A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Suggestologist]

We have devised instruments for the purpose of making precise measurements of phenomena, such as properties of light.

What is it about our experience of seeing the color red (say) that makes you consider it more valid than a measurement of the same phenomenon by the instruments we have devised? Is not the human eye simply a device created for the same purpose, and the quale, red, its output for light with a wavelength around 700 nm? Is this quale somehow less artificial than the output of a scientific instrument? Would the fact that the phenomenon has the specific property of wavelength ever emerge from simple observation?

There's more to color perception than wavelength. There is also saturation and purity; and more. A computer can measure all of the properties for you. What is different when a human perceives color is that: color triggers memory and emotion. Blues and pale whites do "feel" colder to a person, and reds and oranges "feel" warmer. The qualia is not the perception, but the resulting emotional (affective) and body-sensation (kinsethetic) experiences -- personal experiences.

I'm not suggesting that personal experience is more valid or more correct. Just that you cannot evaluate the validity without the experience. How did we determine which color the computer would tell us is "red" and which other color the computer would tell us is "green" and so on? A human had to calibrate the machine (or calibrate the machine that calibrates this one), and to do so, that person had to have the knowledge of what colors are called as well as how they look. The human who calibrated the computer had to have the personal experience of color, otherwise there is no way the person could validate the calibration.

The same is true of any field of science. If you have no personal experience, you cannot create well-formed, valid hypotheses to even begin to test.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

The human who calibrated the computer had to have the personal experience of color, otherwise there is no way the person could validate the calibration.

And the wavelengths outside the visible spectrum? How do you suppose they calibrated those?

 

[Mercutio]

We have devised instruments for the purpose of making precise measurements of phenomena, such as properties of light.

What is it about our experience of seeing the color red (say) that makes you consider it more valid than a measurement of the same phenomenon by the instruments we have devised? Is not the human eye simply a device created for the same purpose, and the quale, red, its output for light with a wavelength around 700 nm? Is this quale somehow less artificial than the output of a scientific instrument? Would the fact that the phenomenon has the specific property of wavelength ever emerge from simple observation?

In fact, simple observation may tell us that something appears orange. That orange, though, may arise as a qualia due to any number of different objective stimuli. Certainly, a particular unique wavelength may be interpreted as orange. So may a blend of two wavelengths, or three, or four or more. "Orange" is experienced; the wavelengths are inferred from our experience with spectrometers and other devices. The experience of seeing orange and the experience of conducting a Fourier analysis of the wavelength or wavelengths that brought about that "seeing orange" are two vastly different experiences. The first is only observable by one person; the second is observable by any number of people. The fact that one method is more public than the other defines the subjective/objective distinction, but it is not the only difference. The first is directly experienced, the second is inferred (as Stimpy explained).

Now, we could throw our hands in the air, claim equivalence of both types of experience, and say that subjective experience is every bit as likely to be "real" as is the collectively agreed-upon "objective" measurements. If I am not mistaken, that is what some are suggesting here. We could also take advantage of the agreement with other observers and place our confidence in the inferred "objective" reality. Can we guarantee the superiority of either choice? Logically, I really don't think so (which is why I understand II's arguments). Practically, however, yes we can. Choosing to believe that reality is objective, logical, consistent (or whatever the three conditions you folk were bandying about) has led to the success of science as a methodology. Practically speaking, if the subjective is the true reality, it has so far behaved as if the objective reality is real, and so there is no practical reason to switch to the subjective assumption.

 

[Suggestologist]

[Suggestologist,
Unlike some people here, I see no reason to obfuscate my arguments with jargon that most people don't know. If I had used the term "nominalization", I would have has to explain what it means anyway, so why bother?

[/B]

Ah, but scientists love to obfuscate. And as I said, I like to give people the experience, not the description. Perhaps my writing style will be clearer below. Or I could be giving you false hope, who knows.

What does your position have to do with my position? I was asked what my position is. I have been trying to explain it. If you want to answer Ian's original question, and state your own position of the subject, then go ahead, but this has nothing to do with my own position, or my attempts to try to explain my position to Ian.

Sort of. I am saying that there is more to the process of thinking than just your experience of it.

