A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Dymanic
Maybe our intrinsic visual inference engines somehow employ what has been called 'mathematical intuition'; the same property that enables us to do what a Turing Machine cannot -- to say, "this calculation will end", or, "this calculation will run on forever". Since this determination provably cannot be reached through a discrete series of steps, our brains must somehow rely on some non-logical process.

A Turing machine can say that; it just won't always be right. Same for us.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

I most certainly do use the experience of redness to infer properties of an object. Specifically the property of reflecting a specific range of wavelengths of light. I just do not naively claim that the experience of redness itself is a property of the object.
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The wavelength of light is inferred from a completely different set of experiences. You cannot infer wavelength from the experience of redness alone.

When did I ever say, or even imply, that I could make such an inference based on the experience of color alone?

If you can, you must show me because I'm bemused at your statement! Wavelength is a quantitative inference. Therefore it must have been inferred from an experience of logical and consistent relationships. Redness is not an experience that has logical relationships therefore you cannot infer the property of logical relationships from the experience of redness.

How delightfully pedantic of you. When did I claim that I ever make inferences about specific objective characteristics from individual sensory experiences, taken completely out of context, and with nor reference to other experiences?

This is silly. First you say that I do not infer objective qualities from the experience of redness, and then when I say that I do, you interpret this to mean that I infer specific objective qualities from only the experience of redness.

Allow me to reiterate, on the off-chance that you really are honestly trying to understand what I am saying, rather than simply searching through my posts for anything that you can take out of context and attack, as appears to be the case.

I infer objective qualities of the world around me through both a logical, and intuitive, analysis of my sensory experiences. All of my sensory experiences. Those experiences themselves are the result of non-cognitive preprocessing of sensory input to my brain. The intuitive inferences are made by cognitive processes specialized for pattern matching, and the logical inferences are made by cognitive processes specialized for analyzing logical relationships.

The entire process, from my sensory inputs, to the final production of the model of reality that infer from them, is a physical process occurring in my brain. No aspects of that process can be considered to be a qualities of the objects being perceived. Nor can the qualities of the objects being perceived be in any way considered to be part of the brain process.

Is that clear and unambiguous enough?

I have no idea what you mean by "the experience of logical relationships". I do not experience any logical relationships. I infer logical relationships from my experiences.
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What ? Of course you experience logical relationships. If you did not then you would not have any basis for inferring the objective existence of them. I understand that the inferred property of logical relationships are not experienced but they are inferred from an experience of logical relationships. They have to be.

Are you talking about finding logical relationships between different aspects of the experience? Is that what you mean by "experiencing logical relationships"? If so, do you understand that even those logical relationships are not directly experienced? They must be derived from the experiences, through a process of rational thought, or at least intuitive pattern matching. Either way, that is a part of the process of inferring the logical relationships between objective qualities, from the experiences.

No. It would simply mean that any unfortunate person living in such a world would not be able to apply the scientific method. That hardly matters, though, because such a person would be incapable of rational thought anyway. In fact, I very much doubt that a human being could survive for any length of time under such conditions. The human brain simply is not designed to function under those conditions.
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So why can’t the fact that some inconsistent and illogical experiences exist be falsification of your framework ? You have to have a condition under which the framework can be falsified at any time !

Why? That is not the case for any other scientific theory. Why should it be the case for the framework of science?

No single experience is going to falsify the General Theory of Relativity, or the Standard Model of Quantum Mechanics, or the Laws of Thermodynamics, or any other theory for which there is currently substantial supporting evidence. A body of evidence is necessary. The theory is falsified when the most parsimonious explanation for all of the available evidence is that the theory is false.

The same goes for science itself. I am not saying that it would be easy to falsify science if it is wrong. It would require a truly extraordinary amount of evidence.
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What kind of evidence ? I still don’t see how your framework could be falsified.

Waking up each day in a World with different physical laws would do it.

You have to imagine what it would be like for somebody who understood the scientific method, but did not yet have any scientific knowledge. Put that person in a nightmare world where nothing makes any sense, and he will quickly discard the theory as falsified. Put you or I in such a world, it will be much harder to convince us, because the preponderance of evidence for the scientific method indicates that it is more likely that you are having some sort of serious neurological problems.
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In this situation it would be impossible to convince us because any experiences that did not make sense would be attributable to the subjective. How would you be convinced that your framework had been falsified ?

You are still operating under the false presumption that I simply ignore any and all experiences, or aspects of my experiences that don't make sense, to the "subjective". I have already explained that this is not the case. Even those aspects of my experiences which, due to subjective bias, do not directly correspond to reliable information about what I am perceiving, must be scientifically explained. I cannot just say "Oh, that demon I saw humping the dog yesterday was an hallucination, so I will just ignore it". The existence of the hallucination itself must have some scientific explanation.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

I cannot just say "Oh, that demon I saw humping the dog yesterday was an hallucination, so I will just ignore it".

I should think not! The poor thing!

 

[Interesting Ian]

I should think not! The poor thing!

I mean can't the demon find one of its own kind?

 

[slimshady2357]

I mean can't the demon find one of its own kind?

It's ok, it was a doggie demon

Adam

 

[davidsmith73]

QUOTE]Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat
davidsmith,



When did I ever say, or even imply, that I could make such an inference based on the experience of color alone? [/QUOTE]


You didn't. I am merely stating an aspect of your position for the purposes of my argument

How delightfully pedantic of you. When did I claim that I ever make inferences about specific objective characteristics from individual sensory experiences, taken completely out of context, and with nor reference to other experiences?

See above.

This is silly. First you say that I do not infer objective qualities from the experience of redness, and then when I say that I do, you interpret this to mean that I infer specific objective qualities from only the experience of redness.

No I mean that any wavelength of light that is inferred to be a property of an object does not need the experience of redness to be inferred. In fact, any aspect of you experiences that are not quantitative are not allowed to participate in your inferences. Your inferences must be made on the basis of a set of experiences that form logical relationships.

Allow me to reiterate, on the off-chance that you really are honestly trying to understand what I am saying, rather than simply searching through my posts for anything that you can take out of context and attack, as appears to be the case.

I am also trying to get you to understand what I am saying. It may appear to you that I am taking things out of context but thats not the case.

I infer objective qualities of the world around me through both a logical, and intuitive, analysis of my sensory experiences. All of my sensory experiences.

