Question for Gawdzilla

[ddt]

It's not the fortifications.
It's the air power.
The Czechs best fighter was a biplane. It was the best biplane ever produced, but it was still a biplane.

The fortifications also weren't as tough as Maginot. There's a map here. Only the red bits were Maginot equivalents (some better). The green were essentially pillboxes at best. Also note the incomplete bits. Yes, the big bunkers were impressive...as the site I linked to says, they were used as practice for Eben Emael. They weren't everywhere.

I've been digging around for the Chiefs of Staff report, but the National Archives aren't cooperating. Found the end of '37 defence expenditure plans, which covers the RAF and how badly outgunned it was compared to the Luftwaffe, and would be up to probably 1941, even with the planned big expansion. CP316(37) "DEFENCE EXPENDITURE IN FUTURE YEARS", if you're at all interested.

To what extent would superior German airpower have been decisive? And in what form, tactical on the battlefield or strategic as in bombing Prague to smithereens?

I found this interesting term paper from a student at Duke University. Haven't read it all, yet, but it concludes that CS, France and the UK would have likely had the upper hand, provided the French would march into Germany and Germany thus would have to pull troops from the CS front to defend against France - they had only 9 divisions on the Westwall compared to 56 French divisions.

And that doesn't take into account that the Soviet Union would have sided with CS, or what other Central-European countries may have done.

 

[HansMustermann]

Well, everyone still had heaps of biplanes, but most countries were by then having at least SOME better airplanes. E.g., the UK did have for example some Hawker Hurricanes since '37, and were producing their first Spitfires. And the French had the Dewoitine line of fighters since 1935 (starting with the D.500 and D.501, followed by the D.510 next year), a few MB-151 and MB-152 since '37, and were just introducing aircraft like the Potez 630 (a twin-engine monoplane). Plus a few others.

So, yeah, biplanes in '38... well, it wasn't too far behind the curve, but it wasn't really cutting edge any more.

Though I think the real issue there isn't as much how it stacked against British and French planes, but how would it stack against a BF-109. And I think it would have been outmatched by any of the BF-109 B to D models that Germany had hundreds of in '38. (The E would be introduced too late in '38 to make a difference.)

 

[HansMustermann]

To what extent would superior German airpower have been decisive? And in what form, tactical on the battlefield or strategic as in bombing Prague to smithereens?

I found this interesting term paper from a student at Duke University. Haven't read it all, yet, but it concludes that CS, France and the UK would have likely had the upper hand, provided the French would march into Germany and Germany thus would have to pull troops from the CS front to defend against France - they had only 9 divisions on the Westwall compared to 56 French divisions.

And that doesn't take into account that the Soviet Union would have sided with CS, or what other Central-European countries may have done.

And THAT is why in retrospect it would have been better to be less of a dick to minorities. I don't think Germany could have won that war in '38.

 

[Craig B]

Funny, Eamon said everything was cool. Ish.

Gas stove hobs were "cool-ish" during the "Emergency" - because of the dreaded "Glimmerman". See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glimmer_man

 

[Craig B]

... So, yeah, biplanes in '38... well, it wasn't too far behind the curve, but it wasn't really cutting edge any more.

Though I think the real issue there isn't as much how it stacked against British and French planes, but how would it stack against a BF-109. And I think it would have been outmatched by any of the BF-109 B to D models that Germany had hundreds of in '38. (The E would be introduced too late in '38 to make a difference.)

Yes it was the Bf 109 that outmatched them. Although it was the Russians who were first with a low wing monoplane fighter with retractable undercarriage. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polikarpov_I-16. In Spain it outclassed most things except the Bf 109 of course. It was still viable, if only just, in the first phase of the 1941 invasion.

 

[catsmate]

Funny, Eamon said everything was cool. Ish.

Bloody DeV.

And THAT is why in retrospect it would have been better to be less of a dick to minorities. I don't think Germany could have won that war in '38.

I suspect they they'd have "won" and defeated the Czechs but been drained and probably attacked by France.

Gas stove hobs were "cool-ish" during the "Emergency" - because of the dreaded "Glimmerman". See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glimmer_man

I remember the stories.

 

[Brainache]

Gentlemen! Gentlemen, you can't fight in here...

