A priori synthetic statements

[davidsmith73]

Undetectable, non-physical stuff is the kind of thing about which, in my opinion, there is simply nothing to say.

I'm curious as to why you use the word "undetectable". To me this implies that you are assuming that non-physical existence has an existence outside of experience, which is not the case. It is experience. So to say that it is "undetectable" has no meaning really. Experience is simply not amenable to physical description, but it exists nontheless. It is neither there to be detected or not detected in a physical sense.

Certainly every attempt to do so has fallen on its face.

Does this make you believe that experience is physically definable?

This is not an argument, it's just an insulting assertion. "If you don't agree with me, it is because you are dishonest. If only you were honest you would admit that I am right because this is easy to understand for honest people".

I didn't mean for my words to be insulting. My appologies if that is the case. I just want to face up to the problems of experience. I don't think you are being dishonest in the sense of deliberate deception, I just think you are not looking in the right places to understand what non-physical existence means.

The usual philosophical definition of knowledge is "true and justified belief". Now as I see it, you do not have knowledge (direct or otherwise) because your belief is not justified. You can call it knowledge, but that does not make it more than mere belief.

Well, if that is the usual philosophical definition then its not the one I am using. There is no "justified belief" involved in the experience of blueness. If there were, we would all be able to sit down at the table and look at the evidence for the existence of blueness. This clearly is not possible because blueness is not physically definable. You do not infer the existence of blueness.

If "if you were honest you would believe as I do" is really the best argument you have to persuade an uncommitted person to your side, your case is not in a very healthy state.

Ok, perhaps we could agree to say that we both experience "blue"?

 

[davidsmith73]

I think they may be some talking at cross purposes here. The fact, if it is a fact, that consciousness arises from the brain is neither here or there. Let's suppose you're right. Now as I say, you can call consciousness material if you like, but this does not alter the fact that the 2 existents are radically characteristically unlike each other. It is clear that the fact that one arises from the other does not, nor could not, alter this fact.

There is consciousness defined by its subjective qualitative feel, and there are tables and all other physical objects in the Universe which are certainly not defined in such a manner.

In addition physical objects and processes have to be defined exclusively by their causal role in the world. If there is anything other to physical objects/processes than their causal power, then we, by definition, could not know about them because, lacking causal power, those aspects could not make their presence known to us, not ever.

On the other hand consciousness is not defined exclusively by their causal role in the world -- consciousness is defined by its subjective qualitative feel. It may have causal powers (and I believe it does), but it is not constituted by such causal powers.

So why refer to both types of existent as both being material? All it achieves is to confuse things and muddy the water.

Well said Ian. You have rightly emphasised that the problem of consciousness/experience is primarily an issue of how it cannot be defined by physical relationships, an issue that remains unanswered even if materialists assert that it is physical by describing a completely different type of existence (physical things such as brain activity).

edited to add:

its only a problem if one tries to explain experience from the perspective of physical processes.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
I just wanted to see if you understood that its not possible to provide evidence for the non-physical nature of experience. The meaning of "evidence" depends on the necessary assumption that the phenomena you seek evidence for is physical (meaning it can be described by logical relationships). If experience is not physically definable then you reach a logical dead end if you try to find evidence for it.

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Kevin Lowe
Undetectable, non-physical stuff is the kind of thing about which, in my opinion, there is simply nothing to say.

There may or may not be anything to say about consciousness. Nevertheless we have incorrigible certitude that it exists. We cannot possibly be mistaken about that.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Then I do not at all understand what you're saying. I have not the remotest idea how your statement:

"By definition, there can be no aspects of your consciousness which you are not aware of, and all of the aspects which you are aware of affect your brain activity in some way".

addresses the point I made.

I already explained how it addresses it. You argued that consciousness is not physical because there is something more to it than its physical effects. But since there cannot be any aspects of consciousness which you are not aware of, and all of those aspects which you are aware of have physical effects, this is impossible.

To put it formally:

Premise 1: Consciousness has some non-physical property 'x'.
Premise 2: All properties of your consciousness are properties which you are aware of.
Premise 3: All properties of consciousness which you are aware of affect your brain in some way.

