Another Saddam Lover Criticizes the Pentagon

[Mark]

okay, so instead of actually trying to address the Generals point, your taking exception to my admittedly flippant comment.

I humbly accept your criticism, now, care to address yet another Generals concern about how the war is/was being run.

Many of us who were against this war were called "traitors, Saddam lovers, America haters, cowards," and much, much worse.

Now the same people who called us those things are insisiting on civility. Republicans; ya gotta love 'em.

Your thread title was perfectly appropriate.

 

[Ziggurat]

I've been criticised here for being too dismissive of the generals' complaints, so I'm actually going to get a little bit specific about one of them. From the article:

"When we violate the principles of war with mass and unity of command and unity of effort, we do that at our own peril." (Batiste)

When I first read this, I didn't really know what he meant, and the article doesn't explain. But from what I've gathered since, I believe he's refering to the split in authority between Bremer (a civilian) and the military efforts in Iraq. And I actually don't doubt that there were serious problems created by this split in authority, and that those problems hurt our efforts.

But the funny thing about that criticism is that it doesn't explicitly place the responsibility for it on Rumsfeld, we're just left with that impression because that's the topic of the article. And yet, the decision to split authority between the military and Bremer wasn't Rumsfeld's to make, it was Bush's. So one possibility is Rumsfeld is the whipping boy because a general's criticism of the SecDef looks more relevant than his criticism of the president - if you're a general and didn't like Bush's decision to invade Iraq, it's easier to strike back lower on the totem pole. Another possibility is if you're a journalist and a general is complaining about both Rumsfeld and Bush, you might lump all of the complaints together and aim them at Rumsfeld because concentrated fire has more effect. If either of those scenarios is true, then there's no obvious reason to think that Rumsfeld's resignation would in any way fix the problem.

 

[Ziggurat]

Many of us who were against this war were called "traitors, Saddam lovers, America haters, cowards," and much, much worse.

Now the same people who called us those things are insisiting on civility. Republicans; ya gotta love 'em.

Is this a game of who's been insulted worse? Because I've had some pretty damned hateful things said about me because of my support for the war too. I'm not going to claim aggrieved victim status, though, because the really guilty parties aren't in this thread. If you think MY calls for civility are too hypocritical because I've called you those things, then you should call me out by name, but otherwise, how other posters have mistreated you in the past doesn't have any bearing on the merits of my request here. Nor does party affiliation, something I don't think you actually know about me (I don't recall ever having stated my affiliation on this board).

 

[Crossbow]

I don't think generals, while still serving, should be in the business of making public statements, unless called before congress and specifically asked to do so (and even there, when acting in an official capacity their responsibility is to try to keep personal opinions to a minimum). Any objections they had at the time should have been voiced up the chain of command, not out in public. That's part of what civilian control of the military requires to work effectively. Had they not objected at the time within the chain of command, that would indeed have been their mistake

Had they complained vigorously within the chain of command, and been overridden, then complaining publicly afterwards (and NOT while serving) is the correct course of action. So in this regard, I don't have any objection to these generals taking a public stand now (though as indicated above, I find the objections, as presented so far, of limited use). Although I never said I had a problem with them speaking out, it's possible someone might have assumed that I did, and I want to make it explicit that I don't.

True enough!

People in the military are never supposed to publicly criticize the leadership unless ordered to do so by some higher authority. In the case of flag officers (such as generals and admirals), such an order would have to come from Congress.

However, officers are allowed to voice their criticisms within channels.
Also, officers can make their criticisms public provided that they resign their commission.

As far as I can tell, there was very little of this sort of thing happening before the war or during the war. Furthermore, the source of the criticisms now are coming from retired flag officers. Case in point, Colin Powell: who had serious doubts about the pre-war rationale for the First Gulf War and the Current Gulf War but kept those doubts largely to himself, however those doubts did not stop him from giving his full support to these wars, but after he left office, then he found the courage to make his doubts known.

As for me, I would have much more respect for these critics if they were provided when they still had a chance to prevent a flawed policy from becoming a failed policy.

 

[BryanLower]

As for me, I would have much more respect for these critics if they were provided when they still had a chance to prevent a flawed policy from becoming a failed policy.

Place yourself in this position. If you resign to criticize the policy, you risk being replaced by somebody less compitent. There are reasons why people stay in a system and try to change it from within. It may not always work... it may not *often* work.... but if you have a job as important as commanding an army, you certainly have a motivation to stay, even if you disagree with the policy you have to carry out.

