Are You Conscious?

[westprog]

No, because silence would be "not working". Slower is annoying, but if you just want to get the damn thing to go from start to finish, slower is "not working properly" but definitely not "not working".

Not working is whatever is defined as not working. But if you prefer "not working properly" then I'm not going to make a fuss about that.

Errors in real-time processing don't only result in delays, of course. They typically result in lost data which can't be recovered.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Is your goal to -simulate- magnetic fields and electrical currents or -physically- generate them?

The first item is just simulation. Simulated movements, and simulated electrical fields. In the original item, it was about whether it is possible to create a faithful simulation of the brain. At this point, I'm only concerned with accuracy of the simulation, and not attach any meaning to it in terms of consciousness. Obviously, the simulation runs on physical hardware, e.g. a powerful computer system.

Before you spoke of simulating consciousness but now you're saying that consciousness is not your concern. Are you backtracking?

The second item deals with transforming the inputs from the real, physical world into numbers that we plug into the simulation, and take simulated outputs, and turn them into real physical effects. In the case of the dynamo, we would be interested in the current output, so we attach a physical device to the computer that can take a digital signal, and turn it into a physical current. This would be a real physical entity that we can measure with a current meter.

Sorry, falkowsi, but it doesn't work that way. You can't cant convert I/O signals produced by a simulated generator into electricity by virtue of computation. You have to physically generate the electrical power -- usable energy can't be conjured into existence by computing it.

In case of our brain simulation, the physical input would be a camera system, and microphone, and the output would be a speaker. If you like, you can also add mechanical limbs, and other parts of the anatomy.

If you hook up a sound card to a computer, which has been programmed to say "good morning", you aren't denying that real physical sounds come out of the speaker ?

The sound is produced by the hardware which meets the physical requirements for producing it. Emulating the computations of the same system without the necessary physical hardware will NOT produce the audio.

Do you agree that it is - in principle - possible to produce such a system to provide a faithful brain simulation, plus an interface to the real world, including a speaker, such that we can hear the simulated person speak to us ?

Note that at this point I'm not concerned with the meaning of consciousness. It is just a matter whether a faithful simulation is possible.

I'll make this simple. A simulated brain will not produce the same physical results as an actual biological brain for the same reasons that a simulated dynamo will not generate actual electricity: it would not meet the physical requirements.

 

[nescafe]

I'll make this simple. A simulated brain will not produce the same physical results as an actual biological brain for the same reasons that a simulated dynamo will not generate actual electricity: it would not meet the physical requirements.

Why should we care more about the physical results than the functional results?

 

[AkuManiMani]

In the case of consciousness however, we're not so much speaking of the -processing- of information but the -experience- of information.

My intuition is that they are one and the same. Yours (obviously) is not. Neither of us have anything empirical to say about it that is decisive.

Information processing is just a general description of what every physical system does. Subjective experience is not.

Computation just refers to the functional constraints imposed upon a given physical system but computation itself is not physics.

The guys working on digital physics (Fredkin and Tegmark (when he is feeling wacky)) have some not-totally-insane arguments along the lines of physics being computation (or straight up maths, which is close enough).

I'm familiar with that ontology [I've even read Seth Loyd's Programming the Universe -- interesting stuff ]. It just so happens that this perspective just emphasizes my original point: Information processing is ubiquitous and therefore has no explanatory force with regard to understanding specific physical phenomena such as consciousness. Of course the world is computable but simulating a phenomena via computation is not the same as reproducing the phenomenon in question. If one wants to produce fire, electrical current, fission/fusion power, consciousness, or gravitational acceleration they must produce the sufficient physical conditions.

In principle, computation cannot explain subjective experience. At best, it describes how those experiences are organized.

I am afraid you are asserting as fact something that you have no way of proving, and that no-one has any reason to accept as axiomatic.

Its a self-evident fact that computations are what physical systems do, not vis versa. Claiming that computation explains consciousness is like saying driving explains cars -- its a logical flub.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'll make this simple. A simulated brain will not produce the same physical results as an actual biological brain for the same reasons that a simulated dynamo will not generate actual electricity: it would not meet the physical requirements.

Why should we care more about the physical results than the functional results?

Because conscious experience is a physical result of brain activity.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Assuming that it is conscious, the hypothetical designer should be able to tell us what it's experiencing and how similar or different it's experiences are from our own.

No. You're moving the goal posts.

Not at all. I still have the same hardass criteria that I did before.

You agreed that it possessed consciousness because its was indiscernable from a conscious entity.

I can't tell you what you're experiencing, even though I'm pretty sure you're conscious.

However, if I were a synthetic conscious system and you're the engineer who designed me you should know something as basic as the details of my conscious operation. Wouldn't you agree?

