. A sleeping person doesn't display the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me" at that moment, so he or she is temporarily not conscious.

Because of this, I consider a rock to be not conscious and therefore actions taken with or against a rock are amoral (without moral consequences). I consider my dog to be conscious that therefore actions taken with or against my dog can be moral or immoral, but not amoral. With this in mind, it is fine to pound a tent stake in with a rock, but not to do so with my dog.

Like most skills, this has to be learned and some people/animals/things do not seem to be able to learn it as well as others. This is why you may see the occasional psychopath (or two year old ) trying to pound tent stakes in with the family dog.

Not really a definition imo. Certainly a result.

Computer programs tend to fall in a gray area with some people recognizing the computer's ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me" and others failing to do so. I believe this has to do with people having varying levels of skill, maybe in a few cases having too much talent for recognizing that ability in others, such as those who subscribe to the "everything is conscious" belief.

Do you foresee the need to treat any computer as an entity subject to moral judgement as to what can be done to it?

Again, maybe in a few thousand years.

 

[Hokulele]

What do you think of "awareness of awareness" as a definition?

Useless, because it just pushes the definition problem back one step onto "awareness".

Not really a definition imo. Certainly a result.

It is a descriptions of the results that can be philosophically reached based on the definition from the first paragraph.

Do you foresee the need to treat any computer as an entity subject to moral judgement as to what can be done to it?

Again, maybe in a few thousand years.

Personally and as of today, I have not, as any computer program I have encountered passes the first part of my definition, but not the second. I believe it could be philosophically and technologically possible, but I am not a very good programmer, so this is just a personal opinion. I don't have any hard data to back it up. Pixy or rocketdodger would have a more informed opinion on this.

Please note, although I do think they could be treated as a moral entity, that does not mean they should be subject to the same judgement as would be given a human being. Just as animals and other creatures are treated as moral entities but not moral equivalents, I think something new would be invented for technology-based consciousness.

 

[AlBell]

Useless, because it just pushes the definition problem back one step onto "awareness".

Interesting. I have no trouble with "awareness"; all life and even computers are aware. Basically stimulus/response with some if/then as complexity increases.

Awareness of Awareness for me is the first definition of consciousness that I've felt describes it.

It is a descriptions of the results that can be philosophically reached based on the definition from the first paragraph.

Under most definitions, too.

Personally and as of today, I have not, as any computer program I have encountered passes the first part of my definition, but not the second. I believe it could be philosophically and technologically possible, but I am not a very good programmer, so this is just a personal opinion. I don't have any hard data to back it up. Pixy or rocketdodger would have a more informed opinion on this.

Which we've heard innumerable times. Too bad repetition doesn't make "strong AI" the Trvth.

Please note, although I do think they could be treated as a moral entity, that does not mean they should be subject to the same judgement as would be given a human being. Just as animals and other creatures are treated as moral entities but not moral equivalents, I think something new would be invented for technology-based consciousness.

Unneeded anytime soon, imo.

 

[.13.]

But isn't it the case that as long as you've been aware of anything at all - that is that you have observed anything at all - that you were observing your consciousness? Consciousness is not a thing you observe. It is the fact that you observe anything at all.

No, in my opinion I haven't observed consciousness, I have observed something. For example this post I'm replying to. Allthough I'm a bit confused since you say that if I have been aware of anything I've observed my consciousness but then the next sentence reads: "Consciousness is not a thing you observe." And that is a sentence I agree with. Also later in the post you talk about contents of consciousness which confuses me further because you say above that "It is the fact that you observe anything at all." How could it then have contents?

I don't really understand. I'm currently observing a computer screen. There's nobody else here. If somebody else was here then they could observe it too. I am also currently observing my consciousness and at the moment it contains, among other things, a computer screen. If somone else was here then they could observe the computer screen, but not my consciousness. At this point we need two definitions of "observe", don't we?

I have a different view. In my view I'm not observing consciousness or contents of consciousness. I'm just observing a computer screen. While the screen is in the environment and is publicly observable by anyone who is in the room with you, your observation is yours alone and it is different from the other persons observation. But that doesn't in my opinion mean that we need two definitions for 'observe' because both of you are just observing a screen.

I can't accept the context of the question, because I'm still unsure of exactly what the word "observe" means to you.

I'll use it in a sentence 'Observe me doing this thing I'm doing'. Or 'observe the smell of napalm in the morning'. That latter sentence is just an awkard way of saying 'smell the napalm...'. Does that help?

Imagine we build a computer which can pretty accurately replicate all the cognitive functions of a human brain - that is it can carry out all of the "computations" and does it in roughly the same way. The computer is not conscious. It has no internal awareness of anything. But it is perfectly capable of learning language and ends up with a complex set of concepts based on an internal model it has built of physical reality. So it knows what atoms and stars and humans are, and it can understand verbs concerning behaviour.

Can this machine, which is capable of learning from the behaviour of humans it picks up with its various sensors (but does not "observe" them, because "there's nobody home"), learn the meaning of the word "consciousness"?

