A question for scientists: Primary and Secondary qualities

[Interesting Ian]

Stimpy
The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist.

I'm afraid it represents stupidity beyond all measure to deny this

It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.

Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!

And we only have your word that a physical process in the brain is numerically identical to the smell of a fart. Sorry matey, but I don't believe you.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Okay, two points to clear up here.

1. How can the smell of a fart not be real? It is the result of the comparison of a stored smell memory (electrical neuron activity) to a smell stimulus (more neuron activity) stimulated by a chemical reaction of a gas molecule with the smell sensors. All of these are real physical processes.

It is is it? How do you know? How can you derive the smell from physical processes precisely??

2. You can measure the colour of an object.

I somewhat doubt that. Colour like smell, like any other qualia, is not susceptible to measurement.

 

[Interesting Ian]

wollery,



That's just the point. Smelling something is a process, not an object. The memory of having smelled something exists. The process of smelling something exists, but to say that the smell itself exists, somehow independently of these things, is simply nonsensical.

{shrugs}

It's you that subscribes to the existence of a physical reality.

 

[iankaplan]

Interesting Ian described my assertions as

Complete unadulterated gobbledegook.

LOL

Have any of you ever heard of the phenomenon whereby someone is so intelligent, and so confident in their intelligence, that they lose the ability to think critically about their own beliefs? I don't know what made me think of that....

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian

What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?
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Quite simple. You have denied there is a distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities.

No, I did not. Go read my response again. What I did was reject the naive notion of primary and secondary qualities, and then go on to explain that this is because I do not think that what we think of as "secondary qualities" are actually "qualities" at all.

Therefore if the smell of a fart is literally in ones head, so then necessarily must a length of an object necessarily be in ones head. Otherwise there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Which you initially denied!

Make your bloody mind up!

Try criticizing what I actually said for once.

The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist.
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I'm afraid it represents stupidity beyond all measure to deny this

Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.

This is no different than saying that I do not think that "raw computation" exists.

It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!

Doubtful.

And we only have your word that a physical process in the brain is numerically identical to the smell of a fart. Sorry matey, but I don't believe you.

That's fine. You don't have to believe me. I don't believe many of the things you believe either. I am telling you what my position is. Take it or leave it.

But just because you don't believe it doesn't mean it is wrong, or stupid, or nonsensical.

That's just the point. Smelling something is a process, not an object. The memory of having smelled something exists. The process of smelling something exists, but to say that the smell itself exists, somehow independently of these things, is simply nonsensical.
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{shrugs}

It's you that subscribes to the existence of a physical reality.

And? Correct me if I am wrong, but you did ask for people's opinion on this subject, didn't you? You asked a question, and I gave you an answer. Nobody is twisting your arm insisting that you accept my answer as correct.

Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them? Or are you just interested in insulting anybody who doesn't agree with you?

I was actually somewhat hopeful when you started this thread that you were trying to understand how non-idealists and non-dualists approach issues like the one you presented. Apparently I was being overly-optimistic.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?
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Quite simple. You have denied there is a distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities.
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No, I did not. Go read my response again. What I did was reject the naive notion of primary and secondary qualities, and then go on to explain that this is because I do not think that what we think of as "secondary qualities" are actually "qualities" at all.

Look, will you for at least once in your life try to understand?? I don't care whether you deny the existence of secondary qualities. My original question was whether those apparent qualities labelled secondary qualities (the actual experience of a colour or smells and so on, whether they exist or not!) have a differing ontological status than that which we label the primary qualities. You do apparently maintain this distinction. But in your answer you certainly gave the impression that you didn't!

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The "raw experience" of the smell is exactly what I am saying does not exist.
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I'm afraid it represents stupidity beyond all measure to deny this
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Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.

But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.

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It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!
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Doubtful.

Look, why can't the actual experience of smells actually be out there in the world, so that they are constitutive of reality? What is wrong with supposing that the physical process in the brain simply allows you access to the smell. Why on earth is this meaningless??

Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them?

Yes, I am perplexed as to why anyone would be a materialist. It simply doesn't make sense to me. Clearly I am not becoming enlightened by debating with you.

