A priori synthetic statements

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Well the ball rebounds because it obeys physical laws.

The fact that the non-physical effecting the physical does not obey physical laws, but in fact unfolds according to the intention of a sentient being, does not at all make it more problematic. Indeed, if anything, it makes it less so.

We have a disagreement. First of all, the ball does not "obey" physical laws. We explain why the ball does what it does using physical laws. That said, it seems (to me) utterly misterious to merely think about some "non physical thing" that can affect the physical by means of intentions.

For example, I decide to move a ball, but it is a complex pattern of brain and muscles behaviours what moves it. Now, what originated the decision in the first place? (here is the trick) I have not a clue, other than the well known folk psychology assumptions. On the other hand I bet you feel you know, just because "you know". Read a little about Folk Psychology, you might find the subject interesting.

Unless you can come up with an argument that specifies the mechanism, we cant go any further, and this idea of yours is merely a matter of belief, not related to any facts.

 

[hammegk]

...... First of all, the ball does not "obey" physical laws. We explain why the ball does what it does using physical laws. ....

And you mistake a mathematical map of reality for reality itself, although the question, "What is more "real" than math?" has interesting implications, imo.

Also, where did all you interactive dualists suddenly come from?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And you mistake a mathematical map of reality for reality itself, although the question, "What is more "real" than math?" has interesting implications, imo.

Also, where did all you interactive dualists suddenly come from?

No, no, no!

Im not a materialist, nor a dualist of any sort. Read again my sentence. A materialist, or anyone who takes a map for reality would say that the ball follows the laws of physics. You should be aware of that.

Now, what I said is that we use them to explain something, to represent, this implies that the laws of physics are merely a map.

 

[Interesting Ian]

We have a disagreement. First of all, the ball does not "obey" physical laws. We explain why the ball does what it does using physical laws.

No, you could only explain it if you assume that physical laws govern the world or -- which amounts to the same thing -- the forces in nature are generative. In other words the motion of the ball is governed by physical laws -- it is not merely described. Alternatively if the motion of the ball is merely described, then you have no explanation of the movement of the ball whatsoever. And that's fine.

That said, it seems (to me) utterly misterious to merely think about some "non physical thing" that can affect the physical by means of intentions.

Absolutely not at all. Why on earth is it mysterious?? You need to provide reasons for your position. What are your reasons?

For example, I decide to move a ball, but it is a complex pattern of brain and muscles behaviours what moves it. Now, what originated the decision in the first place?

You did.

(here is the trick) I have not a clue, other than the well known folk psychology assumptions. On the other hand I bet you feel you know, just because "you know". Read a little about Folk Psychology, you might find the subject interesting.

Unless you can come up with an argument that specifies the mechanism, we cant go any further, and this idea of yours is merely a matter of belief, not related to any facts.

If you have a problem with the notion of a non-physical consciousness effecting the physical world, then what is it??

You still haven't articulated any problems as of yet.

 

[hammegk]

....
Im not a materialist, nor a dualist of any sort. ....

So I've noticed.


Why then did you parrot the following, since -- taking you at your word -- you know it to be meaningless?

....
How does a nonphysical thing affect a physical thing?

....
Absolutely not at all. Why on earth is it mysterious??

Ian, you aver you are not a dualist, yet you make that statement -- meaningless unless you are a dualist, or, unless you choose to define 'physical' and 'non-physical' to be exactly equivalent.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Who said this? [Okay, so nonphysical things are those things that have no effect on physical things.] This is Stimpson J Cat's absurd definition. And maybe other materialists.

If consciousness has no effect on physical things, then how come we can move our bodies?

Then I have no idea how you define nonphysical things.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
The fact that the non-physical effecting the physical does not obey physical laws, but in fact unfolds according to the intention of a sentient being, does not at all make it more problematic. Indeed, if anything, it makes it less so.

