Ok...we fix your head in a vise to keep it from moving, give you an eyepatch for one eye (both just to present a stable image, as distance information can be gleaned from either stereopsis or motion parallax). Now, we put you in a dark room, pitch-black, with no frame of reference for distance. I illuminate an object in front of you. What is its length? You cannot tell without knowing its distance from you. It could be small and close, or big and distant. What is its shape? You cannot tell without knowing its orientation to you. It could be elliptical and flat-on toward you , or circular and angled away from you. What is its color? Red.Interesting Ian said:
A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities
Stimpson J. Cat
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Ian,
I already agreed that we infer the length of objects from our experiences. You can call the specific experiences which you infer the length from "length" if you want to, just as you call the experience from which you infer color (meaning wavelength), "color". So what?
I have made no distinction between the experiences from which length is inferred, and the experiences from which wavelength of light is inferred. Nor have I made any distinction between the objective property of length and the objective property of wavelength of light. I made a distinction between the experience from which wavelength of light is inferred, and the objective property of length.
You are just playing word games, by taking words like "color" and "length", which have multiple meanings in common English, some of which refer to the experience, and some of which refer to objective properties, and deliberately applying the wrong meanings within my statements in order to create apparent contradictions. You can't even reasonably claim that this is not deliberate, because I specifically went out of my way to clarify any such ambiguities. You would have to have deliberately take my statements out of context, and deliberately apply the wrong meanings to my words even after I clarified which meaning I meant, in order to interpret my statements the way you have.
I suppose it is theoretically possible that your misinterpretation was not deliberate, but only of your reading comprehension skills are far below what I have been previously led to believe they are. Either that, or you are not even carefully reading my posts at all, and are instead just skimming through them in search of individual statements you can attack. I suppose it is not a deliberate misrepresentation if you don't actually have any idea what the context of the statement even was.
Furthermore, it is quite obvious that this entire tangent you have gone off on is nothing more than an attempt to avoid the real point, which is that secondary qualities do not exist, and our experiences are brain processes, rather than qualities of objects.
The above position is perfectly clear. Any attempt to suggest that I am claiming that some experiences are also qualities, or that qualities of objects we are perceiving are also brain process, is nothing more than a deliberate misrepresentation of my position.
Dr. Stupid
I already agreed that we infer the length of objects from our experiences. You can call the specific experiences which you infer the length from "length" if you want to, just as you call the experience from which you infer color (meaning wavelength), "color". So what?
I have made no distinction between the experiences from which length is inferred, and the experiences from which wavelength of light is inferred. Nor have I made any distinction between the objective property of length and the objective property of wavelength of light. I made a distinction between the experience from which wavelength of light is inferred, and the objective property of length.
You are just playing word games, by taking words like "color" and "length", which have multiple meanings in common English, some of which refer to the experience, and some of which refer to objective properties, and deliberately applying the wrong meanings within my statements in order to create apparent contradictions. You can't even reasonably claim that this is not deliberate, because I specifically went out of my way to clarify any such ambiguities. You would have to have deliberately take my statements out of context, and deliberately apply the wrong meanings to my words even after I clarified which meaning I meant, in order to interpret my statements the way you have.
I suppose it is theoretically possible that your misinterpretation was not deliberate, but only of your reading comprehension skills are far below what I have been previously led to believe they are. Either that, or you are not even carefully reading my posts at all, and are instead just skimming through them in search of individual statements you can attack. I suppose it is not a deliberate misrepresentation if you don't actually have any idea what the context of the statement even was.
Furthermore, it is quite obvious that this entire tangent you have gone off on is nothing more than an attempt to avoid the real point, which is that secondary qualities do not exist, and our experiences are brain processes, rather than qualities of objects.
The above position is perfectly clear. Any attempt to suggest that I am claiming that some experiences are also qualities, or that qualities of objects we are perceiving are also brain process, is nothing more than a deliberate misrepresentation of my position.
Dr. Stupid
davidsmith73
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Stimpson J. Cat said:
You do not use the experience of redness to infer a property of redness on an object. You do use the experience of logical relationships to infer the property of logical relationships onto an object.
It seems as if that is a statement of the falsifiable framework rather than a single assumption.
