A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

BTW, Ian, you aren't literally the same person you were yesterday. The atoms of your body are constantly being exchanged, added to and subtracted from. In addition, your personality today is not the same as it was when you were 2 years old or 5 years old or even as it was yesterday. It changes constantly. [/B]

One could say my personality changes all the time yes. One day I might be in a bad mood, another day I might be in a good mood, sometimes I feel happy, sometimes sad etc. But if you're actually being serious about the idea that I literally cease to exist, to be replaced by another self springing into being, just because something happens which causes me to switch from a bad mood to a good mood, then I hardly think that this is intuitively compelling (remember you said materialism is intuitively right). It is much more intuitively compelling to suppose there is an unchanging self which simply feels differently at different times.

 

[ceptimus]

It is much more intuitively compelling to suppose there is an unchanging self which simply feels differently at different times.

Materialism wouldn't define 'self' as an identifiable object like you do. To a materialist, the 'self' you speak of is analagous to the 'atmosphere' at a sports event. One can talk of a sports crowd having a good or bad atmosphere, even though individuals may join or leave the crowd. The 'atmosphere' is just a description of the total actions of the crowd - it doesn't exist in isolation - you can't point to it and say, 'Theres a piece of atmosphere.' But when the crowd leaves, the atmosphere no longer exists. Both 'atmosphere' (in this sense) and 'self' (in your sense) are just labels we apply to the large scale actions of a complicated set of parts.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Materialism wouldn't define 'self' as an identifiable object like you do. To a materialist, the 'self' you speak of is analagous to the 'atmosphere' at a sports event. One can talk of a sports crowd having a good or bad atmosphere, even though individuals may join or leave the crowd. The 'atmosphere' is just a description of the total actions of the crowd - it doesn't exist in isolation - you can't point to it and say, 'Theres a piece of atmosphere.' But when the crowd leaves, the atmosphere no longer exists. Both 'atmosphere' (in this sense) and 'self' (in your sense) are just labels we apply to the large scale actions of a complicated set of parts.

I was responding to DD's assertion that I am not literally the same person as I was yesterday. So it seems that he is hinting at a self which ceases to exist to be replaced by another. But you're seem to be saying that there is a self (the atmosphere in your analogy) and it remains intact despite physical changes in the brain (atmosphere changes). Is that right? But this means that the self is not determined by a particular physical configuration of the brain. So what is it determined by?

 

[Interesting Ian]

slimshady

In your thought experiment, you say location does not matter and therefore the two consciousness' they have the same totality of physical facts.

What about the brains? They have the same totality of physical facts as each other except for loaction, so you are saying that Materialism must also there is only one brain.

If you do not say that in your thought expriment Materialism must say there is only one brain (like you HAVE said that Materialism must say there is only ONE consciousness) then explain why the brains are different and they suddenly are not determined by the totality of physical facts (disregarding location).


Loki

We place a glass of water in each room. The glasses are identical, in every possible physical way. All physically measurable attributes of the glasses of water are identical. In this case, the two glasses are identical, and the two locations are identical. All possible "effects/interactions" that apply to one glass are the same for the other. Yet in the case of the glasses of water the totality of physical facts *are not* identical - they differ *only* in location. Does the universe contain 1 unique glass of water, or two unique glasses of water with identical contents, interactins, etc?

Just answer the question about the glasses of water. Explain why there is one, or two, under a materialist worldview. Perhaps then I'll understand what it is you are saying...

Ok just to clear up this misunderstanding. There is no problem with saying there are 2 glasses of water and that they are absolutely identical. Same for bars of chocolate etc. If I'm feeling thirsty it absolutely does not matter which glass of water I drink.

And of course we can take this much further. If my internal organs were replaced by absolute identical duplicates then it cannot possibly make any difference to me whatsoever. Same goes even if my brain is replaced by an absolutely identical one (and as an aside I would say this even from the perspective of my idealism, although we're presupposing materialism here in our arguments).

Now imagine a star trek transporter device. The original body is destroyed and a exact duplicate appears at some other location. If materialism is true then you necessarily must agree that the duplicate really is you in every sense of the word. It is your very stream of consciousness. This is despite the difference in location. And if you still harbour doubts about the location issue then just imagine you were in a room, and your body was destroyed, and simultaneously a duplicate were created in a garden outside that room. It would then be true that this duplicate would be you in the fullest sense of the term just as much than if you were in the room and had simply walked outside. Now do you both agree with this? Anyone disagree?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Location is irrelevant as to how the physical laws work, it is NOT irrelevant to identity!!!!! Think for a second

I wonder if you could explain to me why this is so Adam?

 

[fsol]

And if you still harbour doubts about the location issue then just imagine you were in a room, and your body was destroyed, and simultaneously a duplicate were created in a garden outside that room. It would then be true that this duplicate would be you in the fullest sense of the term just as much than if you were in the room and had simply walked outside. Now do you both agree with this? Anyone disagree?

I would still be "me," but if I had walked out of the room I would be a different "me." This is because I would have experienced walking out of the room that particular time.

 

[slimshady2357]

I wonder if you could explain to me why this is so Adam?