 

[Crossbow]

Place yourself in this position. If you resign to criticize the policy, you risk being replaced by somebody less compitent. There are reasons why people stay in a system and try to change it from within. It may not always work... it may not *often* work.... but if you have a job as important as commanding an army, you certainly have a motivation to stay, even if you disagree with the policy you have to carry out.

Sorry, but I really do not think that is right.

If one has serious problems with the policy, then the officers (more so than anyone else) have a serious obligation to say so. Again, as far as I know, no such things have been done (with the exception of Sheenseki who was fired as a result). Although, one often sees anonymous attributions by officers who say how upset at things have been done before the war and during the war, there has been very little in the way of on the record problems and concerns.

Anyway, one of the big lessons of World War II and the Vietnam War was that commissioned officers, and to a large extent, non-commissioned officers are supposed to THINK; no one is supposed to be just a mindless robot for the person in charge that follows orders without question.

 

[Mark]

Is this a game of who's been insulted worse? Because I've had some pretty damned hateful things said about me because of my support for the war too. I'm not going to claim aggrieved victim status, though, because the really guilty parties aren't in this thread. If you think MY calls for civility are too hypocritical because I've called you those things, then you should call me out by name, but otherwise, how other posters have mistreated you in the past doesn't have any bearing on the merits of my request here. Nor does party affiliation, something I don't think you actually know about me (I don't recall ever having stated my affiliation on this board).

My, aren't we testy this morning. If I had been referring specifically to you, I assure you I would have said so. Try the decaffeinated brands.

That said, those of us who opposed this insane war at the begining were resoundingly vilified for it (including threats of physical violence). You know that's true.

 

[Ziggurat]

Again, as far as I know, no such things have been done (with the exception of Sheenseki who was fired as a result).

No. Shinseki resigned on schedule, at the end of a standard four-year term, a schedule which was established before the buildup to the Iraq war.

 

[Mark]

No. Shinseki resigned on schedule, at the end of a standard four-year term, a schedule which was established before the buildup to the Iraq war.

Turns out, he was encouraged to leave.

Or so I thought. But I wasn't aware that Shinseki had been privately challenging Rumsfeld's troop estimates for the war as far back as late 2001. Rumsfeld may have had other disputes with Shinseki as well, but the troop strength issue really was one of the reasons that Rumsfeld announced Shinseki's replacement so far ahead of time.

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_10/004888.php

 

[BryanLower]

If one has serious problems with the policy, then the officers (more so than anyone else) have a serious obligation to say so.

Don't they also have an obligation to their troops? If those two obligations conflict, I'd say it's not as easy a choice as you might think.

Again, as far as I know, no such things have been done (with the exception of Sheenseki who was fired as a result).

Shinseki wasn't technically fired. But that's neither here nor there. If the perception for a General is that criticizing the official policy is bad for your carreer, and by resigning you may leave your troops in less compitent hands, the General's obligation to his troops may outweigh his criticism of the policy.

Anyway, one of the big lessons of World War II and the Vietnam War was that commissioned officers, and to a large extent, non-commissioned officers are supposed to THINK; no one is supposed to be just a mindless robot for the person in charge that follows orders without question.

That's fine, I can entertain that point. But I would contend that a General's decision to remain at his post despite disagreements with the policy is the *result* of thought, not the absense of it. It's not an easy moral choice that they have to make. It's easy for us to say what they should have done, but it's not so easy for those who actually have to make the decision.

 

[Ziggurat]

My, aren't we testy this morning. If I had been referring specifically to you, I assure you I would have said so. Try the decaffeinated brands.

I was the only one specifically bringing up the issue of civility. And you said 'Now the same people who called us those things are insisiting on civility." (emphasis mine) If you WEREN'T talking about me, who were you talking about? If it wasn't someone in this thread, was there any point in bringing it up in a fashion which made it appear you DID mean someone in this thread? Or did you perhaps mean that you referred to me, but not "specifically" to me because you also wanted to include others? Your response has muddied the waters, not clarified things.

 

[Crossbow]

Don't they also have an obligation to their troops? If those two obligations conflict, I'd say it's not as easy a choice as you might think.


Shinseki wasn't technically fired. But that's neither here nor there. If the perception for a General is that criticizing the official policy is bad for your carreer, and by resigning you may leave your troops in less compitent hands, the General's obligation to his troops may outweigh his criticism of the policy.



That's fine, I can entertain that point. But I would contend that a General's decision to remain at his post despite disagreements with the policy is the *result* of thought, not the absense of it. It's not an easy moral choice that they have to make. It's easy for us to say what they should have done, but it's not so easy for those who actually have to make the decision.

Er, I never said that making the decision to tell your boss that he is wrong is an easy to make. However, making decisions is something that an officer is expected to do.