Ok. I am trying to understand what other than personal experience is going on when you are thinking. At least your thoughts on this.

Your thoughts are brain processes. The "come from" your brain.

What goes on in the brain is not available to anyone else; only to the person who experiences what goes on. So these are personal experiences, which seem (to me) to have to be subjective.

Of course they are connected. I was not implying otherwise. They are just not equivalent.

I did not say that. What I said is that your thoughts are not just experiences, and that your experience of your thoughts is not the same type of experience as your experience of sensory input.

And that is because there is a signal that travels through your body to the brain in one case, and the brain sends signals to itself in the other?

As for science, science assumes that there is a difference between the experiences that occur as a result of sensory input, and the experiences of your own thoughts. This is implicit in the assumption that your sensory experiences contain information about objective reality.

OK, what warrants the assumption that sensory experience contains information about objective reality?

In either case, you can use the principles of science to figure out what the correct conclusion is, and also distinguish the above from the possibility you did not mention, which is that the bang was a figment of your imagination, and not a sensory experience at all.

You can use principles of science. But if you mean we need scientific studies with double-blind controls and statistical analyses, etc., then no, you usually can't.

There are more ambiguous signals than those. And I could get into a discussion of double-binds (not double-blind -- double-bind), but I don't think you would be up to it at this time.

So, something only slightly ambiguous then: What meaning should someone assign to another person smiling at them? Can this always be determined scientifically?

Well, I guess we can agree on one thing, and that is that we completely disagree on what science is. I don't know where you got your ideas about what science is, and how it works, but it bears almost no resemblance at all to the scientific process that is actually used by real scientists. I should know. I'm one of them.

Dr. Stupid

All "real" scientists do it your way? All "real" Americans support the death penalty. -- It's a type of logical fallacy thingy.

When I asked you to tell me what it is in particular, that you think I don't know about science, you told me to go read a book on the subject -- you didn't specify which one, and I've already read plenty of them. It sounded like the old "Go read the bible" answer the credophiles resort to at times.

Anyway, if you have a specific book in mind that you think represents your position on science best, let me know. Alternatively, you could just tell me what you think science actually is; and how "real" scientists do it.

 

[Suggestologist]

And the wavelengths outside the visible spectrum? How do you suppose they calibrated those?

Well, for the visible spectrum, you can't just say that we'll call frequency X, red. Because the english speaking society already "knows" what they mean when they say red. The frequency of what people already called red, then had to be discovered.

The invisible spectra didn't have the problem of social knowledge to constrain them. So, scientists could basically segment the spectrum in any way they wanted to, and call the segments whatever they wanted to. They simply extrapolated out from what they already knew, but what they already knew came from experience.

I can test such things (that invisible spectra exist) by using my remote control or garage door opener. Or by listening to the radio. Or by watching TV. So it's all verifiable by personal experience.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??

Is there a meaningful distinction between length and love?

~~ Paul

 

[Suggestologist]

Ian said:
Is there a meaningful distinction between length and love?

~~ Paul

Is this a trick question? I think it might depend on asking the question: The length of what?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian said:
Is there a meaningful distinction between length and love?

~~ Paul

Yes of course. Length, colour, the smell of a fart etc, all as experienced are all constitutive of the external world. Something like love is a state of mind. So completely different.

BTW, length, colours, smells etc as measured (and therefore objective) is what science deals with. But the real "stuff" of the world is our actual experiences, our qualia.

In this sense science doesn't deal with reality as such since reality is subjective. Science deals with what we might call the merely objective.

All clear?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

I can test such things (that invisible spectra exist) by using my remote control or garage door opener. Or by listening to the radio. Or by watching TV. So it's all verifiable by personal experience.

That's not experience. It's inference based on experimentation. You do not experience radio waves, X-rays, etc. Thousands of years of personal experience with communicable diseases did not lead to understanding of microorganisms.

Mercutio apparently noticed that you didn't answer any of my questions about why you place personal experience above scientific measurement. Would you say that his comments fairly characterize your position, or would you rather have a go at actually answering them yourself?