Well besides the fact that location in relation to other objects is a physical fact, thus part of the totality of physical facts, it's also one of the reasons we say things like 'there are photons' and there are 'electrons'.

Otherwise, since they are indistinguishable, scientists would be saying 'there is one electron, it happens to be in an almost infinite number of objects (and locations) at once'.

The fact that something can not occupy two different locations in space-time and be the same thing is something I thought was rather obvious.

You seem to be stuck on consiousness being a 'special' entity. It's not in materialism.

Will you finally, please, explain clearly why you believe in your thought experiment a materialist would NOT say there is only one brain, but MUST say there is only one consciousness (seeing out of two pairs of eyes).

Please, I've asked this a number of times and you have never explained it. I think it will help get to the heart of the misunderstanding. Why DOES location matter for the brains in your thought experiment, since that is the only physical fact different about the brains too?

Adam

 

[Mercutio]

Now imagine a star trek transporter device. The original body is destroyed and a exact duplicate appears at some other location. If materialism is true then you necessarily must agree that the duplicate really is you in every sense of the word. It is your very stream of consciousness. This is despite the difference in location. And if you still harbour doubts about the location issue then just imagine you were in a room, and your body was destroyed, and simultaneously a duplicate were created in a garden outside that room. It would then be true that this duplicate would be you in the fullest sense of the term just as much than if you were in the room and had simply walked outside. Now do you both agree with this? Anyone disagree?

As far as I understand you, I do agree. Now, if the transporter glitched and created two Ians, materialism would, as I understand it, predict that both of them would think that they were the original Ian, with his complete memory (current understanding is that it is not the particular atoms and molecules, but rather the structure of synaptic connections between neurons that is changed through experience--theoretically, this structure would be identical in each Ian, despite the different molecules forming it--two identical buildings from the same blueprints, using the same building materials, etc...). Obviously, both being original Ians, they would immediately begin arguing with one another about which one was the copy--at this point (actually, at the very first point where their experiences diverge, so at the point of transmission), they begin to change--but only as much as you change from minute to minute due to your experience. You would have created two identical consciousnesses for only a moment, then would have two extraordinarily similar ones for a longer time. How much they diverge over time, of course, is the old nature/nurture question.

Would you still think both would experience one consciousness out of 2 sets of eyes? Or are we in rough agreement?

 

[slimshady2357]

And if you still harbour doubts about the location issue then just imagine you were in a room, and your body was destroyed, and simultaneously a duplicate were created in a garden outside that room. It would then be true that this duplicate would be you in the fullest sense of the term just as much than if you were in the room and had simply walked outside. Now do you both agree with this? Anyone disagree?

I do agree with it.

But here's where we seem to differ, if I was not destroyed and a duplicate was made in the garden (call him G-Adam), then G-Adam would, for an instant be 'me' too. He would have every right to call himself just Adam. He would have a continuous conscious experiecne exactly the same as mine. None-the-less, he would be a seperate consciousness from mine.

There would be two *I*s, two streams of consciousness which are, for an instant, exactly the same. But there would be two of them, exact in every way except for location, just like their brains.

This is exactly what Materialism predicts, because it's exactly what materialism predicts for the brain. The identity of a brain and the identity of consciousness are determined in the same way for materialism, the totality of physical facts. And so the same rules apply, if you can say there are two seperate but identical brains, you must say there are two seperate but identical consciousness'.

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well besides the fact that location in relation to other objects is a physical fact, thus part of the totality of physical facts, it's also one of the reasons we say things like 'there are photons' and there are 'electrons'.

Otherwise, since they are indistinguishable, scientists would be saying 'there is one electron, it happens to be in an almost infinite number of objects (and locations) at once'.

Some of them are disposed to think that aren't they? And indeed I would have some sympathy for this view.

The fact that something can not occupy two different locations in space-time and be the same thing is something I thought was rather obvious.

You seem to be stuck on consiousness being a 'special' entity. It's not in materialism.

Will you finally, please, explain clearly why you believe in your thought experiment a materialist would NOT say there is only one brain, but MUST say there is only one consciousness (seeing out of two pairs of eyes).

Please, I've asked this a number of times and you have never explained it. I think it will help get to the heart of the misunderstanding. Why DOES location matter for the brains in your thought experiment, since that is the only physical fact different about the brains too?

Adam

Well I wanted you to respond to my star trek transporter question first. I need to see where you stand in relation to that, because if you disagree with me there then my whole argument is going to fail for you.

Edited to add: Ah! I see you have responded

 

[Interesting Ian]

And if you still harbour doubts about the location issue then just imagine you were in a room, and your body was destroyed, and simultaneously a duplicate were created in a garden outside that room. It would then be true that this duplicate would be you in the fullest sense of the term just as much than if you were in the room and had simply walked outside. Now do you both agree with this? Anyone disagree?
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I would still be "me," but if I had walked out of the room I would be a different "me." This is because I would have experienced walking out of the room that particular time.

Ok, imagine that the duplicate had memories implanted of walking out of the room. Now it would be true that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the term just if if you had merely walked out of the room, yes?