But the above is actually possible in principle. Imagine if everyone were to hallucinate from the moment they were first conscious to the moment they died. We would all be living in a world where nothing makes any sense. More precisely, we would all be living in a world in which we did not have any logical or consistent experiences. You may now say, well the fact is that this does not happen. Most of us live in a apparently logical world. But surely the fact that it is possible for any one of us to live in a totally hallucinatory world where no experience carries any form of logical relationship serves as evidence against your framework.
In which case, how is it possible to falsify your framework ? Does ones experiences have to be absolutely free of logic and consistency to be classed as a falsification of your framework ? Mind you, if they are then you would not be in a position to be able to understand that they have been falsified !
So my first question is, why do not infer objective properties of objects from brain processes such as redness ?
I do. I told you this before. This is trivially obvious. When I look at an apple, and experience redness, I infer that the apple is reflecting certain wavelengths of light. That inference is made from the experience of redness, along with other factors (context).
Where on Earth did you get the idea that I do not?
I meant that you do not infer the property of redness onto an object from your experience of redness but you do infer the property of a logical relationship from your experience of a logical relationship.
davidsmith73
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Mercutio said:
No, you would still experience length whether or not you could tell how much length. If you did not experience any dimensions to the object then it would not appear to be there at all. You would see nothing.
Interesting Ian
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Mercutio said:
No. If we see something then we will always see it as some shape and length. This might well change (and most certainly will) as further information is received. Nevertheless this doesn't alter the fact that we will see the object as being of a certain shape and length.
Likewise for colour. As we receive further information, the colour will almost certainly be perceived as something different. This is quite evident. Just consider the checker square illusion and the fact that you agreed with me about always seeing the car as red even when the characteristics of the light changes.
We cannot draw a distinction between colour and length, whether we have in mind their measureable properties or that which is immediately experienced.
I'm amazed that you cannot understand this. Come on! You seem to be both a reasonable person and an intelligent one. Are you not able to understand that there cannot be any ontological difference between colour and length? I know Stimpy doesn't understand. Is this disease contageous??
Loki
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Ian,
First, the verification supplied by other consciousnesses. When the first British troops confronted the first Zulu warriors, the Zulus very quickly came to agree that 'bullets' were fatal - despite having never experienced this before. The Incas and Aztecs were quick to embrace the effects of various European diseases once the Spanish provided the opportunity. For some reason, human consciousnesses all seem to be able to agree on the "rules" of this non-existent universe.
Second, the universe itself tells us that there was a time where the *only* verified form of consciousness (humans) didn't exist. Of course, this can be explained as (a) conciousness existed in some other form/place/time back then, or (b) this sense of "long ago" is merely a deception that our human consciusnesses create. Either of these theories (and others) might be correct - but each is ignoring the information, or reinterpreting the information to find an explanation that fits. Why not just accept the explanation that the data actually is correct! That this enormously huge universe has an age and size that are incomprehensible to humans - we put figures on these things, but we cannot truly comprehend the values we are expressing. Just how many stars are in each galaxy, and how many galaxies make up this universe? The universe claims to have been here first. The universe claims to be so much bigger than we can ever comprehend. If consciousness brought this into existence, then why the deception? When you look at what the universe tells you Ian, it says "I don't need humans" - why do you think it's lying?
Perhaps you're right, and the "framework of human/conscious subjectivity" has always existed. Perhaps I'm right, and this framework as arisen as an emergent property from a background of a chaotic universe. Either way, neither of us denies it exists, and neither of us feels it is meaningless. Trust me on this Ian - I'm totally committed to creating "meaning" in my life, and the lives of those I interact with on a daily basis. Your simplistic assertions that this isn't (and can't) be so carry no weight with me, and seem to reveal an alarming lack of empathy on your part for the opposing viewpoint.
Because this 'reality' tells us this!
Not a delusion, an interpretation...or possibly more accurately, a reaction?
It's a universe full of 'triggers', which human experiences are a 'result' of. The unvierse is full of 'causes', and human experiences are 'effects' perhaps?
I have two reasons for supposing the universe exists independantly of my experiences.
First, the verification supplied by other consciousnesses. When the first British troops confronted the first Zulu warriors, the Zulus very quickly came to agree that 'bullets' were fatal - despite having never experienced this before. The Incas and Aztecs were quick to embrace the effects of various European diseases once the Spanish provided the opportunity. For some reason, human consciousnesses all seem to be able to agree on the "rules" of this non-existent universe.