 

[davidsmith73]

I believe it was Galileo who originally made a distinction between what he called the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities being those such as length, width, shape, mass, internal structure etc, which could be measured and treated mathematically, and the secondary qualities such as colour, taste and smell which were not considered to be intrinsic attributes of matter but were purely subjective phenomena which matter gave rise to.

So something like length and mass etc, are really out there in the world, but smells, tastes, the phenomenological experience of colour etc merely represent the powers of the primary qualities to produce the secondary qualities of colour, taste, smell etc within us.

In modern science is this distinction still maintained? Or have scientists now recognised their stupidity and agree that no such distinction between "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" can be made?

Interesting issue Interesting Ian !

I think this original distinction made by Galileo has been the primary cause of the mistaken distinction between an objective reality and subjective experience. It has been the distinction that is the basis of modern science and materialism; that mathematics is the only route to understanding reality.

Ironically, I have read that this original assertion was made in the view that the primary mathematical attributes of reality had a divine origin. Try telling that to Stimpy !

 

[davidsmith73]

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.

This is equally true of any experience that has the "primary" qualities. If the brain is responsible for contructing your experience per se, then the length of an object is also a physical process occuring in your brain.

However, we attribute our subjective experience of length to an objective reality, but not the colour.

The same distinction that Galileo made all that time ago still holds, even if you confine experience to brain processes. In other words, why make a distinction as to which brain processes reflect objectivity and which do not ?

 

[davidsmith73]

What makes you think that things like the length of an object are physical processes in your head? What makes you think that I am suggesting this?

No, you must explain why you think they are NOT physical processes in your head for this reason:

If you say that our conscious experience is nothing more than brain processes then our experience of the length of an object must be included in that definition. But for some reason you choose to segregate certain brain processes from others and say that one set denotes an objective reality whereas the other does not.

The basis on which you select which experiences (all brain processes remember) denote an objective reality are the ones that are amenable to logical relationships and are consistent, for example, length.

However, the validity of your framework of reality is based on how well observations agree with it - namely that reality is logical, consistent and therefore objective. But you have just selected which observations you will compare with your framework based on whether they are logical and consistent. You can then (erroneously) conclude that the logical observations are also objective ! The brain processes that correspond to experiences that are not mathematical you ignore and say they are simply brain processes.

Do you not see how your argument breaks down ?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

No, I did not. Go read my response again. What I did was reject the naive notion of primary and secondary qualities, and then go on to explain that this is because I do not think that what we think of as "secondary qualities" are actually "qualities" at all.
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Look, will you for at least once in your life try to understand?? I don't care whether you deny the existence of secondary qualities. My original question was whether those apparent qualities labelled secondary qualities (the actual experience of a colour or smells and so on, whether they exist or not!) have a differing ontological status than that which we label the primary qualities.

You asked:

In modern science is this distinction still maintained? Or have scientists now recognised their stupidity and agree that no such distinction between "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" can be made?

And I answered:

I think that notion was dismissed as fundamentally meaningless a long time ago. I certainly don't know of any modern scientists who subscribe to this kind of dualism.

I think that makes it quite clear that what I am rejecting is the dualistic notion of things having physical (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. I neither claimed that modern scientists maintain a distinction between them, nor that they do not. What I claimed is that the very idea of primary and secondary qualities was dismissed as being incoherent.

If this is not the question you meant to ask, then you can hardly blame me for not reading your mind, and instead answering the question you actually asked.

That said, clearly I think that qualities of objects are not the same thing as our experiences of percieving them. As for claiming that they have differing ontological status, that sounds to me like dualism again. I will make no claim about their ontological status.

You do apparently maintain this distinction. But in your answer you certainly gave the impression that you didn't!

Perhaps the problem was that you did not carefully read my answer, and instead just jumped to conclusions based on what you thought my answer would be? Or maybe you just have poor reading comprehension. Either way, that is your problem, not mine.

Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.
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But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.

So what? That experience is just a physical process happening in your brain. All your above statement implies is that it is not possible for my brain to perform the same physical process as yours. How does that make the process irreducibly subjective?

It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!
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Doubtful.
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Look, why can't the actual experience of smells actually be out there in the world, so that they are constitutive of reality? What is wrong with supposing that the physical process in the brain simply allows you access to the smell. Why on earth is this meaningless??

If the experience is the process, then it is meaningless by definition.

Remember, you asked for my position. Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.

