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Are Agnostics Welcome Here?

The definition of monism is belief in one single substance which can be material, mental or neutral.
Yes, you're right, I stand corrected. :)

That is simply wrong, again. Theists think of God as the creator of all that is. There is a clear difference in their mind between god and not-god. Some think that god performs all actions in the universe. There is a clear difference between god and not-god.

You are completely misrepresenting what I have presented. I know that isn't you. Please take a step back and look at what has actually been argued.


ETA: Besides, Piggy, what you are arguing is that, for a given definition of God, god(s) don't exist. Do you really want to make such a weak argument? Anyone can say that for a given definition of god that god doesn't exist if you want to stack the deck. The reason arguments arise is because your presentation does not cover all definitions of god, even those in the distant past.
I didn't realize that arguments against a god concept had to be universal, covering all gods logical and illogical, reasonable and unreasonable, perceptible and imperceptible.
 
If you worship something which you sincerely believe is outside our spacetime and is utterly incomprehensible, you've managed to ignore a contradiction -- you supposedly believe in something you couldn't possibly have even heard of.

But that is clearly wrong. The idea of worship there is not based in any of this beings characteristics as a being, but in Being itself. As in "I'm so thankful that I exist and give thanks to the author of existence." That idea is not something that one could not possibly have heard of.


It can be very difficult to spot the error, because of how our brains work. The term "god" has built up a dense network of associations over the years -- much denser than, say, most people's networks around "velocipede" -- so when we use it, it's got a certain heft to it, a thinginess.


I disagree with this as well. The dense network of associations does not give a concept 'thinginess' unless you can provide for me good psychological evidence that such is the case. What it does is provide a network of different connotations that make it difficult for us to arrive at a single definition for a word. That is why Wittgenstein used the concept of family resemblance for words like this. We don't have a network of connotations surrounding an F-16. We don't argue over the definition of that but it is covered in 'thinginess'.


Similarly, if you propose that a god created the universe, it adds no weight to the argument for that god's existence. Instead, you have to tell me who this god is which you're claiming might have done this, and then we can search our world to see if it's real.

But boy, when you say it, the deistic claim sure sounds like it's a zinger.

That's because of the heft that your brain gave to the word "god" on its own, which makes it difficult to perceive when the term is being used in a way that's actually entirely undefined.

Again, I disagree. Proposing that a god could have created the world indicates that a god could have created the world. It's not because of the heft in the word god. It's all based in the argument itself.


There's the god people expect to meet in the afterlife, the kind of god that saves kids from fires, who makes tumors go away, who hears prayer and sends comfort, punishes people with floods, and that sort of thing.

Or there's the god that's beyond everything.

One's not there, and the other's not anything.


Neither are there. The second is not anything. It's just inconsequential as far as our lives are concerned.
 
Yes, you're right, I stand corrected. :)

No problem


I didn't realize that arguments against a god concept had to be universal, covering all gods logical and illogical, reasonable and unreasonable, perceptible and imperceptible.


They don't, but Piggy is proposing a universal argument against gods. I am trying to point out that all such arguments fall short when it comes to absolute denial of the gods' existence since they are still possible. The possibilities mostly fall into the inconsequential camp as far as I can see though. That is why all I have suggested is an amendment to what he has argued and slight toning down of 'no possible gods'.
 
Sure it is from a theist's perspective. All we can do is look at what occurs in the world and describe it. We can't tell its ultimate meaning, its ultimate origin. The most parsimonious explanation is always that it's just one substance, one thing behind it all. But that is not the only explanation. You asked for what difference this god makes vs no god. And the answer from a theist's perspective and for sake of argument is that there is no universe or a chaotic universe without god and an ordered one with god.

As to "it controls the laws of physics", its actions are what we describe as the laws of physics.

You may say we don't need a god to explain any of this, but how do you know this? We argue it on the basis of parsimony, and I think that is a very strong argument. But it doesn't tell me that a god is not possible. Since we can't access basic ontology there is no way to prove things one way or the other.
Here we get down to the real problem -- yet again, we can say that a god is not possible. You first have to posit something that has some kind of reality or substance in order to say whether or not it's possible as far as we can understand. If you continue to claim something exists but cannot explain how this something exists, or where it exists, by what mechanisms it exists, then it's simply nonsensical. You can dream up all kinds of things and say that they could possibly exist but for it to be taken seriously, you would then need to make some sort of plausible, rational explanation for how it can exist given what we understand about science.
 