Intuitive ? Why has intuition suddenly come into it ? You've always said that intuition is notoriously unreliable.

Those experiences themselves are the result of non-cognitive preprocessing of sensory input to my brain. The intuitive inferences are made by cognitive processes specialized for pattern matching, and the logical inferences are made by cognitive processes specialized for analyzing logical relationships.

The entire process, from my sensory inputs, to the final production of the model of reality that infer from them, is a physical process occurring in my brain. No aspects of that process can be considered to be a qualities of the objects being perceived. Nor can the qualities of the objects being perceived be in any way considered to be part of the brain process.

Is that clear and unambiguous enough?

Yes, I already understand that. What you don't understand is that inferences about objective properties of objects is made from some experiences and not others on the basis of the experiences agreeing with your framework of reality. The experiences that do not form logical relationships are not used to infer anything from and you give the explanation that they are just brain processes. This forms an unbreakable explanatory loop. For example:

Frank: Why do you infer objective properties from experiences that form logical relationships ?

Ted: Because they agree with the predictions of the reality framework

Frank: But what about the experiences that do not form logical relationships ?

Ted: they are brain processes

Frank: But that explanation also applies to the experiences that you use to infer objective properties of objects from !

Ted: But those experiences form logical relationships

Frank: so doesn't the fact that experiences sometimes do not form logical relationships, for example hallucinations, provide evidence against the reality framework ?

Ted: no because those experiences are the result of brain processes.

Frank: But so are the experiences that you use to infer objective properties of objects from !

Ted: But those experiences form logical relationships

Go to Frank’s first question

Are you talking about finding logical relationships between different aspects of the experience? Is that what you mean by "experiencing logical relationships"? If so, do you understand that even those logical relationships are not directly experienced? They must be derived from the experiences, through a process of rational thought, or at least intuitive pattern matching. Either way, that is a part of the process of inferring the logical relationships between objective qualities, from the experiences.

I mean that you must be consciously aware of logical relationships, not the inferred kind, otherwise you would not be in a position to identify them. Remember that here we are speaking from the position of not having made any inferences about these experiences yet. Inferences about objective properties come after the experiences.

Me: So why can’t the fact that some inconsistent and illogical experiences exist be falsification of your framework ?

Stimpy:Why? That is not the case for any other scientific theory. Why should it be the case for the framework of science?

No single experience is going to falsify the General Theory of Relativity, or the Standard Model of Quantum Mechanics, or the Laws of Thermodynamics, or any other theory for which there is currently substantial supporting evidence. A body of evidence is necessary. The theory is falsified when the most parsimonious explanation for all of the available evidence is that the theory is false.

A body of evidence that does not agree with the theory is also accompanied by a body of evidence that does agree. So again I shall say - why can’t the fact that some amount of inconsistent and illogical experiences exist be falsification of your framework ? You seem to be thinking that every single experience one has must be illogical or inconsistent for the framework to be falsified. That’s just silly.

Waking up each day in a World with different physical laws would do it.

So in other words experiencing what we call a hallucination every day ?

You are still operating under the false presumption that I simply ignore any and all experiences, or aspects of my experiences that don't make sense, to the "subjective". I have already explained that this is not the case. Even those aspects of my experiences which, due to subjective bias, do not directly correspond to reliable information about what I am perceiving, must be scientifically explained. I cannot just say "Oh, that demon I saw humping the dog yesterday was an hallucination, so I will just ignore it". The existence of the hallucination itself must have some scientific explanation.
Dr. Stupid

No. I am operating under the presumption that you ignore any and all illogical and inconsistent experiences as evidence against your framework of reality. The explanation, and as far as you are concerned the end of the story, for these experiences is that they have an objective existence in the form of a brain process. However, this explanation also applies to the experiences that form logical relationships but you do use these to infer objective properties of objects. Hence we have an unbreakable explanatory loop. Any experiences that do not form logical relationships you explain as being just brain processes. The other experiences that form logical relationships are also brain processes but you use them to infer objective properties of objects because they agree with your framework of reality. Its not possible to falsify your framework !

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

When did I ever say, or even imply, that I could make such an inference based on the experience of color alone?

You didn't. I am merely stating an aspect of your position for the purposes of my argument [/quote]

Well, if you agree that I never stated nor implied that the above was an aspect of my position, then why did you think that it was?

This is silly. First you say that I do not infer objective qualities from the experience of redness, and then when I say that I do, you interpret this to mean that I infer specific objective qualities from only the experience of redness.
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No I mean that any wavelength of light that is inferred to be a property of an object does not need the experience of redness to be inferred.

No specific experience is needed for any property to be inferred. That is completely beside the point.

In fact, any aspect of you experiences that are not quantitative are not allowed to participate in your inferences.

Wrong. This is nonsense.

First of all, no single experience is ever quantitative. We can infer quantitative results from groups of experiences, given certain assumptions about the relationships between those experiences, and the sensory input they represent.

Secondly, the experience of color can, and often does, play a role in such quantitative inferences. There are many examples of this in everyday life. For example, when you compare a colored piece of paper, whose spectral characteristics are known, to another object, you are doing this. Sure, the inference is of limited precision, as are all measurements. Likewise such a measurement will not reveal whether you have a specific wavelength of light reflected, or a combination that gives the same experiential color, but it does narrow the objective property down to a specific set of possibilities. Thus you have inferred information about the objective properties from the experience of color.

Your inferences must be made on the basis of a set of experiences that form logical relationships.

I already said that the inferences cannot be made from any single experience, and are made from sets of experiences, taken in a particular context.

I infer objective qualities of the world around me through both a logical, and intuitive, analysis of my sensory experiences. All of my sensory experiences.
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Intuitive ? Why has intuition suddenly come into it ?

I am specifying both intuitive and logical inference because there is a distinction. If I just say "logical inference", then Ian will complain that there are inferences made which are not done by applying logical rules to the experiences, but rather subconsciously. Those are the intuitive inferences. Once again, I am just trying to be as clear and unambiguous as I possibly can be.

You've always said that intuition is notoriously unreliable.

It is unreliable. That doesn't mean that it doesn't exist, or that we do not use intuitive inference all the time, or even that intuitive inference is not useful. It just means that we should not be so naive as to assume that our intuitive inferences are correct, without verifying through logical inference and the scientific method.

