A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

And I don't get it, I don't get why you can't admit you're wrong. I don't get why you won't back down, like some cornered animal, even when totally beaten. No I don't get that at all.

Adam [/B]

Are you being entirely serious? I have admitted any mistakes I have made in the past in these forums. If I truly believed I am in error I would have no hesitancy in stating this.

I consider you to be a highly intelligent guy, and must confess to be somewhat taken back by your inability to understand my argument. But I suppose that probably all of us can be really intelligent in some areas and seriously deficient in our understanding in other areas. Most curious.

 

[slimshady2357]

I consider you to be a highly intelligent guy, and must confess to be somewhat taken back by your inability to understand my argument. But I suppose that probably all of us can be really intelligent in some areas and seriously deficient in our understanding in other areas. Most curious.

Right back at ya

Adam

 

[Mercutio]

You can say that as many times as you want Mercutio, Ian just won't admit he's wrong.

The only conclusion left is that he is being purposefully obtuse because his frail ego cannot accept that he is wrong. It's becoming quite sad the way he avoids all points he cannot answer

I'm going to give it one more try, but it's unlikely he'll suddenly become man enough to admit he's wrong.

Adam

Actually, Adam, I have seen Ian admit it when he has been convinced he is wrong. (I suppose that's what keeps me going). So I believe him when he says

Are you being entirely serious? I have admitted any mistakes I have made in the past in these forums. If I truly believed I am in error I would have no hesitancy in stating this.

I consider you to be a highly intelligent guy, and must confess to be somewhat taken back by your inability to understand my argument. But I suppose that probably all of us can be really intelligent in some areas and seriously deficient in our understanding in other areas. Most curious.

It's just that, in most cases where he won't back down, I can see his point of view. Here, however, he is claiming to investigate a materialistic interpretation. He's wrong, it is a very simple idea, I just don't get his not understanding (Ian, I do get Adam and my not understanding you; I can accept wholeheartedly that I don't understand you in this thread, at least recently).

What really bothers me is that this thread (and I bear guilt here) is now threatening to (or perhaps already has) overtake my limerick thread in terms of number of posts. It is already safely in the top ten longest threads...I'm gonna start deleting my posts here...

 

[Loki]

Ian,

(addressed to slimshady) ...and must confess to be somewhat taken back by your inability to understand my argument.

It's not that I can't understand your argument - I can't even find it!

How many times must I repeat myself???? This is totally utterly completely irrelevant!!

I do not intend going through the same arguments again.

If I understand you, it is simply your opinion that :

Location is irrelevant because two identical locations would produce identical "effects/interactions" on the two consciousnesses, leaving them with identical contents. Therefore, there is only one "stream of consciousness" that "sees out of both sets of eyes". You and I both agree the immediately preceeding sentence is gibberish. You think materialism requires that sentence be true. I can't see how.

Various others reply that location is integral to identity. For example :

We place a glass of water in each room. The glasses are identical, in every possible physical way. All physically measurable attributes of the glasses of water are identical. In this case, the two glasses are identical, and the two locations are identical. All possible "effects/interactions" that apply to one glass are the same for the other. Yet in the case of the glasses of water the totality of physical facts *are not* identical - they differ *only* in location. Does the universe contain 1 unique glass of water, or two unique glasses of water with identical contents, interactins, etc?

Just answer the question about the glasses of water. Explain why there is one, or two, under a materialist worldview. Perhaps then I'll understand what it is you are saying...

 

[Titus Rivas]

Form and substance

Hi Ian,

Can you please tell me once more why you believe that materialism should lead to noetic monism in your thought experiment?

First of all, let's not forget that reductive materialism does not really acknowledge the existence of an irreducible, non-physical mind. So rather than saying that two identical brains would lead to one and the same mind, they would hold that there is no mind, in our shared sense of an irreducible non-physical entity.

