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Ed 737 Max Crashes (was Shutdown caused Boeing crash.)

I find some of the information in this article worrying

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67909417

Particularly this bit

"Alaska Airlines placed restrictions on the Boeing plane involved in a dramatic mid-air blowout after pressurisation warnings in the days before Friday's incident, investigators say."​
"An additional maintenance look" was requested but 'not completed' before the incident"​

Really? That's all they did - had a "maintenance look" and placed restrictions!!?
I was an aircraft engineer in military aviation, I have never worked in the civil aircraft industry. However, I can't imagine that maintenance and safety procedures would be all that different from an engineering standpoint.

If we had pressurization warnings in a aircraft, this would absolutely be investigated with physical examinations and testing. In the example I know best, the Lockheed C-130 Hercules, every pressure door or openable/removable panel in the pressure hull would be checked for seal integrity - this would include the forward crew egress door, the two paratroop doors on either side of the rear fuselage and the cargo ramp and door...

[qimg]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/7zj1aoyy5ta30n9dhgf60/C-130-FwdCrewEntryDoor.jpg?rlkey=iwm8atckcaig2pxxp5w2arn4f&raw=1[/qimg] [qimg]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/g98tpt84rt2c16d2etnsl/C-130-ParatroopDoors.jpg?rlkey=t9deg2v71dmeq7sabolk8f2ig&raw=1[/qimg] [qimg]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/jtra2s9pudtejuba04zpw/C-130-CargoRamp-Door.jpg?rlkey=w7gxtcmuucv1ip2txr1lx1ow7&raw=1[/qimg]

Also, any pressure panels such as the Doppler radar and radar altimeter radomes on the bottom of the aircraft would be checked for pressure leaks.

This procedure involves first an inspection of the seals, followed by a ground pressurization check. On the C-130 this means closing the aircraft up, shutting the outflow valves and starting up the GTC (in later models the APU) to begin pressuring the aircraft to a pre-set level. Then the ground crew works their way around the aircraft checking for leaks at the doors and panels mentioned above.

I struggle to imagine a scenario in civilian aviation where pressurization warnings would not be followed up with inspection and testing, but it seems all Alaska Airlines did was "have a look".

In my book, this is in no way good enough when you are dealing with the lives of the the public.


No. That's not all they did. The article says it had not been completed by the time of the "accident" flight. So they hadn't even done a "maintenance look".

Incidentally, would a ground pressurisation test have discovered the problem? If the door happened to be correctly seated when they did the test, it would have shown no problem. In fact, maybe the reason why they were treating the pressurisation warnings in such a relaxed way is because they had done ground pressurisation tests and found no issue and thus assumed it was a sensor fault.
 
No. That's not all they did. The article says it had not been completed by the time of the "accident" flight. So they hadn't even done a "maintenance look".

Incidentally, would a ground pressurisation test have discovered the problem? If the door happened to be correctly seated when they did the test, it would have shown no problem. In fact, maybe the reason why they were treating the pressurisation warnings in such a relaxed way is because they had done ground pressurisation tests and found no issue and thus assumed it was a sensor fault.

Seems quite likely. On the basis that the plug door was seated in the correct place by gravity whilst on the ground it would not leak if pressurised. If there was no leak detected outside the plug there would have been no reason to pull the inner liner away to check the fixings. The last landing might well have been enough to reseat the door as far down as it was designed to go.
 
Seems quite likely. On the basis that the plug door was seated in the correct place by gravity whilst on the ground it would not leak if pressurised. If there was no leak detected outside the plug there would have been no reason to pull the inner liner away to check the fixings. The last landing might well have been enough to reseat the door as far down as it was designed to go.

Nope! That is completely, wrong.

https://www.npr.org/2024/02/07/1229...ug-that-blew-off-a-boeing-737-max-9-ntbs-says

The NTSB appears to have determined that the four bolts required to ensure the exit blank is lifted up before being pushed out pretty much rips the rug out from under any notion that gravity was holding it in place. Without the bolts, there is no vertical movement of the exit blank required. The only things holding it in place were the 12 stop pads (6 pairs on either side).

A Commenter on this page who I can tell knows exactly what he is talking about, makes this very clear (my bolding for emphasis).

"It cannot be emphasized enough that the bolts do not do the work of holding the Exit Blank against pressure.

That is the job of 12 pads (6 on both the exit blank and the door frame.) When Pressure is applied inside, it pushes the exit door against those pads and those are what hold the door against pressure.