Conclusion 1: Property 'x' does not affect your brain in any way. This follows directly from the fact that it is non-physical.
Conclusion 2: You are not aware that your consciousness has property 'x'. This follows directly from conclusion 1 and premise 3.
Conclusion 3: Your consciousness does not have property 'x'. This follows directly from conclusion 2 and premise 2.

Conclusion 3 contradicts premise 1. Therefore those three premises cannot all be true. Either your consciousness does not have any non-physical properties, or your consciousness has properties which you are not aware of, or your consciousness has properties which you are aware of, but which cannot possibly have any effect on your brain activity (or behavior) in any way at all.

Which are you claiming is the case? So far, you seem to have agreed with all three premises. This is self-contradictory.


Dr. Stupid

 

[davidsmith73]

Ian,


But since there cannot be any aspects of consciousness which you are not aware of, and all of those aspects which you are aware of have physical effects, this is impossible.

To put it formally:

Premise 1: Consciousness has some non-physical property 'x'.
Premise 2: All properties of your consciousness are properties which you are aware of.
Premise 3: All properties of consciousness which you are aware of affect your brain in some way.

Can you give a brief argument why we should accept premise 3?

 

[Interesting Ian]

I already explained how it addresses it. You argued that consciousness is not physical because there is something more to it than its physical effects. But since there cannot be any aspects of consciousness which you are not aware of, and all of those aspects which you are aware of have physical effects, this is impossible.

No it isn't. Even if we accept that all aspects of consciousness has physical effects this simply doesn't follow at all.

To put it formally:

Premise 1: Consciousness has some non-physical property 'x'.

No, consciousness itself is non-physical.

Premise 2: All properties of your consciousness are properties which you are aware of.
Premise 3: All properties of consciousness which you are aware of affect your brain in some way.

Conclusion 1: Property 'x' does not affect your brain in any way. This follows directly from the fact that it is non-physical.

Conclusion 1 is flat out wrong. Consciousness does affect the brain and it is non-physical. This is necessarily true (ie its non-physicality) therefore conclusion 1 is necessarily false.

Your proof simply doesn't work because conclusion 1 is flat out wrong and I'm not saying that consciousness has non-physical properties; I'm saying consciousness itself is non-physical.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I think they may be some talking at cross purposes here. The fact, if it is a fact, that consciousness arises from the brain is neither here or there. Let's suppose you're right. Now as I say, you can call consciousness material if you like, but this does not alter the fact that the 2 existents are radically characteristically unlike each other. It is clear that the fact that one arises from the other does not, nor could not, alter this fact.

The image on my screen of your avatar is radically characteristically unlike the string of ones and zeroes that gives rise to it too. That proves nothing.

There is consciousness defined by its subjective qualitative feel, and there are tables and all other physical objects in the Universe which are certainly not defined in such a manner.

Not for a value of "defined by" that rules out the possibility of it being purely a matter of atoms going about their business.

In addition physical objects and processes have to be defined exclusively by their causal role in the world. If there is anything other to physical objects/processes than their causal power, then we, by definition, could not know about them because, lacking causal power, those aspects could not make their presence known to us, not ever.

On the other hand consciousness is not defined exclusively by their causal role in the world -- consciousness is defined by its subjective qualitative feel. It may have causal powers (and I believe it does), but it is not constituted by such causal powers.

Says who?

So why refer to both types of existent as both being material? All it achieves is to confuse things and muddy the water.

I do not think I am the one confusing things and muddying the water.

Just because you reckon that consciousness and brains are different it does not follow that they are different.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I'm curious as to why you use the word "undetectable". To me this implies that you are assuming that non-physical existence has an existence outside of experience, which is not the case. It is experience. So to say that it is "undetectable" has no meaning really. Experience is simply not amenable to physical description, but it exists nontheless. It is neither there to be detected or not detected in a physical sense.

That we have experiences is obvious. That these experiences are or involve non-physical stuff is an empty claim, one about which there is simply nothing intelligent to say.

Does this make you believe that experience is physically definable?

It means that it would be irrational to rule out that possibility based on the arguments that have so far been advanced.

I didn't mean for my words to be insulting. My appologies if that is the case. I just want to face up to the problems of experience. I don't think you are being dishonest in the sense of deliberate deception, I just think you are not looking in the right places to understand what non-physical existence means.

