Are we Machines?

[Dancing David]

I don't, read my essay.

I thgought you had because of this statement here

But we cannot create a self from building a machine ground up. Compare going back in time a couple of hundred years and creating a television set. Even if in perfect working order it would not be able to receive a TV signal but would simply display white noise.

This would seem to imply that that an electronic or mechanical construct could not be built that would manifest a self. So I perhaps misunderstood. But this statement seems to imply that a mechanical brain would not be able to manifest as self.

Just as a point of order I do understand that there may be more to consiousness than a purely mechanical process, I just haven't seen evidence of that yet.

I am asking again, if a self would chose to manifest on an organic brain why would it not chose to manifest on a mechanical brain.

The signal is there somewhere, it is not associated with the reciever, therefore different recievers wi\ould be able to recive the signal. just as an analog or a digital method might be used to transmit a TV picture.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I thgought you had because of this statement here


This would seem to imply that that an electronic or mechanical construct could not be built that would manifest a self. So I perhaps misunderstood. But this statement seems to imply that a mechanical brain would not be able to manifest as self.

Manifest?? I'm not sure what you mean by manifest in this context. It could well be that I misunderstood you. What does manifest a self mean?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Manifest?? I'm not sure what you mean by manifest in this context. It could well be that I misunderstood you. What does manifest a self mean?

I think we should avoid using words like manifest that I never used. Let's stick to the terminology I employed.

 

[Dancing David]

I use manifest because that was the word I chose, in your discussion of transmission theory you are discussing a metaphor for how a brain event can potentialy effect or modify the perception of the self.

What I was asking was a different question.
If a brain is in contact(manifests) an immaterial self, then why would a machine that replicates a brain not be able to contact(manifest0 a self.

I realise that your essay does not actualy discuss what the nature of the self or why it would be 'modified' by a brain so I may be overextending the analogy.

I was just thinking that if there is an immaterial self that is in contact witha brain, then maybe there could be an immaterial self in contact with a machine brain.

 

[chance]

Interesting Ian

Again you presuppose materialism, or at least that the world is physically closed (ie physical laws describe the totality of reality including our behaviour so that our behaviour is reducible to physical laws as understood in physics).

I am only presupposing that there are valid materialistic observations of TT that could be made.

If the idea I proposed is correct it wouldn't be doing those things which we normally think of as being controlled by consciousness. I said in the essay to imagine switching a TV set on in the 17th century. You ain't going to receive any programme. Why do you not find this equally incomprehensible since there is nothing wrong with the TV set?? If you say, yeah, but it's not like a TV set, the self/brain is more like a Nintendo gameboy, then you are presupposing materialism and not acknowledging the possibility that the brain doesn't generate consciousness (rather than "filter" consciousness).

I understand the concept, what I was asking was your opinion on how such a ‘created from scratch electronic mind’ would function after power is applied.
You replied with, “it wouldn't be doing those things which we normally think of as being controlled by consciousness” from this I could assume, automated functions like breathing would be functioning, while using a spoon to eat with would not? Correct so far?
The analogy with the TV is a little confusing with this comment “You ain't going to receive any programme”. So the body and mind are functioning but there is no program, but what exactly is ‘no program’ do I assume that the artificial person is in a coma? What is the brain doing (or not doing) to the stimuli that must obviously be streaming in from the working senses.

You and David need to read my essay more carefully because once you've understood it you'll find the answers to your questions. I'm unable to explain it in a more simple way than I have already done, so if you're genuinely unable to understand it then you'll just have to forget about it.

My comprehension of your essay is just fine, the purpose of discussion is to clear up a misunderstandings. One cannot always understand by reading and re-reading. As you posted in the ‘critical thinking’ forum, I am exploring your essay to see if TT will be internally consistent, and to ensure I understand your point of view, as you are the author only you can confirm if my understanding is correct or not.

What I find absolutely astounding is peoples position that it simply is not possible that the brain does not generate consciousness.

Absolutely incredible.