Those experiences themselves are the result of non-cognitive preprocessing of sensory input to my brain. The intuitive inferences are made by cognitive processes specialized for pattern matching, and the logical inferences are made by cognitive processes specialized for analyzing logical relationships.

The entire process, from my sensory inputs, to the final production of the model of reality that infer from them, is a physical process occurring in my brain. No aspects of that process can be considered to be a qualities of the objects being perceived. Nor can the qualities of the objects being perceived be in any way considered to be part of the brain process.

Is that clear and unambiguous enough?
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Yes, I already understand that. What you don't understand is that inferences about objective properties of objects is made from some experiences and not others on the basis of the experiences agreeing with your framework of reality. The experiences that do not form logical relationships are not used to infer anything from and you give the explanation that they are just brain processes.

And I have explained to you that this is simply not the case. Experiences are not simply ignored, nor is saying "they are just brain processes" a legitimate explanation for them.

When I hallucinate, I do not simply discard those experiences, and infer nothing about objective reality from them. I infer from them that something is wrong with my brain processes. That is an inference about objective reality. Furthermore, it is possible with further investigation to determine what is wrong, and why I am hallucinating. In principle, it should even be possible to explain every aspect of the hallucinatory process in terms of physical processes in objective reality.

We (scientists) do not simply throw away any experiences that do not fit with our view of reality. We seek to understand them just like anything else. If I see a demon humping my dog, there is some reason that I see that. The reason may be that there is, in fact, some creature that looks like a demon, humping my dog. The reason may also be that I have a high fever, which is causing glitches in the operation of the visual processing portion of my brain. Which conclusion I come to depends on what I already know about the world, and on the other experiences I have. The fact that I don't even have a dog, for example, is going to play a strong role in how I interpret that set of experiences.

Are you talking about finding logical relationships between different aspects of the experience? Is that what you mean by "experiencing logical relationships"? If so, do you understand that even those logical relationships are not directly experienced? They must be derived from the experiences, through a process of rational thought, or at least intuitive pattern matching. Either way, that is a part of the process of inferring the logical relationships between objective qualities, from the experiences.
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I mean that you must be consciously aware of logical relationships, not the inferred kind, otherwise you would not be in a position to identify them. Remember that here we are speaking from the position of not having made any inferences about these experiences yet. Inferences about objective properties come after the experiences.

You are conceptually confused here. If you are consciously aware of a logical relationship, it is because you have either intuitively or logically inferred it.

I think you are including the process of intuitive inference in the experience. That is just a question of semantics.

No single experience is going to falsify the General Theory of Relativity, or the Standard Model of Quantum Mechanics, or the Laws of Thermodynamics, or any other theory for which there is currently substantial supporting evidence. A body of evidence is necessary. The theory is falsified when the most parsimonious explanation for all of the available evidence is that the theory is false.
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A body of evidence that does not agree with the theory is also accompanied by a body of evidence that does agree. So again I shall say - why can’t the fact that some amount of inconsistent and illogical experiences exist be falsification of your framework ? You seem to be thinking that every single experience one has must be illogical or inconsistent for the framework to be falsified. That’s just silly.

You are acting like there are only two choices: Either any single experience which doesn't seem to match the scientific framework falsifies it, or every single experience you have must be inconsistent with the framework to falsify it. Neither of those choices is the correct answer.

In reality, no inference from observation is ever 100% reliable. All knowledge is fallible. A framework is falsified when the explanation that it is false becomes more parsimonious than the explanation that it is true, and that the evidence against it is flawed.

In other words, it is true that "some amount" of inconsistent and illogical experiences one has would falsify the framework. The question is: how much? The answer is: enough so that the explanation that the scientific framework is invalid, is the most parsimonious explanation for all of the available evidence, including the evidence in support of the scientific method. That means that the "how much" required depends on how much supporting evidence there already is for the validity of the scientific framework.

As I said before, this is the case for all scientific theories. This is, in fact, exactly what is meant by "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence".

Waking up each day in a World with different physical laws would do it.
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So in other words experiencing what we call a hallucination every day ?

If I were unable to distinguish hallucination from reality, then yes. In that case I would have to reject the scientific framework. I would not know which of the axioms of science were wrong. It could be that reality is not objective, or that it is not consistent, or that it does not follow logical rules. It could also just be that I am not capable of extracting reliable information about reality from my experiences. Remember, that is an axiom of science too.

You are still operating under the false presumption that I simply ignore any and all experiences, or aspects of my experiences that don't make sense, to the "subjective". I have already explained that this is not the case. Even those aspects of my experiences which, due to subjective bias, do not directly correspond to reliable information about what I am perceiving, must be scientifically explained. I cannot just say "Oh, that demon I saw humping the dog yesterday was an hallucination, so I will just ignore it". The existence of the hallucination itself must have some scientific explanation.
Dr. Stupid
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No. I am operating under the presumption that you ignore any and all illogical and inconsistent experiences as evidence against your framework of reality. The explanation, and as far as you are concerned the end of the story, for these experiences is that they have an objective existence in the form of a brain process.

This is simply not true. As I have already explained, this is not even close to the "end of the story". You are pretending as though no attempt at all is made to understand these brain processes, and how they work. You are pretending that we simply discard these experiences, rather than trying to understand how they fit into our framework of reality.

However, this explanation also applies to the experiences that form logical relationships but you do use these to infer objective properties of objects.

And no you are pretending that there is no distinction between the two, when there clearly is. Some experiences are the result of sensory input. When those sensory systems are functioning properly, information about what is being perceived can be extracted from those experiences. When those sensory systems are not functioning properly, this may not be the case. And those experiences which are not the result of sensory input, do not contain any information about what we are perceiving at all, even though we may intuitively interpret them as sensory experiences.

There is a distinction. The distinction is not ignored. The experiences are not discarded. In fact, there is an entire field of scientific research concerned specifically with understanding how this all works.

Hence we have an unbreakable explanatory loop. Any experiences that do not form logical relationships you explain as being just brain processes. The other experiences that form logical relationships are also brain processes but you use them to infer objective properties of objects because they agree with your framework of reality. Its not possible to falsify your framework !

This is a strawman argument, which bears no resemblance to my actual position.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Suggestologist]

davidsmith,
Wrong. This is nonsense.

First of all, no single experience is ever quantitative. We can infer quantitative results from groups of experiences, given certain assumptions about the relationships between those experiences, and the sensory input they represent.

