550 tons of Yellowcake removed from Iraq

[President Bush]

Any guesses on where that 4/5 from external sources came from?

The King Fahd Causeway is glowing in the dark
All the sweet green icing flowing down
Someone left the yellowcake in Bahrain.

 

[BeAChooser]

Ooh, claims of illiteracy. New. No, I read them. The programs after GW-I were all allegedly in the 'planning' stages, or otherwise unproduced.

Wow. You're working overtime to embarrass yourself.

Here are some excerpts from the source I provided:

Released on 30 September 2004, the ISG's Comprehensive Report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction states that Iraq worked secretly to develop proscribed missile programs beginning in 1997. These efforts included developing a solid-propellant ballistic missile that would have exceeded the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN Security Council after the first Gulf War, as well as attempts to convert surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) into surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) with ranges in excess of UN limitations. Following the departure of international weapons inspectors in 1998, Iraq also continued work on two cruise missile programs and a new longer range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program.

During their short time in Iraq before the onset of the military campaign to oust the Hussein regime in March 2003, this contingency of UN inspectors supervised the destruction of 50 of Iraq's 75 deployed Al Samoud missiles, along with six missiles still in production and assorted warheads, training missiles, and launchers.

Following the Gulf War, Iraq attempted to work within the boundaries of the 150km range limit, while maintaining technical expertise and manufacturing capability clearly intended to sustain future attempts at long-range missile development. Iraq experimented with shorter range surface-to-surface missiles, namely the Ababil-100 and the Al Samoud missiles. Based on the Soviet SA-2 design, the Al Samoud liquid engine missile had a stated range of 100km although it was clear to UN and intelligence experts that the rocket had a range closer to 180km. The suspected range ultimately resulted in a demand by the U.S. that Iraq destroy its Al Samoud inventory in order to comply with Resolution 687. Ultimately, Iraq yielded, but some analysts believed that Iraq was hiding some of its arsenal. The Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) gathered testimony from missile designers at the Al Kini State Company that Iraq had begun work on converting SA-2 missiles into ballistic missiles with an intended range of 250km.[11]

The Ababil-100 had a solid propellant design and one UN inspector dubbed it "BADR-2000 Junior."[12] The Ababil was said to have a range of 140km, although there is no evidence to support that it was actually ever flight tested. The ISG obtained testimony from a variety of Iraqi sources that a proscribed-range version of the Ababil-100 was under development. The solid rocket motor was to be 800 to 1000mm, or much greater than the 500mm Ababil-100. The goal of this program was to produce a missile varying in range between 400 to 1000km[13]

Now lest you don't believe that source, let's start with what Dr Kay, who headed the ISG during this investigatory timeframe, told Congress they'd found regarding Iraq's delivery systems (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/dkay100203.html ):

Let me just give you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later:

... snip ...

• Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists have said they were told to conceal from the UN.

• Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.

• Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles --probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles, and other prohibited military equipment.

... snip ...

With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred, dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.

Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least 400km and up to 1000km and that measures to conceal these projects from UNMOVIC were initiated in late-2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors. Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid propellant missile, and it appears the work had progressed to a point to support initial prototype production of some parts and assemblies. According to a cooperating senior detainee, Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-propellant and solid-propellant missile design centers would take too long. For instance, the liquid-propellant missile project team forecast first delivery in six years. Saddam countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile designed and built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles grew from 400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002.

ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently seeking additional confirmation and details on this project. A second cooperative source has stated that the program actually began in 2001, but that it received added impetus in the run-up to OIF, and that missiles from this project were transferred to a facility north of Baghdad. This source also provided documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA-2s into surface-to-surface missiles.

ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and cooperative sources that indicate that proscribed-range solid-propellant missile design studies were initiated, or already underway, at the time when work on the clustered liquid-propellant missile designs began.* The motor diameter was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500-mm Ababil-100. The range goals cited for this system vary from over 400km up to 1000km, depending on the source and the payload mass.

A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002 deliberations on the long-range solid propellant project, provided ISG with a set of concept designs for a launcher designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length missile. The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was some way to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that these drawings would not have been requested until the missile progress was relatively advanced, normally beyond the design state. The drawing are in CAD format, with files dated 09/01/02.

... snip ...

Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained two UAV programs that were working in parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and one at al-Rashid Air Force Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development of smaller, more traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion of manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to the UN until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV-20, RPV-30 and Pigeon RPV systems to the UN. All these systems had declared ranges of less than 150km. Several Iraqi officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over 500km on autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the system's range.

... snip ...

ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile programs. The first appears to have been successfully implemented, whereas the second had not yet reached maturity at the time of OIF.

The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense cruise missile. ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony, which is corroborated in part by a captured document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed at increasing the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its original 100km to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr during OIF - one was shot down and one hit Kuwait.

The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more ambitious effort to convert the HY-2 into a 1000km range land-attack cruise missile. The Jenin concept was presented to Saddam on 23 November 2001 and received what cooperative sources called an "unusually quick response" in little more than a week. The essence of the concept was to take an HY-2, strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a turbine engine from a Russian helicopter - the TV-2-117 or TV3-117 from a Mi-8 or Mi-17helicopter. To prevent discovery by the UN, Iraq halted engine development and testing and disassembled the test stand in late 2002 before the design criteria had been met.