The Bolts are in two tracks (left and right) at the top and across the springs at the bottom (again two – its a more nuanced that that at the bottom but all 4 keep the door from moving upwards)

Upwards and then out moves the door off the pads and flimsy brackets hold it onto the hull of the aircraft. Those are simply to hold the door in place so the Exit Blank can be inspected or maint done. They serve no purpose for holding against pressure nor letting the door be moved into its maint position.

Once in the maint position the exit blank can stay there until returned to its normal position or removed if more in depth maint is needed on the exit blank (this also is a position a seal can be put around the plug/exist blanks)

Its is very possible that the 15,500 foot event could only occur in a band at lower attitudes (below 20k for instance). The more pressure on the pads the more friction and the exit blank may not move above say 20k.

But below X altitude with no bolts it can move and it did.

It was always clear there were not bolts in place as there was not tearing damage (though one bolt might have kept it form moving, no telling)

It ejected so cleanly it was clear there was nothing there.

It was possible they had “rattled” loose but that gets into impossible if the washers, nuts and cotter key wee installed at all on any one of them (and if one bolt was installed correctly its a certainty that all of them would have been as the mechanic would have been aware and the lack would catch his eye or not having 4 in hand would send red flags up)

Incidentally, would a ground pressurisation test have discovered the problem? If the door happened to be correctly seated when they did the test, it would have shown no problem. In fact, maybe the reason why they were treating the pressurisation warnings in such a relaxed way is because they had done ground pressurisation tests and found no issue and thus assumed it was a sensor fault.

It is my professional opinion as a retired aeronautical engineer, one who has not only worked on aircraft pressurization systems, but also supervised their repair, maintenance and testing, and given the fact there were no bolts in place, that a properly conducted ground pressurization test was very likely to have revealed severe leaks around that door, and depending on what altitude they pressurized to during the test, may have actually blown the exit blank out during the test. Doing a ground pressurization test is an SOP when the aircrew are repeatedly reporting pressurization alarms, and no sensor issues are found.

For this reason, I am confident no such test was done in this case.
 
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Nope! That is completely, wrong.

https://www.npr.org/2024/02/07/1229...ug-that-blew-off-a-boeing-737-max-9-ntbs-says

The NTSB appears to have determined that the four bolts required to ensure the exit blank is lifted up before being pushed out pretty much rips the rug out from under any notion that gravity was holding it in place. Without the bolts, there is no vertical movement of the exit blank required. The only things holding it in place were the 12 stop pads (6 pairs on either side).
A Commenter on this page who I can tell knows exactly what he is talking about, makes this very clear (my bolding for emphasis).

"It cannot be emphasized enough that the bolts do not do the work of holding the Exit Blank against pressure.

That is the job of 12 pads (6 on both the exit blank and the door frame.) When Pressure is applied inside, it pushes the exit door against those pads and those are what hold the door against pressure.

The Bolts are in two tracks (left and right) at the top and across the springs at the bottom (again two – its a more nuanced that that at the bottom but all 4 keep the door from moving upwards)

Upwards and then out moves the door off the pads and flimsy brackets hold it onto the hull of the aircraft. Those are simply to hold the door in place so the Exit Blank can be inspected or maint done. They serve no purpose for holding against pressure nor letting the door be moved into its maint position.

Once in the maint position the exit blank can stay there until returned to its normal position or removed if more in depth maint is needed on the exit blank (this also is a position a seal can be put around the plug/exist blanks)

Its is very possible that the 15,500 foot event could only occur in a band at lower attitudes (below 20k for instance). The more pressure on the pads the more friction and the exit blank may not move above say 20k.

But below X altitude with no bolts it can move and it did.

It was always clear there were not bolts in place as there was not tearing damage (though one bolt might have kept it form moving, no telling)

It ejected so cleanly it was clear there was nothing there.

It was possible they had “rattled” loose but that gets into impossible if the washers, nuts and cotter key wee installed at all on any one of them (and if one bolt was installed correctly its a certainty that all of them would have been as the mechanic would have been aware and the lack would catch his eye or not having 4 in hand would send red flags up)



It is my professional opinion as a retired aeronautical engineer, one who has not only worked on aircraft pressurization systems, but also supervised their repair, maintenance and testing, and given the fact there were no bolts in place, that a properly conducted ground pressurization test was very likely to have revealed severe leaks around that door, and depending on what altitude they pressurized to during the test, may have actually blown the exit blank out during the test. Doing a ground pressurization test is an SOP when the aircrew are repeatedly reporting pressurization alarms, and no sensor issues are found.

For this reason, I am confident no such test was done in this case.

And how is the plug to be opened for maintenance past the 12 stop pads without raising it up? Those pads are fixed on both door and fuselage.