But if that is what is happening, then the physical thing is not obeying physical laws either, because it is "willing" to be affected by a nonphysical thing that does not obey physical laws. I suppose you could say that physical things obey physical laws and they also obey some nonphysical law that allows them to be affected by nonphysical things (in a way that we cannot investigate). Seems to be getting a bit convoluted to me.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

omegablue said:
So you think consciousness cannot be scientificaly investigated?? oh come one man.... And how did you came up with the idea that consciousness is non-physical? What is physical?

I was addressing Ian's points, not describing my own ideas.

~~ Paul

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

davidsmith,

If you are actually capable of honestly answering "yes", then clearly those supposedly non-physical properties have had some affect on your brain. Without any such effects, the truth of the fact that they had different non-physical properties could not possibly have influenced your behavior of saying that they do.

Why does blueness have to have an effect on my brain in order for me to say something about it? I think this is the assumption you are making that is not necessarily true. And if it isn't true then your argument doesn't carry any weight.

I just explained why. Your brain is what makes you talk. Or are you claiming that even if these supposedly causally inefficacious properties didn't exist, that you would talk and behave as though they did anyway?

If so, then that simply doesn't make any sense. We know that the brain is involved both in the processes of thinking and remembering. If these properties don't affect your brain, then you would be unable to remember having had them an instant before, and unable actually process any information about them. Not only would your behavior of verabally answering that there was a difference not actually be dependent on there actually being a difference, but you would not even be able to remember that they did!

But of course, this is not the case. You do remember having had these supposedly causally inefficacious properties in the past. And those memories are stored physically in your brain. Therefore whatever it is that you remember having had, it clearly is not causally inefficacious.

Only if you assume that non-physical existence must affect my brain in order for me to refer to it.

It's not a question of you being able to refer to it. For that matter, you can refer to things that don't even exist. The problem is that if it is really causally inefficacious, then none of your beliefs about it actually have anything to with it. Those beliefs are purely the result of causally efficacious things which these causally inefficacious properties can not possibly have affected.

Likewise, any properties which you find you actually are capable of remembering having, and capable of thinking about, clearly are causally efficacious.

I can define property X to be causally inefficacious, and then refer to it. But what I am referring to is not anything I am actually aware of having. If I define property X to some property which I actually remember having, then that property has affected my memories, and therefore must be causally efficacious.

The problem with this whole idea of epiphenomenalism is that it is based on the false notion that things like thinking and remembering are performed by something distinct from the brain, which then somehow controls the brain (and thus your behavior). This simply is not the case. Thinking and remembering cannot be separated out from brain activity. Even if you hold out for the unlikely possibility that there is something more than just brain activity to these things, the idea that the brain is not what actually stores and operates on information, is not compatible with reality.

And that is the central point here. Your brain is what processes and stores information. If you believe something, then that belief is physicall encoded in your brain. If you conclude, through some process of thought, that your belief is justified, then that information was processed by your brain.


Ian,

To put it formally in my own words. My own comments are in blue:

Premise 1: Consciousness is non-physical
Premise 2: One is directly aware of ones own consciousness
Premise 3: Ones direct awareness of ones consciousness necessarily affects the brain.

Conclusion 1: Consciousness does not affect your brain in any way. This follows directly from the fact that it is non-physical.

Of course people should be aware that I do say consciousness is causally efficacious. But what Dr Cat is saying here is that from my definition of consciousness (subjective qualitative feelings) the causal power of consciousness is not consciousness itself. And this is precisely what we're considering; namely consciousness itself in abstraction from any causal powers it has.

You have clearly misunderstood my argument. I specifically stated as my first premise that consciousness has a non-physical property, rather than that it is non-physical, precisely because I do recognize that you believe that consciousness is causally efficacious.

When you say that "consciousness itself, in abstraction from any causal powers it has", you are talking about the non-physical properties of consciousness. That is the whole point. If after taking away the causal powers of consciousness, you actually have anything left at all, then what you have left are precisely the non-physical properties of consciousness. That is, the properties of consciousness which do not affect anything physical (including your brain).

In other words we have the trivial claim:

Consciousness shorn of its causal powers does not have any causal powers!

The conclusion of my argument is that consciousness shorn of its causal powers is nothing at all.