In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's attempts to develop delivery systems beyond the permitted UN 150km, ISG has also developed information on Iraqi attempts to purchase proscribed missiles and missile technology. Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an October 2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in the transfer of technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300km (probably No Dong) and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300km.

And as I already pointed out (with linked sources), a document has been found after the ISG effort ended which shows that Iraq actually transferred 10 million dollars to the North Koreans in late 2002 to purchase intermediate range missiles.

The ISG report clearly states that they lacked the technological capacity to produce any of these designs. That was why I added the (clearly unread) link at the end of my post.

ROTFLOL! You obviously did NOT read the ISG report. If you had, you'd have found statements like these:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-03.htm

Iraq demonstrated its ability to quickly develop and deploy liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, such as the Al Samud II, against UN guidelines. ISG believes that, given the order to proceed, Iraq had the capability, motivation and resources to rapidly move ahead with newer longer range ballistic missile designs.

Note that statement directly contradicts your claim about the ISG views on Iraq missile program capabilities.

Continuing from that link:

Iraq began its indigenous liquid-propellant ballistic missile efforts in the early 1990s with the Ababil-100—later known as the Al Samud. These efforts lead to the more successful Al Samud II program, officially beginning in 2001.

Note that statement directly contradicts your claim that the ISG report says the destroyed missiles were pre-GW I weapons. Again, you clearly did NOT read the ISG report and are hell bent on embarrassing yourself.

Continuing from that link:

Iraq researched and developed the Al Samud II missile despite UN provisions, which prohibited such a system with its specification. Not only did the missile have range capabilities beyond the 150-km UN limit, but also Iraq procured prohibited items as well as received foreign technical assistance to develop and produce this system.

... snip ...

Huwaysh’s official approval for the Al Samud II diameter increase to 760 mm occurred in June 2001, despite the 1994 letter from UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus specifying that UNSCOM restricted the diameter of Iraq’s Ababil-100 missile to less than 600 mm. ... snip ... ISG believes that discussions of an “optimum” L/D are fallacious. Iraqi insistence that the diameter increase was intended solely to meet a specific L/D is more probably a ruse to increase the missile’s internal volume—ostensibly for increasing the fuel capacity—thereby further increasing the maximum range potential. ... snip ... The capability of the Al Samud II missile quickly showed a marked improvement over the unsuccessful Al Samud program. After several flight tests, the first of which occurred in August 2001, Iraq began a production ramp-up of the missile in September 2001. ... snip ... According to a former high-level official, Iraq began serial production of the Al Samud II missile beginning in December 2001. The production goal was to yield 10 full missiles a month.

Note the further proof that you were totally wrong in claiming that the Al Samud II missile was a pre-GW I weapon. These missiles were designed after the First Gulf War and went into full production in 2001. And obviously Iraq DID have the technological capacity to produce these designs. And obviously the program was very active and ongoing. And you know why? Because delivery systems was the long pole in any effort by Saddam to rebuild his WMD arsenal. As the ISG report concluded, Iraq could have been producing chemical warheads within 6 months to a year of when sanctions ended. Delivery system development would have taken much longer so that portion of the program was continued ... all the way up to OIF in anticipation of sanctions ending. Sorry, but you clearly did NOT read the ISG report as you claimed to have done.

And the Al Samud II was not the only Iraqi missile design in violation of the agreement that Iraq made not to develop weapon systems with a range greater than 150km. For example, the Al Fat'h missile also violated it.

From the ISG report: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-04.htm

The range capability of the Al Fat’h exceeded the 150-km limit imposed by the UN. A senior Iraqi official insisted the missile was designed to have a maximum range of 145 km with a 260-320 kg warhead, but, during flight tests between 2000 and 2002, the Al Fat’h flew beyond 150 km on at least eight occasions. ... snip ... At least six missiles fired during OIF would have exceeded the 150 km range if not intercepted. The longest test flight declared by Iraq was 161 km, while the longest combat range probably would have exceeded this range.

And then there's the Al 'Ubur missile.

From the ISG report: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-05.htm

The Al ‘Ubur program probably began between 1999 and 2000 after UNSCOM departed and increased funding was available. ... snip ... Range calculations produced a variety of results. - One calculated range is given as 220 km and a second gives a range of 206 km, according to two officials involved in the Al ‘Ubur program. ... snip ... The potential use of the Al ‘Ubur SAM as a long-range ballistic missile is clear, and high-level officials in the program indicated they had considered using the Al ‘Ubur as an SSM. The similarities in the proposed rocket motor and INS indicate an Al ‘Ubur SSM could be developed quickly"

And what about Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects? From the same ISG report section:

Though unable to overtly develop long-range missile projects, compelling evidence suggests that Iraq, in order to reach targets like Tel Aviv and Tehran, never abandoned its interest in delivery systems with ranges well beyond 150 km. Husayn Kamil’s flight to Jordan effectively ended all work on long-range missiles until the efforts were reconstituted after 1998.

Notice the date.

- A senior Iraqi missile engineer stated that the subject of long-range missiles (i.e., missiles with ranges greater than the 150 km) was not raised again until 1997/98 at a monthly ballistic missile meeting chaired by Huwaysh at MIC. At the meeting, Huwaysh reportedly stated his desire for a 1,000-km missile.
- According to Kamal Mustafa “Abdallah Sultan Al Nasiri, the former Secretary General of the Republican Guard, Huwaysh in the summer of 1999 gave a speech to the Republican Guard and SRG audience in which he stated that Iraq was developing a missile with a range of 500 km and that it would take five years to develop.
- At a June 2000 meeting, Saddam ordered Huwaysh to develop a missile with a range greater than the range of the Samud II, according to a senior official within the Iraqi missile program.