Who’s says it does not? But if TT is true then there should be some consequence, yes? E.g. The brain generating the self is an interesting quote from your essay, at what point does this start to happen?, is it incremental with growth? Something must kick-start the process of generating a self, else the fully created electronic brain could do the same.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Interesting Ian

quote:
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Again you presuppose materialism, or at least that the world is physically closed (ie physical laws describe the totality of reality including our behaviour so that our behaviour is reducible to physical laws as understood in physics).
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I am only presupposing that there are valid materialistic observations of TT that could be made.

I have no idea what you are talking about. I am not talking about materialism or whether consciousness has its source in the brain. I am simply not addressing that question at all, and I explicitly state so a couple of times in my essay.

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If the idea I proposed is correct it wouldn't be doing those things which we normally think of as being controlled by consciousness. I said in the essay to imagine switching a TV set on in the 17th century. You ain't going to receive any programme. Why do you not find this equally incomprehensible since there is nothing wrong with the TV set?? If you say, yeah, but it's not like a TV set, the self/brain is more like a Nintendo gameboy, then you are presupposing materialism and not acknowledging the possibility that the brain doesn't generate consciousness (rather than "filter" consciousness).
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I understand the concept, what I was asking was your opinion on how such a ‘created from scratch electronic mind’ would function after power is applied.

It wouldn't work because there is no self. At least it wouldn't be able to do those things the self does.

You replied with, “it wouldn't be doing those things which we normally think of as being controlled by consciousness” from this I could assume, automated functions like breathing would be functioning, while using a spoon to eat with would not? Correct so far?

I really have no idea. Is there any purpose to this??

The analogy with the TV is a little confusing with this comment “You ain't going to receive any programme”. So the body and mind are functioning but there is no program, but what exactly is ‘no program’ do I assume that the artificial person is in a coma? What is the brain doing (or not doing) to the stimuli that must obviously be streaming in from the working senses.

Will you please reread my essay, and this time try to understand it?? How the hell can there be a mind without a self??

If there is no self acting through a body then normally you'd have a corpse. You can't have a mind without a self. That's like saying you can get a TV picture even though no TV programmes are being transmitted!

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You and David need to read my essay more carefully because once you've understood it you'll find the answers to your questions. I'm unable to explain it in a more simple way than I have already done, so if you're genuinely unable to understand it then you'll just have to forget about it.
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My comprehension of your essay is just fine,

Your posts suggest otherwise.

the purpose of discussion is to clear up a misunderstandings. One cannot always understand by reading and re-reading. As you posted in the ‘critical thinking’ forum, I am exploring your essay to see if TT will be internally consistent, and to ensure I understand your point of view, as you are the author only you can confirm if my understanding is correct or not.

No it isn't. Doesn't seem to me you've understood anything about the TV set analogy. Indeed I'm beginning to despair that any skeptic can. So much for their astounding intelligence

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What I find absolutely astounding is peoples position that it simply is not possible that the brain does not generate consciousness.

Absolutely incredible.
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Who’s says it does not?

It is implicit in your posts.

But if TT is true then there should be some consequence, yes? E.g. The brain generating the self is an interesting quote from your essay, at what point does this start to happen?, is it incremental with growth? Something must kick-start the process of generating a self, else the fully created electronic brain could do the same.

{sighs}
If transmission theory is true then the brain does not generate the self.

 

[Dancing David]

Posted by Interesting Ian

If transmission theory is true then the brain does not generate the self.

Which is why I asked my question, why would a self choose to associate with an organic machine and not a man made one?

I too read your essay just fine, you didn't address the question or the nature of the self, so it may be outside the scope of the essay.

Aren't you presupposing that a self would not associate with a man made machine?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Here is someone who agrees with me.