In my opinion there is a contradiction when you say that "The computer is not conscious." Given all those other properties I say that the computer must be considered conscious. What is the difference between saying 'I'm internally aware of the screen in front of me' and 'I'm aware of the screen in front of me'?

If the computer picks up human behaviour with its sensors it is observing (see above for the way I'm using 'observe') that human behaviour. If it can learn language it can learn how to use the word 'consciousness'. It observes the public behaviour of its teachers and when it uses the word, its teachers observe that public behaviour and correct it if necessary. That's the same way I learned to use that word.

I'm not sure I've ever offered an opinion on the definition of "being conscious". Trying to defining the verb "be" is even more treacherous than "consciousness." For some people they end up having the same meaning.

My mistake then. But when I am being conscious (that's a bit awkard way of saying 'I am conscious') I mean that I am behaving in a way that people call conscious. It could also be private behaviour that if people would know about it they would say I'm conscious.

What is the Being of being?

I don't know.

 

[westprog]

Nope, it is a definition.




Yup, which is why the bit you quoted is only half of my definition.




Yup, see the other half of my definition. This is also why I consider it to be a learned skill. Some people learn faster than others, some people underdevelop or overdevelop that skill.

I still don't think that describing something in terms of the way that we recognise it is the same thing as a definition.

One could respond - "The only way we can define anything is in terms of how we recognise it" - but in that case, defining consciousness in terms of the effect it has on our consciousness clearly contains a degree of self-reference. (I suppose that Pixy would be able to claim that that makes the definition of consciousness conscious).

 

[Hokulele]

I still don't think that describing something in terms of the way that we recognise it is the same thing as a definition.

One could respond - "The only way we can define anything is in terms of how we recognise it" - but in that case, defining consciousness in terms of the effect it has on our consciousness clearly contains a degree of self-reference. (I suppose that Pixy would be able to claim that that makes the definition of consciousness conscious).

By the way you use the term "our consicousness", it sounds as if you are treating consciousness as if it were an object. I don't, I see it as an ability which is not a "thing" in its own right, just as "walking" isn't a thing, but a learned skill for most humans. As such, my definition of consciousness is no different than a definition of playing the piano in terms of definition by recognition.

 

[westprog]

By the way you use the term "our consciousness", it sounds as if you are treating consciousness as if it were an object. I don't, I see it as an ability which is not a "thing" in its own right, just as "walking" isn't a thing, but a learned skill for most humans. As such, my definition of consciousness is no different than a definition of playing the piano in terms of definition by recognition.

I don't see it as an object, or as an ability, or as a process. I see it not only as a thing in its own right, but in its own category.

If it were merely a matter of recognising it in other people. it would be of minor interest. It's the capacity to recognise it in ourselves that's of most significance, and we do not recognise it in ourselves by way of our behaviour.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No, in my opinion I haven't observed consciousness, I have observed something. For example this post I'm replying to. Allthough I'm a bit confused since you say that if I have been aware of anything I've observed my consciousness but then the next sentence reads: "Consciousness is not a thing you observe." And that is a sentence I agree with. Also later in the post you talk about contents of consciousness which confuses me further because you say above that "It is the fact that you observe anything at all." How could it then have contents?

The statement "consciousness is not a thing you observe" is not saying that you don't observe consciousness, but that consciousness can't really be considered to be a "thing". The contents of consciousness include things you can observe, like computer screens.

I have a different view. In my view I'm not observing consciousness or contents of consciousness. I'm just observing a computer screen. While the screen is in the environment and is publicly observable by anyone who is in the room with you, your observation is yours alone and it is different from the other persons observation. But that doesn't in my opinion mean that we need two definitions for 'observe' because both of you are just observing a screen.

I'll use it in a sentence 'Observe me doing this thing I'm doing'. Or 'observe the smell of napalm in the morning'. That latter sentence is just an awkard way of saying 'smell the napalm...'. Does that help?

No, not really. I'm going to skip replying to this because your next answer is much more important.

In my opinion there is a contradiction when you say that "The computer is not conscious." Given all those other properties I say that the computer must be considered conscious.

This is the nub of our disagreement. I can see no reason why we can't build a machine which is capable of accurately simulating all the computations carried out by a brain without being conscious. Where is the contradiction here? I have no reason to believe a car alarm or a calculator is conscious (has any sort of internal awareness). I have no reason to believe that a more powerful computer needs to have any sort of internal awareness either, even one capable of simulating the computations carried out by brains. Why do you think such a thing is impossible? If you wanted to convince me it was impossible, how would you go about it?

The properties of brains which enable them to carry out complex computations are properties to with the complex structure of the brain itself. This complex structure is physical, and therefore could theoretically be modelled on a computer (unless Penrose is correct, in which case the brain is a sort of quantum computer which could not be modelled on a computer which didn't mimick those quantum mechanical properties, but we can ignore this possibility for the moment). You are telling me that if we simulate the complexity and information-processing capacity, it logically follows that we must also simulate consciousness. Why do you think this logically follows? I think you must be basing this opinion on some other premise you are introducing with which I do not agree, because I see no logical necessity here. It may well be logically necessary if materialism is true, but we can't start this discussion with that premise, because then you would be begging the question.

