A parapsychologist writes about leaving parapsychology

[davidsmith73]

And if you aren't willing to accept this as a "starting assumption" what conclusion does the "fairly good evidence" lead you to?

We would instead be dealing with a definition of consciousness that is not ammenable to the principle of scientific evidence. The "fairly good evidence" that Beth is talking about would relate to physically defined aspects of brain functioning and cognition, whereas consciousness would be defined as non-physical. Cf, David Chalmers etc.

 

[Darat]

If someone isn't willing to accept the starting assumption, then I don't think it would lead them anywhere.

So why is the evidence "fairly good"?

 

[Darat]

We would instead be dealing with a definition of consciousness that is not ammenable to the principle of scientific evidence. The "fairly good evidence" that Beth is talking about would relate to physically defined aspects of brain functioning and cognition, whereas consciousness would be defined as non-physical. Cf, David Chalmers etc.

No that would just be substituting one assumption for another.

 

[davidsmith73]

No that would just be substituting one assumption for another.

Yes. And in doing so I would be rejecting the former assumption, which is what you asked wasn't it?

 

[Darat]

Yes. And in doing so I would be rejecting the former assumption, which is what you asked wasn't it?

No - I asked where does the evidence lead you to.

 

[Beth]

So why is the evidence "fairly good"?

"Fairly good" is a subjective judgement. I think it's fairly good because there have been some interesting and well done experiments that indicate that if the mind is considered to be 'what the brain does', consciousness might arise as an 'emergent' property of the brain. While that evidence isn't exactly conclusive, it is supportive of that conclusion.

If you're interested in the actual evidence, I'd refer you to Susan Blackmore's "The Meme Machine". She details a number of the experiments, what their results were and gives her own interpretation of their meaning and conclusions.

 

[davidsmith73]

No - I asked where does the evidence lead you to.

I thought I answered that too. Evidence is theory-laiden. If you reject the assumption that consciousness is what the brain does then you view that you take is that the evidence (that you and beth are talking about) is based on a hypothesis that refers to physically defined aspects of brain functioning and cognition - not consciousness.

 

[CFLarsen]

I thought I answered that too. Evidence is theory-laiden. If you reject the assumption that consciousness is what the brain does then you view that you take is that the evidence (that you and beth are talking about) is based on a hypothesis that refers to physically defined aspects of brain functioning and cognition - not consciousness.

That doesn't answer Darat's question. It isn't about rejecting an assumption. It's about where the evidence lead you to.

Where does the evidence lead you to?

 

[Dr B]

That doesn't answer Darat's question. It isn't about rejecting an assumption. It's about where the evidence lead you to.

Where does the evidence lead you to?

I think it leads some of the people above right back to my earlier points....i think some struggle to see when they are redescribing one mystery with another as opposed to actually explaining any...

 

[Dr B]

This is an assumption, a starting place. If you begin with the assumption that the mind is what the brain does, then you can attempt to explain consciousness as an emergent property of the brain. There is some fairly good evidence for this, if you are willing to accept the starting assumption.

No - it is not an assumption in the way you mean. It is factual in the sense that it's evidence-based reasoning. It is a claim based in an overwhelming amount of evidence.

Assuming PSI exists is nothing like that - so its not an assumption in the same manner at all. As Darat points out - if you follow the evidence it will lead you to what I state in my above posts.

I suppose some people are fudging what a true scientific premise is relative to an unfounded one.

 

[Darat]

"Fairly good" is a subjective judgement. I think it's fairly good because there have been some interesting and well done experiments that indicate that if the mind is considered to be 'what the brain does', consciousness might arise as an 'emergent' property of the brain. While that evidence isn't exactly conclusive, it is supportive of that conclusion.

If you're interested in the actual evidence, I'd refer you to Susan Blackmore's "The Meme Machine". She details a number of the experiments, what their results were and gives her own interpretation of their meaning and conclusions.

Thanks - but you seem to be missing my actual question.

What conclusion does the evidence (that you consider "fairly good") lead you to?

 

[Dr B]

I don't think Rodney is making an assumption. He, and I, believe that there is evidence for psi. I would say that the odds are in favour of it existing.

.

That is the assumption you are making - you assume it exists in the absence of convincing, reliable evidence for it. I do not concur. I agree with the usual 'anything is possible' type statement which i suppose we are a few posts from - but would add that far fewer things are likely (probable). You say the odds are in favour? Hyman and others have calculated these odds and it seems they are not.

Parapsychology must include the phenomenon of consciousness as a major part of its subject matter because most of the primary sources that show us there may be something to study in the first place involve anomalous information acquisition that can be consciously recalled. So any model of consciousness, or declarative memory for that matter, must account for these phenomena too.