Secondly, the experience of color can, and often does, play a role in such quantitative inferences. There are many examples of this in everyday life. For example, when you compare a colored piece of paper, whose spectral characteristics are known, to another object, you are doing this. Sure, the inference is of limited precision, as are all measurements. Likewise such a measurement will not reveal whether you have a specific wavelength of light reflected, or a combination that gives the same experiential color, but it does narrow the objective property down to a specific set of possibilities. Thus you have inferred information about the objective properties from the experience of color.

Right, we always ignore some differences when we say that one thing is the "same" as another.

I already said that the inferences cannot be made from any single experience, and are made from sets of experiences, taken in a particular context.

I am specifying both intuitive and logical inference because there is a distinction. If I just say "logical inference", then Ian will complain that there are inferences made which are not done by applying logical rules to the experiences, but rather subconsciously. Those are the intuitive inferences. Once again, I am just trying to be as clear and unambiguous as I possibly can be.

Subitizing... a type of intuitive inference. Counting... a type of logical inference. Right?

It is unreliable. That doesn't mean that it doesn't exist, or that we do not use intuitive inference all the time, or even that intuitive inference is not useful. It just means that we should not be so naive as to assume that our intuitive inferences are correct, without verifying through logical inference and the scientific method.

Agitate and observe.

And I have explained to you that this is simply not the case. Experiences are not simply ignored, nor is saying "they are just brain processes" a legitimate explanation for them.

When I hallucinate, I do not simply discard those experiences, and infer nothing about objective reality from them. I infer from them that something is wrong with my brain processes. That is an inference about objective reality. Furthermore, it is possible with further investigation to determine what is wrong, and why I am hallucinating. In principle, it should even be possible to explain every aspect of the hallucinatory process in terms of physical processes in objective reality.

We (scientists) do not simply throw away any experiences that do not fit with our view of reality. We seek to understand them just like anything else. If I see a demon humping my dog, there is some reason that I see that. The reason may be that there is, in fact, some creature that looks like a demon, humping my dog. The reason may also be that I have a high fever, which is causing glitches in the operation of the visual processing portion of my brain. Which conclusion I come to depends on what I already know about the world, and on the other experiences I have. The fact that I don't even have a dog, for example, is going to play a strong role in how I interpret that set of experiences.

When scientists assume that they can tell the difference between reality and hallucination, they are overconfident. Hallucination need not radically alter the "objective" reality. Hallucination need not be non-isomorphic to the production of rational behavior; as observed by others.

You are acting like there are only two choices: Either any single experience which doesn't seem to match the scientific framework falsifies it, or every single experience you have must be inconsistent with the framework to falsify it. Neither of those choices is the correct answer.

In reality, no inference from observation is ever 100% reliable. All knowledge is fallible. A framework is falsified when the explanation that it is false becomes more parsimonious than the explanation that it is true, and that the evidence against it is flawed.

In other words, it is true that "some amount" of inconsistent and illogical experiences one has would falsify the framework. The question is: how much? The answer is: enough so that the explanation that the scientific framework is invalid, is the most parsimonious explanation for all of the available evidence, including the evidence in support of the scientific method. That means that the "how much" required depends on how much supporting evidence there already is for the validity of the scientific framework.

But parsimony is a matter of opinion, based on experience. Much like compressing a file, it depends on the properties of the compressor.

As I said before, this is the case for all scientific theories. This is, in fact, exactly what is meant by "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence".

If I were unable to distinguish hallucination from reality, then yes. In that case I would have to reject the scientific framework.

Ah, but we have learned HOW some people have accomplished the reality of making hallucination and reality indistinguishable. I can teach you how to do what they did. Will you then reject the scientific framework, or must I prove that I can teach you; before you will?

I would not know which of the axioms of science were wrong. It could be that reality is not objective, or that it is not consistent, or that it does not follow logical rules. It could also just be that I am not capable of extracting reliable information about reality from my experiences. Remember, that is an axiom of science too.

Ah, but even hallucinations have at least a modicum of "reliable" information -- most of the time. And observing the objective world often produces information that is not "reliable". Where you draw the line in terms of "reliability"; the demarkation between hallucination and reality; depends on past personal experiences.

This is simply not true. As I have already explained, this is not even close to the "end of the story". You are pretending as though no attempt at all is made to understand these brain processes, and how they work. You are pretending that we simply discard these experiences, rather than trying to understand how they fit into our framework of reality.

To imply that someone else is pretending, entails that you have access to their personal experience.

 

[davidsmith73]

No specific experience is needed for any property to be inferred. That is completely beside the point.

No, its totally my point. You only infer objective properties from experiences that form logical relationships. Those that do not form logical relationships, you do not infer any objective properties from. That includes illogical and inconsistent relational experiences such as hallucinations and singular experiences such as redness.

We can infer quantitative results from groups of experiences, given certain assumptions about the relationships between those experiences, and the sensory input they represent.

Logical, mathematical relationships are experienced from groups of experiences. They are then inferred to denote objective properties of objects.

Secondly, the experience of color can, and often does, play a role in such quantitative inferences. There are many examples of this in everyday life. For example, when you compare a colored piece of paper, whose spectral characteristics are known, to another object, you are doing this. Sure, the inference is of limited precision, as are all measurements. Likewise such a measurement will not reveal whether you have a specific wavelength of light reflected, or a combination that gives the same experiential color, but it does narrow the objective property down to a specific set of possibilities. Thus you have inferred information about the objective properties from the experience of color.

You have inferred information about objective properties from the logical relationships between the colours, not from the colours themselves. It is not the experience of colour that you infer is an objective property of an object but the experience of the logical relationships between them. As I said, these are the only types of experience that you infer objective properties that are separate from brain processes.

It is unreliable. That doesn't mean that it doesn't exist, or that we do not use intuitive inference all the time, or even that intuitive inference is not useful. It just means that we should not be so naive as to assume that our intuitive inferences are correct, without verifying through logical inference and the scientific method.

Ok, so logical inference has the final say. Lets stick to discussing that.

And I have explained to you that this is simply not the case. Experiences are not simply ignored, nor is saying "they are just brain processes" a legitimate explanation for them.