So let's consider the general case. We have X which has causal powers. But Dr Cat is saying lets abstract X from its causal powers i.e consider each separately.

We are then left with the rather trivial claim that X considered in abstraction from its causal powers does not have any causal powers. But if something has no causal powers whatsoever, then how can we ever know of its existence?? Thus we have absolutely no reason to suppose X exists. Therefore only X's causal powers exist. Except that since X does not exist we only have certain physical processes in the world which could be designated "X" -- and of course "X" is then quite different from X.

Huh? I was with you up until the italicized part. What do you mean "since X does not exist"? Of course X exists! If X has causal powers it must exist. The question is whether there is anything more to X than its causal powers.

The same goes for consciousness. First of all abstract consciousness from its causal powers. Thus consciousness in abstraction from its causal powers has no causal powers. Therefore, since it is unable to affect the world, we can never know of its existence. Thus only the causal powers of consciousness exist; or in other words only certain physical processes in the world exist -- namely our behaviour (there is nothing called consciousness which causes behaviour).

This does not follow from the above at all. On the contrary, since we have established that consciousness does have causal powers, clearly there is something called consciousness which causes our behavior. There is just nothing more to it than its causal powers.

Specifically, in the context of my position, consciousness is a set of brain processes. These brain processes cause our behavior, and like all physical things, there is nothing more to them than their causal powers. That is not the same as saying that consciousness does not exist!

In other words Dr Cat is arguing that we are p-zombies (unconscious automatons).

If you define a p-zombie to be somebody who does not possess consciousness, then clearly we are not p-zombies. Furthermore, if you define a p-zombie to be somebody who is physically identical to a human, but who does not possess consciousness, then such a thing is clearly impossible since consciousness is non-physical.

If, on the other hand, you define a p-zombie to be somebody whose consciousness has no causally inefficacious properties, then of course we are all p-zombies. But such a definition is rather pointless, since this would mean that humans and p-zombies are exactly the same thing.

But since we know absolutely that we are conscious (i.e we cannot possibly be in error in this), we have a paradox. At least either that or Dr Cat's argument is in error.

The only error is your completely illogical leap from "consciousness exists, but consists only of its causal powers" to "consciousness does not exist". Not only does this not follow, but the latter flatly contradicts the former.

The fact is that while we know absolutely that we are conscious, we do not, by any stretch of the imagination, know that our consciousness consists of anything more than its causal powers. On the contrary, as I have already explained, its causal powers are the only part of it we possibly could be aware of having, which implies from the definition of "consciousness" that it can only consist of causal powers.

There are 2 mistakes as I see it. The 2nd one being conclusive.

First of all it might ring mighty strange to people to conclude X has no causal powers by considering it in abstraction from its causal powers in the first place!.

Then why on Earth did you do so? I certainly didn't. Nowhere in any of my arguments have I concluded that consciousness has no causal powers.

But lets leave aside this objection. Dr Cat is saying we only know of our consciousness through its causal powers. But as I have repeated stated, non-materialists reject this thesis.

You can only reject it by burying your head in the sand and completely ignoring what we know about the brain's involvment in thinking and remembering.

When we say we know we are conscious, we are not saying that consciousness causes some other process whereby we come to know it. No, we are saying that our recognition of our our consciousness is unmediated. In other words there is no causal relationship between the fact of my consciousness and me knowing it.

This again contradicts everything we know about the brain's involvement in thinking and remembering.

The fact that I might say I know I am conscious does not mean I could not logically know it without saying it. Indeed it does not mean that I could not know it without any brain activity whatsoever. Of course it may be nomonologically necessary that there will be brain activity whenever I think anything at all, but since my position is that the appropriate brain activity follows consciousness, rather than vice versa, then Dr Cat's argument doesn't hold.

The problem is that your position requires that the brain processes must follow you knowing that you have consciousness. That your brain processes are not actually involved in the processes of thinking or remembering at all, but instead are simply controlled by your "consciousness" to cause your bodily behavior. This position simply is not compatible with reality.