 

[BillyJoe]

Now, we could throw our hands in the air, claim equivalence of both types of experience, and say that subjective experience is every bit as likely to be "real" as is the collectively agreed-upon "objective" measurements. If I am not mistaken, that is what some are suggesting here. We could also take advantage of the agreement with other observers and place our confidence in the inferred "objective" reality. Can we guarantee the superiority of either choice? Logically, I really don't think so (which is why I understand II's arguments). Practically, however, yes we can. Choosing to believe that reality is objective, logical, consistent (or whatever the three conditions you folk were bandying about) has led to the success of science as a methodology. Practically speaking, if the subjective is the true reality, it has so far behaved as if the objective reality is real, and so there is no practical reason to switch to the subjective assumption.

Should trust our subjective experiences or accept that what we subjectively experience may be an hallucination, delusion, illusion or misperception and therefore check our subjective experiences against the experiences of others to arrive at an objective reality.....

regards,
BillyJoe.
[Jus' passin' thru']

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.
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Everything is inferred in this sense. Colour is inferred as well. Just think of that checker square illusion:
http://suso.suso.org/thoughtmedia/illusion.jpg

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??

You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.

The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process. The experience of seeing red when you look at an apple is a physical process in your brain, not a quality of the apple.

The fact that we often refer to both of these things as "color" is just an ambiguity of the English language.

I really don't see why you are having trouble with this simple concept.


Suggestologist,

Unlike some people here, I see no reason to obfuscate my arguments with jargon that most people don't know. If I had used the term "nominalization", I would have has to explain what it means anyway, so why bother?
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Ah, but scientists love to obfuscate.

Evidence? All the scientists I know try to explain their research as clearly as possible, making their explanations more no complicated than is absolutely necessary to be accurate. Can you give some examples of scientists who "love to obfuscate"?

Once again, you are just making unjustified attacks on scientists.

Sort of. I am saying that there is more to the process of thinking than just your experience of it.
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Ok. I am trying to understand what other than personal experience is going on when you are thinking. At least your thoughts on this.

Information processing. Computation. Retrieval and storage of memory. All sorts of things going on subconsciously, which you are not aware of, and can therefore not reasonably be said to have "experienced".

Your thoughts are brain processes. The "come from" your brain.
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What goes on in the brain is not available to anyone else; only to the person who experiences what goes on.

Not true. They are not experiencable by anybody else. That does not mean that they are undetectable, or non-objective, or in any other way fundamentally different from any other physical process.

So these are personal experiences, which seem (to me) to have to be subjective.

Sure, they are subjective. That does not mean that they do not objectively exist, or that they are not physical processes, or that they cannot be studied and understood scientifically.

And once again, this has no relevence to the topic being discussed, which is whether or not your sensory experiences are qualities of the objects you are percieving.

Of course they are connected. I was not implying otherwise. They are just not equivalent.

I did not say that. What I said is that your thoughts are not just experiences, and that your experience of your thoughts is not the same type of experience as your experience of sensory input.
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And that is because there is a signal that travels through your body to the brain in one case, and the brain sends signals to itself in the other?

It is because in one case the source of the signal is sensory input, which contains information about the objects being sensed, and in the other the source is your own brain, which does not contain any information about any objects outside of your brain, that didn't originally get their through sensory input.

As for science, science assumes that there is a difference between the experiences that occur as a result of sensory input, and the experiences of your own thoughts. This is implicit in the assumption that your sensory experiences contain information about objective reality.
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OK, what warrants the assumption that sensory experience contains information about objective reality?

Pragmatism. If we don't make that assumption, then we have nop source of information about objective reality.

In either case, you can use the principles of science to figure out what the correct conclusion is, and also distinguish the above from the possibility you did not mention, which is that the bang was a figment of your imagination, and not a sensory experience at all.
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You can use principles of science. But if you mean we need scientific studies with double-blind controls and statistical analyses, etc., then no, you usually can't.

I said using the principles of science. Double blind studies are a very effective way of controlling for subjective bias, but not the only way. in any event, the double blind protocal is not even relevent to the above scenario.

So, something only slightly ambiguous then: What meaning should someone assign to another person smiling at them? Can this always be determined scientifically?

I principle, yes. In practice, no. What does any of this have to do with the topic being discussed?

Well, I guess we can agree on one thing, and that is that we completely disagree on what science is. I don't know where you got your ideas about what science is, and how it works, but it bears almost no resemblance at all to the scientific process that is actually used by real scientists. I should know. I'm one of them.