Let's see what would happen if we adopted the reductive materialist definition of the mind, i.e. certain physical processes in the brain. I believe Stimpson, Loki, etc. would be right in concluding that two absolutely identical brains contain an identical mind, without these two identical minds being therefore one and the same mind. They would share all their characteristics, just like two hypothetical identical bars of chocolate would. Just like you can eat one bar of chocolate while the second one stays intact, you can destroy one mind in the materialist sense without thereby destroying the other one. In Platonic terminology, they are both concrete realizations or embodiments of the same Idea (or Form), but they aren't thereby one and the same realization or embodiment of this particular Idea. They may share the same form, but remain a different temporal and/or spatial part of the physical world.

Finally, let's consider the epiphenomenalist position. Though the mind wouldn't be identical to brain processes, the same logic applies here. Though the two minds share all of their mental characteristics, they still aren't the same mind.

This even applies to radical dualism or idealism. The mere sharing of all characteristics doesn't make two entities ontologically identical in the substantial sense. (Assuming that all characteristics can indeed be shared.)
That's because the experient cannot be reduced to its experiences or other mental characteristics, or in more technical terms borrowed from Bernhard Bolzano, a substance cannot be reduced to a bundle of its adherentiae (properties).

Best wishes

Titus

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Form and substance

noetic monism reductive materialism irreducible epiphenomenalist radical dualism idealism ontologically adherentiae.

Can anyone learn to use these words, or is it necessary to possess a natural gift for them?

 

[Titus Rivas]

Jargon

noetic monism reductive materialism irreducible epiphenomenalist radical dualism idealism ontologically adherentiae. noetic monism reductive materialism irreducible epiphenomenalist radical dualism idealism ontologically adherentiae.

Can anyone learn to use these words, or is it necessary to possess a natural gift for them?

Well, they're basically a handy shorthand when we're talking about philosophical subjects or subjects with philosophical angles, ceptimus. They shouldn't be seen as more complex (or more mysterious) than any other jargon I believe.

Titus

 

[ceptimus]

Re: Jargon

Well, they're basically a handy shorthand when we're talking about philosophical subjects or subjects with philosophical angles, ceptimus. They shouldn't be seen as more complex (or more mysterious) than any other jargon I believe.

Titus

Thanks. That's what I thought. I wonder what proportion of the people reading this thread think they understand what most of the words mean?

I worry that even those who believe they do understand the meaning of the words, may not have a shared understanding. So a few people who think they know the jargon may actually be talking at cross-purposes with each other, and the rest of us, who don't know the jargon, have no idea what's going on.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ceptimus, do you feel as if you're missing something important?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Form and substance

Let's see what would happen if we adopted the reductive materialist definition of the mind, i.e. certain physical processes in the brain. I believe Stimpson, Loki, etc. would be right in concluding that two absolutely identical brains contain an identical mind, without these two identical minds being therefore one and the same mind.

Well I obviously disagree with this. I mean ideally this should be the materialist position, and yet it can't be because it is conceptually incoherent since the totality of physical facts would then be insufficient to determine the self. So the materialist (and epiphenomenalist) has to retreat to the position that the self would have to experience out of both the 2 bodies.

I did explain all this about a year ago in the "staying alive" thread which I believe that both Loki and Slimshady read. It didn't get anywhere. No-one agreed with me then, not even any of the non-materialists, and if I repeat the argument again it seems unlikely they will agree with me now. It's very unfortunate that thread has dissappeared.

Oh well, I'm giving it another bash tomorrow. I was intending to anyway otherwise Adam (slimshady) will start claiming it's because I can't think how to respond! LOL Been too busy today and yesterday.

BTW I'm afraid I have never heard of noetic monism. I've heard of the word noetic though which I suppose is impressive!

 

[Titus Rivas]

No irreducible self in reductive materialism

Hi Ian,

Well I obviously disagree with this. I mean ideally this should be the materialist position, and yet it can't be because it is conceptually incoherent since the totality of physical facts would then be insufficient to determine the self. So the materialist (and epiphenomenalist) has to retreat to the position that the self would have to experience out of both the 2 bodies.