I am afraid if you are not going to accept the basic fact that all information processing and storage aspects of consciousness (if not all of consciousness itself) are performed by the brain, then we are never going to get anywhere.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Stimpy said:
I am afraid if you are not going to accept the basic fact that all information processing and storage aspects of consciousness (if not all of consciousness itself) are performed by the brain, then we are never going to get anywhere.

I'm fairly certain that I remember Ian saying that memory (some or all?) is not stored in the brain. Then again, almost everything I think Ian said is apparently a misunderstanding on my part.

Perhaps it would help if Ian stated what he thinks the brain does.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

II
To put it formally in my own words. My own comments are in blue:

Premise 1: Consciousness is non-physical
Premise 2: One is directly aware of ones own consciousness
Premise 3: Ones direct awareness of ones consciousness necessarily affects the brain.

Conclusion 1: Consciousness does not affect your brain in any way. This follows directly from the fact that it is non-physical.

Of course people should be aware that I do say consciousness is causally efficacious. But what Dr Cat is saying here is that from my definition of consciousness (subjective qualitative feelings) the causal power of consciousness is not consciousness itself. And this is precisely what we're considering; namely consciousness itself in abstraction from any causal powers it has.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cat
You have clearly misunderstood my argument.

I did misunderstand it when I originally addressed your post. But in my response that you are addressing I do understand it.

I specifically stated as my first premise that consciousness has a non-physical property, rather than that it is non-physical, precisely because I do recognize that you believe that consciousness is causally efficacious.

There's just loads of confusion being generated because you are not using the word consciousness in its correct sense. I needed to alter the argument to make it clear in my own mind what precisely your argument is. I just get confused when people use the word consciousness to refer to behaviour or physical processes in the brain.

When you say that "consciousness itself, in abstraction from any causal powers it has", you are talking about the non-physical properties of consciousness.

No, the whole of consciousness is non-physical. It has physical effects, but that doesn't mean that it's physical.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In other words we have the trivial claim:

Consciousness shorn of its causal powers does not have any causal powers!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The conclusion of my argument is that consciousness shorn of its causal powers is nothing at all.

Yes I know. Your belief is that consciousness doesn't exist -- in other words we are all p-zombies.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So let's consider the general case. We have X which has causal powers. But Dr Cat is saying lets abstract X from its causal powers i.e consider each separately.

We are then left with the rather trivial claim that X considered in abstraction from its causal powers does not have any causal powers. But if something has no causal powers whatsoever, then how can we ever know of its existence?? Thus we have absolutely no reason to suppose X exists. Therefore only X's causal powers exist. Except that since X does not exist we only have certain physical processes in the world which could be designated "X" -- and of course "X" is then quite different from X.
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Huh? I was with you up until the italicized part. What do you mean "since X does not exist"? Of course X exists! If X has causal powers it must exist. The question is whether there is anything more to X than its causal powers.

No, you are saying X in abstraction of its causal powers does not exist. Only the causal powers exist which you refer to as "X".

And we can replace X with consciousness. Thus you are saying consciousness in abstraction of its causal powers does not exist. Only its causal powers exist which you refer to as "consciousness". But clearly consciousness and "consciousness" are not the same thing. And this conversation is hopeless because you keep insisting in talking about "consciousness" where as I am talking about consciousness.

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The same goes for consciousness. First of all abstract consciousness from its causal powers. Thus consciousness in abstraction from its causal powers has no causal powers. Therefore, since it is unable to affect the world, we can never know of its existence. Thus only the causal powers of consciousness exist; or in other words only certain physical processes in the world exist -- namely our behaviour (there is nothing called consciousness which causes behaviour).
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This does not follow from the above at all. On the contrary, since we have established that consciousness does have causal powers, clearly there is something called consciousness which causes our behavior. There is just nothing more to it than its causal powers.

That's what I said. By consciousness you simply mean certain behaviour or brain activity. There is nothing other than such physical processes. Therefore we are not conscious (my definition).

Specifically, in the context of my position, consciousness is a set of brain processes. These brain processes cause our behavior, and like all physical things, there is nothing more to them than their causal powers. That is not the same as saying that consciousness does not exist!