What is the difference between saying 'I'm internally aware of the screen in front of me' and 'I'm aware of the screen in front of me'?

Nothing. The difference is between a machine, like a car alarm, which responds zombie-like to external stimuli without being internally aware of anything at all and something like a brain which carries out similar computations based on similar sense organs/devices, but which is actually internally aware that something is going on. It's the difference between mere response to stimulus and an internal awareness of the stimulus and the perception that the action taken was a free will choice (whether this is an illusion or not is another question, all I am saying is that we internally sense that we have made a free will decision whereas the car alarm does not, and neither does the computer in my example).

If the computer picks up human behaviour with its sensors it is observing (see above for the way I'm using 'observe') that human behaviour.

Then I can't accept your definition of the word "observe". You are just talking about the capacity to respond to external stimuli and I can think of numerous examples of things which are capable of this but which most people do not believe are conscious.

We can't have the word "observe" meaning both what an unconscious machine does and what a conscious being does. We are talking about two completely different things. One is to do with sense equipment and information processing, the other is to do with subjective experience of the events which are occuring.

 

[Hokulele]

I don't see it as an object, or as an ability, or as a process. I see it not only as a thing in its own right, but in its own category.

If it were merely a matter of recognising it in other people. it would be of minor interest. It's the capacity to recognise it in ourselves that's of most significance, and we do not recognise it in ourselves by way of our behaviour.

Then how do you recognize it in yourself? When did you begin to recognize it and what were the indicators that it was consciousness and not, say, some sort of hallucination? I would make the argument that you do recognize it within yourself by way of your actions, actions in this context meaning the actions of accepting certain thoughts as "true" or "relevant" and others as "false" or "irrelevant", just the same way you can recognize it in others by way of their actions. By comparing what you do to what other people and certain animals do and what computers do not do, you can categorize some as fully conscious, others less so, and some not at all.

To me, putting it into its own category is basically defining it by what it isn't, which I personally don't find very useful. Mind you, I am not saying you are wrong, merely saying why I do not find your usage compelling.

 

[Piggy]

Well, no. If you can't define a word, you don't know what it means.

This is not accurate.

If you can use a word to communicate, then you know what it means.

Defining words by using other words is a whole different kettle of fish, and such definitions are never adequate or complete.

 

[Piggy]

Easy. Consicousness is a skill or ability similar to walking or playing the piano.

You can't be serious.

Consciousness is not a skill.

We're born conscious. It's something our bodies do, not something we learn.

I mean, I love you, Hok, but that is patently ridiculous.

 

[Piggy]

Since we don't yet understand how the body does consciousness, the best definition we can have is a functional one.

When we're in deep sleep (not dreaming) we're not conscious.

When we're fully awake and interacting with the world, we're conscious.

When we're dreaming, we're in a different state of consciousness -- we're aware of our dreams.

The boundaries between conscious and non-conscious states are not sharp.

We can dig a little farther and talk about what we're conscious of when we're conscious.

If I'm having a conversation at a party, I'm conscious of what the people around me are saying, but not what people outside that circle are saying, even though I hear it.

But if someone outside that circle says my name, I will "hear" it -- that is, I will be consciously aware of it.

We all have these experiences, and they're not controversial at all. We all move in and out of conscious states every day as we sleep, dream, and wake up. We all have various slices of our environment move in and out of our conscious awareness.

The purpose of definitions, after all, is just to get us on the same page, so we know what it is we're talking about.

If I'm in a room and I say "Close the window" and someone asks "Which window?", I don't need to give an elaborate definition, I can just say "That one" and point.

So in this case, a functional definition is best.

And at the end of the day, we all know what we're talking about.

These calls for dictionary-type definitions can only serve to derail discussion so it goes nowhere.

 

[Hokulele]

You can't be serious.

Consciousness is not a skill.

We're born conscious. It's something our bodies do, not something we learn.

I mean, I love you, Hok, but that is patently ridiculous.

I respectfully disagree. I believe the first half of my definition is something our bodies do without learning (distinguishing between "me" and "not me"), but recognizing that ability in others appears to be taught. I think this is why small children can be such amoral creatures until they are taught how to socialize. They have got the "me/not me" bit down, but they do not reliably recognize that in others, especially others who appear very different (such as another species, like the family dog or cat). Some people seem to never learn this. Like someone who cannot learn to play the piano, they may have some sort of consciousness tone-deafness going on.

I understand that by my definition, infants are not fully conscious, and I would argue that is true up until a certain age. In addition, my definition pretty much requires that while in utero, full consciousness is impossible. However, I do believe that the vast majority of infants are capable of learning how to be conscious, and therefore must be treated morally as there is no fixed age at which this kicks in. Like child prodigies in other fields, it would not surprise me to discover that there are those who fully conscious from an extremely young age.

For those who like to posit anything special about human consciousness, I believe that it is best described as being able to recognize the ability to distinguish between "me" and "not me" in the widest possible range of entities, something my dog is apparently only able to do for a very limited number of creatures.