If you disagree with my position, fine. Just provide some evidence to back up your alternative position.

Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them?
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Yes, I am perplexed as to why anyone would be a materialist. It simply doesn't make sense to me. Clearly I am not becoming enlightened by debating with you.

That is because you are (a) apperently completely unable to consider the nature of reality without imposing your intuitive preconceptions onto it, and (b) you are completely unable to even accept the hypothetical possibility that my position might actually make sense.

Instead of actually trying to understand what I am saying, all you do is pick through my posts looking for comments that you don't think make sense, so that you can tell me they don't make sense. But they are never going to make sense to you if you are not willing to make an honest effort to understand them. And you are never going to be able to do that unless you can get over your absolute certainty that my position doesn't make any sense.


davidsmith,

Ironically, I have read that this original assertion was made in the view that the primary mathematical attributes of reality had a divine origin. Try telling that to Stimpy !

I am quite aware of that. I fail to see why you think this should bother me, given that I think the entire assertion is ill-conceived.

I think I see where you are going with this. The mistake in the "primary and secondary qualities" idea is not that there is no difference between things like length, and things like color. It is that the color of an object is not a "quality" of that object at all.

The color of an object is a part of the experience you have when you see, or remember seeing, that object. It is a physical process occurring in your brain.
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This is equally true of any experience that has the "primary" qualities. If the brain is responsible for contructing your experience per se, then the length of an object is also a physical process occuring in your brain.

Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.

However, we attribute our subjective experience of length to an objective reality, but not the colour.

That is because color is something we experience, and length is not. Length is a property of an object. The color we see is not a property of the object. It is a process in our brain which is affected by properties of the object, as well as by other things.

I would think this would all be trivially obvious to anybody who knows anything about how perception works, and who has ever given it any serious thought.

The same distinction that Galileo made all that time ago still holds, even if you confine experience to brain processes. In other words, why make a distinction as to which brain processes reflect objectivity and which do not ?

Your premise is flawed. We don't experience properties of objects. We infer the properties of objects from our experiences. There is a very important difference.

No, you must explain why you think they are NOT physical processes in your head for this reason:

If you say that our conscious experience is nothing more than brain processes then our experience of the length of an object must be included in that definition. But for some reason you choose to segregate certain brain processes from others and say that one set denotes an objective reality whereas the other does not.

I have never, ever, experienced the length of an object. Next stupid question?


Dr. Stupid

 

[Soapy Sam]

Whence the simple answer to the Zen question:-

"If a tree falls in the forest and there is noone to hear it, does it make a noise?"

No. Noise is an artifact of nervous systems.

Next question.

 

[Suggestologist]

Ian
This is no different than saying that I do not think that "raw computation" exists.

Right, raw computation is a "User Illusion".

I'll point out that the technical term for a process or verb that has been turned into a steady-state or noun is a "Nominalization". A smell is a nominalization for the process of smelling.

And I'll just quickly point out that science (oops, another nominalization, and wrong type of referent as well -- since "science" can't function as an actor, only people who call themselves scientists can) nominalizes processes all the time, fixes them as entities with properties, and proceeds to promote such objectified views.

Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.

Your position is that we infer measurements from personal experiences; thus we see the measuring stick, we calibrate it between the points we INTEND to measure (intentional stance) and utilize our effectors (usually our hands) to do so, we see the contrast of color, we interpret one color as the figure of the numbers, and the other color as the ground (figure-ground - which requires the subconscious analysis of contextual-cues), we match the figures to the semantic (meaning) of numbers stored in our associative memory, and thus we can infer a measurement of an object -- also a meaning-making (semantic) undertaking.

Seeing the measuring stick AS a measuring stick is a "user illusion", and seeing the object as one in need of measurement is a meaning-making, and deciding to carry out the measurement is our intentional stance. Calibrating the measurement is a product of learning. And so on..

Now, you are suggesting that objectivity can be arrived at by inference from a sequence of subjective experience. Please explain: Is the process of inference itself a subjective sequence of experience?

 

[Interesting Ian]

I think that makes it quite clear that what I am rejecting is the dualistic notion of things having physical (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. I neither claimed that modern scientists maintain a distinction between them, nor that they do not. What I claimed is that the very idea of primary and secondary qualities was dismissed as being incoherent.