But it's precisely the same since you say only the causal powers of consciousness exist. This was what I was talking about above. If only the causal powers of consciousness exist, this means that consciousness, the possessor of causal powers does not exist. Only the causal powers exist which, in the absence of consciousness, are simply physical processes in the world. Your position is that we are p-zombies.

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In other words Dr Cat is arguing that we are p-zombies (unconscious automatons).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


If you define a p-zombie to be somebody who does not possess consciousness, then clearly we are not p-zombies. Furthermore, if you define a p-zombie to be somebody who is physically identical to a human, but who does not possess consciousness, then such a thing is clearly impossible since consciousness is non-physical.

But you have argued that consciousness doesn't exist!! LOOK:

Cat said previously
consciousness is a set of brain processes. These brain processes cause our behavior, and like all physical things, there is nothing more to them than their causal powers.

If "consciousness" is constituted by simply "its" causal powers, then there is no "its" to which causal powers belong. You're saying that consciousness is nothing more than physical processes. A p-zombie too is nothing more than physical processes, as is a boulder rolling down a hill, or the planets orbiting the Sun. With your definition of "consciousness" a p-zombie is "conscious", but it is not conscious in the way the rest of the human race understands by consciousness.

If, on the other hand, you define a p-zombie to be somebody whose consciousness has no causally inefficacious properties, then of course we are all p-zombies. But such a definition is rather pointless, since this would mean that humans and p-zombies are exactly the same thing.

That is your position if one takes your statements seriously. Anybody who is sane though will recognise that there's a world of difference between a real conscious person and an unconscious automaton.

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But since we know absolutely that we are conscious (i.e we cannot possibly be in error in this), we have a paradox. At least either that or Dr Cat's argument is in error.
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The only error is your completely illogical leap from "consciousness exists, but consists only of its causal powers" to "consciousness does not exist". Not only does this not follow, but the latter flatly contradicts the former.

You don't seem to be following my argument at all.

The fact is that while we know absolutely that we are conscious, we do not, by any stretch of the imagination, know that our consciousness consists of anything more than its causal powers.

First of all I'm not talking about your p-zombie "consciousness". Secondly I'm afraid that anyone who is conscious (not your p-zombie consciousness) does in fact know with complete and absolute certainty that they are conscious. Certainly I am not interested in arguing about the point for the simple reason there is nothing to be said.

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There are 2 mistakes as I see it. The 2nd one being conclusive.

First of all it might ring mighty strange to people to conclude X has no causal powers by considering it in abstraction from its causal powers in the first place!.
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Then why on Earth did you do so? I certainly didn't. Nowhere in any of my arguments have I concluded that consciousness has no causal powers.

But that's simply the way you define consciousness. I am talking about proper consciousness, and you're saying that it doesn't exist. You're saying only its causal powers exist.

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But lets leave aside this objection. Dr Cat is saying we only know of our consciousness through its causal powers. But as I have repeated stated, non-materialists reject this thesis.
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You can only reject it by burying your head in the sand and completely ignoring what we know about the brain's involvment in thinking and remembering.

Oh yes? But if my position is correct, and we are conscious after we die, then the brain need not necessarily be involved in thinking and remembering. In other words the brain is only involved whilst we're still alive. Of course you can presuppose your own position is correct in your premises, but then you cannot conclude anything about my position.

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When we say we know we are conscious, we are not saying that consciousness causes some other process whereby we come to know it. No, we are saying that our recognition of our our consciousness is unmediated. In other words there is no causal relationship between the fact of my consciousness and me knowing it.
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This again contradicts everything we know about the brain's involvement in thinking and remembering.

Oh yes? But if my position is correct, and we are conscious after we die, then the brain is not involved in thinking and remembering. In other words the brain is only involved whilst we're still alive. Of course you can presuppose your own position is correct in your premises, but then you cannot conclude anything about my position.