I just think that you are looking at "problems" of your own imagination. You do not actually have either an intelligent argument or evidence for the claim that experience cannot be an instance of atoms in the brain doing their thing. You just help yourself to this premise for free, and then wonder why nobody wants to engage with you in arguments about what follows from this premise.

Well, if that is the usual philosophical definition then its not the one I am using. There is no "justified belief" involved in the experience of blueness. If there were, we would all be able to sit down at the table and look at the evidence for the existence of blueness. This clearly is not possible because blueness is not physically definable. You do not infer the existence of blueness.

It is not yet possible to do so, no. I think it may well turn out in the future that blueness will be physically defineable in terms of how the brain encodes and decodes it, just as the way a computer encodes and decodes colour now is physically defineable. The premise you have helped yourself to rules this out, but that's a problem with your premise, not with this possible future development.

Ok, perhaps we could agree to say that we both experience "blue"?

Blue, pain, fear, love, pleasure, sure. I am about as sure that we both experience these things as I am sure of anything.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
Conclusion 1 is flat out wrong. Consciousness does affect the brain and it is non-physical. This is necessarily true (ie its non-physicality) therefore conclusion 1 is necessarily false.

If I've understood you at all over the years, by nonphysical you mean an aspect of the Mind that does not follow the physical laws that the Mind dictates for the subset of its activities that are "physical." So consciousness is nonphysical, but the brain is physical.

Now consider how consciousness would affect the brain. It would necessarily have to follow at least some of the physical laws so it could interact with the brain to affect it. If this were not the case, then it would have to affect the brain by miracle, which means that the brain can accept change via miracle, which means that it is not strictly following all the physical laws. But we said it was.

So consciousness appears to be divided into a nonphysical part and a physical part. Isn't this a problem, since by induction we have consciousness being entirely physical?

Is this division between nonphysical and physical really tenable?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

In what way does physicalism lock the door to psi? Apparently this is the crucial question, since we are talking about "less impossible" vs. "supposedly impossible."

If physicalism means there is a local physical Universe which self-exists (and is ALL that exists) then communication of information and mechanisms of control MUST act through that physical medium. As a result, any communication of any signal of any type is relativistically limited. i.e. no information can get from A to B faster than the speed of light and no non-physical forms of causality are possible. As such, this view "locks the door" on nearly all forms of PSI phenomena, and those which aren't locked out are only possible if they aren't really PSI phenomena at all, but strange physical phenomena. The whole thing that makes PSI unusual is that it requires some sort of non-physical causality or non-physical information transfer. Both of these are possible if physicalism is false and some other model is true, because there is another "route" open for the information and control mechanism i.e. in idealism it is direct via the metamind. Idealism provides what comms people would call a "hub", instead of a system where each computer is just connected to its neighbour.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I think they may be some talking at cross purposes here. The fact, if it is a fact, that consciousness arises from the brain is neither here or there. Let's suppose you're right. Now as I say, you can call consciousness material if you like, but this does not alter the fact that the 2 existents are radically characteristically unlike each other. It is clear that the fact that one arises from the other does not, nor could not, alter this fact.

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Kevin_Lowe
The image on my screen of your avatar is radically characteristically unlike the string of ones and zeroes that gives rise to it too. That proves nothing.

I don't think this is useful at all. Your experience of my avatar is simply a perceptual experience on your part and has nothing to do with 0's and 1's or information. This is so even if you couldn't have the perceptual experience without the 0's and 1's. Indeed it seems to be that this is the same dichotomy under a different guise. The only distinction is that we are here talking about some properties of consciousness i.e qualia in the form of my avatar, as compared to consciousness itself. But qualia is non-physical as well. And if you were to object you're talking about my real physical avatar rather than your perception of it, then this real physical avatar is indeed just 0's and 1's; but then you can't talk about it having a radical different appearance from 0's and 1's.

There is consciousness defined by its subjective qualitative feel, and there are tables and all other physical objects in the Universe which are certainly not defined in such a manner.

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Not for a value of "defined by" that rules out the possibility of it being purely a matter of atoms going about their business.

Atoms "going about their business" is not what is understood by subjective qualitative feelings therefore it cannot be defined by them.

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In addition physical objects and processes have to be defined exclusively by their causal role in the world. If there is anything other to physical objects/processes than their causal power, then we, by definition, could not know about them because, lacking causal power, those aspects could not make their presence known to us, not ever.