You can maintain there is no distinction, but you cannot maintain they are incoherent. Hell, you yourself are asserting that the secondary qualities are literally one and the same as physical processes in the brain, and yet, for some mysterious reason, the primary qaulities aren't Sorry matey, you're going to have to explain that one!

That said, clearly I think that qualities of objects are not the same thing as our experiences of percieving them.

So you think there are qualities which our perceptions resemble?

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Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.
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But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.
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So what?

Well that is precisely what subjective means!

That experience is just a physical process happening in your brain.

No it isn't, a smell of a fart is not one and the same thing as a physical process in the brain. A smell of a fart is a smell of a fart!!

All your above statement implies is that it is not possible for my brain to perform the same physical process as yours. How does that make the process irreducibly subjective?

Because you do not experience the same qualitative feel of some secondary quality that I do. Nor is there any objective way (from 3rd person perspective) to ever experience my experiences.

Stimp
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It is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absence of the process, because the experience is the process.
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II
Certainly not meaningless! Jesus wept!!
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Stimp
Doubtful.
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II
Look, why can't the actual experience of smells actually be out there in the world, so that they are constitutive of reality? What is wrong with supposing that the physical process in the brain simply allows you access to the smell. Why on earth is this meaningless??
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Stimp
If the experience is the process, then it is meaningless by definition.

Yet again you demonstrate your poor grasp of the English language. It seems that in addition to a whole host of other words you persistently misuse, you also don't know the meaning of meaningless.

It would not be meaningless, it would simply be incorrect. That which is incorrect is not necessarily meaningless!

Remember, you asked for my position. Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.

You are now shifting the meaning of the word "meaningless". A position contrary to yours is not necessarily meaningless. It is not meaningless to hypothesise that you might be wrong!

If you disagree with my position, fine. Just provide some evidence to back up your alternative position.

But I don't need any! We immediately experience qualia. There fore it exists and it is meaningless to say that it doesn't exist or is synonymous with some physical activity. And I use the word meaningless in its proper sense!

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Are you interested in understanding what other people's worldviews are, and why they hold them?
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Yes, I am perplexed as to why anyone would be a materialist. It simply doesn't make sense to me. Clearly I am not becoming enlightened by debating with you.
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That is because you are (a) apperently completely unable to consider the nature of reality without imposing your intuitive preconceptions onto it, and (b) you are completely unable to even accept the hypothetical possibility that my position might actually make sense.

This like saying I am refusing to even accept the hypothetical possibility that your position that 2 + 2 = 5 might actually make sense. The point is it doesn't.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Suggestologiest,

And I'll just quickly point out that science (oops, another nominalization, and wrong type of referent as well -- since "science" can't function as an actor, only people who call themselves scientists can) nominalizes processes all the time, fixes them as entities with properties, and proceeds to promote such objectified views.

Like what?

And even if they do, how is this relevant? What does this have to do with my argument that raw experiences do not exist?

Since my position is that experiences are a process in the brain, clearly I think that it is meaningless to talk about the experience in the absense of the process.
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Your position is that we infer measurements from personal experiences; thus we see the measuring stick, we calibrate it between the points we INTEND to measure (intentional stance) and utilize our effectors (usually our hands) to do so, we see the contrast of color, we interpret one color as the figure of the numbers, and the other color as the ground (figure-ground - which requires the subconscious analysis of contextual-cues), we match the figures to the semantic (meaning) of numbers stored in our associative memory, and thus we can infer a measurement of an object -- also a meaning-making (semantic) undertaking.

Seeing the measuring stick AS a measuring stick is a "user illusion", and seeing the object as one in need of measurement is a meaning-making, and deciding to carry out the measurement is our intentional stance. Calibrating the measurement is a product of learning. And so on..

That has got to be the most convoluted, obfuscated, and unnecessarily overcomplicated way of saying that science is based on unprovable assumptions, that I have ever seen. I hope you are proud of yourself. Suffice it to say, I am not impressed. Anybody who understands anything about formal logic knows this.

Now, you are suggesting that objectivity can be arrived at by inference from a sequence of subjective experience. Please explain: Is the process of inference itself a subjective sequence of experience?

I am not suggesting it at all. It is an axiom of science. And no, the process of inference is not a sequence of experiences. You experience the process, but that just means that you experience your own thoughts.