You still want to claim you actually read the ISG report?

From yet another section of the ISG report you obviously didn't read:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-06.htm

ISG has retrieved copies of Iraqi design drawings for two long-range missiles, one based on a cluster of two SA-2/Volga engines and the other based on a five-engine cluster. Although dated 23 August 2000, the drawings are not signed and therefore the name of the draftsman or designer is unknown.

... snip ...

- One design uses a two-engine cluster mounted in a flared engine bay that supports a 760-mm-diameter airframe. Iraqi experts have assessed the range of this version to be at least 500 km. The propellant tanks, pressurization system, G&C, and warhead of this concept would be common with the 760-mm Al Samud II ballistic missile.
- The second design uses a five-engine cluster mounted in a flared engine bay that supports a 1,250-mm-diameter airframe. Iraqi missile experts assessed this design would reach a range of at 950-1,000 km

Various sources have provided ISG with differing timelines of events for the clustered engine project pursued by Al Karamah, but most sources suggest the order to develop long-range missiles came in 2001.

... snip ...

- Designs for the two-engine and five-engine missiles were delivered to Huwaysh in December 2001 or January 2002, and all work on these was completed in January 2002.
- A high-ranking MIC official reported that these designs were completed in March 2003.
- In July 2002, Huwaysh ordered that all documents pertaining to the long-range missiles be returned to him. He said that Muzhir brought him two boxes of documents and in December of that year. However, other documentation not forwarded to Huwaysh had been recovered by ISG.
- Huwaysh ordered at the onset of OIF that all the documents on the long-range missile project be destroyed, according to several high-level officials in the Iraqi missile program.

... snip ...

ISG’s confirmation that Iraq was working on designs for long-range clustered-engine missiles, although this work never progressed beyond the design phase, is evidence that the Regime was covertly researching the development of missiles with ranges in excess of 150 km. Further, Iraq took advantage of existing Al Samud II designs and had begun to develop the infrastructure that could have led to rapid development of these concepts.

So in conclusion, I think it must be clear to all by now that either you are illiterate or you lied about reading the ISG reports.

 

[GreyICE]

Perhaps you should try using the adult version of google:

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=binary+sarin+shell+IED&btnG=Google+Search

Yeah, as I said, no credible sources on the first three pages. Just a bunch of blogs and tabloids.

 

[GreyICE]

Wow. You're working overtime to embarrass yourself.

Here are some excerpts from the source I provided:

Let me restate, since you appear to be a badly programmed copy/paste bot:

The manufacture of a modern phased array-based SAM system would have been a daunting challenge for Iraq, even with access to Russian technical specifications. Exploitation of captured documents, however, indicates development of the SAM elements of the Al ‘Ubur program by the end of 2002.

The potential use of the Al ‘Ubur SAM as a long-range ballistic missile is clear, and high-level officials in the program indicated they had considered using the Al ‘Ubur as an SSM. The similarities in the proposed rocket motor and INS indicate an Al ‘Ubur SSM could be developed quickly, but such development could be detected during the inspection process. Further, given the longer motor and potential for lighter materials, an Al ‘Ubur SSM would certainly have exceeded the 150-km limit imposed by the UN. ISG judges that elements of the Al ‘Ubur SAM program were well beyond Iraq’s manufacturing capabilities.

They couldn't do it. Period, the end.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-05.htm

Now lest you don't believe that source, let's start with what Dr Kay, who headed the ISG during this investigatory timeframe, told Congress they'd found regarding Iraq's delivery systems (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/dkay100203.html ):

How, how HOW can you read the entire ISG report and miss the CONCLUSION? It boggles the imagination!

You repeatedly castigate me with that report when you just cherry picked it. READ THE BLOODY REPORT! They. Couldn't. Do. It.

And as I already pointed out (with linked sources), a document has been found after the ISG effort ended which shows that Iraq actually transferred 10 million dollars to the North Koreans in late 2002 to purchase intermediate range missiles.

A document can be found showing anything. There was no evidence that anyone knew how they were planning to ship long-range ballistic missiles from one hostile country under sanctions to another, landlocked hostile country under sanctions. That seems... insane.

Note the further proof that you were totally wrong in claiming that the Al Samud II missile was a pre-GW I weapon. These missiles were designed after the First Gulf War and went into full production in 2001. And obviously Iraq DID have the technological capacity to produce these designs. And obviously the program was very active and ongoing. And you know why? Because delivery systems was the long pole in any effort by Saddam to rebuild his WMD arsenal. As the ISG report concluded, Iraq could have been producing chemical warheads within 6 months to a year of when sanctions ended. Delivery system development would have taken much longer so that portion of the program was continued ... all the way up to OIF in anticipation of sanctions ending. Sorry, but you clearly did NOT read the ISG report as you claimed to have done.

ARGH! Again with the not reading. Those missiles had a range mildly in excess of 150 km, but calling them long-range ballistic missiles is way off-base.

As for the rest, Iraq did NOT have technological capacity to produce those designs, and was in the process of destroying Al-Samud II when we invaded.