Quite wrong actually. You need to demonstrate a phenomena exists before you model it.

Examples?

Oh there are many - look at the imagery / obe stuff post-Blackmore. Its bloody awful.....Parapsychology seems almost totally blind to cognitive neuroscience (with one or two exceptions), its methods, frameworks, theories etc.

I think you have it the wrong way round. Any complete explanation of consciousness must be able to include and predict psi phenomena, .

Not at all - you make a fallacy here. Its incorrect because a theory of consciousness does not have to explain a phenomena that is likely not to exist! How can your statement be logical in this sense?

if such things turn out to be reliably demonstrated enough to justify this inclusion

Ahhhh you qualify your statement here well, but it contradicts the one you make above and your whole assumption. Nontheless, i would agree with the theme of this last point - but my point is - you have not satisfied it.

I don't see any conflict between the existence of psi and your definition of the mind. Psi might simply be seen as another way (as yet unidentified) that information is exchanged between the environment and the modules of the brain responsible for conscious perception.

Contradiction? You are saying that models of consciousness need to encompass something that does not exist.....why?

 

[Dr B]

"Fairly good" is a subjective judgement. I think it's fairly good because there have been some interesting and well done experiments that indicate that if the mind is considered to be 'what the brain does', consciousness might arise as an 'emergent' property of the brain. While that evidence isn't exactly conclusive, it is supportive of that conclusion

What is not reasonably conclusive about the evidence for this statement? I find it a perfectly supported, evidenced, useful and helpful starting point to study the brain and cognition. Assuming fairies live at the bottom of the garden or in the existence of PSI (both of which need conclusive reliable evidence) is none of these.

If I damage a brain - the mind is impaired
If I stimulate a brain - the mind responds
Mental experience is limited to neural capacity (you cannot see colours outside of the wavelengths that the eye is capable of responding to)
If the brain stops - so does the mind

All seems fairly uncontroversial to me.

 

[Beth]

Thanks - but you seem to be missing my actual question.

What conclusion does the evidence (that you consider "fairly good") lead you to?

You must have missed my post #240.

 

[Darat]

You must have missed my post #240.

No I saw but your posts are contradictory - on the one hand you say there is "fairly good evidence", on the other you say it leads nowhere, and on the third hand you say it leads somewhere if you start with a certain assumption.

 

[Beth]

What is not reasonably conclusive about the evidence for this statement? I find it a perfectly supported, evidenced, useful and helpful starting point to study the brain and cognition. Assuming fairies live at the bottom of the garden or in the existence of PSI (both of which need conclusive reliable evidence) is none of these.

If I damage a brain - the mind is impaired
If I stimulate a brain - the mind responds
Mental experience is limited to neural capacity (you cannot see colours outside of the wavelengths that the eye is capable of responding to)
If the brain stops - so does the mind

All seems fairly uncontroversial to me.

1 and 2 are indeed true and uncontroversial. # 3 I'm not sure if I agree with - consider synesthia where people 'see' colors that aren't there but are associated with shapes such as numbers or letters - but I suppose it depends on how you define certain terms. They only see normal colors, not infrared.

#4 is the controversial statement. It's true IF you start with the assumption that the mind is what the brain does. If you start with a different assumption - for example, the assumption that the mind is not just flesh and blood and neurons, but also contains an immortal soul which is not part of our physical body - then that statement would not be true.

 

[Beth]

No I saw but your posts are contradictory - on the one hand you say there is "fairly good evidence", on the other you say it leads nowhere, and on the third hand you say it leads somewhere if you start with a certain assumption.

Correct, given the assumption that mind is 'what the brain does', then there is good evidence to support that assumption. It is not, however, conclusive evidence. But if you start with a different assumption, that the mind is more than 'what the brain does', then the evidence available does not contradict that assumption and it leads nowhere.

I'm not sure why you consider this contradictory. Basically, whatever your starting assumption is, it cannot be rejected given the current evidence (or at least, given the current evidence I've seen). This isn't unusual in science. If you're interested and I have some time later, I can try to explain in greater detail - it involves comparing different null hypothesis and the power of tests when the null is not rejected.

 

[Dr B]

1 and 2 are indeed true and uncontroversial. # 3 I'm not sure if I agree with - consider synesthia where people 'see' colors that aren't there but are associated with shapes such as numbers or letters - but I suppose it depends on how you define certain terms. They only see normal colors, not infrared.

None of them are controversial and you misunderstand brain science if you think they are.