Nonsense, I have defined god and if you look back to the origins of the mythological god its definition is essentially the same as my definition.
No, you haven't defined anything rationally as I've pointed out to you specifically several times.


ie the physical aspect(materialism), it caused or was the precursor to the known world or universe.

In the subjective aspect(idealism), it chose(with intention) what the known world or known universe is and does.

All god concepts are in essence intelligent manipulators of the stuff of existence.

Please provide proof that there aren't any of these?
Please provide evidence that they are any of these. Without any rational basis or proposal for the mechanisms by which this god concept could have the attributes of creator or even existence, then it's simply nonsensical.

How do you think things like quarks or dark matter are thought to exist in the first place? Certainly not by some mystic sitting in a cave somewhere, dreaming his drug-addled dreams or believing that seizing brain activity is really a doorway into a fundamental truth of... life, reality, humanity, whatever... fill in the blank with the meme du jour.
 
They don't, but Piggy is proposing a universal argument against gods. I am trying to point out that all such arguments fall short when it comes to absolute denial of the gods' existence since they are still possible. The possibilities mostly fall into the inconsequential camp as far as I can see though. That is why all I have suggested is an amendment to what he has argued and slight toning down of 'no possible gods'.
Okay, can you explain a bit more about your first and second sentences? I'm just not seeming to get it. Do you have an example of what you are thinking may fall outside of his universal argument?
 
They don't, but Piggy is proposing a universal argument against gods. I am trying to point out that all such arguments fall short when it comes to absolute denial of the gods' existence since they are still possible. The possibilities mostly fall into the inconsequential camp as far as I can see though. That is why all I have suggested is an amendment to what he has argued and slight toning down of 'no possible gods'.

All that is no more than a semantic point. At the very best. Defining (or 'defining') God into existence is not the problem. Rejecting these definitions (or 'definitions') is easy too.
 
Here we get down to the real problem -- yet again, we can say that a god is not possible. You first have to posit something that has some kind of reality or substance in order to say whether or not it's possible as far as we can understand. If you continue to claim something exists but cannot explain how this something exists, or where it exists, by what mechanisms it exists, then it's simply nonsensical. You can dream up all kinds of things and say that they could possibly exist but for it to be taken seriously, you would then need to make some sort of plausible, rational explanation for how it can exist given what we understand about science.

That's where the irrationality I mentioned to you earlier comes into play for theists.

This god is spiritual. It isn't made of matter so words like structure, mechanism, etc. do not pertain. It affects the universe by means of magic.

I think it is an open matter whether or not we can reject such gods on logical grounds. I think there might be a way to do it, but I haven't worked that idea out completely. The usual explanation is that such a god is logically possible, so you cannot prove that it doesn't exist. I think we need to look more closely at this whole idea of logical possibility, though.

I reject such gods out of hand because they depend on substance dualism and hence magic. As I mentioned above, though, I am interested in whether or not we can prove them wrong on logical grounds.

For now, it is still logically possible that such a god exists. It is also possible that idealism is correct and everything is just thoughts in the mind of god. There is no way to disprove that possibility, but I still don't see what difference it makes to anyone.
 
All that is no more than a semantic point. At the very best. Defining (or 'defining') God into existence is not the problem. Rejecting these definitions (or 'definitions') is easy too.

Rejecting in what sense? I think it is somewhat difficult to say that we know that all such possible gods don't exist. I don't think it is difficult to reject them, though, if that is what you mean because the solutions offered are generally not relevant to anyone.
 
Okay, can you explain a bit more about your first and second sentences? I'm just not seeming to get it. Do you have an example of what you are thinking may fall outside of his universal argument?


Let's first assume monism. All we can do is see what happens in the world and model it. That is what science does -- provide explanations that help predict what will happen next. Science can't tell us what the ultimate nature of what we see actually is, however. We could be dealing with materialism. It could be idealism, which means there is a god and we are thoughts in god's mind. It could be neutral monism, but I think that is just dualism in a dress so I don't think it is worth discussing.