And the Al Samud II was not the only Iraqi missile design in violation of the agreement that Iraq made not to develop weapon systems with a range greater than 150km. For example, the Al Fat'h missile also violated it.

From the ISG report: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-04.htm

Another system that may or may not have exceeded the range by a few kilometers. We're still talking lightyears away from the 300-600 km ranges, or over. They're still just tactical weapons systems.

They found no evidence of biological or chemical munition mods, no evidence that those were even considered in the design, and no real evidence that the violation was anything other than numerical.

And then there's the Al 'Ubur missile.

From the ISG report: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-05.htm

You mean the hypothetical one beyond their production capacity? Not impressed.

And what about Long-Range Ballistic Missile Projects? From the same ISG report section:



Notice the date.



You still want to claim you actually read the ISG report?

From yet another section of the ISG report you obviously didn't read:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-06.htm


So in conclusion, I think it must be clear to all by now that either you are illiterate or you lied about reading the ISG reports.

Once again, designs and reports on people's desires. We invaded the country on the basis of a "Clear and present danger." None of this is even close to qualifying.

I repeat, it is obvious that none of this is close to qualifying. There is no clear and present danger. Just some hypothetical danger at some point in the future that may or may not be important, and a few missiles which are like 10-15% beyond the proscribed range. And which the Inspectors were overseeing the destruction of.

Their technological capacity was limited, and their ambitions did not appear to go beyond the conventional at any stage of the design.

There was no clear and present danger.

 

[Ocelot]

Saddam Hussein had a delivery system that could ahve been adapted to deploy chemical agents at distances in excess of 150 km from launch within six months of sanctions being lifted.

See... It's a car!

If it had been a missile, so what? They're allowed to plan, just not build (yet).

 

[Megalodon]

It's so funny... I thought that the US government would have made a big show out of the wmd, when found.

But they seem to actually admit there weren't any... Maybe some of our posters could drop them a line.

 

[Ziggurat]

Yes, I will continue to downplay the significance of the Al-Samoud II, which had a range of 10 km over the 150 km limit - 40 if you remove the payload (of course at that point its pretty much an expensive tin can, but that's details). And I'll downplay the fact they were destroying them... uh... wait, these facts don't need to be downplayed. The inspectors found the one violation and removed it - even though the violation was minor. That's a far cry from a chemical weapons program.

Indeed it is. But you said that there were no prohibited weapons, and that claim was wrong.

And then some old abandoned shells dug up with traces of chemical weapons in them that were completely inert they were so old. The biggest danger those posed was that you'd cut yourself on the sharp edges and get an infection, but hey, details, right?

"Dug up"? At least one of those shells was used against coalition forces. The biggest danger was that it would kill someone. Conventional munitions could too, but your statement here that the biggest danger was cutting oneself is simply wrong. You have, once again, resorted to false hyperbole to try to make your argument.

I dunno, they were under sanctions that made it impossible for them to sell much of anything?

You seriously think they couldn't have gotten permission to get rid of a critical component of any nuclear weapons program? You seriously think the US and the rest of the UNSC would have stood in the way of them doing that? I'm sorry, but that's simply not credible.

Is there any evidence at all that there was any program in Iraq at the time of the invasion?

Active programs? No. Nor did I claim there was. But that was not the only cause for concern. The fact of the matter is, inspections and sanctions could not last forever. They were never intended to, but were instead intended to end if they had achieved their goal (verifying full compliance). Once they ended, how would we know if Iraq started up its WMD programs again? We would not be able to. You can make arguments about whether or not the war was worth it, but the truth of the matter is that the invasion was the only possible way to ensure that Saddam would never get WMD's. And you can't form an honest argument on the former point if you can't acknowlege the latter.

 

[GreyICE]

Indeed it is. But you said that there were no prohibited weapons, and that claim was wrong.

Yiyiyi.

Yes, the conservative nitpicking brigade wins a point. There's a long way from 10-15% on the range of a clause of the UN agreement and "Clear and present danger." Especially since they were destroying the missiles.

"Dug up"? At least one of those shells was used against coalition forces. The biggest danger was that it would kill someone. Conventional munitions could too, but your statement here that the biggest danger was cutting oneself is simply wrong. You have, once again, resorted to false hyperbole to try to make your argument.

Um, no. I haven't. I sourced my claims. You are the one making unsourced claim. Care to back it up with non-blog, non-tabloid sources? The last poster gave me a bunch of blogs, and frankly, I don't trust those rags. It was a blog (drudge) that broke the story of nuclear weapons being discovered in Iraq, and it echoed around the blog echo chamber for a while (until everyone realized it was horse pucky).

You seriously think they couldn't have gotten permission to get rid of a critical component of any nuclear weapons program? You seriously think the US and the rest of the UNSC would have stood in the way of them doing that? I'm sorry, but that's simply not credible.

Everyone knew about the yellowcake. It is the biggest non-issue ever. The inspectors knew about it, the US knew about it, the UN knew about it, it's just not an issue.

Active programs? No. Nor did I claim there was. But that was not the only cause for concern. The fact of the matter is, inspections and sanctions could not last forever. They were never intended to, but were instead intended to end if they had achieved their goal (verifying full compliance). Once they ended, how would we know if Iraq started up its WMD programs again? We would not be able to. You can make arguments about whether or not the war was worth it, but the truth of the matter is that the invasion was the only possible way to ensure that Saddam would never get WMD's. And you can't form an honest argument on the former point if you can't acknowlege the latter.