The orthodox materialist view seeks support in contemporary brain research
which identifies the specific areas of the brain activated when certain mental
events take place, inferring from this that the areas concerned are therefore
responsible for creating these events. However, this inference is
unwarranted. We can as readily argue that instead of creating these mental
events, the areas concerned are activated by them, i.e. they are activated by a
non-physical mind working through a physical brain. Instead of being the
force generating our mental life and controlling the body, the brain is may
thus be the connecting principle between the non-physical mind and the
physical body (the analogy of the television set, which receives signals from
elsewhere and converts them into pictures on the screen, is sometimes used
to clarify this view of the brain’s role). This view of brain as the receiver
rather than the initiator of mental events is not disproven by the findings that
when the brain is damaged, mental impairment takes place. Mind cannot act
as readily through a damaged brain as it can through one that is whole, just
as signals cannot be properly received by damaged televisions set, and a
damaged car cannot obey the wishes of a driver.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Which is why I asked my question, why would a self choose to associate with an organic machine and not a man made one?

I too read your essay just fine, you didn't address the question or the nature of the self, so it may be outside the scope of the essay.

Aren't you presupposing that a self would not associate with a man made machine?

You would need to create something that is functionally equivalent to a brain. So in a thousand years that might be possible.

But then we know nothing about why a self operates through a particular brain. Why is my self operating through my brain rather than anyone else's? Why was I born when I was? Lots of questions, very few answers.

 

[chance]

Interesting Ian

chance> I am only presupposing that there are valid materialistic observations of TT that could be made.

I have no idea what you are talking about. I am not talking about materialism or whether consciousness has its source in the brain. I am simply not addressing that question at all, and I explicitly state so a couple of times in my essay.

You are missing the point, either TT relies on observations in the materialist world, else how could one conclude such a thing a TT exist, (you operate and function in a material world, even if the mind operates with a percentage of TT), do you have any particular insight into the reality of TT, if so how have you concluded it’s validity?. If no observations are possible then TT must be relegated to a ‘what if’ philosophy, and have no more validity than any number of ‘what ifs.
quote:

chance> I understand the concept, what I was asking was your opinion on how such a ‘created from scratch electronic mind’ would function after power is applied.

It wouldn't work because there is no self. At least it wouldn't be able to do those things the self does.

Can you define what aspects the self does control? By stating “It would not work” is a bit vague.

chance> You replied with, “it wouldn't be doing those things which we normally think of as being controlled by consciousness” from this I could assume, automated functions like breathing would be functioning, while using a spoon to eat with would not? Correct so far?

I really have no idea. Is there any purpose to this??

Just applying some critical thought to TT, to see if it withstands criticism, at a minimum it should be logically consistent, yes?

chance> The analogy with the TV is a little confusing with this comment “You ain't going to receive any programme”. So the body and mind are functioning but there is no program, but what exactly is ‘no program’ do I assume that the artificial person is in a coma? What is the brain doing (or not doing) to the stimuli that must obviously be streaming in from the working senses.

Will you please reread my essay, and this time try to understand it?? How the hell can there be a mind without a self??

If there is no self acting through a body then normally you'd have a corpse. You can't have a mind without a self. That's like saying you can get a TV picture even though no TV programmes are being transmitted!

How about attempting to answer the question, is the artificial brain processing the information at all (with no self /mind)? Or do you propose there will be no life at all when power is applied?

interesting ian> You and David need to read my essay more carefully because once you've understood it you'll find the answers to your questions. I'm unable to explain it in a more simple way than I have already done, so if you're genuinely unable to understand it then you'll just have to forget about it.

chance> My comprehension of your essay is just fine,

interesting ian> Your posts suggest otherwise.

Then you are confusing ‘my comprehension’ with ‘your intent’. Or are you under the misapprehension that continual re-reading will impart understanding? Dialogue is the method to impart understanding (for complex subjects) else why would we need teachers?

chance> the purpose of discussion is to clear up a misunderstandings. One cannot always understand by reading and re-reading. As you posted in the ‘critical thinking’ forum, I am exploring your essay to see if TT will be internally consistent, and to ensure I understand your point of view, as you are the author only you can confirm if my understanding is correct or not.

No it isn't. Doesn't seem to me you've understood anything about the TV set analogy. Indeed I'm beginning to despair that any skeptic can. So much for their astounding intelligence

ludicrous, you put pen to paper and the world understands, so much for the teaching profession eh! I’m begging to suspect that you cannot defend your own point of view.

interesting ian > What I find absolutely astounding is peoples position that it simply is not possible that the brain does not generate consciousness. Absolutely incredible.

chance> Who’s says it does not?