On the other hand consciousness is not defined exclusively by their causal role in the world -- consciousness is defined by its subjective qualitative feel. It may have causal powers (and I believe it does), but it is not constituted by such causal powers.

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Says who?

Well if "consciousness" is constituted by such causal powers then you're saying that real consciousness i.e the subjective qualitative aspect, does not exist. Your definition of "consciousness" is not then the same as mine. But I submit that to deny the existence of ones own consciousness (subjective qualitative definition) is crashingly absurd and more clearly false then anything could possibly be.

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So why refer to both types of existent as both being material? All it achieves is to confuse things and muddy the water.
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I do not think I am the one confusing things and muddying the water.

You are in error.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I think it may well turn out in the future that blueness will be physically defineable in terms of how the brain encodes and decodes it, just as the way a computer encodes and decodes colour now is physically defineable. The premise you have helped yourself to rules this out, but that's a problem with your premise, not with this possible future development.

The word colour here shifts in its meaning. In your second use of the word you're referring to the physical events in the external world which eventually enables us to see a colour. In the 1st instance you're talking about actual colour (eg blueness as in a quale).

 

[Interesting Ian]

Now consider how consciousness would affect the brain. It would necessarily have to follow at least some of the physical laws so it could interact with the brain to affect it. If this were not the case, then it would have to affect the brain by miracle, which means that the brain can accept change via miracle, which means that it is not strictly following all the physical laws. But we said it was.

You might have done. I don't believe this. In fact if the brain simply follows physical laws then we have no more free will than an orbiting planet. But we know we do have free will (I have provided the proof before which I can repeat if necessary). Thus if an orbiting planet does not have free will it follows that processes in the brain do not follow physical laws.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I don't think this is useful at all. Your experience of my avatar is simply a perceptual experience on your part and has nothing to do with 0's and 1's or information. This is so even if you couldn't have the perceptual experience without the 0's and 1's. Indeed it seems to be that this is the same dichotomy under a different guise. The only distinction is that we are here talking about some properties of consciousness i.e qualia in the form of my avatar, as compared to consciousness itself. But qualia is non-physical as well. And if you were to object you're talking about my real physical avatar rather than your perception of it, then this real physical avatar is indeed just 0's and 1's; but then you can't talk about it having a radical different appearance from 0's and 1's.

That's all neither here nor there. The fact remains that just because you think that your consciousness is non-physical it does not follow that you are not mistaken. You might be right, or there might be psychological reasons why you are wrong.

To settle this question we look at the evidence. Well, I do.

Atoms "going about their business" is not what is understood by subjective qualitative feelings therefore it cannot be defined by them.

You can "understand" that the Bible is not a pile of atoms too, but doesn't stop someone defining an individual Bible precisely in terms of which kind of atom goes where. You can "understand" any incoherent, stupid or just plain wrong definition for any word you choose, and it is no impediment to more sensible people using the word in other ways.

Well if "consciousness" is constituted by such causal powers then you're saying that real consciousness i.e the subjective qualitative aspect, does not exist. Your definition of "consciousness" is not then the same as mine. But I submit that to deny the existence of ones own consciousness (subjective qualitative definition) is crashingly absurd and more clearly false then anything could possibly be.

I question the necessity of consciousness-as-you-define-it, since as Stimpy has already proven your definition is incoherent. I argue for the strong possibility that consciousness as it is generally understood, and as I experience it, arises from and depends on atoms going about their business.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

The word colour here shifts in its meaning. In your second use of the word you're referring to the physical events in the external world which eventually enables us to see a colour. In the 1st instance you're talking about actual colour (eg blueness as in a quale).

That's only a problem if you can demonstrate that a quale is not, when you get right down to it, a physical event in the brain. You keep begging the same damn question, Ian.

 

[davidsmith73]

That we have experiences is obvious. That these experiences are or involve non-physical stuff is an empty claim, one about which there is simply nothing intelligent to say.

I'm not so sure about that. It means that science cannot conceivably provide an explanation of experience in terms of physical processes. What this may mean is that experience must be elevated to a different status in our account of reality. This may mean that the explanatory direction is turned around - we may be able to provide an account of how physical processes arise from experience. Who knows what new phenomena may be predicted from that?