Second, the universe itself tells us that there was a time where the *only* verified form of consciousness (humans) didn't exist. Of course, this can be explained as (a) conciousness existed in some other form/place/time back then, or (b) this sense of "long ago" is merely a deception that our human consciusnesses create. Either of these theories (and others) might be correct - but each is ignoring the information, or reinterpreting the information to find an explanation that fits. Why not just accept the explanation that the data actually is correct! That this enormously huge universe has an age and size that are incomprehensible to humans - we put figures on these things, but we cannot truly comprehend the values we are expressing. Just how many stars are in each galaxy, and how many galaxies make up this universe? The universe claims to have been here first. The universe claims to be so much bigger than we can ever comprehend. If consciousness brought this into existence, then why the deception? When you look at what the universe tells you Ian, it says "I don't need humans" - why do you think it's lying?
Note the use of "we". The assumption here, and I'm sure this is clearly what you believe, is that "human consciousness" is the focus of the Universe. This assumption appears to be denied by the (experienced) data that this universe provides.
Everything else you've said is your opinion regarding "reality" - and neither of us going to prove[ the other wrong. But this is just rubbish. My loves, hopes and fears are nothing over and above meaningless chemical processes? You don't believe that, and neither do I. My loves, hopes and fears are the result of chemical processes, but the meaning exists in the human frame of reference, not in a molecular frame of reference.
Perhaps you're right, and the "framework of human/conscious subjectivity" has always existed. Perhaps I'm right, and this framework as arisen as an emergent property from a background of a chaotic universe. Either way, neither of us denies it exists, and neither of us feels it is meaningless. Trust me on this Ian - I'm totally committed to creating "meaning" in my life, and the lives of those I interact with on a daily basis. Your simplistic assertions that this isn't (and can't) be so carry no weight with me, and seem to reveal an alarming lack of empathy on your part for the opposing viewpoint.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
So has the concept 'length' been elevated to a qualia, this beats plato and the eternal nature of beauty!
Damn there goes another irony meter.
(You guys are silly, which is not a qualia is is a value judgement)
Damn there goes another irony meter.
(You guys are silly, which is not a qualia is is a value judgement)
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
davidsmith73 said:
Sorry but the property of reddness is a learned process, it is not inate to the biological situation, it is learned response to the exposure to the color red.
Remeber mary who was raised in the black and white room? She will not see red when first exposed to it, it is learned from exposure to the experience.
Sorry, red does not exist outside of the perception.
You have to have the experience of red to percieve red and infer it's precense, a person like Mary can read about red , but she will not see it on first exposure.
davidsmith73
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Dancing David said:
According to the view held by Stimpy, which was the one I was addressing, you have confused the issues, as follows. Firstly, redness is not a property of anything. It is an experience and as such is a process, specifically occuring in the brain. Saying that this process is learned does not detract from the essential point that the experience of redness occurs when a particular brain process occurs. They are thought to be one and the same thing. Secondly, the brain process that is the experience of redness is formed in response to exposure of inferred objective properties such as the wavelength of light.
This may seem like nit picking with words but its important not to mix up meanings of words in this argument especially when you are trying to point out the inconsistencies in someone elses view point.
How does this answer my question raised in response to Stimpy's viewpoint ? Learning in the sense of brain processes is just a physical change in the process, i.e., its still a brain process.
Stimpson J. Cat
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davidsmith,
I most certainly do use the experience of redness to infer properties of an object. Specifically the property of reflecting a specific range of wavelengths of light. I just do not naively claim that the experience of redness itself is a property of the object.
I have no idea what you mean by "the experience of logical relationships". I do not experience any logical relationships. I infer logical relationships from my experiences.
If you want to express the framework in completely formal set theory, then it is more than one assumption. That is completely beside the point.
No. It would simply mean that any unfortunate person living in such a world would not be able to apply the scientific method. That hardly matters, though, because such a person would be incapable of rational thought anyway. In fact, I very much doubt that a human being could survive for any length of time under such conditions. The human brain simply is not designed to function under those conditions.