To open the plug for maintenance it has to be lifted so the top retainer rollers can leave the two tracks at the top of the plug and the 12 plug stop pads are above the 12 fuselage stop pads and thus disengaged. This raising is aided by the two springs under the lower mounting hinges. Without the four pins which were missing, only gravity prevented the plug being raised to clear the stop pads when the aircraft is depressurised, plus perhaps some friction at the air seal. When pressurised the stop pads take the pressurisation loads and the seal holds the air.

I doubt the plug could be moved from it's correct position whilst pressurised due to the loads on the stop pads, which suggests to me that the door had already moved up to partially disengage the stop pads before pressurisation took place on the flight in question. I can picture the plug moving up and down on it's hinges/tracks during unpressurised flght, and then seating correctly during the landing and subsequent taxi to the gate.



I agree that the four security pins were not in place, I am not convinced that tests were not carried out on the ground. If the door was moving up and down during unpressurised flight it is quite possible it was in the correct position on the ground and thus passed a pressurisation test.
 
And how is the plug to be opened for maintenance past the 12 stop pads without raising it up? Those pads are fixed on both door and fuselage.

Oh sure, it has to be pushed up, but with the bolts not in place, a bump on landing, or even while taxiing could do that and there is no guarantee that the exit blank would come back down to its correct position. A misplaced exit blank would be almost impossible to spot during the the flight crew pre-flight inspection. It might not even be detected at all from the outside, and there is no way to detect it from the inside because it is covered up by the interior lining.

I doubt the plug could be moved from it's correct position whilst pressurised due to the loads on the stop pads, which suggests to me that the door had already moved up to partially disengage the stop pads before pressurisation took place on the flight in question.

I agree

I can picture the plug moving up and down on it's hinges/tracks during unpressurised flght, and then seating correctly during the landing and subsequent taxi to the gate.

What unpressurized flight?

No part of a flight in a pressurized airliner is unpressurized. An airliner begins to pressurize from the moment the pilot pushes the engine levers to TOGA, and is still partially pressurized on the ground at touchdown.

From the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Operations Manual

- The cabin begins to pressurize on the ground at higher power settings. The controller modulates the outflow valve toward close, slightly pressurizing the cabin. This ground pressurization of the cabin makes the transition to pressurized flight more gradual for the passengers and crew, and also gives the system better response to ground effect pressure changes during takeoff.

- The descent mode is activated when the airplane descends 0.25 psi below the selected FLT ALT. The cabin begins a proportional descent to slightly below the selected LAND ALT. The controller programs the cabin to land slightly pressurized so that rapid changes in altitude during approach result in minimum cabin pressure changes.

While taxiing in, the controller drives the outflow valve slowly to the full open position depressurizing the cabin.


I agree that the four security pins were not in place, I am not convinced that tests were not carried out on the ground. If the door was moving up and down during unpressurised flight it is quite possible it was in the correct position on the ground and thus passed a pressurisation test.

As I pointed out above, there is no "unpressurized flight"

The default position is that a GPC was not conducted unless there is evidence that it was.

Alaska Airlines said they did "another maintenance look but it was not completed" - "Maintenance look" is not a term I am familiar with, but is likely similar to the "Level One Inspections" we did in military aviation - a cursory inspection looking for obvious defects such as loose high-speed tape and frayed or missing rats rails on the trailing edges of control surfaces. It would include things such as pushing a "press-to-test" button to electrically check a sensor system was working.

"We did another maintenance look but it was not completed" is a euphemism for "we kicked the tyres and everything seemed fine - and we didn't even kick all of them".

A "maintenance look" is NOT a GPC. If you can provide evidence that a proper GPC was carried out, I will change my stance. Until then, I'll stick with what my professional experience tells me.

 
Here is the thing though... everyone makes mistakes.

By all accounts, this wasn't a rare mistake by people doing their best work but maybe not having the best quality control processes. Rather, it was a pervasive culture of half-assery, in which both management and labor were complicit by the time of this incident.

They're assembling a passenger jet, for Christ's sake! That's not a time for "oops, I didn't mean to, sorry 'bout that." That's a time, if ever there was, for "you have to mean not to."

I dunno, maybe if you're making fidget spinners, it might be okay to take out your grievances with management on the assembly line. These scumbags weren't even "working to rule" as far as I can tell. They were just slacking. And slacking is not the same as making a mistake from time to time.
 
Oh sure, it has to be pushed up, but with the bolts not in place, a bump on landing, or even while taxiing could do that and there is no guarantee that the exit blank would come back down to its correct position. A misplaced exit blank would be almost impossible to spot during the the flight crew pre-flight inspection. It might not even be detected at all from the outside, and there is no way to detect it from the inside because it is covered up by the interior lining.