It means that it would be irrational to rule out that possibility based on the arguments that have so far been advanced.

Well, one thing is for sure: any conceivable physical explanation of "blueness" must first define the explanandi (blueness) in terms of physical relationships. And this is where things get a bit inconsistent on the materialists side. Usually, the explanandi is easily defined first and foremost in terms of physical relationships. For example, "walking" is first easily defined in terms of the movement of a body in space and time. This is a physically defined explanandi, i.e., there are clear physical relationships that are identified without the need for an explanation. The explanation then follows, also in terms of physical relationships. So my question would be - do you really believe that "blueness" is first and foremost an entailment of physical relationships?

I just think that you are looking at "problems" of your own imagination. You do not actually have either an intelligent argument or evidence for the claim that experience cannot be an instance of atoms in the brain doing their thing. You just help yourself to this premise for free, and then wonder why nobody wants to engage with you in arguments about what follows from this premise.

I do wonder why you are not examining the reality of that premise. You say that you are sure you experience "blueness". That gives me some hope. What would it take to make you realise that you could be wrong about your view?

It is not yet possible to do so, no. I think it may well turn out in the future that blueness will be physically defineable in terms of how the brain encodes and decodes it, just as the way a computer encodes and decodes colour now is physically defineable. The premise you have helped yourself to rules this out, but that's a problem with your premise, not with this possible future development.

Is it a problem with my premise? Is my premise a premise at all? Or is it something about reality that is undeniable? You say that blueness may be physically defineable in terms of how the brain encodes and decodes it. What is it? If it is completely entailed by a description of the process of encoding and decoding then what were people talking about when they said the "experience of blue" way before the concept of information processes were even conceived? How was blueness defined then?

Blue, pain, fear, love, pleasure, sure. I am about as sure that we both experience these things as I am sure of anything.

Then you must appreciate that those experiences are qualitative in nature, not quantitative yes? This is indicated by the fact that person A ,who knows nothing about physical description, can nevertheless talk meaningfully about "blueness". How does person A define "blueness"?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I don't think this is useful at all. Your experience of my avatar is simply a perceptual experience on your part and has nothing to do with 0's and 1's or information. This is so even if you couldn't have the perceptual experience without the 0's and 1's. Indeed it seems to be that this is the same dichotomy under a different guise. The only distinction is that we are here talking about some properties of consciousness i.e qualia in the form of my avatar, as compared to consciousness itself. But qualia is non-physical as well. And if you were to object you're talking about my real physical avatar rather than your perception of it, then this real physical avatar is indeed just 0's and 1's; but then you can't talk about it having a radical different appearance from 0's and 1's.

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Kevin_Lowe
That's all neither here nor there. The fact remains that just because you think that your consciousness is non-physical it does not follow that you are not mistaken. You might be right, or there might be psychological reasons why you are wrong.

To settle this question we look at the evidence. Well, I do.

I have already provided my proof.

a) Consciousness is utterly characteristically different from any other physical thing (you saying that my avatar appears to be different from 0's and 1's too, I just refuted).

b) Consciousness cannot possibly be accommodated by any scientific theory because science only deals with the causes and effects which is not what consciousness is.

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Atoms "going about their business" is not what is understood by subjective qualitative feelings therefore it cannot be defined by them.

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You can "understand" that the Bible is not a pile of atoms too, but doesn't stop someone defining an individual Bible precisely in terms of which kind of atom goes where. You can "understand" any incoherent, stupid or just plain wrong definition for any word you choose, and it is no impediment to more sensible people using the word in other ways.

A bible is a pile of atoms and it conveys information (whether false or true information). This just reduced to a bible is a family of qualia which imparts information. Emphasising the qualia part or emphasising the information part is neither here nor there. It certainly does not at all address my point. You can say that consciousness has an aspect consisting of neurons firing, but that fails to make it the very same thing as neurons firing. What we understand by consciousness is its subjective dimension. Even if it also had an objective dimension in the firing of ones neurons, that is not materialism.

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Well if "consciousness" is constituted by such causal powers then you're saying that real consciousness i.e the subjective qualitative aspect, does not exist. Your definition of "consciousness" is not then the same as mine. But I submit that to deny the existence of ones own consciousness (subjective qualitative definition) is crashingly absurd and more clearly false then anything could possibly be.