No, invasion was NOT the only way to ensure that Saddam didn't get WMDs. Periodic inspections would have worked perfectly well, and ensured that he did not start any programs.

It's not like invasion would have been taken off the table. He kicks out the inspectors, starts up his programs, fine! Do what Clinton did, bomb him a few times, and then ask him if he likes that road. If he does, then smash him.

You seem to be thinking that invasion was a binary proposition - invade then, or we could absolutely never invade again.

This is just not the case. There was no clear and present danger, there was no reason to attack. It sent the wrong message to everyone, and it got a whole lot of people killed.

 

[Ziggurat]

Um, no. I haven't. I sourced my claims. You are the one making unsourced claim. Care to back it up with non-blog, non-tabloid sources?

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4997808/

No, invasion was NOT the only way to ensure that Saddam didn't get WMDs. Periodic inspections would have worked perfectly well, and ensured that he did not start any programs.

Except there was no legal basis for periodic inspections. The inspection AND sanctions regime that was in place was designed to end when compliance was verified, and since further inspections were NOT part of the ceasefire agreement, it would not happen.

You seem to be thinking that invasion was a binary proposition - invade then, or we could absolutely never invade again.

I said nothing of the sort. An argument can be made that this was not the optimal time for an invasion, but invasion at some point was the only way we knew we could be sure. As I already said, that does not preclude arguments that being sure wasn't worth the cost, that the risk of not invading was worth taking, but that's still the reality of the situation.

 

[BeAChooser]

Yeah, as I said, no credible sources on the first three pages. Just a bunch of blogs and tabloids.

For the record, the very first source in the google list is FoxNews. It is neither a tabloid or a blog. Now I know you democrats hate Fox News because you don't control it, but you really do need to get over it. I know you don't like conservative blogs because you don't control them. But like it or not, that FoxNews article and those blogs quote named military sources regarding the binary sarin round. And the sixth source on the list is MSNBC saying much the same thing that FoxNews did. So are you claiming MSNBC isn't credible either? Even a WashingtonPost article can be found in the first several pages of the google listing. Surely you think it's a credible news outlet.

In any case, you claimed to have read the ISG report. Well obviously you didn't or you'd have known about this munition since the following is from that report:

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxF.html "The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist."

Other military sources say the shell contained 4 to 5 liters of agent. Now just so you know, 4 to 5 liters of 40 percent purity sarin is about the same as that in the Tokyo subway attack which killed a dozen and injured thousands. But numerous experts have stated that had the Tokyo cult more effectively dispersed their agent (instead of simply poking holes in bags of the liquid with umbrellas and relying on natural air currents to spread the stuff) they could have killed THOUSANDS of people and injured tens of thousands.

It is also a fact that Iraq never declared binary sarin artillery shells until UNSCOM still found some in 1996. THEN, Iraq admitted it had worked on them ... but only on ones that had to be mixed just prior to launch. But this shell was more advanced than that. This was a munition where the binary components were mixed in flight.

Frankly, you are beginning to bore me, GreyICE.

 

[Elind]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4997808/


Except there was no legal basis for periodic inspections. The inspection AND sanctions regime that was in place was designed to end when compliance was verified, and since further inspections were NOT part of the ceasefire agreement, it would not happen.

It's amazing how many times, and not just to this person, that has been pointed out, but it keeps popping out of the box again and again. "Saddam was contained, sort of, and therefore would always have been contained"...and so it gets repeated about as often as creationists ask for the next binary chopped transition fossil.

 

[GreyICE]

Except there was no legal basis for periodic inspections. The inspection AND sanctions regime that was in place was designed to end when compliance was verified, and since further inspections were NOT part of the ceasefire agreement, it would not happen.

So add it into a resolution. I'd support it. Working another resolution through the UN seems somewhat less drastic than declaring war without a single effort.

I said nothing of the sort. An argument can be made that this was not the optimal time for an invasion, but invasion at some point was the only way we knew we could be sure. As I already said, that does not preclude arguments that being sure wasn't worth the cost, that the risk of not invading was worth taking, but that's still the reality of the situation.

There are all sorts of things that could happen to completely avoid the situation without any need for invasion. Saddam was neither immortal nor entirely in control of his own country, and he may very well have seen the wisdom of stopping in order to foster better relations with the west. There are solutions inbetween "Do nothing" and "Invade!"

For the record, the very first source in the google list is FoxNews. It is neither a tabloid or a blog. Now I know you democrats hate Fox News because you don't control it, but you really do need to get over it. I know you don't like conservative blogs because you don't control them. But like it or not, that FoxNews article and those blogs quote named military sources regarding the binary sarin round. And the sixth source on the list is MSNBC saying much the same thing that FoxNews did. So are you claiming MSNBC isn't credible either? Even a WashingtonPost article can be found in the first several pages of the google listing. Surely you think it's a credible news outlet.

I didn't see the MSNBC results on that page. As for Fox, no, I don't trust a damn thing they say. They only won a court case saying they had the right to lie in the news.

In any case, you claimed to have read the ISG report. Well obviously you didn't or you'd have known about this munition since the following is from that report:

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxF.html "The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist."

I said I read it. Not that I memorized it.