I agree



What unpressurized flight?

No part of a flight in a pressurized airliner is unpressurized. An airliner begins to pressurize from the moment the pilot pushes the engine levers to TOGA, and is still partially pressurized on the ground at touchdown.

From the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Operations Manual

- The cabin begins to pressurize on the ground at higher power settings. The controller modulates the outflow valve toward close, slightly pressurizing the cabin. This ground pressurization of the cabin makes the transition to pressurized flight more gradual for the passengers and crew, and also gives the system better response to ground effect pressure changes during takeoff.

- The descent mode is activated when the airplane descends 0.25 psi below the selected FLT ALT. The cabin begins a proportional descent to slightly below the selected LAND ALT. The controller programs the cabin to land slightly pressurized so that rapid changes in altitude during approach result in minimum cabin pressure changes.

While taxiing in, the controller drives the outflow valve slowly to the full open position depressurizing the cabin.




As I pointed out above, there is no "unpressurized flight"

The default position is that a GPC was not conducted unless there is evidence that it was.

Alaska Airlines said they did "another maintenance look but it was not completed" - "Maintenance look" is not a term I am familiar with, but is likely similar to the "Level One Inspections" we did in military aviation - a cursory inspection looking for obvious defects such as loose high-speed tape and frayed or missing rats rails on the trailing edges of control surfaces. It would include things such as pushing a "press-to-test" button to electrically check a sensor system was working.

"We did another maintenance look but it was not completed" is a euphemism for "we kicked the tyres and everything seemed fine - and we didn't even kick all of them".

A "maintenance look" is NOT a GPC. If you can provide evidence that a proper GPC was carried out, I will change my stance. Until then, I'll stick with what my professional experience tells me.


Ok, thank you for the details. So skip unpressurised flight and add unpressurised taxiing as per your first paragraph. Whilst there may be no guarantee that the plug might not return to the correct position during taxi to the gate there is no certainty it wouldn't do so. There is a larger black section at the top of the plug on the outside, which I assume is the pressure seal. The black section appears to be there to allow the plug to be pushed up to open without hitting the fuselage opening. If the plug remained raised on the ground, even partially, the black patch at the top would be smaller and a corresponding black patch would appear at the bottom. That isn't to say the aircraft would be inspected on the outside, but the evidence would be there. You choose to deny the possibility of a pressure test having been done on the basis of your cynical view of the Alaska maintenance crews. I consider the evidence inconclusive either way.
 
Ok, thank you for the details. So skip unpressurised flight and add unpressurised taxiing as per your first paragraph. Whilst there may be no guarantee that the plug might not return to the correct position during taxi to the gate there is no certainty it wouldn't do so.

Not related to Sir Humphrey Appleby by any chance?

There is a larger black section at the top of the plug on the outside, which I assume is the pressure seal. The black section appears to be there to allow the plug to be pushed up to open without hitting the fuselage opening. If the plug remained raised on the ground, even partially, the black patch at the top would be smaller and a corresponding black patch would appear at the bottom. That isn't to say the aircraft would be inspected on the outside, but the evidence would be there. You choose to deny the possibility of a pressure test having been done on the basis of your cynical view of the Alaska maintenance crews. I consider the evidence inconclusive either way.

I deny the possibility that a GPC was done because I know for a fact that it was not.

This is a CNN interview from three days ago, where Brianna Kielar is talking with David Soucie (author of "Why Planes Crash" and "Safer Skies") He has 45 years experience as an aircraft engineer, and is one of the world's leading experts on aviation mishaps and crashes.

If you won't accept this fact from me, perhaps you will accept it from him!


Kielar: That is a bombshell, as Pete said there, especially since it seemed before this door plug blew off, it was an airplane that was kind of giving some signs, right, with the pressurization issues that it had been experiencing on multiple occasions.

Soucie: Yeah, three times before this, they had pressurization indications, and the airplane was put on the ground. They inspected it, they checked it. They didn't go to the extent of doing a pressurization check on the ground, which typically isn't done. They'll do a couple of other things before they do that, but that's the one thing that I think is missing here. But this problem started long long before this actual door came out, that's for sure..... at Boeing.

You can watch the whole article here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSl3l1-UkHE

The interview with David Soucie starts here: https://youtu.be/DSl3l1-UkHE?t=224
 
Not related to Sir Humphrey Appleby by any chance?



I deny the possibility that a GPC was done because I know for a fact that it was not.