Also, while it is true, Shenseki was never technically fired, however ...

In semi-private, the Pentagon's civilian leadership was far more scathing. A "senior administration official" told the Village Voice newspaper that Gen Shinseki's remark was "bull**** from a Clintonite enamoured of using the army for peacekeeping and not winning wars".

http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,925140,00.html

Sorry, but I have to disagree yet again with the sucession issue you speak of. While losing key people is a pain to deal with, it can be done. After all, if a war starts and your key military people are killed, does one just give up? Of course not, one simply finds new people who can take on the job and having a good chain of command makes such things quite possible.

 

[BryanLower]

Also, while it is true, Shenseki was never technically fired, however ...

I absolutely agree. I didn't intend to imply that I disagreed with your basic point. I just wanted to make clear that he wasn't technically fired, but that technicality doesn't change the fact that Shinseki was castigated for disagreeing with Rumsfeld.

Sorry, but I have to disagree yet again with the sucession issue you speak of. While losing key people is a pain to deal with, it can be done. After all, if a war starts and your key military people are killed, does one just give up? Of course not, one simply finds new people who can take on the job and having a good chain of command makes such things quite possible.

Yes, that's correct. That is how it works. But for a General who must weigh his obligation to his troops with his disagreement with policy, I don't think this nice, neat succession helps. Morally, he's still in the same quandary.

I don't think we disagree on very much. I just don't have as much of a problem with military war critics not coming out while they're still serving, or resigning because of it. I can see their side of it, so I can't condemn them for it.

 

[BryanLower]

This doesn't really prove either point, but it does support your contention that generals should come forward sooner:

[retired Maj. Gen. Charles]Swannack also criticized the way the war was being run before he retired.

In May 2004, while still on active duty, Swannack told the Washington Post that he thought the United States was losing strategically in Iraq

Source: CNN (cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/14/iraq.rumsfeld/index.html)

If Gen. Swannack could criticize the official policy while still serving, others could have, too. Crossbow, that's definately a point on your side.

 

[jj]

So, Rumsfeld is very carefully tuning the leadership of the Army into a group that is loyal to him, is that what is happening?

Gosh, I wonder why he would want to do that?

 

[Tricky]

Even if you take that view, though, this hardly represents anything of the kind. All we're getting is the views of whatever former generals the journalist who wrote this decided to talk to AND decided to include in his piece. We have absolutely no data on how representative any of those opinions actually are - it's quite possible the journalist doesn't know, and it's also possible the journalist could have slanted the representation of the slice he did have access to. So there's not even enough information here using YOUR standards for making any kind of decision.

I didn't mean to suggest that this latest episode should have been enough to change your mind, but rather that this sort of data should have the potential to change your mind, thereby being "useful". It appeared that you were suggesting that this sort of data was not ever going to be useful, in that no amount of it would sway you. I apologize if I misconstrued.

Yet we are not talking about a poll here. We are talking about knowledgeable people standing up and taking a position on an issue/theory. Polls measure support. Informed positions by knowledgeable people create it.

But we have no idea what those numbers actually are. All we have is anecdotes.

And I submit that it is not the numbers that are under discussion here, but a real (not false) appeal to authority.

Again, not as such. It's possible every single general could think Rumsfeld did a bad job, and I wouldn't agree. Why? Because the complaint I just listed is nebulous, and what I think is important for Rumsfeld to do might not be identical to what the generals want Rumsfeld to do.

Perhaps, but you are not really in a position to comment with authority, nor am I. But I think you would agree that it is important that a commander have the trust and support of those he commands, especially the most highly placed ones. If he is unable to convince the generals that he is correct, then he should consider the possibility that he is not correct. Rumsfeld does not appear to share this opinion.

So the SUBSTANCE of the complaints matters quite a bit, and that's not going to be captured by any simplistic poll of who likes Rumsfeld and who doesn't. In fact, it's not even captured significantly within the article linked above. We've got a few sentences of complaint from these generals, but that's really not enough to even understand what in particular they really think Rumsfeld did wrong, and what the exact consequences of those mistakes were.

Well there's this:

"A lot of them are hugely frustrated," in part because Rumsfeld gave the impression that "military advice was neither required nor desired" in the planning for the Iraq war, said retired Lt. Gen. Wallace Gregson, who until last year commanded Marine forces in the Pacific Theater.

and this (from the same article):

Another retired officer, Army Maj. Gen. John Riggs, said he believes that his peer group is "a pretty closemouthed bunch" but that, even so, his sense is "everyone pretty much thinks Rumsfeld and the bunch around him should be cleared out."
He emphatically agrees, Riggs said, explaining that he believes Rumsfeld and his advisers have "made fools of themselves, and totally underestimated what would be needed for a sustained conflict."

and this:

What we are living with now is the consequences of successive policy failures. Some of the missteps include: the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, the initial denial that an insurgency was the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of the other agencies of our government to commit assets to the same degree as the Defense Department. My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions--or bury the results.