When I hallucinate, I do not simply discard those experiences, and infer nothing about objective reality from them. I infer from them that something is wrong with my brain processes. That is an inference about objective reality. Furthermore, it is possible with further investigation to determine what is wrong, and why I am hallucinating. In principle, it should even be possible to explain every aspect of the hallucinatory process in terms of physical processes in objective reality.

That is all very well but does not address my point which is the fact that you do not infer illogical hallucinatory experiences as denoting anything about an objective reality separate from the brain process that is the experience. With logical and consistent experiences you do infer those experiences to denote an objective reality separate from the objective reality of the actual experiences which is the brain process.

So in effect you have two types of objective inferences going on here. One is common to all experiences which is that the actual experience is objective in the form of a brain process. The other is only applied to experiences that form logical relationships. Experiences that do not form these relationships are not inferred to denote an objective property of an object and so are not compared to your framework of reality. Therefore your framework is selecting which observations to compare to its predictions.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Suggestologist,

When scientists assume that they can tell the difference between reality and hallucination, they are overconfident. Hallucination need not radically alter the "objective" reality. Hallucination need not be non-isomorphic to the production of rational behavior; as observed by others.

What? Could you explain what that barrage of syntactic abuse is supposed to mean? I know what isomorphic means, but I have no idea what you mean by saying that a hallucination may or may not be isomorphic to the production of rational behavior.

But parsimony is a matter of opinion, based on experience. Much like compressing a file, it depends on the properties of the compressor.

No, it is not. That is a very popular myth among post-modernists and believers in the paranormal, but it is only popular because they do not have any clue what the principle of parsimony actually means.

If I were unable to distinguish hallucination from reality, then yes. In that case I would have to reject the scientific framework.
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Ah, but we have learned HOW some people have accomplished the reality of making hallucination and reality indistinguishable. I can teach you how to do what they did. Will you then reject the scientific framework, or must I prove that I can teach you; before you will?

What on earth are you talking about?

I would not know which of the axioms of science were wrong. It could be that reality is not objective, or that it is not consistent, or that it does not follow logical rules. It could also just be that I am not capable of extracting reliable information about reality from my experiences. Remember, that is an axiom of science too.
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Ah, but even hallucinations have at least a modicum of "reliable" information -- most of the time. And observing the objective world often produces information that is not "reliable". Where you draw the line in terms of "reliability"; the demarkation between hallucination and reality; depends on past personal experiences.

There is no line. It is a continuum. That is the whole point. We use the scientific method to extract reliable information about what we are perceiving from our sensory experiences. Since our sensory systems are not the only source of our experiences, some experiences contain a great deal of such information. Others contain very little. The term "hallucination" specifically refers to experiences which intuitively seem like sensory experiences, but are not. The term "optical illusion" specifically refers to visual sensory experiences which cause us to intuitively infer the wrong thing about what we are viewing. And so on.

This is simply not true. As I have already explained, this is not even close to the "end of the story". You are pretending as though no attempt at all is made to understand these brain processes, and how they work. You are pretending that we simply discard these experiences, rather than trying to understand how they fit into our framework of reality.
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To imply that someone else is pretending, entails that you have access to their personal experience.

Or that I am drawing an inference from them their behavior.


davidsmith,

No specific experience is needed for any property to be inferred. That is completely beside the point.
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No, its totally my point. You only infer objective properties from experiences that form logical relationships. Those that do not form logical relationships, you do not infer any objective properties from. That includes illogical and inconsistent relational experiences such as hallucinations and singular experiences such as redness.

We are going around in circles here. Try to understand what I am saying. There is no such thing as a logical or illogical set of experiences!

We attempt to find logical explanations for our experiences. Sometimes the logical explanation is that our experience is a sensory experience, which was caused by some particular set of properties of the perceived object. We then assign those properties to that object. Sometimes the logical explanation is that the experience was not a sensory experience at all, but was instead caused by specific abnormal brain processes.

In all such cases, we are trying to find a logical explanation for all of our experiences. None of them are simply discarded as being unnecessary to explain. Nor is just saying that they were brain processes the end of the story. We then go on to try to understand those brain processes. We want to know how and why people hallucinate, and we are making scientific progress towards exactly that.

You are trying to claim that science is unfalsifiable because we simply discard any experiences we don't have logical explanations for. This is simply not true. Even hallucinations have logical explanations, which can be found through the application of the scientific method.

We can infer quantitative results from groups of experiences, given certain assumptions about the relationships between those experiences, and the sensory input they represent.
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Logical, mathematical relationships are experienced from groups of experiences. They are then inferred to denote objective properties of objects.

Logical relationships are not experienced. They are inferred from experiences. You are confused.

Secondly, the experience of color can, and often does, play a role in such quantitative inferences. There are many examples of this in everyday life. For example, when you compare a colored piece of paper, whose spectral characteristics are known, to another object, you are doing this. Sure, the inference is of limited precision, as are all measurements. Likewise such a measurement will not reveal whether you have a specific wavelength of light reflected, or a combination that gives the same experiential color, but it does narrow the objective property down to a specific set of possibilities. Thus you have inferred information about the objective properties from the experience of color.
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You have inferred information about objective properties from the logical relationships between the colours, not from the colours themselves.

The logical relationships between the colors are inferred from the colors themselves.

It is not the experience of colour that you infer is an objective property of an object but the experience of the logical relationships between them.

It is the logical relationship that I infer is an objective property of the object, but those logical relationships are not experienced. They are inferred from the experiences.

As I said, these are the only types of experience that you infer objective properties that are separate from brain processes.

Of course. I only infer properties of perceived objects from sensory experiences. Not all experiences are sensory. Those which are determined to not be sensory experiences clearly tell me nothing about what I am perceiving. They instead tell me something about what is going on in my brain.

Remember that brain processes are part of objective reality too. Either way I end up inferring something about objective reality from my experiences. And either way I can use the scientific method to verify those inferences.

When I hallucinate, I do not simply discard those experiences, and infer nothing about objective reality from them. I infer from them that something is wrong with my brain processes. That is an inference about objective reality. Furthermore, it is possible with further investigation to determine what is wrong, and why I am hallucinating. In principle, it should even be possible to explain every aspect of the hallucinatory process in terms of physical processes in objective reality.
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That is all very well but does not address my point which is the fact that you do not infer illogical hallucinatory experiences as denoting anything about an objective reality separate from the brain process that is the experience.