It is implicit in your posts.

Is this a problem for you, would you be so wounded if I suspect you are less than sincere in a willingness to explain TT to me?

chance> But if TT is true then there should be some consequence, yes? E.g. The brain generating the self is an interesting quote from your essay, at what point does this start to happen?, is it incremental with growth? Something must kick-start the process of generating a self, else the fully created electronic brain could do the same.

interesting ian>{sighs}
If transmission theory is true then the brain does not generate the self.

then whence does a self come from, are you proposing the brain allows expression of the self (not material) into the material world? Do you propose this holds true for other animals as well?

 

[Peskanov]

Ian, while I liked your text, I think two areas of science should be mentioned in the "case for" section: neuroscience and theory of evolution. I feel both are highly relevant in the view of man as machine.

Neuroscience works in formal models of the brain; if they succeed in correctly mapping the whole brain, definitely discarding any external source of information in the system, the transmision theory and strong dualism would be invalidated. The ongoing successes of neuroscience create a strong force behind the "man as machine" view.

The theory of evolution matters here because it refers to creation of machines. The simple, determistic rules of evolution explain how can machines evolve to grow in complexity. Most of the questions related to our possible mechanic nature are tentatively answered using the theory of evolution. Without it, the case would be certainly weaker.

 

[Interesting Ian]

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chance> I am only presupposing that there are valid materialistic observations of TT that could be made.
quote:
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I have no idea what you are talking about. I am not talking about materialism or whether consciousness has its source in the brain. I am simply not addressing that question at all, and I explicitly state so a couple of times in my essay.

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You are missing the point, either TT relies on observations in the materialist world, else how could one conclude such a thing a TT exist, (you operate and function in a material world, even if the mind operates with a percentage of TT), do you have any particular insight into the reality of TT, if so how have you concluded it’s validity?. If no observations are possible then TT must be relegated to a ‘what if’ philosophy, and have no more validity than any number of ‘what ifs.

If you have a point to all this then it totally elludes me. And theories of mind/consciousness do not simply rely upon "observations in the material world"!

At the moment in my arguments it's a "what if" "philosophy", sure. Indeed no more or less than a materialist hypothesis is. Again, I repeat for the umpteenth time that it was not my intention to argue for TT in my essay, that comes in the next. At this time I was simply arguing that it was a viable alternative. Either you agree with me on this or you don't. If you don't then spell out the error in my reasoning.

Unless you address this question then I won't be responding to you again because you're not saying anything of the remotest relevance and you are seemingly incapable of understanding anything.

It was not my intention in posting my essay to discuss it with idiots who are incapable of comprehending it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, while I liked your text, I think two areas of science should be mentioned in the "case for" section: neuroscience and theory of evolution. I feel both are highly relevant in the view of man as machine.

Neuroscience works in formal models of the brain; if they succeed in correctly mapping the whole brain, definitely discarding any external source of information in the system, the transmision theory and strong dualism would be invalidated. The ongoing successes of neuroscience create a strong force behind the "man as machine" view.

Neuroscience would have to be in principle reducable to physics. Otherwise how do we know the neural correlates of consciousness are not responding to conscious states and intentions rather than conscious states and intentions following neural activity? And I have addressed the issue about the world being able to be physically described, and the fact that the brain should be considered to be no different in kind from any other physical object.

The theory of evolution matters here because it refers to creation of machines. The simple, determistic rules of evolution explain how can machines evolve to grow in complexity. Most of the questions related to our possible mechanic nature are tentatively answered using the theory of evolution. Without it, the case would be certainly weaker.

At most it provides an explanation for our behaviour. I do not believe it has any direct bearing on whether we are machines over and above what I already have said.

 

[Darri]

At most [evolution] provides an explanation for our behaviour. I do not believe it has any direct bearing on whether we are machines over and above what I already have said.