I think there's plenty of pith there to support the contention that these are not just people who "don't like Rumsfeld". I doubt that they could go into specific operations that were discussed without the possibility of being charged with treason.

Sure, IF I thought that was the right thing to do, but I haven't reached that conclusion. And this article doesn't actually help me come to that conclusion. That is what I mean by "useful".

I agree that by itself, that article is not useful enough to mold my opinion, but taken with the greater body of evidence that the war has been mishandled, it should at least reach the not-very-lofty level of "useful".

 

[Ziggurat]

Perhaps, but you are not really in a position to comment with authority, nor am I. But I think you would agree that it is important that a commander have the trust and support of those he commands, especially the most highly placed ones. If he is unable to convince the generals that he is correct, then he should consider the possibility that he is not correct. Rumsfeld does not appear to share this opinion.

"Appear" is the key word here. I have an active distrust in what the media makes things "appear" as.

But let me offer a counterpoint perspective to some of this criticism from someone who has a lot more military experience than I do:
http://iraqnow.blogspot.com/2006/03/retired-major-general-is-calling-for.html

Here's a short sampling:

"General Eaton's argument would fall apart with just a few informed questions. Yes, Shinseki did float a 400,000 troop requirement, based on some back-of-the-envelope calculations.

General Shinseki might as well have been on crack. That was never realistic, and it was never necessary. General Eaton: Where do you think we could have gotten the troops from?

The U.S. surged nearly 500,000 people into the Gulf Region in 1990-91. But that was with an Army nearly twice its current size. And that was at the tail end of the longest period of sustained economic growth in the history of the Republic to that time, which is the engine that runs the war machine. Actually, we did it with the remnants of a Cold War army that was about to be dismantled on the alter of the peace dividend. The Kuwait war was the last hurrah of the Cold War Army.

To think the Army was capable of surging that kind of manpower again is to harbor an illusion. Even if the Army could surge 400,000 soldiers into theater, what then? The insurgency would know that that force was unsustainable. And that early in the conflict, there was no way a force that large could be guided by any kind of adequate battlefield intelligence. It would have been a bull in a counterguerrilla china shop.

General Eaton would have us shoot our wad in the first 8 months of the conflict and retire exhausted from the field. Al Qaeda has no such time limitation.
...
Patton was despised by his subordinates. Until he brought victories. Stonewall Jackson was despised by his subordinates. Until he brought victories. Lee was revered by his subordinates - and lost.

The Secretary of Defense's job is not to make generals happy. It's to push them to the limit to win our nation's wars."

That's going to be the ultimate judgment of history. Rumsfeld's methods DID win over Saddam's army, and quite handily, with far fewer troops than many of these generals said was needed even for that phase. Whether or not we'll win against the insurgents and terrorists is still up in the air, but at this point it's not primarily a military question anymore.

 

[Mark]

I was the only one specifically bringing up the issue of civility. And you said 'Now the same people who called us those things are insisiting on civility." (emphasis mine) If you WEREN'T talking about me, who were you talking about? If it wasn't someone in this thread, was there any point in bringing it up in a fashion which made it appear you DID mean someone in this thread? Or did you perhaps mean that you referred to me, but not "specifically" to me because you also wanted to include others? Your response has muddied the waters, not clarified things.

Don't take offense when none was offered.

I was speaking in general...I have lately experienced former war hawks all over now demanding civility, when before they were the most offensive one could possibly get. Another variation lately is to ask me, "Why do you have to talk about politics?" When they were the most vocal at the begining of this misbegotten war.

Anyway, were you calling people cowards and traitors for not supporting Bush's war? I hereby state categorically and for the record that I have no idea. That's between you and your karma.

 

[Ziggurat]

I was speaking in general...

Thank you for that clarification, but it would have been useful to make this explicit in your original post.

 

[zakur]

Rumsfeldian response to why Bush won't fire Rumsfeld

Are there other people who could replace Rumsfeld? Sure there are. Do we know where they are? Yes, they are located in the areas north, south, east, and west of Washington.

Are a lot of things really Rumsfeld's fault? Not necessarily- you go into war with the defense secretary you have, not the one you wish you had. Who will replace Rumsfeld and how will the situation in Iraq change because of them? It's hard to know. After all there are known knowns, unknown knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.