It is the standard situation. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
There is already very extraordinary evidence in support of the theory that the scientific method is valid. It would therefore require comparable extraordinary evidence to refute this claim.
Consider something less extreme, like falsifying Newtonian Mechanics nearly a century ago. No single observation of some anomaly that didn't fit with Newton's laws was going to convince anybody. Extraordinary evidence was required. When the preponderance of evidence against Newton's laws was sufficient so that the hypothesis that Newton's laws were correct, and that the evidence against them was in error, was no longer the most parsimonious explanation, the theory was falsified.
The same goes for science itself. I am not saying that it would be easy to falsify science if it is wrong. It would require a truly extraordinary amount of evidence. That is nothing more than a reflection of how well supported the theory already is.
You have to imagine what it would be like for somebody who understood the scientific method, but did not yet have any scientific knowledge. Put that person in a nightmare world where nothing makes any sense, and he will quickly discard the theory as falsified. Put you or I in such a world, it will be much harder to convince us, because the preponderance of evidence for the scientific method indicates that it is more likely that you are having some sort of serious neurological problems.
Ian,
Exactly what is it you are claiming I do not understand? I have explicitly told you, at least twice now, that I do not make any "ontological" distinction between the experiences we infer length from, and the experiences we infer wavelength of light from. They are both sensory experiences.
Mercutio has made it quite clear that he is using the term "color" to refer to the experience, and the term "length" to refer to the actual objective distance in space between two points. Your usage of the word "color" to refer to both the experience, and the wavelength of light, and the word "length" to refer to both the distance between points in space, and the experience that you infer this distance from, is purely a semantic issue. Your attempts to claim that Mercutio is saying something he clearly is not, by deliberately applying your definitions to his statements, in spite of the fact that you know his definitions are different than yours, is just plain dishonest.
This is the same old crap you always pull. You ignore people when they define their terms, and then accuse them of not making any sense when you apply your own definitions to what they have said.
Dr. Stupid
I most certainly do use the experience of redness to infer properties of an object. Specifically the property of reflecting a specific range of wavelengths of light. I just do not naively claim that the experience of redness itself is a property of the object.
I have no idea what you mean by "the experience of logical relationships". I do not experience any logical relationships. I infer logical relationships from my experiences.
If you want to express the framework in completely formal set theory, then it is more than one assumption. That is completely beside the point.
No. It would simply mean that any unfortunate person living in such a world would not be able to apply the scientific method. That hardly matters, though, because such a person would be incapable of rational thought anyway. In fact, I very much doubt that a human being could survive for any length of time under such conditions. The human brain simply is not designed to function under those conditions.
It is the standard situation. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
There is already very extraordinary evidence in support of the theory that the scientific method is valid. It would therefore require comparable extraordinary evidence to refute this claim.
Consider something less extreme, like falsifying Newtonian Mechanics nearly a century ago. No single observation of some anomaly that didn't fit with Newton's laws was going to convince anybody. Extraordinary evidence was required. When the preponderance of evidence against Newton's laws was sufficient so that the hypothesis that Newton's laws were correct, and that the evidence against them was in error, was no longer the most parsimonious explanation, the theory was falsified.
The same goes for science itself. I am not saying that it would be easy to falsify science if it is wrong. It would require a truly extraordinary amount of evidence. That is nothing more than a reflection of how well supported the theory already is.
You have to imagine what it would be like for somebody who understood the scientific method, but did not yet have any scientific knowledge. Put that person in a nightmare world where nothing makes any sense, and he will quickly discard the theory as falsified. Put you or I in such a world, it will be much harder to convince us, because the preponderance of evidence for the scientific method indicates that it is more likely that you are having some sort of serious neurological problems.
Ian,
Exactly what is it you are claiming I do not understand? I have explicitly told you, at least twice now, that I do not make any "ontological" distinction between the experiences we infer length from, and the experiences we infer wavelength of light from. They are both sensory experiences.
Mercutio has made it quite clear that he is using the term "color" to refer to the experience, and the term "length" to refer to the actual objective distance in space between two points. Your usage of the word "color" to refer to both the experience, and the wavelength of light, and the word "length" to refer to both the distance between points in space, and the experience that you infer this distance from, is purely a semantic issue. Your attempts to claim that Mercutio is saying something he clearly is not, by deliberately applying your definitions to his statements, in spite of the fact that you know his definitions are different than yours, is just plain dishonest.