Synaesthesia is not the seeing of different colours at all!!!!! It merely represents a case of sensory-hyperintegration. My points were about seeing colours that the brain is not endowed to see. In Synaesthesia people report reds, greens, blues, etc - all well within the capacity of the eye / brain. My points are - you cannot experience anything outside of the basic neural machinery you have. Your colour vision represents cellular restrictions that impact on conscious experience. On these grounds your example is irrelevant and serves no purpose to your case. All it shows is that you dont really understand what the example was illustrating (sorry for not being clearer). You can certainly hallucinate colours - but again - only those that the brain is equipped to see. Thus, neural limitations constrain and shape the contents of awareness. This is simply not predicted by a mind / brain dualism account. Why should mind be restricted by the organic matter of brain if it is a separate thing?

#4 is the controversial statement. It's true IF you start with the assumption that the mind is what the brain does. If you start with a different assumption - for example, the assumption that the mind is not just flesh and blood and neurons, but also contains an immortal soul which is not part of our physical body - then that statement would not be true.

Did you read any of my last post? These are not the same. It is not true if I alter my assumptions - facts do not dissapear depending on whether you choose not to believe them. Its based on evidence (you seem to have missed that problematic bit for you). There is no reliable convincing evidence that 'mind' survives brain death - unless you have this evidence and are waiting to publish in Nature as we speak. Assumptions do not alter truths in the way you seem to apply they do.

Now - differing assumptions can lead to differing questions and results etc within science - but all assumptions should be, to some degree, evidence by reasons, logic, data, facts. Your claim of an immortal soul is an unfounded assumption. My claim that the mind is what the brain does is not.

Tell yourself that fire will not hurt you (an assumption) then go and test it....see if that changes as a function of your assumptions. I think not.

I find this type of reasoning displayed in your thinking logically flawed because you are seeing all assumptions / premises etc as equal. I am sure i am not the only one around here who can tell you that just aint so.....

 

[Dr B]

I would just like to clarify

Many of us see the same reasons / evidence in different ways and if we can provide an evidenced case for our version of provisional truth (which may well make different assumptions) - then fine. Such arguments lead to more refined and even totally new theories and which is indeed at the heart of science. In this sense making different assumptions can be liberating (but is not a license to make nonsense up).

However you need to be careful not to use your term 'assumption' as an all encompassing thing equally applicable to all forms of reasoning and argumentation - not so. Some assumptions are well founded, helpful and useful. Some less so, and some totally unfounded.

You cannot place a well founded assumption alongside an unfounded one and claim they are equal in the eyes of science. This lies at the heart of your fallacy I feel.

The world does not cease to be round if I choose to assume it is flat.

 

[Beth]

Did you read any of my last post?

Yes.

These are not the same.

I'm sorry, but it's not clear to me what the 'these' are that you are claiming are not the same.

It is not true if I alter my assumptions - facts do not dissapear depending on whether you choose not to believe them. Its based on evidence (you seem to have missed that problematic bit for you).

I never said that facts change. I said that conclusions differ based on the starting assumptions.

There is no reliable convincing evidence that 'mind' survives brain death - unless you have this evidence and are waiting to publish in Nature as we speak. Assumptions do not alter truths in the way you seem to apply they do.

You are correct that there is no reliable convincing evidence that the 'mind' (or soul or whatever you wish to call it) survives after brain death. However, there is no reliable convincing evidence the other way either. The current evidence we have is simply inconclusive.

I agree that assumptions do not alter truths, but assumptions do alter the conclusions we derive from such evidence as is available to us. In particular, in the absense of sufficiently strong evidence, we cannot claim to know the 'truth'. Since we do not know the 'truth' of whether or not there is more to the mind than 'what the brain does', whatever starting assumptions we make will effect the conclusions we derive from the evidence we have available to us.

Now - differing assumptions can lead to differing questions and results etc within science - but all assumptions should be, to some degree, evidence by reasons, logic, data, facts.

Ideally, yes. Realistically, no. We are limited by both the evidence we have at hand and our ability to interpret it. Our world views, which underlie all of our assumptions and interpretations of data, are not constructed in a wholely rational manner, but integrated into our psyche as we grow and mature.

Your claim of an immortal soul is an unfounded assumption. My claim that the mind is what the brain does is not.

You err when you assume I am making the claim that an immortal soul exists. I am, rather, simply pointing out that if one starts with that assumption, one arrives at a different conclusion than if one starts with the assumption that the mind is 'what the brain does'. I do not wish to argue the plausibility of those different assumptions. I suggest you try the Religion forum if you are interested in that. There are many lengthy threads debating that very topic.