Next let's assume substance dualism. We can still only see what occurs in the world and model it. It might be the case that there is a god, composed of a different substance, behind the world determining what happens. Since all we can see is what occurs in the world, just as we cannot determine that the ultimate nature of what is is actually material or mental or neutral, we also cannot tell if we exist in a universe based in substance dualism ruled by such a god.

I reject substance dualism because it is not parsimonious and relies on magic, but I don't see how to reject it on purely logical grounds.
 
Rejecting in what sense? I think it is somewhat difficult to say that we know that all such possible gods don't exist. I don't think it is difficult to reject them, though, if that is what you mean because the solutions offered are generally not relevant to anyone.

I was talking about definitions. What is and what exists has little to nothing to do with it.
 
I was talking about definitions. What is and what exists has little to nothing to do with it.

Then in terms of definitions? I can easily see rejecting many because they lead to inconsequential god ideas. Some I have problems proving that they can't possibly exist. Agreed that there is no sense in discussing the actual existence of gods.
 
Then in terms of definitions? I can easily see rejecting many because they lead to inconsequential god ideas. Some I have problems proving that they can't possibly exist. Agreed that there is no sense in discussing the actual existence of gods.

Putting to one side whether they are technically gods that can't possibly exist or not what possible reason would we have for entertaining these concepts?

They are one of an infinite number of 'made up things I can call God' which also includes God being a mystical fried egg from the future and God being an echo of my toenails in time.

Whatever made-up concept of God you come up with it's just as likely that God is that same thing but with the words 'I love Bramley apples' tatooed on its forehead.

And yet from this infinite number of possibilities which can all be different in an infinite number of ways 'you' just happened to pick the right one? The probability of that is zero.
 
Putting to one side whether they are technically gods that can't possibly exist or not what possible reason would we have for entertaining these concepts?

They are one of an infinite number of 'made up things I can call God' which also includes God being a mystical fried egg from the future and God being an echo of my toenails in time.

Whatever made-up concept of God you come up with it's just as likely that God is that same thing but with the words 'I love Bramley apples' tatooed on its forehead.

And yet from this infinite number of possibilities which can all be different in an infinite number of ways 'you' just happened to pick the right one? The probability of that is zero.


The traditional positive reason for exploring god concepts is to explain being. Whether gods are needed is an open question that I think has been answered successfully "no". But that doesn't mean that I think arguments against possible gods actually work (arguments against the mythological ones are very good).

My primary reason for doing so today is that I'm waiting for the Texas game to start. Both Bergeron and Malcolm Brown are hurt, so the Longhorns chances are slim against RGIII and his mighty arm.
 
The traditional positive reason for exploring god concepts is to explain being.

Well, you won't get very far explaining being via something that you can't possibly know anything about by definition. Which just takes us back to Piggy's position that an unknowable God-thing is just a non-answer.

Seriously, if the question is how did the universe come into being then the answer is 'we don't know fully' If you want to call 'we don't know' God then how is that helping anything? If anything it's only making matters worse because there are millions of people who understand God to mean something totally different.

In any case, you didn't actually answer my question which was why should we give any specific definition of God any thought if its based on nothing?
 
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Rejecting in what sense? I think it is somewhat difficult to say that we know that all such possible gods don't exist. I don't think it is difficult to reject them, though, if that is what you mean because the solutions offered are generally not relevant to anyone.
We can say that all such possible gods don't exist because of the word 'possible.' This is where the argument fails, every time. That's why I've been saying that there must be a plausible, rational explanation -- it's the inherent requirement of the word.


Let's first assume monism. All we can do is see what happens in the world and model it. That is what science does -- provide explanations that help predict what will happen next. Science can't tell us what the ultimate nature of what we see actually is, however.
Neither can god-concepts.


Next let's assume substance dualism. We can still only see what occurs in the world and model it. It might be the case that there is a god, composed of a different substance, behind the world determining what happens. Since all we can see is what occurs in the world, just as we cannot determine that the ultimate nature of what is is actually material or mental or neutral, we also cannot tell if we exist in a universe based in substance dualism ruled by such a god.