BTW... from the actual report (instead of your dead link):
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...nal-report/isg-final-report_vol3_cw-anx-f.htm

Beginning in May 2004, ISG recovered a series of chemical weapons from Coalition military units and other sources. A total of 53 munitions have been recovered, all of which appear to have been part of pre-1991 Gulf war stocks based on their physical condition and residual components.

The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist.

* ISG has no information to indicate that Iraq produced more binary Sarin rounds than it declared, however, former Iraqi scientists involved with the program admitted that the program was considered extremely successful and shelved for future use. According to the source, General Amer al-Saadi sought to downplay its findings to the UN to avoid heightened attention toward the program.

Under UN Security Resolution 687, Iraq should have destroyed or rendered harmless all CW munitions, but we cannot determine without additional information whether the rounds we have recovered were declared or if their destruction was attempted.

* An Iraqi source indicated that when weapons were forward-deployed in anticipation of a conflict, the CW weapons often became mixed in with the regular munitions, and were never accounted for again. Another source stated that several hundred munitions moved forward for the Gulf war, and never used, were never recovered by retreating Iraqi troops. A thorough post-OIF search of forward depots turned up nothing—if the weapons were indeed left behind, they were looted over the 12 years between the wars.
* Iraq’s unilateral destruction of weapons in 1991 was far from perfect—a February 2003 UNMOVIC inspection at the Al Azziziyah Firing Range to attempt to account for 157 R-400 bombs by inspecting the debris turned up 8 bombs that had survived the 1991 explosions. So it is possible that Iraqi—or even UN—explosion pits could have been looted of a few surviving munitions.
* Because of poor Iraqi inventory accounting, simple pilferage before or after the 1991 Gulf war could have resulted in some lost munitions.

Hardly a resounding condemnation. Failure, yet again, especially since it doesn't represent any post-1991 production.

Other military sources say the shell contained 4 to 5 liters of agent. Now just so you know, 4 to 5 liters of 40 percent purity sarin is about the same as that in the Tokyo subway attack which killed a dozen and injured thousands. But numerous experts have stated that had the Tokyo cult more effectively dispersed their agent (instead of simply poking holes in bags of the liquid with umbrellas and relying on natural air currents to spread the stuff) they could have killed THOUSANDS of people and injured tens of thousands.

Of course, the scare tactics. I know what Sarin is, thank you.

It is also a fact that Iraq never declared binary sarin artillery shells until UNSCOM still found some in 1996. THEN, Iraq admitted it had worked on them ... but only on ones that had to be mixed just prior to launch. But this shell was more advanced than that. This was a munition where the binary components were mixed in flight.

Frankly, you are beginning to bore me, GreyICE.

You mean the 1980s prototype? Known about.

I'm sorry you are getting bored trying to prove there was a post-1991 weapons program. It must be boring to have to wade through all those conservative nonsense sources indeed. I'd be bored to tears if I had to read that garbage all day.

 

[Ziggurat]

So add it into a resolution. I'd support it.

You have an awfully inflated sense of importance if you think that matters. Russia and China would not support it, and unlike you and me, their opinion matters. They're willing to support drawing some lines in the sand regarding acceptable behavior (namely, the invasion of Kuwait). But anything beyond what was part of the ceasefire for that past transgression becomes, legally speaking, a matter of Iraq's internal affairs. And both Russia and China are notoriously unwilling to set UNSC precedent regarding interference in a country's internal affairs (I hope I don't have to spell out why). China's willingness to stonewall action against Suddan serves as a case in point. Inspections and sanctions (because you couldn't even hope for the former without at least threat of the latter) beyond what was part of the ceasefire were NEVER an option, and it is pure fantasy to believe otherwise.

Working another resolution through the UN seems somewhat less drastic than declaring war without a single effort.

Less dramatic? Sure. Possible? Nope. I'll reconsider once China agrees to serious sanctions on Sudan.

Saddam was neither immortal nor entirely in control of his own country, and he may very well have seen the wisdom of stopping in order to foster better relations with the west.

Yes, Saddam was not immortal. Neither was he close to dying naturally, and he had heirs who were not exactly liberal pacifists themselves. Might he have been willing to start behaving? Yes, it's a possibility. Which goes to the question of whether or not it would have been worth the risk to not invade, an issue which I already mentioned I understood there were grounds for disagreement about.

There are solutions inbetween "Do nothing" and "Invade!"

There are courses of action between "do nothing" and "invade". But a "solution" applies to a specific problem, which you have not actually explicitly framed. I have explicitly framed a problem (namely, ensuring Saddam never got WMD's), and the only course of action which presented a solution to that problem was invasion. Every other course of action constituted management of that problem, not a solution to it. Sometimes the management of a problem can be better than the solution to it, but even in such cases one should still recognize the distinction. You continue to fail to do that.

 

[BeAChooser]

ISG judges that elements of the Al ‘Ubur SAM program were well beyond Iraq’s manufacturing capabilities.

They couldn't do it. Period, the end.

You didn't notice that in the two paragraphs you quoted they were talking about the Surface to Air Missile (SAM) role of the missile, not the SSM role? The first paragraph you quoted should have given you a clue. It states "manufacture of a modern phased array-based SAM system would have been a daunting challenge for Iraq, even with access to Russian technical specifications." They are clearly talking only about the use of the missile as a SAM in the section you quoted. The sentence you bolded even says "SAM program".

