No, not necessarily 'argue' for. But you should be required to show
something. "We don't know", by definition is not anything. It can't be God. Hence the disagreement with this:
I'm saying that we can't call "we don't know" not-God [full stop]
Calling "we don't know" God, falls into the not-even-wrong category. And it is utterly ridiculous, when this is waved at an atheist as if it meant anything.
Not having a clue, is not having a clue. Making the statement "God exists" says something else. You cannot have both at the same time.
Ah, OK, yes with that I agree fully. That is why I tried to make the distinction -- I agree that it is silly to call "I don't know" god. In fact that is what I stated plainly beforehand I thought.
Do you think I am saying that god exists? I have no idea why anyone would think that based on what I have said. The only thing I have argued is that we can't say successfully that we know that gods don't exist. I think we can say, quite successfully, that we know that certain types of gods don't exist, but I don't think we can say that all gods don't exist [full stop].
Let me see if I can lay this out in precise fashion.....
We know, for absolute certain, only a very few things. One thing that we know for certain is that something that thinks exists. So, existence is a given for all the rest that follows. Existence = some kind of substance. It is possible that there is one substance and also possible that there are multiple substances.
When we speak of two or more substances, though, we run into a serious problem because what defines a substance is that things of that type (made of that substance) can interact with one another. Science basically boils down to examining how things interact with the interactions carried out by mechanisms that we can identify or infer. By definition a second substance could not interact through a mechanism because if it could we would know that it was not actually a second substance but some unknown form of the first substance.
Since we know that some things exist, let's start with a simple example. Rocks exist. But there is no rock particle that is responsible for rockiness. Rocks are made of atoms, made of quarks, etc.
Whatever the most fundamental level is we cannot get to -- I still think the easiest argument is the language one. We define things and concepts in terms of other things and concepts. When we get to the most fundamental level (let's say whatever is responsible for vibrating strings and space-time), there is nothing against which we can compare and contrast it because it is, literally, everything.
Three different substances have been proposed as the ultimate substance historically (actually four, so I'll throw that in as well) -- matter, mind, and neutral (with the apeiron thrown in as a bonus). Matter has been viewed as water, as air, as fire, as atoms, etc.
Whatever the ultimate substance is the world is going to look exactly the same to us, and we will always be left with the same philosophical issues (do humans have free will?, etc.) with no solution being different depending on which substance.
Since we can't know what the ultimate substance is, we can't know what the ultimate substance isn't. It could be any of the three, or four options. It is also logically possible, supposedly, that substance dualism is correct (I have my doubts about the logical possibility, though). I suppose there might be other options here, but I haven't heard any; these seem to be the simplest possibilities that we have to deal with and simplest is preferable.
So, it is supposedly logically possible that god exists since god can be defined as the mind of idealism, some form of the mental bits of neutral monism, or as being the second substance in substance dualism. There is no way to prove that any of these possibilities is correct; it is impossible to prove the existence of god. No one can claim, through this sort of analysis, to claim to know that god exists. Likewise we cannot claim to know that god's don't exist.
My own personal take on this is basically Belz's: we should stop where we have knowledge -- at 'what things do'. I cannot, therefore, tell a theist that it is impossible for god to exist because I cannot rule out the possibility of idealism. I think we can make an excellent argument against the supernatural and substance dualism, however; I don't see a way for anyone to support rationally that view of existence.