First of all, like I said before, there is no such thing as a logical, or illogical experience. Secondly, I do infer things about objective reality from hallucinatory experiences. The fact that the part of objective reality that they contain relevant information about is my brain, is completely beside the point. My brain processes are part of objective reality too.

With logical and consistent experiences you do infer those experiences to denote an objective reality separate from the objective reality of the actual experiences which is the brain process.

See above.

So in effect you have two types of objective inferences going on here. One is common to all experiences which is that the actual experience is objective in the form of a brain process. The other is only applied to experiences that form logical relationships. Experiences that do not form these relationships are not inferred to denote an objective property of an object and so are not compared to your framework of reality.

There are two types of experiences. Sensory experiences, and non-sensory experiences. And as I said before, all experiences have logical explanations. Sometimes the logical explanation is that the experience was sensory, and sometimes it is not. Either way, I ultimately end up inferring something about objective reality from the experience.

Therefore your framework is selecting which observations to compare to its predictions.

I already explained why this is wrong. All experiences are (or at least can be) compared to the predictions.

Like I said before, experiences which we conclude to be nonsensory are not simply thrown away. We are looking for scientific explanations for them too. We already have a considerable amount of scientific knowledge about them. Your presentation of things like hallucination simply being an ad-hoc explanation for any experience that doesn't fit into our worldview, simply does not hold water.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Mercutio]

I may have to nominate this:

When scientists assume that they can tell the difference between reality and hallucination, they are overconfident. Hallucination need not radically alter the "objective" reality. Hallucination need not be non-isomorphic to the production of rational behavior; as observed by others.

for the language award. It is right up there with "just because you are diagnosed as paranoid, that doesn't mean they're not out to get you." If I read you right, you are saying that any and every "normal" condition might just as easily be a hallucination. Which, logically speaking, I suppose must be true. It's where Decartes started, anyway...

Pragmatically, though, if we cannot tell if it is a hallucination or not, if the hallucination is acting like a predictable objective universe, then it just doesn't matter! Go ahead, hypothesize that we are in multiple layers of irrational hallucinations that just coincidentally have the cumulative effect of looking like a rational objective world. It makes the same logical sense. Until, as Stimpy has said (don't mean to put words in your mouth, cat), until we wake up one morning and the rules have changed enough for us to actually notice that our predictable objective universe is no longer a reasonable explanation...until that morning, all the hypothesizing about hallucinations is meaningless. (in a pragmatic sense.)

As Wittgenstein might have said, later on in his career, the very fact that we agree on the word "hallucination" means that it has a shared meaning in our language community. We do reliably separate out the real and the unreal (if I might use those words), enough that (I think this was actually in a different thread) the examples of hallucinations often give the specific circumstances (chemicals, etc) which give rise to them! Yes, even hallucinations are, to that extent, predictable! If solipsistic it-might-all-be-a-hallucination thinkers truly believe that, why get dressed before going to the store?



On a completely unrelated note...I got no response back when we were talking about "experiencing the length of something" in the same sense we experience color (you remember, the original primary-secondary topic of the thread)...So, since we're on another page, I'll quote myself to bump it up, cuz I really would like to see how we experience length...or lengthE, to be more specific:

A thought though, based on the structure of our retinas and the structure of the arguments in this thread. We (I hope) agree that colorE is experienced. (ok, for stimpy and me, there is a process that we would call seeing color(E)). Could we not say that what you (Ian) are calling lengthE must be infered from our experience of where one color leaves off and another begins? Think of camoflage--the best way to hide something is to obscure its outline, either by blending color or by breaking contours by including extra breaks between colors. This works because we (arguably, this is what I'm contemplating here and putting out for your commentary) tell where an object begins and ends based on changes in color. (I saw a wonderful photo of a large ship--a carrier, perhaps--that was camoflaged to look like two considerably smaller and less torpedo-worthy ships. The space between the two painted-on ships was the grey-blue color of ocean and sky, and was at one of the more vulnerable areas of the ship. You really have to study the photo closely to see that the two ships are in fact part of a much bigger single ship.)

Thus, my "head in a vise" example was perhaps justifiably torn apart, not because it was wrong but because I used the wrong explanation. If the background was of the exact same color as the object, you could not see its length because you could not tell where it begins and ends without infering this from a color change. (again I use "infer" in the near-instantaneous "translate" sense). You still would see red, but no length or width or shape. Length, width and shape all depend on a change of color to show where one thing leaves off and another begins.

 

[Suggestologist]

Suggestologist,
What? Could you explain what that barrage of syntactic abuse is supposed to mean? I know what isomorphic means, but I have no idea what you mean by saying that a hallucination may or may not be isomorphic to the production of rational behavior.

Some people have hallucinations which other people would consider irrational, the hallucinators know enough not to talk about their hallucinations; therefore others see them as rational as themselves. Just one example of what I mean.

No, it is not. That is a very popular myth among post-modernists and believers in the paranormal, but it is only popular because they do not have any clue what the principle of parsimony actually means.

And what does it "actually" mean? To you?

What on earth are you talking about?

I am saying that there are ways that you can adjust your thinking that will produce the effect of not being able to tell the difference between hallucination and normal hallucination -- er.. reality.

If you were taught how, would you then reject the scientific protocols?

There is no line. It is a continuum. That is the whole point. We use the scientific method to extract reliable information about what we are perceiving from our sensory experiences. Since our sensory systems are not the only source of our experiences, some experiences contain a great deal of such information. Others contain very little. The term "hallucination" specifically refers to experiences which intuitively seem like sensory experiences, but are not. The term "optical illusion" specifically refers to visual sensory experiences which cause us to intuitively infer the wrong thing about what we are viewing. And so on.

Continuum, line, they're just metaphors. The demarkation, where you can't tell if something is real or hallucination, along the "contninuum", depends on experience -- for the location of the region it occupies along the "continuum".

Or that I am drawing an inference from them their behavior.

Like I said, scientists are overconfident if they think they can tell reality from hallucination.

 

[jj]

Like I said, scientists are overconfident if they think they can tell reality from hallucination.

I see, so all of physics is a shared, communial hallucination? Now, you didn't really say that directly in that sentence, but you argue that reality is "normal hallucination", which seems to indicate that you do hold the idea that everything is a hallucination.

Can you please explain why gravity is shared, but TM flying isn't? What kinds of hallucinations are communially shared, and why?