I hope you are not trying to deliberately confuse the experience of your own thought processes and the experiences you have from sensory input. Once again, the fact that they are different, and that it is possible for us to tell the difference, are assumptions of science.

Why is it that discussions like this always evolve into attacks on the validity of science itself? If you reject the assumptions of science, then clearly you are not going to agree with a position that is based on the acceptance of those assumptions.

Mine is such a position. If you reject the very validity of science, then just say so. Don't screw around with a bunch of philosobabble. Just say flat out that you think I am wrong because you think science is bunk. That way none of us have to waste our time trying to have an intelligent discussion with you.


Ian,

I think that makes it quite clear that what I am rejecting is the dualistic notion of things having physical (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. I neither claimed that modern scientists maintain a distinction between them, nor that they do not. What I claimed is that the very idea of primary and secondary qualities was dismissed as being incoherent.
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You can maintain there is no distinction, but you cannot maintain they are incoherent.

The idea is incoherent because it is based on a fundamental misconception about the nature of sensory perception.

Hell, you yourself are asserting that the secondary qualities are literally one and the same as physical processes in the brain, and yet, for some mysterious reason, the primary qaulities aren't Sorry matey, you're going to have to explain that one!

I already explained it to you. What part of my explanation did you not understand?

That said, clearly I think that qualities of objects are not the same thing as our experiences of percieving them.
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So you think there are qualities which our perceptions resemble?

No. How can a physical process resemble the qualities of physical objects? What would that even mean?

Why? Keep in mind that I am not denying the existence of the experience, nor am I denying the existence of any aspect of the experience that I am aware of. What I am denying is the dualistic notion that there is some irreducibly subjective aspect of the experience.
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But there is. If I smell something you can never know what it is like to have my experience, even if you smell the same smell.
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So what?
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Well that is precisely what subjective means!

I am not saying it isn't subjective. I am saying that the above does not, in any way, imply that it is irreducibly subjective. Do you understand the difference?

That experience is just a physical process happening in your brain.
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No it isn't, a smell of a fart is not one and the same thing as a physical process in the brain. A smell of a fart is a smell of a fart!!

Proof by assertion, followed by an irrelevant tautology. Don't you have anything better than that?

All your above statement implies is that it is not possible for my brain to perform the same physical process as yours. How does that make the process irreducibly subjective?
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Because you do not experience the same qualitative feel of some secondary quality that I do. Nor is there any objective way (from 3rd person perspective) to ever experience my experiences.

What secondary quality??? That is my whole point. You are starting from the point of view that objects have secondary qualities that we somehow experience. I am saying that objects do not have such secondary qualities at all. Your experience of seeing an apple is a process in your brain. My experience of seeing the same apple is a process in my brain. Same apple, different processes. Neither of us is experiencing any "secondary quality" of the apple. We are both responding to stimulus from light being reflected off of the apple.

I don't need to experience you thoughts to know that they objectively exist, any more than I need for my brain to perform the same computational process as my CPU, to know that the computation process is actually happening in my CPU.

If the experience is the process, then it is meaningless by definition.
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Yet again you demonstrate your poor grasp of the English language. It seems that in addition to a whole host of other words you persistently misuse, you also don't know the meaning of meaningless.

It would not be meaningless, it would simply be incorrect. That which is incorrect is not necessarily meaningless!

My grasp of the English language is just fine. It would be incorrect to assert that some aspect of the experience exists independently of the process. Once it is established that no such aspect exists, it is meaningless to talk about "raw-experiences" as though they were actually something that exists.

If you disagree with my position, fine. Just provide some evidence to back up your alternative position.
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But I don't need any! We immediately experience qualia. There fore it exists and it is meaningless to say that it doesn't exist or is synonymous with some physical activity. And I use the word meaningless in its proper sense!

Incorrect. We have experiences. Your definition of "qualia", as far as I can tell, includes the presumption of some sort of irreducibly subjective "secondary qualities". That means that your assertion that what we experience are qualia, is not an assertion that you have demonstrated is true, or which I agree with.

Like I said, I reject the notion that what we experience is some sort of secondary quality of objects. What an apple looks like, is not a quality of the apple at all. It is a process occurring in the brain. That process is dependent on qualities of the apple (as well as other things). Those qualities are ordinary physical qualities like shape, texture, and color (meaning wavelengths of light reflected). There are no irreducibly subjective "secondary qualities".