I reject substance dualism because it is not parsimonious and relies on magic, but I don't see how to reject it on purely logical grounds.
It seems to me that the argument that believing something with no evidence is illogical. Since there is no evidence of (properly and rationally defined) gods, then it's not logical to believe in them.


The traditional positive reason for exploring god concepts is to explain being. Whether gods are needed is an open question that I think has been answered successfully "no". But that doesn't mean that I think arguments against possible gods actually work (arguments against the mythological ones are very good).

My primary reason for doing so today is that I'm waiting for the Texas game to start. Both Bergeron and Malcolm Brown are hurt, so the Longhorns chances are slim against RGIII and his mighty arm.
See here? This is subtle, but a common tactic that is used. In this instance, you are making a distinction between possible gods and mythological ones.

How does one make the distinction while relying on logic? I believe one cannot, and I find it amusing to see posters like punshhh and annnoid (what's with the repetitive letters, anyway?) try to defend nonsense and irrationality with sense and rationality. It's almost like they're saying, "it's logical that humans are sometimes illogical, therefore God."
 
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Well, you won't get very far explaining being via something that you can't possibly know anything about by definition. Which just takes us back to Piggy's position that an unknowable God-thing is just a non-answer.

Seriously, if the question is how did the universe come into being then the answer is 'we don't know fully' If you want to call 'we don't know' God then how is that helping anything? If anything it's only making matters worse because there are millions of people who understand God to mean something totally different.

In any case, you didn't actually answer my question which was why should we give any specific definition of God any thought if its based on nothing?


My contention is that it is not a non-answer but one that we can't know. You can call that a non-answer, but that is different from saying that god is not possible.

I'm not saying that we should call 'we don't know' God. I'm saying that we can't call "we don't know" not-God [full stop]. That's pretty much it.

The definition of god is not based on nothing, though. It is based on the mystery of being -- something we just can't answer. There isn't much to the definition of god that most people give aside from god is responsible for existence. All powerful and all knowing are generally thrown into the mix.
 
We can say that all such possible gods don't exist because of the word 'possible.' This is where the argument fails, every time. That's why I've been saying that there must be a plausible, rational explanation -- it's the inherent requirement of the word.

I assume you meant 'can't' above. Yes, as a positive proposition that gods exist I don't see a reason to accept any non-rational proposition. I have been arguing a negative here. I don't see a way to argue for the proposition of gods and end up with anything that makes sense, is worthy or worship and is consequential.



Neither can god-concepts.

Yes, right. All that a god concept can do is provide a possible ontology. No one can prove them correct. No one can prove them incorrect when the god in question is removed from examination.



It seems to me that the argument that believing something with no evidence is illogical. Since there is no evidence of (properly and rationally defined) gods, then it's not logical to believe in them.

Believing something with evidence against it is clearly illogical. We are in a very grey area, here, though, because no evidence is even possible. If people want to believe in something where there is some sort of an explanation of some sort (we know existence is a given), then I don't have that much of a problem with them. If they want to tell me that there belief is true, however, I have no reason to accept it. They can't say anything more than "I believe" in that situation. We end up in the same place but take a slightly different route.



See here? This is subtle, but a common tactic that is used. In this instance, you are making a distinction between possible gods and mythological ones.

How does one make the distinction while relying on logic? I believe one cannot, and I find it amusing to see posters like punshhh and annnoid (what's with the repetitive letters, anyway?) try to defend nonsense and irrationality with sense and rationality. It's almost like they're saying, "it's logical that humans are sometimes illogical, therefore God."


Easy. We have evidence against mythological gods because evidence is possible and available. When it comes to the issue of Being we can't have evidence, so all bets are off in a sense. We make our decision there based on what is the most logical option -- and that is monism. Monism excludes all gods except the god of idealism, but that is an entirely different sort of god.

I'm not following what the other guys are saying so I can't comment. Now the game is starting. I have to watch the Longhorns lose:( unless Manny Diaz can pull off a defensive miracle.
 
The definition of god is not based on nothing, though.

Oh it absolutely is as you have defined it as we have zero information to base a definition on and cannot have any as you have described it.

Would you entertain the notion that one of my toenails travelled in time and created the universe? Is it provably wrong by your standards?
 

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