BStrong
Penultimate Amazing
Here's the true narrative.
Some muslim hard ons cooked up a fairly simple plan - smuggle edged weapons onto commercial flights, kill or seriously wound some aircrew and passengers, cowing the remainder.
After they accomplished that, the plan was to hit selected targets, using the aircraft as weapons.
While they were cooking up their scheme, certain law enforcement and intelligence agencies started to get little blips on their radar.
Unfortunately, and this is true of every LE agency in the U.S. that I'm familar with, nobody in the agencies in question with tasking authority had the view that the little blips constituted a pattern, and needed to be focused on - other problems were ahead of the blips in the enforcement priority queue, and agent and officers reports went unheeded.
Agencies and officers that had an idea that something serious was going on did not have the opportunty to compare notes, so that those closest to the terrorist operation couldn't put their seperate parts of intel together into a whole.
After the fact, folks in the administration end of enforcement realized that they and their respective agencies had made the worst awe **** mistake in the history of the republic, as did certain politicans, so at that point the CYA principle came into the picture, and reputation and position protection became Job One.
Some muslim hard ons cooked up a fairly simple plan - smuggle edged weapons onto commercial flights, kill or seriously wound some aircrew and passengers, cowing the remainder.
After they accomplished that, the plan was to hit selected targets, using the aircraft as weapons.
While they were cooking up their scheme, certain law enforcement and intelligence agencies started to get little blips on their radar.
Unfortunately, and this is true of every LE agency in the U.S. that I'm familar with, nobody in the agencies in question with tasking authority had the view that the little blips constituted a pattern, and needed to be focused on - other problems were ahead of the blips in the enforcement priority queue, and agent and officers reports went unheeded.
Agencies and officers that had an idea that something serious was going on did not have the opportunty to compare notes, so that those closest to the terrorist operation couldn't put their seperate parts of intel together into a whole.
After the fact, folks in the administration end of enforcement realized that they and their respective agencies had made the worst awe **** mistake in the history of the republic, as did certain politicans, so at that point the CYA principle came into the picture, and reputation and position protection became Job One.