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I question the necessity of consciousness-as-you-define-it, since as Stimpy has already proven your definition is incoherent.

He has? Is this in his last post of which I only addressed the beginning? I didn't read the rest of his post. Could you quote the bit where you believe he has shown it to be incoherent?

I argue for the strong possibility that consciousness as it is generally understood, and as I experience it, arises from and depends on atoms going about their business.

That is not being discussed. As I said, we can for the sake of argument assume this to be true, but if it is true we cannot say materialism is correct. Consciousness is necessarily non-physical even if its genesis is from the physical.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Geoff said:
If physicalism means there is a local physical Universe which self-exists (and is ALL that exists) then communication of information and mechanisms of control MUST act through that physical medium. As a result, any communication of any signal of any type is relativistically limited. i.e. no information can get from A to B faster than the speed of light and no non-physical forms of causality are possible. As such, this view "locks the door" on nearly all forms of PSI phenomena, and those which aren't locked out are only possible if they aren't really PSI phenomena at all, but strange physical phenomena.

Wow. You just defined psi phenomena to necessarily entail nonphysical processes.

The whole thing that makes PSI unusual is that it requires some sort of non-physical causality or non-physical information transfer.

Holy begging the question cow.

Both of these are possible if physicalism is false and some other model is true, because there is another "route" open for the information and control mechanism i.e. in idealism it is direct via the metamind.

And you know that the metamind is not relativistically limited because ... ?

Because you get to imagine idealism any old way you want to.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
You might have done. I don't believe this. In fact if the brain simply follows physical laws then we have no more free will than an orbiting planet. But we know we do have free will (I have provided the proof before which I can repeat if necessary). Thus if an orbiting planet does not have free will it follows that processes in the brain do not follow physical laws.

Oh yes, please do provide the proof of free will again. I expect it begins with a definition of free will, right?

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I'm not so sure about that. It means that science cannot conceivably provide an explanation of experience in terms of physical processes.

No it doesn't.

Well, one thing is for sure: any conceivable physical explanation of "blueness" must first define the explanandi (blueness) in terms of physical relationships. And this is where things get a bit inconsistent on the materialists side. Usually, the explanandi is easily defined first and foremost in terms of physical relationships. For example, "walking" is first easily defined in terms of the movement of a body in space and time. This is a physically defined explanandi, i.e., there are clear physical relationships that are identified without the need for an explanation. The explanation then follows, also in terms of physical relationships. So my question would be - do you really believe that "blueness" is first and foremost an entailment of physical relationships?

In the same way that the Mona Lisa is "first and foremost" a collection of atoms, sure.

I do wonder why you are not examining the reality of that premise. You say that you are sure you experience "blueness". That gives me some hope. What would it take to make you realise that you could be wrong about your view?

I've examined it and discarded it, please give me that much credit. What would it take to make me take it seriously? Evidence of non-physical stuff that does stuff, or a philosophical argument for that position that can itself be taken seriously.

So far we have not progressed beyond people repeating, in increasingly obfuscated ways, that they intuit that their consciousness partakes of immaterialism in some form. What you intuit is at best a starting point for a search for evidence, not reason to hold that intuition as truth.

Is it a problem with my premise? Is my premise a premise at all? Or is it something about reality that is undeniable? You say that blueness may be physically defineable in terms of how the brain encodes and decodes it. What is it? If it is completely entailed by a description of the process of encoding and decoding then what were people talking about when they said the "experience of blue" way before the concept of information processes were even conceived? How was blueness defined then?

Yes. Yes. No. It is what we refer to as blueness, what more do you want? They were talking about blueness in the same way that people talked about the Mona Lisa before they knew it was a collection of atoms. It was defined as that colour you see when you look at the blue thing I am pointing at.

Then you must appreciate that those experiences are qualitative in nature, not quantitative yes? This is indicated by the fact that person A ,who knows nothing about physical description, can nevertheless talk meaningfully about "blueness". How does person A define "blueness"?

How does Polly define "want a cracker"? Does it follow from the fact that Polly knows what "a cracker" refers to that Polly has some mystical insight into whether or not crackers are physical objects composed of atoms or whether they have an immaterial component?