This is a CNN interview from three days ago, where Brianna Kielar is talking with David Soucie (author of "Why Planes Crash" and "Safer Skies") He has 45 years experience as an aircraft engineer, and is one of the world's leading experts on aviation mishaps and crashes.

If you won't accept this fact from me, perhaps you will accept it from him!


Kielar: That is a bombshell, as Pete said there, especially since it seemed before this door plug blew off, it was an airplane that was kind of giving some signs, right, with the pressurization issues that it had been experiencing on multiple occasions.

Soucie: Yeah, three times before this, they had pressurization indications, and the airplane was put on the ground. They inspected it, they checked it. They didn't go to the extent of doing a pressurization check on the ground, which typically isn't done. They'll do a couple of other things before they do that, but that's the one thing that I think is missing here. But this problem started long long before this actual door came out, that's for sure..... at Boeing.

You can watch the whole article here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSl3l1-UkHE

The interview with David Soucie starts here: https://youtu.be/DSl3l1-UkHE?t=224

Ok, I watched it. Did this CNN expert actually inspect the Alaska Airlines maintenance records? Was he there at the time? "Typically isn't done" isn't a statement of fact, it's a statement of opinion.

So, no, it still isn't a fact that they didn't pressurise it, but I accept that it is very unlikely they did, and even if they had, the door might well have been back in the correct position after taxi. ( in which case even an external examination would have shown no signs of movement)

signed - Sir Humphrey Appleby
 
Ok, I watched it. Did this CNN expert actually inspect the Alaska Airlines maintenance records?

They didn't need to, they talk to people with expertise as well as people involved in the investigation.

Was he there at the time?

Did he need to be?

Do you disbelieve that the sun rises in the east unless you personally observe it rising.

Do you disbelieve that Neil Armstrong walked in the Moon in 1969 because you were not personally there to see it?

"Typically isn't done" isn't a statement of fact, it's a statement of opinion.

But "They didn't go to the extent of doing a pressurization check on the ground" is not a statement of opinion, it is a statement of fact! He is stating this in a way which clearly shows that he knows one was not done.

"Typically isn't done" is also a statement of fact... one that I can back up with personal experience. GPCs are not typically done unless there are repeated pressurization issues that have not been resolved with other inspections and tests. I can promise you that as NCO i/c servicing, if the aircrew flying any of the C-130's I was responsible for, twice reported pressurization alarms, the very next thing I would do is order a GPC, and it would be a "no-fly" priority (which means, the plane don't fly until the GPC is done and passes!)

So, no, it still isn't a fact that they didn't pressurise it, but I accept that it is very unlikely they did, and even if they had, the door might well have been back in the correct position after taxi. ( in which case even an external examination would have shown no signs of movement)

I completely disagree with you on this. I seems clear to me now that no matter what evidence you are presented with, you have decided that you are right and everyone else is wrong. But I will give it one last try.

Have you seen pictures of the exit blank and the hole in blew out from? Here let me help you with that...

737-ExitBlank3.jpeg


[IMGw=800]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/w7otbadpw47w35pkjxq5w/737-ExitBlank1.jpg?rlkey=4wtdbtgx5am3leujn7mn54esy&raw=1[/IMGw]

737-ExitBlank2.png



Look at the three photos above, and thinking about the issue of pressurization and the fact that the door blew out when the aircraft was pressurized, what do you notice about those three photographs?

 
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They didn't need to, they talk to people with expertise as well as people involved in the investigation.



Did he need to be?

Do you disbelieve that the sun rises in the east unless you personally observe it rising.

Do you disbelieve that Neil Armstrong walked in the Moon in 1969 because you were not personally there to see it?



But "They didn't go to the extent of doing a pressurization check on the ground" is not a statement of opinion, it is a statement of fact! He is stating this in a way which clearly shows that he knows one was not done.

"Typically isn't done" is also a statement of fact... one that I can back up with personal experience. GPCs are not typically done unless there are repeated pressurization issues that have not been resolved with other inspections and tests. I can promise you that as NCO i/c servicing, if the aircrew flying any of the C-130's I was responsible for, twice reported pressurization alarms, the very next thing I would do is order a GPC, and it would be a "no-fly" priority (which means, the plane don't fly until the GPC is done and passes!)



I completely disagree with you on this. I seems clear to me now that no matter what evidence you are presented with, you have decided that you are right and everyone else is wrong. But I will give it one last try.

Have you seen pictures of the exit blank and the hole in blew out from? Here let me help you with that...