Dr. Stupid
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All "real" scientists do it your way? All "real" Americans support the death penalty. -- It's a type of logical fallacy thingy.

The logical fallacy being used here is "false analogy".

Do you even know any real scientists? Have you ever discussed these issues with one? have you ever read any articles from real scientific journals? Ever read the guidelines for publication in those journals?

Do you actually have any idea what you are talking about at all? Or are you just repeating the post-modernistic nonsense that you heard from somebody else, or read about in some philosophy book or papers?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.
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Everything is inferred in this sense. Colour is inferred as well. Just think of that checker square illusion:
http://suso.suso.org/thoughtmedia/illusion.jpg

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??
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You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.

Ummmm . . .no I'm not. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my explanation. First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.

Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear?

The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process.

This of course isn't relevant to the crucial point as perhaps you'll now understand on reading the above. I would just like to say though that although I agree with you that the wavelength of light reflected by the apple is not a brain process (duh!), I have to disagree that it is a quality of the apple. It is not the wavelength of light that is a quality of the apple, but rather the colour we actaully experience (which incidentally is again not a brain process).

The experience of seeing red when you look at an apple is a physical process in your brain, not a quality of the apple.

As I have said I disagree with this.

The fact that we often refer to both of these things as "color" is just an ambiguity of the English language.

Well, I'm more disposed to feel it is scientists and the materialists who have abused the English language and started to use words in an incorrect sense.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Yes of course. Length, colour, the smell of a fart etc, all as experienced are all constitutive of the external world. Something like love is a state of mind. So completely different.

BTW, length, colours, smells etc as measured (and therefore objective) is what science deals with. But the real "stuff" of the world is our actual experiences, our qualia.

In this sense science doesn't deal with reality as such since reality is subjective. Science deals with what we might call the merely objective.

All clear?

Not at all. I don't understand the distinction. If everything is conjured up by my mind, then it is conjuring up length, color, and love. In fact, you have reamed us up and down about making distinctions between the objective world and subjective experience. Now you're making a distinction between the "merely objective" and other stuff.

Even if we make that distinction, how do you know that my cat doesn't have a love-projection attribute that I am experiencing with my senses, just like she has a length attribute?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

....First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.

Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear? [...]

Actually, a bit less clear, but worth exploring. There's something here...let's take the colour of that square, to start. We can easily simplify it--take a piece of orange paper as a center, and two other pieces of paper as surrounds--that is, we'll take a yellow piece and a red piece, cut a hole in each, and place them in turn over the orange piece. In the case of the yellow surround, the orange will look more red; in the case of the red surround, the orange will look more yellow. But I cannot agree that its change in appearance is inferred, as you claim above. It is directly experienced (yes, we can go into opponent process channels and perceptual fields, relying on the mechanics of the bipolar and ganglion cells in the retina to explain the effect, but if I am not mistaken, all that is irrelevant to your argument). We can recall the process by which we constructed the illusion, remembering that, in fact, it is the same piece of orange paper beneath two different surrounds, to infer that the color is actually the same, and that the apparant difference is illusory. The fact that our agreed-upon "objective" inference about the illusion does not make the "subjective" experience of the changing nature of the orange paper any less real--it truly does appear to be two different colors. But the appearance is not inferred--it is experienced.

Anyway, that's my reaction when I read your above statement. Am I mistaken?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Mercutio

The experience of seeing orange and the experience of conducting a Fourier analysis of the wavelength or wavelengths that brought about that "seeing orange" are two vastly different experiences. The first is only observable by one person; the second is observable by any number of people. The fact that one method is more public than the other defines the subjective/objective distinction, but it is not the only difference. The first is directly experienced, the second is inferred (as Stimpy explained).

But first-hand experience (especially visual experience) is absolutely filthy with inference, as the optical illusion demonstrates. Input recieved through our visual apparatus is pre-processed in ways that made the results more useful for our protohuman ancestors, facing different types of problems than those addressed by modern science.

 

[Mercutio]

But first-hand experience (especially visual experience) is absolutely filthy with inference, as the optical illusion demonstrates. Input recieved through our visual apparatus is pre-processed in ways that made the results more useful for our protohuman ancestors, facing different types of problems than those addressed by modern science.