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The fact that I might say I know I am conscious does not mean I could not logically know it without saying it. Indeed it does not mean that I could not know it without any brain activity whatsoever. Of course it may be nomonologically necessary that there will be brain activity whenever I think anything at all, but since my position is that the appropriate brain activity follows consciousness, rather than vice versa, then Dr Cat's argument doesn't hold.
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The problem is that your position requires that the brain processes must follow you knowing that you have consciousness. That your brain processes are not actually involved in the processes of thinking or remembering at all, but instead are simply controlled by your "consciousness" to cause your bodily behavior. This position simply is not compatible with reality.

But why didn't you just say that at the outset instead of spewing forth spurious arguments? You could have contented yourself in saying that, I could have said I disagree, and we could have both saved ourselves all this bother.

I am afraid if you are not going to accept the basic fact that all information processing and storage aspects of consciousness (if not all of consciousness itself) are performed by the brain, then we are never going to get anywhere.

I agree with your last point.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Ian, I find it amusing but also annoying that you are rebuking Stimpson for using words in their normal English sense, and assuming that what we know of the brain is correct.

For future reference, I think I can now describe Ian's modus operandi.

1. He uses the word "consciousness" to refer to a spooky immaterial process which he intuits to exist, not to consciousness as the word is usually used, and he has no evidence for the existence of this immaterial process.

2. He believes memory and Ian-consciousness to be spooky immaterial processes which (despite all we know of the brain) can go on quite well without the brain, and he has no evidence for this claim.

3. He believes that without this spooky Ian-consciousness associated with our brains we would be unconscious but totally indiscernable from conscious people, and evidence for this claim could not be found even in theory.

4. He will avoid making claims 1-3 explicit for as long as possible, so that a maximally pointless conversation with be created. Instead he will gesture vaguely towards these points with incoherent arguments, unsupported claims, and rhetorical questions.

5. When he gets pinned down and cannot avoid admitting that he has been covertly assuming 1-3 to be true all along, and cannot avoid admitting that these are articles of faith not positions of reason, the thread ends and Ian has to begin a new one.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Oh yes? But if my position is correct, and we are conscious after we die, then the brain need not necessarily be involved in thinking and remembering. In other words the brain is only involved whilst we're still alive. Of course you can presuppose your own position is correct in your premises, but then you cannot conclude anything about my position.

And what does the brain do while we are alive?

I'm looking forward to being conscious after I die, even though I'm not conscious while I'm asleep.

~~ Paul

Edited to add: Holy cow! I just figured out what the brain does. It prevents my consciousness from remembering anything while my brain is asleep.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ian, I find it amusing but also annoying that you are rebuking Stimpson for using words in their normal English sense, and assuming that what we know of the brain is correct.

I assume absolutely nothing about the brain; nor have I ever claimed otherwise. As for the word consciousness, I simply use it in the sense that the vast majority of the human race uses it, namely the subjective qualitative (what it is like) nature of consciousness. In other words what some people might describe as the phenomenological. I do not believe that the vast majority of the human race define consciousness as physical processes. If they did so they would be saying they are p-zombies i.e unconscious automatons.

For future reference, I think I can now describe Ian's modus operandi.

1. He uses the word "consciousness" to refer to a spooky immaterial process which he intuits to exist, not to consciousness as the word is usually used, and he has no evidence for the existence of this immaterial process.

I repeat, I am using the word consciousness as it is almost universally understood apart from the materialists. Whether you call it "spooky" or however you like to refer to it, our knowledge of such consciousness is absolute. We cannot possibly be mistaken in thinking we are conscious.

2. He believes memory and Ian-consciousness to be spooky immaterial processes which (despite all we know of the brain) can go on quite well without the brain, and he has no evidence for this claim.

My belief in a "life after death" is completely irrelevant in the context of this thread. I was simply pointing out that consciousness is not physical. And BTW I have plenty of reasons and evidence for subscribing to the survival ("life after death") hypothesis.

3. He believes that without this spooky Ian-consciousness associated with our brains we would be unconscious but totally indiscernable from conscious people, and evidence for this claim could not be found even in theory.

No, on the contrary, we would be corpses without consciousness. It is materialists whose position necessitates that people are either p-zombies or that their consciousnesses is an epiphenomenon.