That is because you are (a) apperently completely unable to consider the nature of reality without imposing your intuitive preconceptions onto it, and (b) you are completely unable to even accept the hypothetical possibility that my position might actually make sense.
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This like saying I am refusing to even accept the hypothetical possibility that your position that 2 + 2 = 5 might actually make sense. The point is it doesn't.

I can provide a formal logical proof that, within the context of the axioms of arithmetic, 2+2=5 is a false statement. Can you provide a formal logical proof that within the context of the axioms of science, my position is false?


Dr. Stupid

 

[davidsmith73]

I am quite aware of that. I fail to see why you think this should bother me, given that I think the entire assertion is ill-conceived.

It was just a light hearted joke. Things can get a bit too heated here.

Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.

Exactly. You infer "length" to objectively exist even though the inference is based on experiences which you say are nothing but brain processes. Colour is also a brain process but you do not infer it to exist objectively in the same sense as length.

I want you to justify this inference. You can't justify it simply by restating your inference ! That would be circular reasoning.

That is because color is something we experience, and length is not. Length is a property of an object. The color we see is not a property of the object. It is a process in our brain which is affected by properties of the object, as well as by other things.

You have laden your argument with the assumptions we are trying to validify.

Think about it again.

If you say that all experiences are brain processes then the experiences that constitute the length of an object are also brain processes, just like the observations that constitute a hallucination are brain processes.

You infer some experiences to denote objective properties of objects while others brain processes you do not.

So, you have to justify why you ascribe an objective reality to some experiences and not others.

Remember that we start with our experiences

I would think this would all be trivially obvious to anybody who knows anything about how perception works, and who has ever given it any serious thought.

And someone who knows anything about how perception works would know that an inference of objective length is based on experiences which you regard as nothing but brain process. Colours are also brain processes but you do not ascribe them to denote objective properties of reality. Why ?

Your premise is flawed. We don't experience properties of objects. We infer the properties of objects from our experiences. There is a very important difference.

Again, laden with the assumptions we are trying to validify.

see above.

I have never, ever, experienced the length of an object. Next stupid question?

If you assume that all experiences are brain processes, you have to admit that the experiences you use to infer your objective "length" are themselves brain processes.

So, the question is, how can you justify ascribing certain brain processes to denote an objective reality (the ones that make up length) while others ones you do not (the ones that make up colour).

 

[Suggestologist]

Suggestologiest,

Like what?

And even if they do, how is this relevant? What does this have to do with my argument that raw experiences do not exist?

Well, I thought that I'd just mention a couple points in passing before I got to the meat of the argument. Since you were describing the concept some people call "nominalization", seemingly without knowing that is its name. An in-context example of the process was then added.

Providing such examples is in line with my position on the primacy of personal experience. I would much rather provide an experience for you, than coldly describe it in a disembodied way.

That has got to be the most convoluted, obfuscated, and unnecessarily overcomplicated way of saying that science is based on unprovable assumptions, that I have ever seen. I hope you are proud of yourself. Suffice it to say, I am not impressed. Anybody who understands anything about formal logic knows this.

I find it strange that you read it that way. I was simply describing the process you were discussing. And describing it as a sequence of subjective experience. Again, providing live examples seems not to agree with your disposition.

I am not suggesting it at all. It is an axiom of science. And no, the process of inference is not a sequence of experiences. You experience the process, but that just means that you experience your own thoughts.

Are you saying that one's own thoughts are not subjective experiences? Ok, I experience my own thoughts. Where do the thoughts come from (that priviledges them as objective constructs) when an inference is made?

I hope you are not trying to deliberately confuse the experience of your own thought processes and the experiences you have from sensory input. Once again, the fact that they are different, and that it is possible for us to tell the difference, are assumptions of science.

Sensation and thought processes are connected. Think of a juicy lemon and your mouth waters. I was not aware that "science" (I assume you mean some specific scientists) had made the assumption that thought and sensory input were not both types of personal experience. I'm really not sure what you mean when you say that "we can tell the difference". Your own thought processes necessarily frame and select what sensory information you will become aware of and what meanings you will apply to them.