This is the same old crap you always pull. You ignore people when they define their terms, and then accuse them of not making any sense when you apply your own definitions to what they have said.
Dr. Stupid
Interesting Ian
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Stimpson J. Cat said:
What a load of cr*p. Newton's laws were discarded because a better theory came along. Theories are not abandoned because they are falsified.
But why is he doing this?? It's just incredibly confusing! If he is to be consistent he should use the words color and length to refer to experiences, or he should use the words to refer to these properties as measured. But it is ridiculous for you and him to jumble them up like this! No wonder I'm bloody confused!
Just to note that would be intrinsically infer rather than "logically infer". As I explain below, this notion of yours, "logical inference", is without any meaning.
I made a long post last night, and when I pressed send I just got the microsoft eror page, and I couldn't get back what I'd typed out. I can't be bothered to type it all out again. But I did say that I thought it was you rather than I who was deliberately confusing the situation. I proposed that we call the actual experience of color by colorE and the measurement of color by colorM. The same for length.
BTW I am genuinely utterly confused about what your position is on this thread. More confused than anything I have ever read by you. So could you tell me if you disagree with any of the following.
We have colorE and lengthE. You call them processes in the brain. Now you say we infer lengthM from lengthE. I presumed you meant the normal sense of infer ie what Dymanic has labelled "intrinsic inference". However you claimed you did not mean this, and you were referring to what you called "logical inference". After further questioning it transpires that by "logical inference" you mean what we actually measure.
But in this case your contention that we infer lengthM from LengthE becomes we establish lengthM by measuring it! So lenthE is completely left out of the equation! So you cannot say that lenghtM is inferred, at least in the sense you mean "infer". Indeed your statement is now seen to be purely tautalogical.
Anyway, what I'm puzzled about is that you apparently treat length and color on differing ontological levels. As I said, if we experience a color (colorE) it will be of a certain shape and length (lengthE). By intrinsic inference (nb not the meaningless "logical inference") we can get some idea of colorM and lengthM.
So the question here is that from an ontological perspective it is simply not possible to distinguish color from length. But I get the impression you have been doing so in this thread. But hell, I really don't know!
Please tell me if you agree with the above.
Thanks.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
David Smith,
I have read this debate, but Iam not sure you understand the meaning of the scientidic method. It is a series of approxiamtions to test the nature of experince. It is valid irregardless of the ontology of the situation.
There is no way to say that it is falsifiable by saying that it is experiential. Just because something is experienced does not mean that it isn't verfiable.
Then there is this very mistaken quote, you have a very poor garsp of the intersection between human nature and the scientific method.
""""""
But surely the fact that it is possible for any one of us to live in a totally hallucinatory world where no experience carries any form of logical relationship serves as evidence against your framework.
"""""""
I am positive that you did not mean to say that people who are hallucinating or irrational are incapable of using the scientific method, but that seems to be be inherent in your statement.
That is the beauty of the scientific method, it doesn't matter if the theory involves eceltrons or pixies. As long the method makes a prediction about the behavior of the world. That is the beauty of the world , it is infinite, diverse and totaly coherent in terms of isotropy (okay maybe the fine structure unravels at a great distance)
I have read this debate, but Iam not sure you understand the meaning of the scientidic method. It is a series of approxiamtions to test the nature of experince. It is valid irregardless of the ontology of the situation.
There is no way to say that it is falsifiable by saying that it is experiential. Just because something is experienced does not mean that it isn't verfiable.
Then there is this very mistaken quote, you have a very poor garsp of the intersection between human nature and the scientific method.
""""""
But surely the fact that it is possible for any one of us to live in a totally hallucinatory world where no experience carries any form of logical relationship serves as evidence against your framework.
"""""""
I am positive that you did not mean to say that people who are hallucinating or irrational are incapable of using the scientific method, but that seems to be be inherent in your statement.