 

[Suggestologist]

I may have to nominate this: for the language award. It is right up there with "just because you are diagnosed as paranoid, that doesn't mean they're not out to get you." If I read you right, you are saying that any and every "normal" condition might just as easily be a hallucination. Which, logically speaking, I suppose must be true. It's where Decartes started, anyway...

No, I'm saying that every hallucination might just as easily be seen as normal; behaviorally.

Pragmatically, though, if we cannot tell if it is a hallucination or not, if the hallucination is acting like a predictable objective universe, then it just doesn't matter! Go ahead, hypothesize that we are in multiple layers of irrational hallucinations that just coincidentally have the cumulative effect of looking like a rational objective world. It makes the same logical sense. Until, as Stimpy has said (don't mean to put words in your mouth, cat), until we wake up one morning and the rules have changed enough for us to actually notice that our predictable objective universe is no longer a reasonable explanation...until that morning, all the hypothesizing about hallucinations is meaningless. (in a pragmatic sense.)

Do you agree that if a hallucinator acts in a way that nobody can tell that they have hallucinations; behaviorally -- then it just doesn't matter?

As Wittgenstein might have said, later on in his career, the very fact that we agree on the word "hallucination" means that it has a shared meaning in our language community. We do reliably separate out the real and the unreal (if I might use those words), enough that (I think this was actually in a different thread) the examples of hallucinations often give the specific circumstances (chemicals, etc) which give rise to them! Yes, even hallucinations are, to that extent, predictable! If solipsistic it-might-all-be-a-hallucination thinkers truly believe that, why get dressed before going to the store?

Well, just because you're the only real person, and everybody else is a hallucination, that doesn't mean that life has no meaning and isn't worth living. Does it, now?

On a completely unrelated note...I got no response back when we were talking about "experiencing the length of something" in the same sense we experience color (you remember, the original primary-secondary topic of the thread)...So, since we're on another page, I'll quote myself to bump it up, cuz I really would like to see how we experience length...or lengthE, to be more specific:

As I covertly suggested to Stimpson: Let's ground what we're talking about in something simple, and easily comparable. Subitizing vs. Counting, seem like they may fit.

 

[Suggestologist]

I see, so all of physics is a shared, communial hallucination? Now, you didn't really say that directly in that sentence, but you argue that reality is "normal hallucination", which seems to indicate that you do hold the idea that everything is a hallucination.

The meaning of physics is often a shared, communal hallucination, a "user illusion" that has become embedded in a culture. That does not mean that there isn't an actual physical reality.

Can you please explain why gravity is shared, but TM flying isn't? What kinds of hallucinations are communially shared, and why?

One is isomorphic to physical reality, and the other is not. Meanings are communally shared, in response to the need to be able to communicate with other people. That does not mean that meaning is isomorphic to physical reality.

Most people think that if pain goes away (in disease or an injured area of the body or psyche), then healing is occurring (or has ocCured). That is a culturally held meaning that is non-isomorphic with the physical reality.

 

[Mercutio]

No, I'm saying that every hallucination might just as easily be seen as normal; behaviorally.

Logically speaking, this is a re-phrasing of exactly what I said; you are saying that there can be no certainty of real vs. hallucination. Either way, that normal can be seen as hallucination, or that hallucination can be seen as normal, means the same thing. It is still where Decartes started, and unless you get out, it is still solipsism. (mind you, if you assume the reality of mental entities, I think solipsism is the only defensible position. But you must make that assumption.)

Do you agree that if a hallucinator acts in a way that nobody can tell that they have hallucinations; behaviorally -- then it just doesn't matter?

If you realize what you are saying, I agree with you. Remember, though, that thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. are all behaviors. When you say "nobody can tell that they have hallucinations", you are saying that the person him or her self cannot tell. In which case I wholeheartedly agree, it makes no practical difference whatsoever. Occam's razor might throw out the hallucination on grounds of unneccesary addition, but the pragmatist would simply say the question is irrelevant and not worth considering, since by your definition nobody can tell the difference. (Hmmm...a difference that nobody can see... are you really going to rest your philosophy on the existence of a difference that makes no difference?)

Well, just because you're the only real person, and everybody else is a hallucination, that doesn't mean that life has no meaning and isn't worth living. Does it, now?

I wouldn't know.

I would guess that any meaning that hinges whatsoever on the opinions of others would be moot. "Do unto others as...never mind." "What goes around, comes arou...never mind"

Words are cheap. What we do tells what we believe. Solipsism sounds great, but you do not have the courage of your convictions. You weasel out and say "does it now?" when in fact any meaning whatsoever in solipsism is by definition what you put there. Ok, I agree with you; it "doesn't mean that life has no meaning and isn't worth living." I'll go a step further. It doesn't mean anything at all.

As I covertly suggested to Stimpson: Let's ground what we're talking about in something simple, and easily comparable. Subitizing vs. Counting, seem like they may fit.

I grounded my example in how one might perceive the length of an object without infering it from color. I cannot think of a simpler example. It has not been addressed.

 

[Suggestologist]

Logically speaking, this is a re-phrasing of exactly what I said; you are saying that there can be no certainty of real vs. hallucination. Either way, that normal can be seen as hallucination, or that hallucination can be seen as normal, means the same thing. It is still where Decartes started, and unless you get out, it is still solipsism. (mind you, if you assume the reality of mental entities, I think solipsism is the only defensible position. But you must make that assumption.)

Hmmmm, you've obviously misread my miscommunication. I'm not talking about certainty. I'm asking if hallucinating differently from other people, where those other people can't tell that their hallucinations are different from your hallucinations, makes a difference.

If I say, "The cat played with a ball of yarn." Think about what that means for a moment.

Your hallucination of the sentence will be different from that of other people's. You may see the cat as bigger than the ball, or the ball as bigger than the cat, you may see the cat chasing the ball, or playing with it in one spot -- or both in sequence; or something else -- depending on your personal experience. And other people will hallucinate the sentence differently.

If you realize what you are saying, I agree with you. Remember, though, that thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. are all behaviors. When you say "nobody can tell that they have hallucinations", you are saying that the person him or her self cannot tell.

Well, of course not. Anything they do that's idiosyncratic, will be seen as normal idiosyncracy. Someone who investigates can break that illusion of "normalcy"; but whether anyone ever will, is indeterminant.