Simple example, If you think you are in a war, a large bang will be interpreted as likely coming from a bomb. In other contexts, you would draw different conclusions about a big bang.

Why is it that discussions like this always evolve into attacks on the validity of science itself? If you reject the assumptions of science, then clearly you are not going to agree with a position that is based on the acceptance of those assumptions.

I'm not attacking "science". What I have disagreed with in this thread and one or two others, is your interpretation of science, and the specific assumptions about it that you entertain. Most centrally, I disagree with your belief in the primacy of experimental study over personal experience. I believe in the primacy of personal experience; and once personal experience is established, scientific studies can be entertained.

Mine is such a position. If you reject the very validity of science, then just say so. Don't screw around with a bunch of philosobabble. Just say flat out that you think I am wrong because you think science is bunk. That way none of us have to waste our time trying to have an intelligent discussion with you.

That's not what I think. I think you are wrong because you've read something into the "scientific process" that isn't there.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Suggestologist

Most centrally, I disagree with your belief in the primacy of experimental study over personal experience. I believe in the primacy of personal experience; and once personal experience is established, scientific studies can be entertained.

We have devised instruments for the purpose of making precise measurements of phenomena, such as properties of light.

What is it about our experience of seeing the color red (say) that makes you consider it more valid than a measurement of the same phenomenon by the instruments we have devised? Is not the human eye simply a device created for the same purpose, and the quale, red, its output for light with a wavelength around 700 nm? Is this quale somehow less artificial than the output of a scientific instrument? Would the fact that the phenomenon has the specific property of wavelength ever emerge from simple observation?

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.
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Exactly. You infer "length" to objectively exist even though the inference is based on experiences which you say are nothing but brain processes. Colour is also a brain process but you do not infer it to exist objectively in the same sense as length.

I want you to justify this inference. You can't justify it simply by restating your inference ! That would be circular reasoning.

I justify it based on a scientific analysis of my experiences.

That is because color is something we experience, and length is not. Length is a property of an object. The color we see is not a property of the object. It is a process in our brain which is affected by properties of the object, as well as by other things.
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You have laden your argument with the assumptions we are trying to validify.

What exactly is it that you think we are trying to "validify". I have been attempting to explain my position, not to provide evidence or arguments to support it. I can hardly hope to convince you, or anybody else, that my position is reasonable, if you don't even understand what my position is.

Think about it again.

If you say that all experiences are brain processes then the experiences that constitute the length of an object are also brain processes, just like the observations that constitute a hallucination are brain processes.

No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.

You infer some experiences to denote objective properties of objects while others brain processes you do not.

No, I extract information about objective properties of objects from my experiences. There is no "experience of length", or "experience of mass", etc...

So, you have to justify why you ascribe an objective reality to some experiences and not others.

I ascribe an objective reality to all experiences. All experiences objectively exist. The question is whether a specific experience is telling me something about an object or not.

I would think this would all be trivially obvious to anybody who knows anything about how perception works, and who has ever given it any serious thought.
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And someone who knows anything about how perception works would know that an inference of objective length is based on experiences which you regard as nothing but brain process. Colours are also brain processes but you do not ascribe them to denote objective properties of reality. Why ?

Once again, you are all mixed up. Color is one of many brain processes that extract information about objects from. Objective qualities are not brain processes. They are not experiences.

Why are you mixing the two up? You have experiences. You make some basic assumptions about how those experiences relate to objective reality. Based on those assumptions, you infer characteristics of objective reality from your experiences.

At no point is a quality of an object an experience. At no point is an experience a quality of an object.

I have never, ever, experienced the length of an object. Next stupid question?
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If you assume that all experiences are brain processes, you have to admit that the experiences you use to infer your objective "length" are themselves brain processes.

Of course. But the experience I use to infer length is not the quality of length. It is not a quality of the object at all.

So, the question is, how can you justify ascribing certain brain processes to denote an objective reality (the ones that make up length) while others ones you do not (the ones that make up colour).

I don't. There are no brain processes which constitute the length of an object. That is an incredibly silly misrepresentation of my position.


Suggestologist,

And even if they do, how is this relevant? What does this have to do with my argument that raw experiences do not exist?
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Well, I thought that I'd just mention a couple points in passing before I got to the meat of the argument. Since you were describing the concept some people call "nominalization", seemingly without knowing that is its name. An in-context example of the process was then added.