As a Surface to Surface missile (SSM) system, however, the ISG report states "Based on its previous success in converting the SA-2/Volga into an SSM, Iraq possessed the techniques required to undertake such a project. "

Also, the fact that "elements" of the Al 'Ubur program were beyond Iraq's manufacturing capability is essentially meaningless given that Iraq had ready suppliers for those elements from the non-coalition nations (Russia, France, Germany, China) that were eager to see the sanctions lifted so they could score lucrative oil and arms business deals with Iraq. In fact, they were already giving them prohibited assistance with their missile program. And the fact that they did have those sources and contracts is made clear in the ISG report numerous times. But then you didn't actually read or understand the ISG report, did you. Or you simply ignored that portion of the report. Just like you ignored the other missiles I noted that Iraq clearly did have the ability to produce in numbers ... because they were already producing them.

Quote:
And as I already pointed out (with linked sources), a document has been found after the ISG effort ended which shows that Iraq actually transferred 10 million dollars to the North Koreans in late 2002 to purchase intermediate range missiles.

A document can be found showing anything. There was no evidence that anyone knew how they were planning to ship long-range ballistic missiles from one hostile country under sanctions to another, landlocked hostile country under sanctions.

Shall I quote some more sources regarding this discovery, knowing ahead of time that you will just blindly dismiss them because you already know everything you need to know? How about the NYTimes? Will you believe that as a source?

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E2D8103AF932A35751C1A9659C8B63

For two years before the American invasion of Iraq, Mr. Hussein's sons, generals and front companies were engaged in lengthy negotiations with North Korea, according to computer files discovered by international inspectors and the accounts of Bush administration officials.

The officials now say they believe that those negotiations -- mostly conducted in neighboring Syria, apparently with the knowledge of the Syrian government -- were not merely to buy a few North Korean missiles.

... snip ...

In return for a $10 million down payment, Mr. Hussein appears to have gotten nothing.

The trail that investigators have uncovered, partly from reading computer hard drives found in Baghdad and partly from interviews with captured members of Mr. Hussein's inner circle, shows that a month before the American invasion, Iraqi officials traveled to Syria to demand that North Korea refund $1.9 million because it had failed to meet deadlines for delivering its first shipment of goods.

Instead, the goal was to obtain a full production line to manufacture, under an Iraqi flag, the North Korean missile system, which would be capable of hitting American allies and bases around the region, according to the Bush administration officials.

The trail that investigators have uncovered, partly from reading computer hard drives found in Baghdad and partly from interviews with captured members of Mr. Hussein's inner circle, shows that a month before the American invasion, Iraqi officials traveled to Syria to demand that North Korea refund $1.9 million because it had failed to meet deadlines for delivering its first shipment of goods.

North Korea deflected the request, telling Mr. Hussein's representatives, in the words of one investigator, that ''things were too hot'' to begin delivering missile technology through Syria.

Why are you so desperate to prove Iraq innocent that you ignore anything that undermines that belief? Isn't it clear by now that Iraq was in clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687 at the time of the invasion and had every intention of violating it even more egregiously in the near future had we not invaded, sanctions or no sanctions? Of course it is. So what do you hope to achieve here other than to further embarrass yourself?

They found no evidence of biological or chemical munition mods, no evidence that those were even considered in the design, and no real evidence that the violation was anything other than numerical.

Whether they considered this in the designs or not is completely irrelevant. The agreement Iraq made to end the first Gulf War was not to even research weapon systems in excess of 150 km. And the violations I've pointed out that the ISG pointed out are indeed far more than merely numerical. Let me repeat something again, since you seem to have a great deal of trouble understanding it. The agreement Iraq made to end the first Gulf War was not to even research weapon systems in excess of 150 km. Yet they were very clearly doing that. So your efforts to bury your head in the sand are merely embarrassing yourself.

And by the way, regarding your claim that chemical and biological payloads were not considered in the design, how can you know this with any certainty since Iraq destroyed so many documents related to the missile and special weapon programs before, during and even after the invasion. As Dr Kay noted several Iraqi "officials acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons." Obviously, they would need a delivery system. And the ISG report on the Al Samud-2 missile (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/l...-report/isg-final-report_vol2_delivery-03.htm ) states that "although ISG has recovered no evidence to suggest that “special” warheads were developed for the Al Samuds, the warhead is a direct extrapolation of the impact warhead design for the Scud and Al Husayn missiles and could be modified in the same way Iraq modified the Al Husayn HE warhead to produce crude CBW warheads." It then states that "Iraq retained the intellectual capital for reproducing these kinds of “special” warhead designs, so modification and production of this crude type of warhead could be achieved in a matter of weeks with a relatively small team of specialized individuals." Did you see that? IN A MATTER OF WEEKS.

We invaded the country on the basis of a "Clear and present danger."

TOTALLY FALSE AGAIN. President Bush said very clearly in his 2003 State of the Union address that the reason we might need to invade was to PREVENT Iraq from becoming an imminent threat. But then you didn't actually listen to or read that address, did you.

 

[BeAChooser]

If it had been a missile, so what? They're allowed to plan, just not build (yet).

That's totally false. Iraq was prohibited from researching, developing, testing, producing and stockpiling anything related to WMD and long range range delivery systems. They weren't even allowed to keep documents on the subjects. So they clearly violated the agreement they made to end the First Gulf War. And that's why Saddam is now dead.

 

[BeAChooser]

I sourced my claims.