This would seem to imply that you'd consider single celled lifeforms (and even viruses) as somehow non-mechanical, otherwise you'd have to explain the emergence of the non-mechanical aspects of our minds through evolution, giving that process a somewhat direct bearing on whether we are (still) machines.

 

[chance]

interesting ian

You are missing the point, either TT relies on observations in the materialist world, else how could one conclude such a thing a TT exist, (you operate and function in a material world, even if the mind operates with a percentage of TT), do you have any particular insight into the reality of TT, if so how have you concluded it’s validity?. If no observations are possible then TT must be relegated to a ‘what if’ philosophy, and have no more validity than any number of ‘what ifs.

interesting ian> If you have a point to all this then it totally elludes me. And theories of mind/consciousness do not simply rely upon "observations in the material world"!

At the moment in my arguments it's a "what if" "philosophy", sure. Indeed no more or less than a materialist hypothesis is. Again, I repeat for the umpteenth time that it was not my intention to argue for TT in my essay, that comes in the next. At this time I was simply arguing that it was a viable alternative. Either you agree with me on this or you don't. If you don't then spell out the error in my reasoning.

Seems to me the point has not eluded you at all, and you have cleared this point up nicely, thanks. I think it’s a viable explanation insofar as It may not be able to be disproved (an important point). As an analogy consider electrical current flow within a circuit – it does not matter if you explain current flow using + to – flow, or – to + flow, each theory works as well (not strictly true), however, only one can be right.

interesting ian> Unless you address this question then I won't be responding to you again because you're not saying anything of the remotest relevance and you are seemingly incapable of understanding anything.

No one is twisting your arm to respond to me, it’s entirely your own choice.

interesting ian> It was not my intention in posting my essay to discuss it with idiots who are incapable of comprehending it.

An unfounded assumption, If I (or anyone else) disagrees with you that does not make me (or them) an idiot, it does however reflect upon your posting intent into a critical thinking forum, (hint – use a dictionary look up ‘forum’).

 

[DrMatt]

I'd like to point out that the image of the dichotomy between mechanism and free will is hard to maintain when you consider such mechanisms as weather--or the orbits in star clusters--or the actions of nerve cells. The image hinges, first and foremost, upon the equation of mechanism with ease of prediction of outcome (e.g. comparing the range of action of an iBot with the behavior of your lover), but even as mechanical things as the rotational axes of planets undergo complex variation in response to the gravity of the sun and other planets and to the occasional collision in space.
The universe is outrageously complex, and we haven't yet found a good justification for supposing that our introspective feelings of "free will" are anything other than what it feels like to be our particular kind of organism.

 

[Peter Soderqvist]

Ian, while I liked your text, I think two areas of science should be mentioned in the "case for" section: neuroscience and theory of evolution. I feel both are highly relevant in the view of man as machine.

Neuroscience works in formal models of the brain; if they succeed in correctly mapping the whole brain, definitely discarding any external source of information in the system, the transmision theory and strong dualism would be invalidated. The ongoing successes of neuroscience create a strong force behind the "man as machine" view.

The theory of evolution matters here because it refers to creation of machines. The simple, determistic rules of evolution explain how can machines evolve to grow in complexity. Most of the questions related to our possible mechanic nature are tentatively answered using the theory of evolution. Without it, the case would be certainly weaker.

Soderqvist1: you have not defined what you mean with "man as a machine"?
But I assume that you implicitly mean the computational theory of mind! If so Steven Rose, and Susan Greenfield don't agree with you! You have also mentioned the theory of evolution, I have just completed my readings of the evolutionary psychologist Stephen Pinker 's book How The Mind Works, and he agrees with you, but note that he is a psychologist, not a neuroscientists! Steven Rose is a distinguished laboratory scientist with memory as his expertise, he is well renowned for his experiments on memory in animals, and he has said in his book (I am on page 150), Making of Memory, from molecules to mind; that computer memory and neuronal memory is not analogous! " A bit is a bit", but a neuron is a changing growing unit with axons changing synaptic contact all the time! Susan Greenfield has said something similar in his book The Human Brain! This is an interview with her I think you should read!