I think the problem might be that the self in a non-materialist sense, simply is not part of the reductive materialist world view anyway.
A reductive materialist may use the word "self" as a synonym for (a) self-concept -meaning here the quantifiable concept a physical system may have of itself- or (b) the physical system itself which may have a self-concept. But the non-materialist sense of an irreducible, non-physical experient simply falls outside the scope of reductive materialism. In other words, mind-boggling though this may seem, there simply isn't any self in the irreducible sense according to reductive materialism. For a reductive materialist, the self does not experience anything in the non-physical sense, as there is no non-physical self nor any non-physical experience. In other words, we can certainly hold it against a reductive materialist that he denies the obvious, but it's even quite reassuring that the subsequent deductions from his absurd positions are at least sound.

But maybe I still haven't got your point. You know I welcome any additional formulations to show the incoherence of reductive materialism .

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Well I obviously disagree with this. I mean ideally this should be the materialist position, and yet it can't be because it is conceptually incoherent since the totality of physical facts would then be insufficient to determine the self.

So you're saying that the fact that there are two copies of something is not a physical fact about those two things?

If you are saying that, then clearly there is a fundamental aspect of your worldview that many of us are not grokking. Not just a little aspect, but a great big honking aspect.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: No irreducible self in reductive materialism

Hi Ian,


I think the problem might be that the self in a non-materialist sense, simply is not part of the reductive materialist world view anyway.
A reductive materialist may use the word "self" as a synonym for (a) self-concept -meaning here the quantifiable concept a physical system may have of itself- or (b) the physical system itself which may have a self-concept. But the non-materialist sense of an irreducible, non-physical experient simply falls outside the scope of reductive materialism. In other words, mind-boggling though this may seem, there simply isn't any self in the irreducible sense according to reductive materialism. For a reductive materialist, the self does not experience anything in the non-physical sense, as there is no non-physical self nor any non-physical experience. In other words, we can certainly hold it against a reductive materialist that he denies the obvious, but it's even quite reassuring that the subsequent deductions from his absurd positions are at least sound.

But maybe I still haven't got your point. You know I welcome any additional formulations to show the incoherence of reductive materialism .

Best wishes,

Titus

My argument relies upon the fact that there is a self of some description, even if one describes it as illusionary. I mean if everybody is only a p-zombie there would be no problem in Slimshady's and Loki's position. But I take it as axiomatic that there are experiences. Of course one might argue there isn't an experiencer or self which has these experiences. Maybe there are only "free floating" experiences. But nevertheless these experiences do appear to come in distinct groups. That is to say there seems to be a distinction between my body kissing a gorgeous young lady and someone else doing so, because in the former "I" shall receive pleasurable experience. Well, at least "I" will if she can kiss, and she hasn't got bad breath. Anyway . . er . . where was I? Yes so there seems to be a self in the sense that of the totality of distinct experiences, there is only a tiny subset that "I" am acquainted with in a way that "I" am not acquainted with all other experiences. This stream of experiences can constitute the self for the materialist; or at least this stream of seeming experiences, if the past doesn't exist and their reality is constituted by "ones" memory. So it would seem that a materialist should admit a "self" appropriately defined so long as he doesn't hold the position that everyone is a p-zombie.

Having said that I have to confess I'm pretty clueless at understanding materialism, but as far as I understand these things I don't think your point detracts from my argument I shall put forth tomorrow (providing people are good )

 

[Interesting Ian]

BTW are the materialists on here happy with the notion that if a star trek transporter device were ever invented, then the person who is transported is literally the very same person as he was before s/he got transported? Just as much so as in our normal second by second existence in other words? Or do I need to argue for this extensively tomorrow?

 

[DanishDynamite]

Titus Rivas:

In other words, we can certainly hold it against a reductive materialist that he denies the obvious, but it's even quite reassuring that the subsequent deductions from his absurd positions are at least sound.

It's a funny thing, but for the life of me I've never understood how anyone in our day and age could hold a non-materialist view. Materialism is not only intuitively right, it is supported by tons of evidence. The only reason I can think of why anyone would invent a viewpoint where consciousness is somehow "not of this world" is that they are terrified of the notion that they are just a physical process.