This is the War Thread!

 

[Tolls]

In 1938 biplanes were still the thing. Zhukhov still had lots of them deployed against the Japanese in September 1939.

In '38 everyone used they as front line fighters, including the UK and France.

Apart from the Germans.
Read some of the balance of power analyses by teh likes of the RAF or the Franch Air Force in 37 and 38 and you'll see them arguing that construction of modern planes was essential as the biplanes were now obsolete compared to the bf109.

And that's what the Czechs would be up against. Not biplanes.

 

[Tolls]

To what extent would superior German airpower have been decisive? And in what form, tactical on the battlefield or strategic as in bombing Prague to smithereens?

I found this interesting term paper from a student at Duke University. Haven't read it all, yet, but it concludes that CS, France and the UK would have likely had the upper hand, provided the French would march into Germany and Germany thus would have to pull troops from the CS front to defend against France - they had only 9 divisions on the Westwall compared to 56 French divisions.

And that doesn't take into account that the Soviet Union would have sided with CS, or what other Central-European countries may have done.

But that analysis fails the "what actually happened in 1939" test.
France could not mobilise that quickly.
Germany would have had as much of a free hand in Czechoslovakia in '38 as they had in Poland in '39.
The Saar offensive pulled together 11 divisions? And that lasted a week, ending a fortnight or so after Germany had invaded Poland. So even with that, that's 2 weeks with little interference.

 

[ddt]

But that analysis fails the "what actually happened in 1939" test.
France could not mobilise that quickly.
Germany would have had as much of a free hand in Czechoslovakia in '38 as they had in Poland in '39.
The Saar offensive pulled together 11 divisions? And that lasted a week, ending a fortnight or so after Germany had invaded Poland. So even with that, that's 2 weeks with little interference.

Could not or would not? In 1940, half a year later, they did mobilize to full strength.

The Saar Offensive was a joke. The French advanced 8 km, captured 12 villages unopposed, checked out part of the Westwall (which wouldn't have been there in 1938), lied to the Poles they had enemy contact and retreated.

Why would they fight for the Poles if they hadn't done for the Czechs?

And another difference between 1938 and 1939 is the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact. In 1938, the Soviet Union would have sided with Czechoslovakia if France had done so.

 

[Tolls]

To what extent would superior German airpower have been decisive? And in what form, tactical on the battlefield or strategic as in bombing Prague to smithereens?

Missed this bit.
Tactical.
Looking at the campaigns up to the fall of France that was the main area the Luftwaffe were dominant.

Air superiority would essentially negate anything the Czechs could do with their tanks.

And before someone mentions the quality of the Czech tanks it's worth remembering that they were not going to be used in the same way the Germans used them, but in the way the British and French used them. The armour tended to be plonked in with the infantry.

 

[Tolls]

Could not or would not? In 1940, half a year later, they did mobilize to full strength.

Could not.
Their mobilisation plans were firmly set in the previous war.
The idea was any offensive required the deployment of big guns and lots of troops.

The Saar Offensive was a joke. The French advanced 8 km, captured 12 villages unopposed, checked out part of the Westwall (which wouldn't have been there in 1938), lied to the Poles they had enemy contact and retreated.

Why would they fight for the Poles if they hadn't done for the Czechs?

The lie was in the fact they were never going to mobilise fast enough to launch the sort of offensive they were mentally geared up for. The sort of offensive more associated with 1917/18 than 1940.

And they did have enemy contact, since the Germans launched an (albeit diddy) counterattack, recapturing a couple of the villages which the French then recaptured.

And another difference between 1938 and 1939 is the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact. In 1938, the Soviet Union would have sided with Czechoslovakia if France had done so.

Oh yes. That's true. But the Soviets would have had to get there and that would have required either Poland siding with Germany (they would not have sided with the Czechs) or, more likely, Romania entering the war. And then we hit the speed of Soviet mobilisation...which was no quicker than the French.

ETA: I'm not saying the world wouldn't have been very different, but Czechoslovakia would have been overrun.

 

[HansMustermann]

A few random ideas...

The USSR siding with Czechoslovakia in '38 would be pretty much a given, since they had a defense pact. (Albeit an impractical one, unless it would be against Poland, as originally made against.) There was a major shift in external policy in the USSR as a result of Munich, which obviously wouldn't be there if Munich were to go the other way around.