[qimg]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/1ks9j1jms08p117zfbcx0/737-ExitBlank3.jpeg?rlkey=4x92dsav25ixh21p1oinu8t3w&raw=1[/qimg]

[IMGw=800]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/w7otbadpw47w35pkjxq5w/737-ExitBlank1.jpg[/IMGw]

[qimg]https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/wpps5nh84mvih43z52k01/737-ExitBlank2.png?rlkey=h82desxbnjygcfwqpy7ki7irp&raw=1[/qimg]


Look at the three photos above, and thinking about the issue of pressurization and the fact that the door blew out when the aircraft was pressurized, what do you notice about those three photographs?


I don't care what he thinks was not done or what the experts think would not have been done, or even what you would have done, Anyone who states categorically that something has not been done should either have witnessed the actual inspection or seen the inspection logs. That is simple logic. Am I being pedantic? sure, but then so are you. Does it actually matter? not in the least.

At the time the door blew out it has risen so that the stop tabs were not fully engaged and thus could not hold the pressure. It seems likely that it rose up enough to make the lower part of the plug seal leak several times prior to the total failure. If it had stayed slightly high on the ground a small gap would have been visible at the bottom of the door, even though the pressure seal was still at least partially operational. only an external inspection would have shown that though the person inspecting would have needed sharp eyes. It might not have fallen back, though you seemed to agree previously that it might have done during taxi. I don't know what else you want to point out, but there you go - perhaps you're simply annoyed that someone has the temerity to argue with you.

Meh.
 
Boeing's problems as seen from inside:

‘I’m Not Trying to Cause a Scene. I Just Want to Get Off This Plane.’

A former senior Boeing employee on why he still won’t fly on a MAX plane.

In 2018, Ed Pierson decided that he could no longer work as a senior manager for Boeing’s 737 MAX program.

At the company’s production facility in Renton, Washington, he had watched as employee morale plummeted and oversight and assembly procedures faltered. He told his superiors but retired soon after. But then fatal MAX 8 crashes occurred in 2018 and 2019. He decided to speak up publicly and was then called to testify before Congress on the problems he says he saw up close.

Five years later, after a door plug blew off of a 737 MAX 9 in the middle of an Alaska Airlines flight last month, Pierson is again trying to sound the alarm. Regulators ultimately approved the plane to return to the air nearly two years after the 2019 crash, but Pierson still doesn’t trust the MAX line — the modernized, more fuel-efficient version of Boeing’s predecessor planes.

The Boeing Company is capable of building quality airplanes,” says Pierson, now the executive director for the nonprofit Foundation for Aviation Safety. “The problem is leadership, or lack thereof, and the pressure to get airplanes out the door is greater than doing the job right.”
 
Boeing stating that the guy died of a self-inflicted wound is really nasty.

I was appalled when I heard that announced on the news here, and more appalled now that I see the article attributes that comment to Boeing.
 
Boeing stating that the guy died of a self-inflicted wound is really nasty.

I was appalled when I heard that announced on the news here, and more appalled now that I see the article attributes that comment to Boeing.

Are you referring to this? "The Charleston County coroner confirmed his death to the BBC on Monday. It said the 62-year-old had died from a "self-inflicted" wound on 9 March and police were investigating."

It seems like the BBC is attributing that comment to the Charleston County coroner('s office).
 
Boeing stating that the guy died of a self-inflicted wound is really nasty.

I was appalled when I heard that announced on the news here, and more appalled now that I see the article attributes that comment to Boeing.

I think you're misreading the article, due to some very poor wording:
Boeing said it was saddened to hear of Mr Barnett's passing. The Charleston County coroner confirmed his death to the BBC on Monday.

It said the 62-year-old had died from a "self-inflicted" wound on 9 March and police were investigating.

I'm pretty sure they meant the Coroner's office said he died from a self-inflicted wound.

I watched the John Oliver video a couple of days ago. As I said on my other forum, I found it both hilarious and heartbreaking. He very correctly identified the root cause as being Jack Welch.

I will take issue with him on one thing: The use of Boeing employees as FAA designated representatives. I worked closely with those folks for 20 years. A more honest and dedicated group of people you could not ask for. I will acknowledge that things could have changed some sine I retired in 2010.
 
It just doesn't stop for Boeing! A Chilean 787 took a sudden dive over the Tasman Sea, injuring 50 people:



The TL/DW: Boeing added a handy switch atop the back of the pilot's seat to assist in moving it in and out, to help the pilot get in. It's under a plastic cover. But if the switch is loose in its mount and someone leans on the cover, in this case a flight attendant bringing the captain a meal, the seat can go forward and cause inadvertent pushing of the control column in the nose down direction. Sheesh!
 
I think that the article may have been corrected.