Unlike some people here, I see no reason to obfuscate my arguments with jargon that most people don't know. If I had used the term "nominalization", I would have has to explain what it means anyway, so why bother?

Providing such examples is in line with my position on the primacy of personal experience. I would much rather provide an experience for you, than coldly describe it in a disembodied way.

What does your position have to do with my position? I was asked what my position is. I have been trying to explain it. If you want to answer Ian's original question, and state your own position of the subject, then go ahead, but this has nothing to do with my own position, or my attempts to try to explain my position to Ian.

I am not suggesting it at all. It is an axiom of science. And no, the process of inference is not a sequence of experiences. You experience the process, but that just means that you experience your own thoughts.
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Are you saying that one's own thoughts are not subjective experiences?

Sort of. I am saying that there is more to the process of thinking than just your experience of it.

Ok, I experience my own thoughts. Where do the thoughts come from (that priviledges them as objective constructs) when an inference is made?

Your thoughts are brain processes. The "come from" your brain.

I hope you are not trying to deliberately confuse the experience of your own thought processes and the experiences you have from sensory input. Once again, the fact that they are different, and that it is possible for us to tell the difference, are assumptions of science.
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Sensation and thought processes are connected. Think of a juicy lemon and your mouth waters.

Of course they are connected. I was not implying otherwise. They are just not equivalent.

I was not aware that "science" (I assume you mean some specific scientists) had made the assumption that thought and sensory input were not both types of personal experience.

I did not say that. What I said is that your thoughts are not just experiences, and that your experience of your thoughts is not the same type of experience as your experience of sensory input.

As for science, science assumes that there is a difference between the experiences that occur as a result of sensory input, and the experiences of your own thoughts. This is implicit in the assumption that your sensory experiences contain information about objective reality.

I'm really not sure what you mean when you say that "we can tell the difference".

I mean that it is possible to distinguish between sensory input and hallucination.

Your own thought processes necessarily frame and select what sensory information you will become aware of and what meanings you will apply to them.

Irrelevant.

Simple example, If you think you are in a war, a large bang will be interpreted as likely coming from a bomb. In other contexts, you would draw different conclusions about a big bang.

In either case, you can use the principles of science to figure out what the correct conclusion is, and also distinguish the above from the possibility you did not mention, which is that the bang was a figment of your imagination, and not a sensory experience at all.

Why is it that discussions like this always evolve into attacks on the validity of science itself? If you reject the assumptions of science, then clearly you are not going to agree with a position that is based on the acceptance of those assumptions.
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I'm not attacking "science". What I have disagreed with in this thread and one or two others, is your interpretation of science, and the specific assumptions about it that you entertain. Most centrally, I disagree with your belief in the primacy of experimental study over personal experience. I believe in the primacy of personal experience; and once personal experience is established, scientific studies can be entertained.

Well, I guess we can agree on one thing, and that is that we completely disagree on what science is. I don't know where you got your ideas about what science is, and how it works, but it bears almost no resemblance at all to the scientific process that is actually used by real scientists. I should know. I'm one of them.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

Stimp
Nonsense. I do not ever experience the length of an object. I infer its length from my experiences.
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DavidSmith
Exactly. You infer "length" to objectively exist even though the inference is based on experiences which you say are nothing but brain processes. Colour is also a brain process but you do not infer it to exist objectively in the same sense as length.

I want you to justify this inference. You can't justify it simply by restating your inference ! That would be circular reasoning.
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Stimp
I justify it based on a scientific analysis of my experiences.

Oh dear. Looks like David is making you look like a fool

 

[Interesting Ian]

DavidSmith
Think about it again.

If you say that all experiences are brain processes then the experiences that constitute the length of an object are also brain processes, just like the observations that constitute a hallucination are brain processes.
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Stimp
No experience "constitutes" the length of an object. The length of an object is inferred from our experiences.

Everything is inferred in this sense. Colour is inferred as well. Just think of that checker square illusion:
http://suso.suso.org/thoughtmedia/illusion.jpg

There is no meaningful distinction between length and colour. In both cases we can measure them, and in both cases the mind implicitly infers and thereby experiences certain qualia of a certain colour or length. How do you draw a distinction between the two?? How can you say that one is a brain process and the other is not??