The Soviet army always had more than enough mobilized divisions, so that would not be a problem. You'd be surprised how many soldiers they had on active duty even in peace times. They had no mobilization problems in dealing with the Japanese for example. And a few thousand Soviet tanks, even if it was BT-5 and BT-7, would have just rolled over Germany in '38. There's no way a few Pz-II and a bunch of Pz-I were gonna stop those. (Though the 88mm AT gun would be a major problem.)

 

[Craig B]

And another difference between 1938 and 1939 is the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact. In 1938, the Soviet Union would have sided with Czechoslovakia if France had done so.

That's very significant, I think. Hitler required, or at least sought, Soviet understanding and cooperation when he attacked Poland. If Stalin had decided otherwise, what would Hitler have done? One of Stalin's motivations was the contempt he had acquired for the Entente powers following Munich. So no Nazi Soviet Pact. Therefore no Soviet occupation of the Baltic Republics, Karelia or Bukovina? Soviet threats deterring a future German invasion of Poland?

One complexity. Poland would in no circumstances permit passage of Soviet troops through its territory and - shamefully - participated with the Germans in dismembering Czechoslovakia.

A war commencing in 1938 would have been very different from the one that in fact began the following year. And there would have been no surprise invasion of the USSR as in 1941. But was the Red Army in a fit state to do much in '38, given Stalin's murderous assault on its officers, in full swing that year?

 

[HansMustermann]

The Soviet army would have been just as scared witless of its commissars in '38 and in '41 or '45, but like in '45, it wouldn't matter much.

Why it mattered in the invasion of the USSR was that nobody knew what to do, and everyone was too scared to take a decision. Because, you know, you can be purged if you take the wrong one.

That, however, is not a problem when you get your orders handed to you. If you were told to attack that-a-way, then the same fear says you better do just that. Or, you know, you get to explain to comrade commissar and the nice comrades from the NKVD why didn't you move when told to move.

And from a pragmatic point of view, the Soviet army had no problem attacking when told to attack in the clash with the Japanese that we discussed on the first page.

I think the only problem would be getting there.

 

[ddt]

Could not.
Their mobilisation plans were firmly set in the previous war.
The idea was any offensive required the deployment of big guns and lots of troops.

What made it different in 1940 then? They already had mobilized in May 1940?

The lie was in the fact they were never going to mobilise fast enough to launch the sort of offensive they were mentally geared up for. The sort of offensive more associated with 1917/18 than 1940.

And they did have enemy contact, since the Germans launched an (albeit diddy) counterattack, recapturing a couple of the villages which the French then recaptured.

Still, they could have done more with the troops that were mobilized?

Oh yes. That's true. But the Soviets would have had to get there and that would have required either Poland siding with Germany (they would not have sided with the Czechs) or, more likely, Romania entering the war. And then we hit the speed of Soviet mobilisation...which was no quicker than the French.

Romania still was on friendly terms with Czechoslovakia (Little Entente)?

And while the Soviets couldn't simply have marched an army into Czechoslovakia, because either Poland or Romania was in the way, could they have flown in aircraft? Yes, that's violation of airspace, but it's easier to turn a blind eye to.

That's very significant, I think. Hitler required, or at least sought, Soviet understanding and cooperation when he attacked Poland. If Stalin had decided otherwise, what would Hitler have done? One of Stalin's motivations was the contempt he had acquired for the Entente powers following Munich. So no Nazi Soviet Pact.

Very much. It's a good what-if question what Hitler would have done in 1939 without the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop pact in 1939, but without it, there would have been significant less risk of Soviet involvement than with CS: Polish-Russian relations had been, hmm, complicated since 1600 or so (first false Dmitri) when Russia began to dislodge Poland as a Great Power and started to meddle in its internal affairs soon after. Not to speak of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920-1922.

But in 1938, there were no such complications and no time either for secret agreements. The Soviet Union also had a clear pact with CS: if France backed CS, the SU would do so too.

One complexity. Poland would in no circumstances permit passage of Soviet troops through its territory and - shamefully - participated with the Germans in dismembering Czechoslovakia.

Teschen, over which they had a short border war in 1920, and which was partitioned then.