 

[westprog]

Of course the world is computable

The best evidence so far is that it isn't. It may be that it will turn out that some new theory will change things, but as things stand the universe looks as if it isn't computable.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The best evidence so far is that it isn't. It may be that it will turn out that some new theory will change things, but as things stand the universe looks as if it isn't computable.

Well the whole exercise to create physical theories is to create quantitative models of the world. We can then use these models for things like simulations of physical systems. Of course, our theories will always be incomplete but they are still good workable approximations

 

[Robin]

There are limits to the accuracy of the brain. Things like a mild fever will already adjust all chemical balances inside the brain. The same thing happens when you shake your head, have a beer, get tired, have low blood sugar, breathe really quickly, ...etc...

These things do have an effect on our perception, so there are noticeable shifts in the brain chemistry, and they are much bigger than the billionth decimal place. Nevertheless, consciousness isn't affected until you have an extreme fever, or pass out from the alcohol, take a big blow to the head, ...etc...

It doesn't look like infinite precision is obtainable in our heads, nor does it look like it is necessary.

I think you are conflating "simulatable" with "computable".

And also there is some ambiguity between the statements that "the brain computes" and the statement "the brain is computable".

If reality is not discrete then there is infinite precision in our brains and the brain is not computable.

The question that remains is whether a sufficiently high res simulation of the brain will simulate the function of the brain.

A high res simulation of the brain producing the outward behaviour we associate with consciousness would put the question of whether or not consciousness requires something more than function beyond doubt to me, although the idea will probably still seem strange to me.

But we are quite some way off being able to test that particular hypothesis even if we can.

A more realistic scenario is that computationalism can provide hypothesis to explain current questions in neuroscience, such as the one Dr. Ramachandran posed in the article I cited earlier. He indicated in that article that computational hypotheses were being considered.

In other words this is a question I leave completely to the neuroscientists.

 

[PixyMisa]

No, because silence would be "not working". Slower is annoying, but if you just want to get the damn thing to go from start to finish, slower is "not working properly" but definitely not "not working".

Apparently in Westprog's world a musical piece played adagio (or, by extension, allegro) is no longer music.

 

[PixyMisa]

I think you are conflating "simulatable" with "computable".

And also there is some ambiguity between the statements that "the brain computes" and the statement "the brain is computable".

If reality is not discrete then there is infinite precision in our brains and the brain is not computable.

Yes-ish. Reality does not appear to be absolutely discrete, but is effectively discrete; there is no infinite precision - precision beyond the Planck scale is not meaningful - so the brain is effectively computable.

The question that remains is whether a sufficiently high res simulation of the brain will simulate the function of the brain.

And the answer is yes.

As has been pointed out by several posters, minor changes in the operation of the brain - minor but many orders of magnitudes larger than the Planck scale - do not affect consciousness. So not only is infinite precision unnecessary, we don't even need to approach Planck-level precision.

A high res simulation of the brain producing the outward behaviour we associate with consciousness would put the question of whether or not consciousness requires something more than function beyond doubt to me, although the idea will probably still seem strange to me.

Why?

But we are quite some way off being able to test that particular hypothesis even if we can.

We can and are testing it as applies to sub-units of the brain, cf. the Blue Brain project.

And of course there is no reason at all to doubt that it will work. None.

 

[Frank Newgent]

FedUpWithFaith said to say goodbye.

FUWF
Oh, dear -- that's too wonderful to be true!
Oh, it's -- it's going to be so hard to say
goodbye. I love you all, too. Goodbye, rocketdodger.
Oh, don't cry. You'll rust so
dreadfully. Here -- here's your oil-can.
Goodbye.

ROCKETDODGER
Now I know I've got a heart -- 'cause it's
breaking.

FUWF
Oh -- Goodbye, Anagnostopoulos. You know, I know it
isn't right, but I'm going to miss the way
you used to holler for help before you found
your courage.

ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
Well -- I would never've found it if it
hadn't been for you, FedUpWithFaith.

FUWF
I think I'll miss you most of all PixyMisa.

PIXYMISA
No.

 

[PixyMisa]

I think I'd rather be a winged monkey.

 

[AkuManiMani]

FedUpWithFaith said to say goodbye.

I LOL'ed till QQ

 

[nescafe]

Information processing is just a general description of what every physical system does. Subjective experience is not.

Right, subjective experience happens on a specific information processing system -- the brain and its neurons, which happen to process information at a level which is quite distinct from the information processing that happens among the fundamental particles that make up the neurons, which I see no reason to worry about yet.

Information processing is ubiquitous and therefore has no explanatory force with regard to understanding specific physical phenomena such as consciousness.

Funny, I think the same thing about invoking quantum mechanics or EMF field effects to try and explain consciousness.