That is the beauty of the scientific method, it doesn't matter if the theory involves eceltrons or pixies. As long the method makes a prediction about the behavior of the world. That is the beauty of the world , it is infinite, diverse and totaly coherent in terms of isotropy (okay maybe the fine structure unravels at a great distance)
Stimpson J. Cat
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Ian,
If you were not so Hell-bent on finding flaws in my statements, you would realize that this is exactly what I said. Newton's theory plus the assumption that the non-conforming evidence was in error, was no longer the most parsimonious explanation. The new theory was more a more parsimonious explanation for the observations, and thus a "better" theory.
Likewise, The theory that the scientific method is valid will be falsified, and rejected, when the explanation that the scientific method is not valid, becomes a more parsimonious explanation for our observations.
No, what is confusing is to use the terms "color" and "length" to refer to both, as you have been doing. This makes absolutely no sense, given that the discussion is about the nature of the distinction between sensory experiences and the qualities of objects that are inferred from them.
You are confused for no other reason than that you wish to be. I know for a fact that you are not as stupid as you would have to be otherwise.
The hell it is. I infer all sorts of things about the objects I perceive that are not inferred "intrinsically".
The intrinsic inference is just intuitive inference. Yes, it is there too. But you have to be a fool to rely entirely on it. It is known to be unreliable.
In any event, this still has absolutely no relevance to the point we have been trying to make, which is that sensory experiences are not properties of the objects being perceived. They are brain processes.
Works for me.
Yes, the actual objective value. For example, I measure my monitor to be 15" diagonal. That is not an "intrinsic" inference of lengthM. My intrinsic inference of lengthM just tells me its approximate size compared to other things in my visual field, and varies greatly depending on context.
Both are inferences about objective objects from the sensory experience. One is an intuitive inference, and the other is a logical inference.
How do you figure? You want to explain to me how you can measure something without logically inferring the result from your experiences?
That makes no sense. How you measure the lengthM of something? You compare the lengthE you associate with it to the lengthE associated with something whose lengthM is known, under conditions which allow you to logically infer the relative values of their lengthM's from their LengthE's.
There can be no measurement without sensory experience. That is trivially obvious.
Yes, we intuitively infer colorM and lengthM from colorE and lengthE. So what? ColorE and lengthE are still brain processes, as is the process of intuitive inference, and as is the process of logical inference.
I have not been, and I am completely at a loss as to how you could think I am, after I have not only gone to great pains to clarify when I am talking about an experience vs an objective property, and have specifically told you that I am not making any such distinction.
Dr. Stupid
If you were not so Hell-bent on finding flaws in my statements, you would realize that this is exactly what I said. Newton's theory plus the assumption that the non-conforming evidence was in error, was no longer the most parsimonious explanation. The new theory was more a more parsimonious explanation for the observations, and thus a "better" theory.
Likewise, The theory that the scientific method is valid will be falsified, and rejected, when the explanation that the scientific method is not valid, becomes a more parsimonious explanation for our observations.
No, what is confusing is to use the terms "color" and "length" to refer to both, as you have been doing. This makes absolutely no sense, given that the discussion is about the nature of the distinction between sensory experiences and the qualities of objects that are inferred from them.
You are confused for no other reason than that you wish to be. I know for a fact that you are not as stupid as you would have to be otherwise.
The hell it is. I infer all sorts of things about the objects I perceive that are not inferred "intrinsically".
The intrinsic inference is just intuitive inference. Yes, it is there too. But you have to be a fool to rely entirely on it. It is known to be unreliable.
In any event, this still has absolutely no relevance to the point we have been trying to make, which is that sensory experiences are not properties of the objects being perceived. They are brain processes.
Works for me.
Yes, the actual objective value. For example, I measure my monitor to be 15" diagonal. That is not an "intrinsic" inference of lengthM. My intrinsic inference of lengthM just tells me its approximate size compared to other things in my visual field, and varies greatly depending on context.
Both are inferences about objective objects from the sensory experience. One is an intuitive inference, and the other is a logical inference.
How do you figure? You want to explain to me how you can measure something without logically inferring the result from your experiences?
That makes no sense. How you measure the lengthM of something? You compare the lengthE you associate with it to the lengthE associated with something whose lengthM is known, under conditions which allow you to logically infer the relative values of their lengthM's from their LengthE's.
There can be no measurement without sensory experience. That is trivially obvious.
Yes, we intuitively infer colorM and lengthM from colorE and lengthE. So what? ColorE and lengthE are still brain processes, as is the process of intuitive inference, and as is the process of logical inference.