If you are speaking of the gestalt perceptual phenomena (closure, grouping, continuity, etc.) then you have a case for a form of inference (although it does stretch the word a bit). The example, however, was of color perception. Unless I am overlooking something, "inference" is not a word I would apply to the experience of a particular color. As I said above, we may certainly infer a process (or several competing hypotheses about processes) to explain our experience--but the processes are what is inferred, not the experience itself. When we see a unique wavelength as "orange" or when we see a mixture of two other wavelengths as "orange", our perception is identical--we see orange. We do not "infer" orange from either stimulus set, unless you wish to postulate that any mechanical processing at all is a form of inference. If that is your argument, I have no response to it at present.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.
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Ummmm . . .no I'm not. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my explanation. First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.

Good grief, man! That is a completely different type of inference. In fact, the first example is not inference at all. It is a matter of your experience being determined by the sensory input according a set of rules which your visual cortex has learned over the course of your life.

That is completely different than logical inference, which is a sequnce of logical deductions about the world, made from your experiences, based on assumptions you have made about the relationship between your experiences and the world.

In the first case, your visual cortex is interpreting your sensory input according to a set of heuristics which it has learned, and which cause you to experience the two rectangles as being different colors. The second case is a matter of you logically inferring facts about the world from your experiences. Are you seriously going to tell me you do not think there is any difference between those things?

Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear?

The wavelength of light reflected by an object is a measurable property, just like length. But as the optical illusion you mentioned clearly illustrates, the experience of color you see is not a property of the object you are looking at. It is a process in your brain which depends not only on the wavelength of light hitting your eyes, but also on a number of other factors, including the way your brain has learned to inerpret such sensory input.

The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process.
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This of course isn't relevant to the crucial point as perhaps you'll now understand on reading the above. I would just like to say though that although I agree with you that the wavelength of light reflected by the apple is not a brain process (duh!), I have to disagree that it is a quality of the apple. It is not the wavelength of light that is a quality of the apple, but rather the colour we actaully experience (which incidentally is again not a brain process).

That makes absolutely zero sense. Suffice it to say that this view is completely inconsistent with the scientific view of objective reality, and how perception works. You can preach this view all you want, but the simple fact that you believe it does not make it true, and does not render my own view false.

You asked me for my view on the issue. I gave it to you. You clearly disagree. Do you have any actual criticism for my view? Or are you just going to insist that my view is false because yours is true?

The fact that we often refer to both of these things as "color" is just an ambiguity of the English language.
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Well, I'm more disposed to feel it is scientists and the materialists who have abused the English language and started to use words in an incorrect sense.

Well whoopee for you. Who cares?


Dr. Stupid

 

[slimshady2357]

Now, we could throw our hands in the air, claim equivalence of both types of experience, and say that subjective experience is every bit as likely to be "real" as is the collectively agreed-upon "objective" measurements. If I am not mistaken, that is what some are suggesting here. We could also take advantage of the agreement with other observers and place our confidence in the inferred "objective" reality. Can we guarantee the superiority of either choice? Logically, I really don't think so (which is why I understand II's arguments). Practically, however, yes we can. Choosing to believe that reality is objective, logical, consistent (or whatever the three conditions you folk were bandying about) has led to the success of science as a methodology. Practically speaking, if the subjective is the true reality, it has so far behaved as if the objective reality is real, and so there is no practical reason to switch to the subjective assumption.

I'm going to nominate this for some Aug awards

And no one has yet given one good practical reason, though many have been asked.

What do you think Ian? Pretend I'm a total pragmatist, give me a reason to adopt your belief system. What is something useful that would come from the world accepting it?

I'm serious.

Adam

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Mercutio

Unless I am overlooking something, "inference" is not a word I would apply to the experience of a particular color.

On the back cover of my paperback copy of Dennett's Consciousness Explained is an optical illusion consisting of a simple grid of horizontal and vertical black lines -- except that within the bounds of a donut-shaped area, the lines are red. The spaces inside the cells are not filled with any color, but where the lines are red, they appear to be filled with a light pink. This illusion is very strong; close inspection is required to determine that the pink is in fact entirely illusory.