A war commencing in 1938 would have been very different from the one that in fact began the following year. And there would have been no surprise invasion of the USSR as in 1941. But was the Red Army in a fit state to do much in '38, given Stalin's murderous assault on its officers, in full swing that year?

It would have pitted Germany not only against CS, but against three Great Powers at the same time.

And irrespective of the direct strength those powers could field, it would have been highly unpopular with the German people and with the German high command. Ludwig Beck was ready for a coup and, unlike Stauffenberg in 1944, he had the support of many high-ups.

 

[Craig B]

... And from a pragmatic point of view, the Soviet army had no problem attacking when told to attack in the clash with the Japanese that we discussed on the first page.

Yes, you're right. They were able to field an army quite effectively. Although Zhukhov's predecessor fell a victim to the purge.

The importance of the Far East Front gave Blyukher a certain degree of immunity from Stalin's purge of Red Army command, which had begun in 1937 with the execution of Mikhail Tukhachevsky. In fact, Blyukher had been a member of the tribunal that convicted Tukhachevsky. In 1938 he was accused of inadequate armed forces leadership during the battle of Lake Khasan and dismissed from his post. On October 22 he was arrested, convicted of espionage for Japan.

And secretly bumped off.

 

[Tolls]

A few random ideas...

The USSR siding with Czechoslovakia in '38 would be pretty much a given, since they had a defense pact. (Albeit an impractical one, unless it would be against Poland, as originally made against.) There was a major shift in external policy in the USSR as a result of Munich, which obviously wouldn't be there if Munich were to go the other way around.

The Soviet army always had more than enough mobilized divisions, so that would not be a problem. You'd be surprised how many soldiers they had on active duty even in peace times. They had no mobilization problems in dealing with the Japanese for example. And a few thousand Soviet tanks, even if it was BT-5 and BT-7, would have just rolled over Germany in '38. There's no way a few Pz-II and a bunch of Pz-I were gonna stop those. (Though the 88mm AT gun would be a major problem.)

Unles Poland joined up (presumably on the German side) they still wouldn't have got them there in time.

Besides, this is also the same Soviet army that had such a happy time against Finland a year later...forgive me for not being overly impressed. As for Japan...they had been clashing for the best part of a year prior to it. No surprise they had troops already deployed. Not the same as a mobilisation in the West.

What made it different in 1940 then? They already had mobilized in May 1940?

France started mobilising in September 1939. That's the mobilisation that could not have gone faster, and consequently limited (dramatically) what the French could do against Germany.

Still, they could have done more with the troops that were mobilized?

Possibly, but the last thing they wanted was to be attacking the German fortifications and finding themselves out of position when the Germans turned around.

Romania still was on friendly terms with Czechoslovakia (Little Entente)?

And while the Soviets couldn't simply have marched an army into Czechoslovakia, because either Poland or Romania was in the way, could they have flown in aircraft? Yes, that's violation of airspace, but it's easier to turn a blind eye to.

Yes, Romania was the other option (as I said). But look at the border between Romania and Czechoslovakia. Also the rail routes. Not the best communications.

And the air force still needs supply and somewhere to launch from. The Czech airfields were the first target.

As I say, though. It would have been a very different war. Note that Britain and France would really have not had much in the way of useful airpower.
The relative strengths (GB and F vs G) were very much in the German favour at that point.

 

[HansMustermann]

Well, in the Winter War, the Russian tried to imitate blitzkrieg in winter, in a country with a remarkable lack of infrastructure, and with no clear military objectives to take quickly. And learned a lesson that Germany itself would learn the hard way in Russia.

I don't think the same factors would work against them in Germany in '38. Especially not in the summer.

 

[Tolls]

Well, in the Winter War, the Russian tried to imitate blitzkrieg in winter, in a country with a remarkable lack of infrastructure, and with no clear military objectives to take quickly. And learned a lesson that Germany itself would learn the hard way in Russia.

I don't think the same factors would work against them in Germany in '38. Especially not in the summer.

Most of the "war starts in 1938" are based around a late September/early October start. Essentially around a failed Munich.

The Soviet command didn't manage to handle a non-standard situation which, without Polish involvement, would be the case with a Soviet force operating through Romania.