I have not been, and I am completely at a loss as to how you could think I am, after I have not only gone to great pains to clarify when I am talking about an experience vs an objective property, and have specifically told you that I am not making any such distinction.
Dr. Stupid
I understand (and empathise!), but it is not my fault--it is our language that uses the one word in multiple ways (far more than just our experience/property distinction--for instance, we metaphorically say our philosophical assumptions color the things we write here. Our colloquial language was not meant to be precise, whereas our scientific language has to be, to the extent that it can.)Interesting Ian said:But why is he doing this?? It's just incredibly confusing! If he is to be consistent he should use the words color and length to refer to experiences, or he should use the words to refer to these properties as measured. But it is ridiculous for you and him to jumble them up like this! No wonder I'm bloody confused!
An interesting distinction! I believe this does show that you are trying to understand rather than trying to obfuscate. I will, however, have to give it some time and consideration--you wouldn't want me to just throw something together....*snip*... I proposed that we call the actual experience of color by colorE and the measurement of color by colorM. The same for length.
BTW I am genuinely utterly confused about what your position is on this thread. More confused than anything I have ever read by you. So could you tell me if you disagree with any of the following.
We have colorE and lengthE. You call them processes in the brain. Now you say we infer lengthM from lengthE. I presumed you meant the normal sense of infer ie what Dymanic has labelled "intrinsic inference". However you claimed you did not mean this, and you were referring to what you called "logical inference". After further questioning it transpires that by "logical inference" you mean what we actually measure.
But in this case your contention that we infer lengthM from LengthE becomes we establish lengthM by measuring it! So lenthE is completely left out of the equation! So you cannot say that lenghtM is inferred, at least in the sense you mean "infer". Indeed your statement is now seen to be purely tautalogical.
Anyway, what I'm puzzled about is that you apparently treat length and color on differing ontological levels. As I said, if we experience a color (colorE) it will be of a certain shape and length (lengthE). By intrinsic inference (nb not the meaningless "logical inference") we can get some idea of colorM and lengthM.
So the question here is that from an ontological perspective it is simply not possible to distinguish color from length. But I get the impression you have been doing so in this thread. But hell, I really don't know!
Please tell me if you agree with the above.
Thanks.
A thought though, based on the structure of our retinas and the structure of the arguments in this thread. We (I hope) agree that colorE is experienced. (ok, for stimpy and me, there is a process that we would call seeing color(E)). Could we not say that what you (Ian) are calling lengthE must be infered from our experience of where one color leaves off and another begins? Think of camoflage--the best way to hide something is to obscure its outline, either by blending color or by breaking contours by including extra breaks between colors. This works because we (arguably, this is what I'm contemplating here and putting out for your commentary) tell where an object begins and ends based on changes in color. (I saw a wonderful photo of a large ship--a carrier, perhaps--that was camoflaged to look like two considerably smaller and less torpedo-worthy ships. The space between the two painted-on ships was the grey-blue color of ocean and sky, and was at one of the more vulnerable areas of the ship. You really have to study the photo closely to see that the two ships are in fact part of a much bigger single ship.)
Thus, my "head in a vise" example was perhaps justifiably torn apart, not because it was wrong but because I used the wrong explanation. If the background was of the exact same color as the object, you could not see its length because you could not tell where it begins and ends without infering this from a color change. (again I use "infer" in the near-instantaneous "translate" sense). You still would see red, but no length or width or shape. Length, width and shape all depend on a change of color to show where one thing leaves off and another begins.
(Ok, I have decided, Ian--I like the distinction. It makes the topics easier to handle, even if one conclusion might be that lengthE does not exist!)
Well, it's known to be reliably fast anyway. To me, the term 'intuition' actually implies a certain reliability; the ability to reach conclusions based on facts not in evidence, with a success rate better than what would be expected by random chance.
Some biogists (and others) seem to assume that the intrinsic inferences our visual processes make about such things as the length of an object (or, say, the navigational abilities of some migratory animals) are the results of logical algorithmic processes; that as we move about in our environments (driving, playing billiards, putting away groceries, whatever) somewhere deep in the cognitive machinery some fiendishly efficient trig routines are crunching numbers (or something) at dizzying speed. I am not entirely conviced that this is not attributing to the process more sophistication (or at least more deliberation) than it actually employs.