Why do you have a non-materialist view, Titus?

II:

BTW are the materialists on here happy with the notion that if a star trek transporter device were ever invented, then the person who is transported is literally the very same person as he was before s/he got transported? Just as much so as in our normal second by second existence in other words?

They are not literally the same as far as they don't consist of the same elementary particles, but otherwise, yes. Our "I" or sense of identity is afterall just generated by our brains. Two identical brains will generate identical "I"'s.

BTW, Ian, you aren't literally the same person you were yesterday. The atoms of your body are constantly being exchanged, added to and subtracted from. In addition, your personality today is not the same as it was when you were 2 years old or 5 years old or even as it was yesterday. It changes constantly.

 

[Titus Rivas]

Intuition

DanishDynamite,

Why do you have a non-materialist view, Titus?

Well, take a look at this thread, as I have repeatedly given my reasons here.

Materialism is not only intuitively right, it is supported by tons of evidence

I don't accept either of these claims. Moreover, I think that even hard core materialists would have to admit that materialism is not exactly an intuitively obvious position.

Best wishes,

Titus

 

[DanishDynamite]

Re: Intuition

Titus Rivas:

Well, take a look at this thread, as I have repeatedly given my reasons here.

Darn. I was hoping you could sum up so I wouldn't have to read 28 pages.

I don't accept either of these claims. Moreover, I think that even hard core materialists would have to admit that materialism is not exactly an intuitively obvious position.

I don't see how you can't at least accept the claim that there is tons of evidence. Can you at least accept the claim that there is no evidence against materialism?

And yes, I would be surprised if hard-core materialists didn't find materialism intuitively obvious in this day and age. Afterall, everything else in this world has been or is being explained by science. And science has materialism as its base.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Hi DD, glad to see you posting again. I have to say though that I so fundamentally disagree with everything you say I scarcely know where to begin!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian asked:

BTW are the materialists on here happy with the notion that if a star trek transporter device were ever invented, then the person who is transported is literally the very same person as he was before s/he got transported? Just as much so as in our normal second by second existence in other words? Or do I need to argue for this extensively tomorrow?

Define very same.

For all practical purpose, yes. I'm assuming that the original me is vaporized and that it doesn't matter for the definition of very same that my actual particles are immediately and completely different. I'm also assuming that I'm not transported into the middle of a bridge abutment. Finally, we have to assume that my fundamental brain processes are not dependent upon quantum state, or that said state can also be duplicated.

~~ Paul

 

[Titus Rivas]

Danish Dynamite,

Darn. I was hoping you could sum up so I wouldn't have to read 28 pages.

The problem for me is that we've had quite some discussion going on about my position and everything what could be said about it, seems to have been said already .

But, essentially, I hold that though introspective reports may be flawed, introspection as an inner process is the only direct way to get access to our subjective experiences. Subjective experiences qua subjective experiences cannot be reduced to anything else. Now, if we accept the reality of subjective experiences, we must admit that at least these experiences cannot be ontologically reduced to anything physical in the brain. Additionally, I've given arguments against
epiphenomenalism (which are shared BTW by Stimpson, Ian and others) and the identity theory (which I'm glad to say were understood by Paul). My arguments against the identity theory can be found here.

I don't see how you can't at least accept the claim that there is tons of evidence.

It's quite simple actually. I do accept the evidence but I don't accept its interpretation as evidence for materialism. I hold that the materialist interpretation is flawed, not the evidence itself.

Can you at least accept the claim that there is no evidence against materialism?

I'm afraid not But then again, I'm not a skeptic, but a dualist philosopher and psychical researcher, so it's less surprising than it may seem. I think there is both naturalistic and experimental evidence for phenomena which wouldn't make much sense in a reductive materialist world view, though Stimpson has said already that if any acceptable (for him) evidence would be found for some conscious entity which would survive physical death, he would accept the evidence, declaring that entity physical in the process.

So I guess, the options are a bit wider than you may think

Best wishes,

Titus