Neuroscientist Professor Susan Greenfield is the first woman director of the prestigious 200 year old Royal Institution of Great Britain. She leads a team dedicated to finding out how the brain works and whose latest work has been to look at the connection between Parkinson's and Alzheimer's disease.

Greenfield: would just like to indicate why biological brains are currently not like current artificial systems. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ss/stories/s137294.htm

Soderqvist1: There is simple way to show that the computational theory of mind is incomplete! Kurt Gödel took the whole logical language of Principia Mathematica and translated it into numbers, and he took Epimenides paradox (this statement is not truth) from Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and changed the last word "truth" to "provable". And made his incompletes theorem from this sentence, and "so showed" David Hilbert that this theorem (this statement is not provable) in numbers is the evidence that mathematics is incomplete because the theorem has proven something which cannot be proven because the statement has said it is not provable, and so the theorem is inconsistent! We end up in paradoxes both ways, but we can see that the statement is truth but we have no computational procedure to show it, because mathematics is too weak top prove its own consistency! And for the same reason a Turing Machine cannot simulate the human cognitive state of truth, but unprovable!

In the abstract universe of cakes there is a Gödel cake nobody knows how to bake, and its name is un-bake-able! The sound wave which bombarding my eardrum is not the beautiful music I feel, because beautiful have no wavelengths, nor does it have any objective existence because my neighbor hate it, so I am wondering about how can such rigorous discipline as science of physics probe such an ambiguous entity known as human Qualia?

 

[Robin]

Soderqvist1: There is simple way to show that the computational theory of mind is incomplete! Kurt Gödel took the whole logical language of Principia Mathematica and translated it into numbers, and he took Epimenides paradox (this statement is not truth) from Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and changed the last word "truth" to "provable". And made his incompletes theorem from this sentence, and "so showed" David Hilbert that this theorem (this statement is not provable) in numbers is the evidence that mathematics is incomplete because the theorem has proven something which cannot be proven because the statement has said it is not provable, and so the theorem is inconsistent! We end up in paradoxes both ways, but we can see that the statement is truth but we have no computational procedure to show it, because mathematics is too weak top prove its own consistency! And for the same reason a Turing Machine cannot simulate the human cognitive state of truth, but unprovable!

(my emphasis)

A Turing machine (probably) cannot simulate any human cognitive state simply because it is an algorithmic instrument and the human brain is not algorithmic (my reference is the Susan Greenfield article you cited). It has nothing to to with Godel!

A Turing machine cannot simulate the weather either (at least not with any accuracy).

And just because the human mind might be a complex and subtle machine does not mean that it is not a machine. There is no rule that says machines have to work with bits.

 

[Peter Soderqvist]

TO ROBIN

You wrote on page 2, 07-16-2004 02:48 AM: (my emphasis)
A Turing machine (probably) cannot simulate any human cognitive state simply because it is an algorithmic instrument and the human brain is not algorithmic (my reference is the Susan Greenfield article you cited).

Soderqvist1: I agree!

It has nothing to with Godel!

Soderqvist1: what do you mean? Can you describe why so?

A Turing machine cannot simulate the weather either (at least not with any accuracy).

Soderqvist: wrong!
The weather is a nonlinear chaotic phenomenon unpredictable from a human point of view. Our abilities to predict weather is very limited because of its chaotic nature expand exponentially in our equations, and so we end up bogged down in our calculations! But the phenomenon in question is in principle computationally tractable, because exponential growth generates computable numbers!

And just because the human mind might be a complex and subtle machine does not mean that it is not a machine. There is no rule that says machines have to work with bits.

Soderqvist1: it must, because a Turing machine works with bits and can compute every possible physical state, except undecidable propositions, and uncomputable numbers etc, which are abstract phenomena, according to the Turing-Church principle!

I will be back at Monday!

Best regards!

 

[The Cats Venm]

Ian,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but essentially all your essay is saying is:

The 'as machine' view assumes A(the brain) causes B(the self).
This assumption is flawed because there could be a C(I'm not sure what to call it?) that causes B filtered through A

Eveything else you plan to show in your other (was it 10?) essays.

Is that the jist of it?