 

[Interesting Ian]

As far as I understand you, I do agree. Now, if the transporter glitched and created two Ians, materialism would, as I understand it, predict that both of them would think that they were the original Ian, with his complete memory (current understanding is that it is not the particular atoms and molecules, but rather the structure of synaptic connections between neurons that is changed through experience--theoretically, this structure would be identical in each Ian, despite the different molecules forming it--two identical buildings from the same blueprints, using the same building materials, etc...). Obviously, both being original Ians, they would immediately begin arguing with one another about which one was the copy--at this point (actually, at the very first point where their experiences diverge, so at the point of transmission), they begin to change--but only as much as you change from minute to minute due to your experience. You would have created two identical consciousnesses for only a moment, then would have two extraordinarily similar ones for a longer time. How much they diverge over time, of course, is the old nature/nurture question.

Would you still think both would experience one consciousness out of 2 sets of eyes? Or are we in rough agreement?

No I'm afraid we're not in rough agreement But of course this relates to the argument I shall deliver which Adams keeps demanding I give. BTW if this really did happen, the 2 Ian's wouldn't start arguing about who is the copy because they would be intelligent enough to know this cannot conceivably be of any relevance.

 

[fsol]

Ok, imagine that the duplicate had memories implanted of walking out of the room. Now it would be true that the duplicate is you in the fullest sense of the term just if if you had merely walked out of the room, yes?

Yes. But it would not be a duplicate of me before I had walked out of the room. It would have the additional experience that you had implanted.

 

[slimshady2357]

I've been demanding you give that argument since the start because you've been equivocating on the matter since the beginning! Plus, I truly do believe it will help us get to the heart of the misuderstanding.

Under Materialism location does make a difference for some things, but not for others when determining identity ... that has been your implicit stance from beginning. I've been trying to get to the bottom of why you believe this for some time now.

I will enjoy you actually addressing this point

Adam

 

[Interesting Ian]

There would be two *I*s, two streams of consciousness which are, for an instant, exactly the same. But there would be two of them, exact in every way except for location, just like their brains.

Adam [/B]

Well I think the brains might be the same in a way that the 2 streams of consciousnesses aren't. But let's forget about this for now and concentrate on the question I'm going to ask you and others in my next post.

 

[ceptimus]

I was responding to DD's assertion that I am not literally the same person as I was yesterday. So it seems that he is hinting at a self which ceases to exist to be replaced by another. But you're seem to be saying that there is a self (the atmosphere in your analogy) and it remains intact despite physical changes in the brain (atmosphere changes). Is that right?

Yes. That's what I think - I can't speak for DD of course

But this means that the self is not determined by a particular physical configuration of the brain. So what is it determined by?

It is determined by the configuration of the brain I think, but it doesn't exist in an objective sense. To me, 'self' is a property of the brain machinery, in the same way that temperature is a property of (say) a ball. The temperature doesn't belong to any particuar bit of the ball, but to the ball as a whole. We could replace the ball a bit at a time, but it would still be a ball and it would still have a temperature. To ask, 'where would the temperature be if we took the ball away?' is meaningless.

To me, asking 'where is the self?' is equally meaningless - it is just a property possessed by brains (and potentially by other very complicated 'thinking machines').

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes. But it would not be a duplicate of me before I had walked out of the room. It would have the additional experience that you had implanted.

Well it would be the duplicate of you after you had walked out of the room.

Sorry Adam, but it wasn't the next post after all

 

[fsol]

Well it would be the duplicate of you after you had walked out of the room.

Umm, I already agreed with that.

It only works if the original "me" was destroyed though. Otherwise for it to be an exact duplicate, it would have to exist at the same location as the original and at the same time. In other words it would have to materialise at the instant the original reached that location. The problem with that is I can't walk through walls.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Self and abstraction

Dear Ian,

I really think the materialists here won't understand the same thing by a 'self' than you or I would. As far as I understand them, a self is nothing but an abstract description of purely physical structures or processes in the brain. As would go for any abstraction, it's a matter of degree whether one would call a self different or similar when compared to another self. As they're repeating here, the self who typed in this post is strictly speaking not the same self as the self who will read your response to it. For substantialists like ourselves that it is problematic, as for us the difference between two selves is absolute, and certainly not gradual. But that's the consequence of our substantialist views of the self, which obviously is not shared by materialism. We're talking about a very real, irreducible element in reality, whereas they're just talking about an abstract entity which does not really exist apart from the physical processes it's an abstraction from. The non-physical self is beyond materialism.

Titus

 

[Interesting Ian]

A question to Adam and others

Lets suppose we have the technology to precisely physically duplicate peoples' bodies. Let's imagine that someone were to offer you $10,000 if you allowed them to physically duplicate your body, but that they would kill the duplicate Adam 24 hours after duplication so that he only actually lives 24 hours. Let's further imagine that you never even get to see the duplicate Adam.

You would surely accept this offer because after all this duplicate Adam doesn't exist now, so when he gets killed after allowing him to live 24 hours, that cannot possibly make you worse off than you are now. So basically you would be getting $10,000 for nothing, right?