When I followed the link, the statement was immediately after other quotes from Boeing, and not attributed to anyone else.

I'm still appalled that the 'self inflicted wound' stuff was announced at all.
 
I'm still appalled that the 'self inflicted wound' stuff was announced at all.

It's probably standard procedure for the coroner's office to make some public statement about their findings. Not sure why you find it appalling. It would have been gratuitous and in poor taste for Boeing to say it, which is why I'm inclined to doubt that interpretation. The coroner's office saying it makes more sense, and doesn't seem tasteless to me at all.
 
Another oopsie with 737-800

https://abc7news.com/united-flight-missing-panel-sfo-medford-oregon/14529741/

"United plane apparently loses external panel mid-flight after taking off from SFO, officials say

A United Airlines flight that took off from San Francisco International Airport Friday morning landed in Oregon with a missing external panel, according to officials.

United Flight 433 left San Francisco at 10:20 a.m. and landed at Rogue Valley International-Medford Airport in Medford shortly before noon, according to FlightAware. The airport's director, Amber Judd, said the plane landed safely without incident and the external panel was discovered missing during a post-flight inspection."​

If its Boeing, I ain't going!!
 
Another oopsie with 737-800

https://abc7news.com/united-flight-missing-panel-sfo-medford-oregon/14529741/

"United plane apparently loses external panel mid-flight after taking off from SFO, officials say

A United Airlines flight that took off from San Francisco International Airport Friday morning landed in Oregon with a missing external panel, according to officials.

United Flight 433 left San Francisco at 10:20 a.m. and landed at Rogue Valley International-Medford Airport in Medford shortly before noon, according to FlightAware. The airport's director, Amber Judd, said the plane landed safely without incident and the external panel was discovered missing during a post-flight inspection."​

If its Boeing, I ain't going!!

I'm still trying to figure out how much of this is quality control issues from the manufacturer, and how much of this is airlines cutting corners on routine maintenance.

The door plug incident is pretty clearly a manufacturer issue. A lot of these others seem like they're happening to parts of planes that the airline is responsible for maintaining.
 
The aircraft in the latest incident is, according to the report I saw, a 737-800, and if I recall correctly was around 30 years old. At that point, it's almost certainly a maintenance issue, not a manufacturing or design issue.

EDIT: Source: https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/boeing...-from-california-to-southern-oregon-1.6809958
It's a 737-824, and was delivered in 1998 to Continental Airlines. United has had it since November 2011.
 
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The common thread for the string of the latest Boeing incidents is United.

The problem is not the plane. It's the maintenance. The latest panel missing shows a body that looks like it's been sitting in a junkyard.
 
Yeah, I think it's not just the manufacturers that are cutting corners. I'm about to stop flying, not because of the manufacturers, but because of the airlines. A manufacturing defect, you issue a recall, you do a mitigation or correction, Robert's your mother's brother. A maintenance problem with the airline? Good ******* luck, my dude. Take the train
 
Another oopsie with 737-800

https://abc7news.com/united-flight-missing-panel-sfo-medford-oregon/14529741/

"United plane apparently loses external panel mid-flight after taking off from SFO, officials say

A United Airlines flight that took off from San Francisco International Airport Friday morning landed in Oregon with a missing external panel, according to officials.

United Flight 433 left San Francisco at 10:20 a.m. and landed at Rogue Valley International-Medford Airport in Medford shortly before noon, according to FlightAware. The airport's director, Amber Judd, said the plane landed safely without incident and the external panel was discovered missing during a post-flight inspection."​

If its Boeing, I ain't going!!

Man, that would suck to survive a scary thing like that only to end up in ******* Medford.
 
I'm still trying to figure out how much of this is quality control issues from the manufacturer, and how much of this is airlines cutting corners on routine maintenance.

The door plug incident is pretty clearly a manufacturer issue. A lot of these others seem like they're happening to parts of planes that the airline is responsible for maintaining.

As someone who used to maintain aircraft for the Navy, a missing panel sounds likely to be a maintenance issue rather than a manufacturing issue.

However, I can't say conclusively.
 
As someone who used to maintain aircraft for the Navy, a missing panel sounds likely to be a maintenance issue rather than a manufacturing issue.

However, I can't say conclusively.

The retaining bolts for the plug were removed by the manufacturer so they could take the door off to fix an unrelated issue, but they weren't replaced afterwards. That is conclusively a manufacturing issue.
 
The retaining bolts for the plug were removed by the manufacturer so they could take the door off to fix an unrelated issue, but they weren't replaced afterwards. That is conclusively a manufacturing issue.

Fixing an issue is maintenance not manufacturing. Maintenance involves more than just changing the oil.