You either lied about reading the ISG reports, or having read them you lied about the contents of the reports. The only other possibility is that you read the reports and are simply illiterate or comprehension challenged.

The last poster gave me a bunch of blogs, and frankly, I don't trust those rags.

But since you knowingly make false statements like this, my money is that you lied, one way or the other.

 

[BeAChooser]

There are all sorts of things that could happen to completely avoid the situation without any need for invasion.

Saddam was offered the only other reasonable one. Step down and leave the country. Sanctions and containment had already been tried for over a decade. 9/11 changed the equation. No longer could we tolerate his efforts to acquire even small amounts of WMD. Especially when he was friendly with terrorists and openly congratulated the 9/11 hijackers for a job well done.

Saddam was neither immortal nor entirely in control of his own country,

Which made it all the more imperative that Saddam be toppled. Don't you recall David Kay saying after his inspections that Iraq was even more dangerous than anyone suspected before the invasion as a source of WMD related materials to terrorists precisely because Saddam was not fully in control?

As for Fox, no, I don't trust a damn thing they say.

Well that just says something about you.

BTW... from the actual report (instead of your dead link)

Sorry about that. But I'm glad you confirmed the ISG report says what I said it said.

Hardly a resounding condemnation. Failure, yet again, especially since it doesn't represent any post-1991 production.

Immaterial. Iraq was not supposed to have that shell. Iraq claimed they had all been destroyed. The shell was unmarked. Saddam did that to hide them from inspectors. And the truth is that no one on your side of the fence has offered a reasonable explanation how that shell came to be in the hands of the insurgents if it was indeed the only one still in existence in all of Iraq. Think of the incredible odds against picking out that one shell from the MILLIONS in Saddam's stockpiles.

Likewise, no one on your side of this issue has explained why the Iraq regime sanitized files, computers and facilities thought related to WMD before, during and even after the invasion. Why do that if Iraq had no WMD and WMD programs as you claim? You haven't explained the contents of the trucks that were seen moving to Syria before the invasion. These were trucks that various sources in Iraq, Syria and Israel say contained WMD related materials. In fact, the ISG report states they have a CREDIBLE source indicating those trucks contained WMD related materials. What materials? What could be so important that Saddam would move them before the invasion? A few more of those binary sarin shells (best in his arsenal)? Raw binary sarin agents? VX? The truth is that you can't answer that question even though you assure everyone you can when you chant over and over that there were no wmd. The truth is you have your head in the sand.

Of course, the scare tactics. I know what Sarin is, thank you.

Those aren't scare tactics. Experts in chemical weapons and terrorism have stated on numerous occasions that the amount and potency of sarin used in the Japan subways could have killed thousands if it had been properly dispersed. That shell contained another 9/11 and Iraq wasn't supposed to have it. Iraq had denied having any more like it. Iraq LIED.

You mean the 1980s prototype? Known about.

The ISG report that you quoted stated that "the existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist." And we don't know for certain when or where that shell was produced. There was nothing about the shell to suggest it was a prototype. We have only supposition because the Iraqis were not forthcoming on the matter of binary munitions. They CLAIMED to have shut down the program but their top scientists also "admitted that the program was considered extremely successful". Saddam was not one to stop production of something he dearly desired and that his scientists were telling him was "extremely successful". Especially when shells such as this would be extremely easy to hide. In fact, the ISG report that you cited states that "UN investigations revealed a number of uncertainties surrounding the nature and extent of Iraq’s work with these systems and it remains unclear how many rounds it produced, tested, declared, or concealed from the UN."

I'm sorry you are getting bored trying to prove there was a post-1991 weapons program.

Don't trouble yourself. I've actually enjoyed destroying your credibility.

 

[Kestrel]

Any guesses on where that 4/5 from external sources came from?

Are you insinuating that it's the yellowcake from Niger that George W. Bush warned us about in his State of the Union address?

To prove that theory, you will have to find the time machine Saddam used to send it back to 1992 so it could be inventoried and put under IAEA seal.

 

[Ziggurat]

Are you insinuating that it's the yellowcake from Niger that George W. Bush warned us about in his State of the Union address?

Obviously not.

There's an interesting aspect to that report which I suspect you overlooked. They mentioned that none of the material which was under inspection prior to GW1 (in particular, highly enriched reactor fuel elements) was diverted to clandestine programs. This report is from 1993. We found out in 1995 that, while the fuel had not been diverted to a clandestine program, a clandestine program (the so-called "crash program") had been underway prior to GW1 whose purpose was to do exactly that. They were working on developing a way to divert it quickly and create the weapon so that inspection could not detect the diversion until the weapon was already complete, and were only a few years away from being able to do so. The crash program was revealed by a high-level defector. Inspections never detected this program, though they were able to confirm its existence after having been informed of it. Those who place complete confidence in inspections would do well to consider that case as a warning about their limitations.

 

[Texas]

Are you insinuating that it's the yellowcake from Niger that George W. Bush warned us about in his State of the Union address?

To prove that theory, you will have to find the time machine Saddam used to send it back to 1992 so it could be inventoried and put under IAEA seal.

No I was just asking for a guess as to which external source supplied that yellowcake. However, since you mentioned it, why is the amount in the report exactly the same amount the Italian yellowcake "forgery" said Saddam was seeking from Niger? Could it have been to replace his stash that was under seal?