 

[Jeff Corey]

... It is materialists whose position necessitates that people are either p-zombies or that their consciousnesses is an epiphenomenon.

Absolutely not. You have no shred of an idea what you are babbling about.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Absolutely not. You have no shred of an idea what you are babbling about.

Jeff, there is no other option.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

When you say that "consciousness itself, in abstraction from any causal powers it has", you are talking about the non-physical properties of consciousness.

No, the whole of consciousness is non-physical. It has physical effects, but that doesn't mean that it's physical

There is absolutely no point in bickering about what "physical" means. It doesn't make any difference whether you call if "physical" or not. The point is that when you say "consciousness itself, in abstraction from any causal powers it has", you are talking about the properties which do not affect the brain.

The conclusion of my argument is that consciousness shorn of its causal powers is nothing at all.

Yes I know. Your belief is that consciousness doesn't exist -- in other words we are all p-zombies.

I don't get it, Ian. How can you take something I say, and then repeat back something which flatly contradicts what I said as being my position. I am not claiming that consciousness doesn't exist! I am claiming that consciousness without its causal powers is nothing at all. But clearly since it does have causal powers, it does exist.

Why do you insist on blatantly misrepresenting what I say to make it sound like something else? I am not saying that consciousness doesn't exist. I am just saying that I don't think there is anything more to it that its causally efficacious properties. You agree with me that it does have such properties, so I do not see how you can possibly leap from "consciousness does not have any causally inefficacious properties" to "consciousness does not exist".

Huh? I was with you up until the italicized part. What do you mean "since X does not exist"? Of course X exists! If X has causal powers it must exist. The question is whether there is anything more to X than its causal powers.

No, you are saying X in abstraction of its causal powers does not exist. Only the causal powers exist which you refer to as "X".

You are mixing up your own terminology. You defined X to include those causal powers. Having done so, you cannot claim that when I say X doesn't include anything else, that I am saying that X doesn't exist!

And we can replace X with consciousness. Thus you are saying consciousness in abstraction of its causal powers does not exist.

Exactly. Is it not obvious that this is not the same as saying that consciousness does not exist?

Only its causal powers exist which you refer to as "consciousness". But clearly consciousness and "consciousness" are not the same thing.

How is this clear? On the contrary, my argument shows quite clearly that they must be the same thing, since if consciousness had any causally inefficacious properties, we would not be aware of them, which contradicts the definition of consciousness.

And this conversation is hopeless because you keep insisting in talking about "consciousness" where as I am talking about consciousness.

What I am disputing is the nature of consciousness, not its existence. We both agree that it exists, and we both agree that it has causally efficacious properties. What we disagree on is whether or not it has any causally inefficacious properties.

How difficult is that to understand? Why can't you simply address the question of whether or not consciousness actually has any causally inefficacious properties, rather than misrepresenting my position as being that "consciousness doesn't exist", and simply dismissing it?

This does not follow from the above at all. On the contrary, since we have established that consciousness does have causal powers, clearly there is something called consciousness which causes our behavior. There is just nothing more to it than its causal powers.

That's what I said. By consciousness you simply mean certain behaviour or brain activity. There is nothing other than such physical processes. Therefore we are not conscious (my definition).

Then you are defining consciousness to have causally inefficacious properties, which is just begging the question. What's more, since your definition also requires that consciousness cannot have any aspect which you are unaware of, this renders your definition self-contradictory.

Specifically, in the context of my position, consciousness is a set of brain processes. These brain processes cause our behavior, and like all physical things, there is nothing more to them than their causal powers. That is not the same as saying that consciousness does not exist!

But it's precisely the same since you say only the causal powers of consciousness exist. This was what I was talking about above. If only the causal powers of consciousness exist, this means that consciousness, the possessor of causal powers does not exist. Only the causal powers exist which, in the absence of consciousness, are simply physical processes in the world.

This is complete nonsense. The causal powers causal powers of consciousness. In the subsense of consciousness those causal powers are absent as well!