If you want to blame it on Boeing manufacturing, discuss why the bolts were needed at all and/or whether a more failsafe system could have been devised.
 
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Fixing an issue is maintenance not manufacturing. Maintenance involves more than just changing the oil.

You understand that the issue jeremyp is talking about happened during the manufacture of the aircraft concerned, right?

It was carried out on the production line, by the same workers actually manufacturing the fuselages, propulsion systems and wing systems on the line at Spirit Aerosystems, and the work was signed off by the same Boeing supervisors that sign off all the steps and tasks during manufacture.

You might want to split hairs and call this actual, specific task "maintenance" on a technicality, but this happened at the factory where these aircraft are manufactured. The FAA would not be impressed by your hair-splitting.
 
You understand that the issue jeremyp is talking about happened during the manufacture of the aircraft concerned, right?

It was carried out on the production line, by the same workers actually manufacturing the fuselages, propulsion systems and wing systems on the line at Spirit Aerosystems, and the work was signed off by the same Boeing supervisors that sign off all the steps and tasks during manufacture.

You might want to split hairs and call this actual, specific task "maintenance" on a technicality, but this happened at the factory where these aircraft are manufactured. The FAA would not be impressed by your hair-splitting.

Yes, I will split the hairs, and I don't give a stuff what the FAA think. Taking the plane to bits again to fix a problem is maintenance. As to being signed off by Boeing staff, I thought the problem was that the actual workers were Spirit staff working at Boeing and there was no actual sign off of refitting the bolts since the quality systems were incompatible.

And I see you don't feel there should be any criticism of the design? No wondering if putting springs under the hinges was perhaps a mistake since the absence of the bolts allowed the springs to help the door upwards? No? okay then, it was just perfect as it was...
 
The retaining bolts for the plug were removed by the manufacturer so they could take the door off to fix an unrelated issue, but they weren't replaced afterwards. That is conclusively a manufacturing issue.

Are we talking about the same incident? United Flight 433? Was it a panel or a door?

https://web.archive.org/web/20240321131047/https:/www.faa.gov/newsroom/statements

March 15, 2024
Commercial Aviation / Medford, Oregon

United Airlines Flight 433 landed safely at Medford Airport in Oregon around 11:30 a.m. local time on Friday, March 15. A post landing airline inspection revealed a missing panel. The Boeing 737 departed from San Francisco International Airport. The FAA will investigate. Please contact the airline for more information.
 
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Fixing an issue is maintenance not manufacturing. Maintenance involves more than just changing the oil.

A fault was discovered while they were manufacturing the plane. They* dismantled part of the plane that had already been assembled to gain access to fix the fault. They then reassembled that part but without the necessary retaining bolts. All this happened while the plane was still being built.
If you want to blame it on Boeing manufacturing, discuss why the bolts were needed at all and/or whether a more failsafe system could have been devised.

There was a hole in the side of the fuselage that you could put a door in. Not every airline wanted a door there, so Boeing would put a "plug door" in place instead. This is a door shaped bit of metal that you aren't supposed to be able to open during the normal course of operations but you are supposed to be able to open/remove for maintenance.

Bolts are fastenings that are typically used in all sorts of places to hold bits of the aircraft together. They are well understood technology and are not normally an issue unless you forget to put them in or install them improperly.

In this case, the bolts weren't actually load bearing components, they were just there to retain the door plug in the correct position. The load (caused by the pressure differential inside and outside of the plane was born by a series of lugs.

I think you should read the documentation on the Alaska Airline incident. You'll see that the issue is squarely with the manufacturer in this case.

* the manufacturer: Boeing
 
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Yes, I will split the hairs, and I don't give a stuff what the FAA think. Taking the plane to bits again to fix a problem is maintenance.
Well, if we are splitting hairs, maintenance is "the process of preserving the condition of something". In this case, they were not preserving any kind of condition, they were fixing a manufacturing fault. That is part of the manufacturing process, and more importantly, it was done by the manufacturer, not the customer, which is what really counts here.

As to being signed off by Boeing staff, I thought the problem was that the actual workers were Spirit staff working at Boeing and there was no actual sign off of refitting the bolts since the quality systems were incompatible.
Whatever the cause, the plane was being manufactured by Boeing and Spirit was Boeing's subcontractor. The buck stops with Boeing.
And I see you don't feel there should be any criticism of the design? No wondering if putting springs under the hinges was perhaps a mistake since the absence of the bolts allowed the springs to help the door upwards? No? okay then, it was just perfect as it was...

How would you design a removable door plug to account for any possible bodging by the assembly line workers?
 
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