Of course the world is computable but simulating a phenomena via computation is not the same as reproducing the phenomenon in question. If one wants to produce fire, electrical current, fission/fusion power, consciousness, or gravitational acceleration they must produce the sufficient physical conditions.

Right, but 4 out of 5 of those things are direct consequences of the underlying physical laws. You appear to assume consciousness is as well, but you have not given any compelling reason to back your assumption up.

Its a self-evident fact that computations are what physical systems do, not vis versa. Claiming that computation explains consciousness is like saying driving explains cars -- its a logical flub.

It is not at all self evident, otherwise the digital physics folks would not exist-- their view is that computations are what physical systems are, and it works as well as materialism does as an ontology.

 

[nescafe]

Because conscious experience is a physical result of brain activity.

So is heat, carbon dioxide, and a slight electromagnetic field.

The simulation of a powerplant that was controlling the real powerplant was also a physical result of computer activity in the hypothetical mentioned upthread. Why is consciousness not the same sort of physical result?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Information processing is just a general description of what every physical system does. Subjective experience is not.

Right, subjective experience happens on a specific information processing system -- the brain and its neurons, which happen to process information at a level which is quite distinct from the information processing that happens among the fundamental particles that make up the neurons, which I see no reason to worry about yet.

You seem to be firmly stuck in a conceptual mode [by will or by flub] thats preventing you from seeing what I'm getting at. Metaphorically speaking, what I'm trying to get you to do is step back and stop thinking merely in terms of the abstract symbolism you're using to count tally sticks and focus on the sticks as physical objects.

Remember that computations are carried about by physical hardware. Whatever a given IP system produces is by virtue of the interactions of it's physical constituents. Terms like "inputs", "ops", and "outputs" are just the functional labels we apply to what concrete objects are doing. Understanding, in the abstract, the computational ops that underly the symbolic representations on your calculator's screen is not the same as understanding the LCD thats displaying those symbols or knowing how to make one.

Step back into metaphor with me because I really don't think you truly grok what it is I've been saying. Think of the mind as a computer monitor, consciousness as the illumination of the screen, and qualia as the various color pixels that are able to be produced by the display. Symbols on the screen are the products of the computations performed, but the actual display [i.e. the screen, the pixels, and the power used to light the screen] used to conveying those symbols is a product of the -physics- of the hardware.

Information processing is ubiquitous and therefore has no explanatory force with regard to understanding specific physical phenomena such as consciousness.

Funny, I think the same thing about invoking quantum mechanics or EMF field effects to try and explain consciousness.

Of course the world is computable but simulating a phenomena via computation is not the same as reproducing the phenomenon in question. If one wants to produce fire, electrical current, fission/fusion power, consciousness, or gravitational acceleration they must produce the sufficient physical conditions.

Right, but 4 out of 5 of those things are direct consequences of the underlying physical laws. You appear to assume consciousness is as well, but you have not given any compelling reason to back your assumption up.

So do you think conscious experience is something going on in a magical ether realm of abstraction separate from the physical universe?

Its a self-evident fact that computations are what physical systems do, not vis versa. Claiming that computation explains consciousness is like saying driving explains cars -- its a logical flub.

It is not at all self evident, otherwise the digital physics folks would not exist-- their view is that computations are what physical systems are, and it works as well as materialism does as an ontology.

Nescafe, if I take a pencil and write "1" on a piece of paper is it literally the number one?

Because conscious experience is a physical result of brain activity.

So is heat, carbon dioxide, and a slight electromagnetic field.

Your point being?

The simulation of a powerplant

...is just a switching pattern on a computer that we use to symbolically represent an actual power plant.

that was controlling the real powerplant

The physical computer was controlling the physical power plant at the direction of it's physical human operators.

was also a physical result of computer activity in the hypothetical mentioned upthread.

"Simulation" is just a label we apply to the portion of the computer's activity that we think of as representing the plant.

Why is consciousness not the same sort of physical result?

For the same reason my drawing of an apple is not the same sort of physical result as an edible fruit.

 

[PixyMisa]

You seem to be firmly stuck in a conceptual mode [by will or by flub] thats preventing you from seeing what I'm getting at.

No, we understand you. We have from the beginning. You're making a category error.

 

[AkuManiMani]

No, we understand you. We have from the beginning. You're making a category error.

Are you cognitively capable of explaining what the "error" is and why its an "error" ?

 

[Robin]

Why?

Because, as I said earlier, it would imply that a moment of consciousness just like the one I am experiencing right now could result from millions of individual processes in millions of devices isolated from each other in space and millions of miles apart, so that their processes would complete years before the data that my conscious moment represents could physically be in the same place.

That seems strange to me. That seems sufficient to justify a wait and see approach.