I would say that the pink is 'inferred', the inference being intrinsic to the way the processing mechanism works -- its principle design consideration being to arrive at the best approximation possible within something like 200 milliseconds (and probably having something to do with continuity, as you mentioned).

I agree completely with what Stimpy has just said about this being a completely different type of inference than logical inference -- this intrinsic inference is based on the differential success of employment of various rule sets, containing no knowledge of the reasons why one set might work more often than another; no structure that says: "because this is so, that must be so, etc."; simply: "if you see this, infer that; if it works, keep it". There is an enormous difference.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You are deliberately confusing the color of an object, defined to be the wavelength of light it emits or reflects, and the experience of color.
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Ummmm . . .no I'm not. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my explanation. First let's consider actual experiences. The colour we actaully expereince depends on context, right? Just consider that checker square illusion. The colour of a square we actually see depends upon the colour of the surrounding squares, and in the context of the fact that it is an image of a 3 dimensional object etc. So the colour as experienced is inferred. And you have already agreed that the length of an object as experienced is also inferred. So no difference there.
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Good grief, man! That is a completely different type of inference.

Huh? Buit clearly we do infer length in this manner. I mean we either come to know a length by observing it and hence inferring it from our experiences, or by actually measuring its length. What is this third mysterious way??

In fact, the first example is not inference at all.

I disagree, but I'll reply to Mercutio on that point.

That is completely different than logical inference, which is a sequnce of logical deductions about the world, made from your experiences, based on assumptions you have made about the relationship between your experiences and the world.

You can logically deduct the length of an object from your experiences? I think not! It all depends on context. What we actually see is dictated by an implicit low level theory about the world. There is no logical deduction about it! We infer it yes, but it would I think be incorrect to call it a logical deduction. Plenty of optical illusions illustrating that the apprent length of objects depend on context (ie low level theory).

In the first case, your visual cortex is interpreting your sensory input according to a set of heuristics which it has learned, and which cause you to experience the two rectangles as being different colors.

Well, I suspect it's what our minds have learned.

The second case is a matter of you logically inferring facts about the world from your experiences. Are you seriously going to tell me you do not think there is any difference between those things?

I would tell you I have absolutely no idea what you mean by the latter. There is only the inference I have already mentioned, and actual measuring. Nothing else so far as I can see.

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Secondly there are their measurable properties. Well both the length of an object can be measured and so can a particular wavelength of electromagnetic radiation. So again there is no difference. Thus we cannot draw any distinction between color and length. Has that made it any more clear?
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The wavelength of light reflected by an object is a measurable property, just like length. But as the optical illusion you mentioned clearly illustrates, the experience of color you see is not a property of the object you are looking at.

If anyone with good vision is in agreement about an object being a particular colour than I disagree. There is nothing more to the properties of objects than a concensus of subjectivity.

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The wavelength of light that an apple reflects is a quality of the apple. It is not a brain process.
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This of course isn't relevant to the crucial point as perhaps you'll now understand on reading the above. I would just like to say though that although I agree with you that the wavelength of light reflected by the apple is not a brain process (duh!), I have to disagree that it is a quality of the apple. It is not the wavelength of light that is a quality of the apple, but rather the colour we actaully experience (which incidentally is again not a brain process).
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That makes absolutely zero sense. Suffice it to say that this view is completely inconsistent with the scientific view of objective reality, and how perception works.

There is no scientific view of objective reality. The notion of an objective reality is outside the purview of science. My idea here certainly isn't opposed to science if that's what you mean. Inconsistent with materialism yes. So what?

You asked me for my view on the issue. I gave it to you. You clearly disagree. Do you have any actual criticism for my view? Or are you just going to insist that my view is false because yours is true?

You've given nothing to me. I asked how you can distinguish between length and colour (experiential or measured!) so that one literally is a brain process and the other isn't. You've talked a lot but said nothing to address this point.

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The fact that we often refer to both of these things as "color" is just an ambiguity of the English language.
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Well, I'm more disposed to feel it is scientists and the materialists who have abused the English language and started to use words in an incorrect sense.
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Well whoopee for you. Who cares?

If you feel that way then stop addressing my arguments.