In which case I wholeheartedly agree, it makes no practical difference whatsoever. Occam's razor might throw out the hallucination on grounds of unneccesary addition, but the pragmatist would simply say the question is irrelevant and not worth considering, since by your definition nobody can tell the difference. (Hmmm...a difference that nobody can see... are you really going to rest your philosophy on the existence of a difference that makes no difference?) I wouldn't know.

Like Bateson, I'm only interested in the difference that makes a difference. Everything is always moving, always changing; not all differences make a difference.

I would guess that any meaning that hinges whatsoever on the opinions of others would be moot. "Do unto others as...never mind." "What goes around, comes arou...never mind"

That's all up to each individual solipsist to decide.

Words are cheap. What we do tells what we believe. Solipsism sounds great, but you do not have the courage of your convictions. You weasel out and say "does it now?" when in fact any meaning whatsoever in solipsism is by definition what you put there. Ok, I agree with you; it "doesn't mean that life has no meaning and isn't worth living." I'll go a step further. It doesn't mean anything at all.

I'll be pragmatic and say that it means whatever meaning the solipsist means it to mean.

I grounded my example in how one might perceive the length of an object without infering it from color. I cannot think of a simpler example. It has not been addressed.

I was referring to the controversy between intuitive inference (which subitizing is a clear example) and counting (which is a clear example of logical inference).

 

[Mercutio]

Hmmmm, you've obviously misread my miscommunication. I'm not talking about certainty. I'm asking if hallucinating differently from other people, where those other people can't tell that their hallucinations are different from your hallucinations, makes a difference.

If I say, "The cat played with a ball of yarn." Think about what that means for a moment.

Your hallucination of the sentence will be different from that of other people's. You may see the cat as bigger than the ball, or the ball as bigger than the cat, you may see the cat chasing the ball, or playing with it in one spot -- or both in sequence; or something else -- depending on your personal experience. And other people will hallucinate the sentence differently.
[/B]

Well then, I must apologize for something I said earlier. I had said

As Wittgenstein might have said, later on in his career, the very fact that we agree on the word "hallucination" means that it has a shared meaning in our language community. We do reliably separate out the real and the unreal (if I might use those words), enough that (I think this was actually in a different thread) the examples of hallucinations often give the specific circumstances (chemicals, etc) which give rise to them! Yes, even hallucinations are, to that extent, predictable!

but I am obviously wrong. Your use of the word "hallucination" in the first quote above is clearly different from any usage I have ever seen. Most folk I know would have used the term "imagining" or even "picturing" the cat in question, and none would have confusedly thought that the cat was, in fact, present in person when it was present "in mind". The term "hallucination", on the other hand, (and this is without a dictionary, so cut me a bit of slack, I'm using the word as I use the word) implies a distortion in one's perception of reality. My friends who have tried various chemicals or fungi to induce hallucinations assure me that it is in fact the world that melts away, and that is the freaky thing. I can very easily imagine that I have four legs (an additional pair, that is); this is not disturbing in the least. I have a friend who hallucinated that I had four legs, and this was extremely disturbing. His reality had shifted; mine had not. If every time I close my eyes and picture Girl6, you say I am hallucinating, we really have no need to continue this thread; your solipsism may not extend to public nudity, but it certainly is reflected in your vocabulary.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less.

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master--that's all."

Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. "They've a temper, some of them--particularly verbs, they're the proudest--adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs--however, I can manage the whole lot! Impenetrability! That's what I say!"

"Would you tell me, please," said Alice, "what that means ?"

 

[Rayn]

Wow. I've read this entire post, and the majority of what I've seen is basically a debate grounded in semantic loopholes and the basic linguistic frailty that occurs when there is no set lexicon. Most disturbing of all though, is the fact that someone mentioned Korzybski's General Semantics, but there has been no follow up in that manner. Outside of Interesting Ian's attempt to distinguish between colorE/M and lengthE/M, there has been no clarification of words such as "hallucination," and consequently I perceive this whole debate to mired in a semantic swamp. Hopefully, this will change as although I have a position on the matter, I think Stimpy and Mercutio are providing it quite clearly and eloquently.

I think a good book to read if anyone is so inclined to read a book on this subject is "Consciousness Explained," by Daniel C. Dennett, which despite it's absurdly pretentious title, is a thorough analysis of brain processes and provides solid answers to those who believe we have images in our brain, or are viewing reality in some sort of Cartesian Theatre. It presents a solid view that I believe Stimpy and Mercutio are advocating, but since it's a book written by one author, has a proscribed lexicon that the reader adheres to while reading, unlike here where any definition under the sun seems able to be brought into service at any time. I am enjoying the discussion though, despite all that. Thanks.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Wow. I've read this entire post, and the majority of what I've seen is basically a debate grounded in semantic loopholes and the basic linguistic frailty that occurs when there is no set lexicon. Most disturbing of all though, is the fact that someone mentioned Korzybski's General Semantics, but there has been no follow up in that manner. Outside of Interesting Ian's attempt to distinguish between colorE/M and lengthE/M, there has been no clarification of words such as "hallucination," and consequently I perceive this whole debate to mired in a semantic swamp. Hopefully, this will change as although I have a position on the matter, I think Stimpy and Mercutio are providing it quite clearly and eloquently.

I think a good book to read if anyone is so inclined to read a book on this subject is "Consciousness Explained," by Daniel C. Dennett, which despite it's absurdly pretentious title, is a thorough analysis of brain processes and provides solid answers to those who believe we have images in our brain, or are viewing reality in some sort of Cartesian Theatre. It presents a solid view that I believe Stimpy and Mercutio are advocating, but since it's a book written by one author, has a proscribed lexicon that the reader adheres to while reading, unlike here where any definition under the sun seems able to be brought into service at any time. I am enjoying the discussion though, despite all that. Thanks.

Stimpy is clear and eloquent? Right, just looking at the first few posts in this thread and already his contradictions shine through. His very first post declares there is no distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Then after about the third or fourth post he denies that a primary quality like length is simply a process in the brain but that secondary qualities like the smell of a fart, or the actual raw experience of color, are a process in the brain! He just contradicts himself all the time!

BTW isn't Dennet an eliminative materialist?? Isn't this the most mind numbingly stupid position on the mind/body problem ever dreamt up?? Sorry, I don't feel inclined to read anything by someone who denies consciousness exists.