If we define some set of causal powers to be "the causal powers of consciousness", then consciousness is whatever possesses those causal powers.

Your position is that we are p-zombies.

Complete nonsense. P-zombies are logically self-contradictory. My position is that consciousness consists only of causal powers.

If you define a p-zombie to be somebody who does not possess consciousness, then clearly we are not p-zombies. Furthermore, if you define a p-zombie to be somebody who is physically identical to a human, but who does not possess consciousness, then such a thing is clearly impossible since consciousness is non-physical.

But you have argued that consciousness doesn't exist!! LOOK:

Cat said previously
consciousness is a set of brain processes. These brain processes cause our behavior, and like all physical things, there is nothing more to them than their causal powers.

If "consciousness" is constituted by simply "its" causal powers, then there is no "its" to which causal powers belong.

Now you are just playing silly word games. If I say that an electron is constituted by its causal powers, then am I saying electrons don't exist? No, of course not. I am simply saying that the word only refers to some set of causal properties.

You're saying that consciousness is nothing more than physical processes.

Exactly, which is clearly completely different than saying that it does not exist!

A p-zombie too is nothing more than physical processes, as is a boulder rolling down a hill, or the planets orbiting the Sun. With your definition of "consciousness" a p-zombie is "conscious", but it is not conscious in the way the rest of the human race understands by consciousness.

P-zombies are logically self-contradictory, and thus irrelevant. Why don't you actually address my argument for why consciousness cannot have causally inefficacious properties, rather than beating up helpless strawmen?

If, on the other hand, you define a p-zombie to be somebody whose consciousness has no causally inefficacious properties, then of course we are all p-zombies. But such a definition is rather pointless, since this would mean that humans and p-zombies are exactly the same thing.

That is your position if one takes your statements seriously. Anybody who is sane though will recognise that there's a world of difference between a real conscious person and an unconscious automaton.

I am not claiming that we are unconscious automatons. On the contrary, I am claiming that we are consciousness biological machines. It is not at all clear that there is any difference between a real conscious person and a conscious biological machine. Again, you simply assuming as part of your definition of "consciousness" that it includes causally inefficacious properties. I do not need to be insane to doubt that such properties actually exist.

You can only reject it by burying your head in the sand and completely ignoring what we know about the brain's involvment in thinking and remembering.

Oh yes? But if my position is correct, and we are conscious after we die, then the brain need not necessarily be involved in thinking and remembering. In other words the brain is only involved whilst we're still alive.

But we are alive, and while we are alive, it is involved. If you want to speculate that after you die some mysterious new thing attaches itself to consciousness, so that it can continue to think and remember, go right ahead. But the fact remains that right now, you, as a living being who uses his brain to think and remember, cannot possibly be aware of any causally inefficacious properties of consciousness.

Of course you can presuppose your own position is correct in your premises, but then you cannot conclude anything about my position.

And even if you presuppose your own position is correct, it is still incoherent, since you are not dead, and currently do use your brain to think and remember.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

I have started a new thread on this topic in the philosophy forum.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Of course you did.

~~ Paul

 

[davidsmith73]

Why does blueness have to affect the brain in order for us to know about blueness?

That question sounds absurd, so I must not understand how you're looking at this. Where do we "know" things, if not in the brain? Also, I'm not sure why you think we can't describe blueness. In particular, I can point at a blue object and say "It feels like that color, only less well defined. It reminds me of blueberries. I associate it with being sad. It's one of my favorite colors. My mother had a nice blue dress."

~~ Paul

None of those are descriptions of blueness. Mary in the black and white room cannot be given any of your descriptions and know what blueness is like. Conversely, Mary can be given a description of a physical process, and know everything there is to know about that description. Even though we use the same word (knowledge) for each scenario, the former scenario is different to the latter for the simple reason that blueness cannot be described to Mary. If we cannot describe to Mary what blueness is in the same way that we can describe every conceivable physical process, then blueness cannot be physical. If blueness cannot be described to Mary in terms of physical relationships then how can you say it affects the brain? In order for something to affect the brain it must be initially defined in a physical way.