Presumably, these routines aquire their efficiency through a trial-and-error based learning process (which is what infants are doing when they manipulate objects). But this learning process differs significantly from the way we learn trigonometry in school, because there is much more reliance on hard-wiring by selectively establishing neural connections; this flexibility diminishes as free connections become committed, and the specific sets of connections that are retained are those that gave outputs which, when used as the basis for actions, had a statistically favorable chance of producing functionally useful results (such as "cookie now within grabbing range").
Solving a problem in trigonometry (the hard way) involves a progressive series of steps, each of which must be done according to a fixed set of logical rules, each rule producing an exact result. If any step is skipped, or done incorrectly, the end result is likely to be wildly inaccurate.
But what if our low-level intrinsic inference engines don't work that way? The conclusions they produce do not have to be precise or logically defensible, they merely have to lead to statistically favorable conclusions (as defined by the context of an organism interacting with its environment). What if they are enthymematic (an argument consisting of only two propositions, an antecedent and consequent deduced from it; a syllogism with one premise omitted)?
So in an environment in which some red berries are poisonous, getting sick after eating red berries might generate the conclusion: "red berries make you sick". Because some steps were skipped along the way, this conclusion might in fact be erroneous; it might be that some of the red berries are actually quite safe and nutritious. But if the potential risk of being poisoned by eating red berries outweighs the potential risk of starvation by avoiding them, then employing a simple rule such as: "avoid all red berries" might be good enough (certainly cheaper).
Maybe our intrinsic visual inference engines somehow employ what has been called 'mathematical intuition'; the same property that enables us to do what a Turing Machine cannot -- to say, "this calculation will end", or, "this calculation will run on forever". Since this determination provably cannot be reached through a discrete series of steps, our brains must somehow rely on some non-logical process. A happy thought is the possibility that this could be a product of less complexity, rather than more.
Suggestologist
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[/B]Stimpson J. Cat said:
It was a possibility that others have suggested, so I decided to ask if it was your position. It wasn't. Sorry to have bothered to ask.
You could replicate the experiment; but the subjects would still be the ones corroborating that their subjective experiences were adequately mind-probed. The only way the experimenter could assure himself that some joke by a rival lab(s) wasn't being played on him -- would be to experience the mind-probe process him/herself. Or, how would you double-blind this particular experiment?
Perhaps they have no other personal experience that would lead them to believe that any other ways could or should exist. It may indeed be true that assuming god exists gives their lives "meaning" -- whatever "meaning" means to them. And that a "meaning" from any other source would not have the same meaning of "meaning" to them.
Suggestologist
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Interesting Ian said:
In General Semantics(tm), this is called indexing. Korzybski's ("The Map is not the Territory") invention. A General Semanticist would probably just use the full words with subscripts. Online, I've sometimes used a form like: color_measurement, color_experience, length_measurement, length_experience. Or even: Length_Ian, Length_Stimpy; to index by the person who developed the definition. What people are discussing is a little more transparent that way.
Stimpson J. Cat
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Loki,
Did I mention my computer is a laptop?
Dr. Stupid
Did I mention my computer is a laptop?
Dr. Stupid
davidsmith73
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Stimpson J. Cat said:
The wavelength of light is inferred from a completely different set of experiences. You cannot infer wavelength from the experience of redness alone. If you can, you must show me because I'm bemused at your statement! Wavelength is a quantitative inference. Therefore it must have been inferred from an experience of logical and consistent relationships. Redness is not an experience that has logical relationships therfore you cannot infer the property of logical relationships from the experience of redness.
What ? Of course you experience logical relationships. If you did not then you would not have any basis for inferring the objective existence of them. I understand that the inferred property of logical relationships are not experienced but they are inferred from an experience of logical relationships. They have to be.
So why can’t the fact that some inconsistent and illogical experiences exist be falsification of your framework ? You have to have a condition under which the framework can be falsified at any time !
What kind of evidence ? I still don’t see how your framework could be falsified.
In this situation it would be impossible to convince us because any experiences that did not make sense would be attributable to the subjective. How would you be convinced that your framework had been falsified ?