what's the difference between "knowledge" and "belief"?

[phiwum]

Why? Do you think it will affect me adversely not to believe what the majority believe?

You appear to be taking a philosophical stance in regard to this. I am not.

Look, most of us think that the law of excluded middle (LEM) is a pretty darned solid assertion -- especially in the case, like this one, where the proposition is decidable (a technical matter that need not bother us here).

You've just decided, with no apparent concern, to jettison LEM.

It's not just that you use the word "believe" differently. It's that, as a consequence of what you've said here, you've decided to deny one of the fundamental rules of classical logic.

Like I said: good luck with that.

In your previous post you asked more than 1 Q too.

A1. 'False' is different from 'untruthful' in the sense I am using the words. Specifically I am using the word 'untruthful' to denote something which is purposefully proclaimed as true when it is provably not.

So, if something is "untruthful", then it is false. Yes?

A2: Which P are you referring to?

Let me quote the question:

Do you deny that, for every statement P,

"Either Navigator believes that P or Navigator does not believe that P."

is true?

Your question ("Which P?") makes no sense here. Do you understand what "for every P" means?

Now, back to the meat. If I am correct, and every untruthful statement is also a false statement, then what you've said is this:

It is false that N believes P. (I.e., NOT Bel(N,P))
It is also false that N does not believe P. (I.e., NOT NOT Bel(N,P))

In other words,

NOT Bel(N,P) & NOT NOT Bel(N,P),

and this is an obvious contradiction.

So, like I said, good luck. This is an even worse case than merely denying LEM.

 

[Navigator]

Look, most of us think that the law of excluded middle (LEM) is a pretty darned solid assertion -- especially in the case, like this one, where the proposition is decidable (a technical matter that need not bother us here).

You've just decided, with no apparent concern, to jettison LEM.

It's not just that you use the word "believe" differently. It's that, as a consequence of what you've said here, you've decided to deny one of the fundamental rules of classical logic.

Like I said: good luck with that.



So, if something is "untruthful", then it is false. Yes?



Let me quote the question:

Do you deny that, for every statement P,

"Either Navigator believes that P or Navigator does not believe that P."

is true?

Your question ("Which P?") makes no sense here. Do you understand what "for every P" means?

Now, back to the meat. If I am correct, and every untruthful statement is also a false statement, then what you've said is this:

It is false that N believes P. (I.e., NOT Bel(N,P))
It is also false that N does not believe P. (I.e., NOT NOT Bel(N,P))

In other words,

NOT Bel(N,P) & NOT NOT Bel(N,P),

and this is an obvious contradiction.

So, like I said, good luck. This is an even worse case than merely denying LEM.

Lets go back to the beginning.

I asked if knowledge was the same as knowing.

The reason being that it seems to be different.

I gave an example. If I KNOW something is true, is this different from what is being referred to as the thread topic.

What's the difference between "knowledge" and "belief"?

I could see that the argument seemed to be saying that knowledge is no different than belief.

I asked if to know something as true was different than having knowledge because I did not (and do not) see that if something was actual TRUE, that it required BELIEF.

Now if something is TRUE or FALSE and can be proven as so, then BELIEF is not required.

Belief can insinuate that the proposition could be believed as either true or false, but not known either way as being true or false.

Thus I gave an example which you have now said is a 'proposition.'

The example I gave (as to something I know to be true) is that I know I am conscious. (note the lack of the word 'believe')

The example is not under question. It is a statement of fact. It is true.

I KNOW it as fact (true) and (unless you can show otherwise) so do you.

(If I were to say, "I know there are daisies growing in my back lawn" this is true, but you would not know it were true, thus it is knowledge (data) to you but you cannot say if it is true knowledge or false.)

So what I was asking was if there were a difference between knowledge and knowing, or if you like, between data that is known to be true or false and data that could be true or false.

I say that there is a difference, and that knowing something is true or false is different from believing something is true or false.

You brought in 'proposition' as if it had something to do with my question.

I was not making a proposition in saying that "I know I am conscious." I was stating truth.

In doing so, I am not expressing belief that I know I am conscious. I am stating fact.

 

[phiwum]

[...]

Okay, let's clarify a few things here.

First, a proposition is simply a statement, the sort of thing that is either true or false. Propositions include "1 = 1", "NOT (1 = 1)", "There is a gold nugget thirty-seven feet under my house," and so on.

Now, as far as your usage of "believes" goes, I have two points to make.

(1) Your usage is quite different than the conventional meaning of "believes".

Now, definitions of terms like "believes" are generally given by stipulation, so there's nothing inherently wrong with using a different definition -- aside from the fact that you cause needless confusion when one definition has become conventional.

But, you seem to think that you have the "right" definition and anyone else is wrong. This is, of course, nonsense. The meanings of words are settled by convention and stipulation. Some definitions are more well-suited for their purpose than others, however, and your own usage of "believes" lacks any clear definition at all.

(2) Your own usage of the term is inconsistent.

We lack a clear definition of "believes" (in the sense you use it), so I have asked you questions about your usage. You have said that both of the following sentences are "untruthful" and hence false.

(a) N believes N is conscious.
(b) N does not believe N is conscious.

The negations of these two sentences are

(a') N does not believe N is conscious.
(b') It is not the case that N does not believe N is conscious.

If (a) and (b) are false, then (a') and (b') are true. That's what false means. But this is obviously a logical contradiction.

There's really nothing more to say at this point. You've shown that your own intuitions about belief are inconsistent. You have to go back and fix that inconsistency if you want to discuss anything meaningful at all.

But, generally speaking, you seem completely certain about your intuitions, with no real consideration or exposure to any of the topics at hand. Clearly, you've never read epistemology, logic or likely anything dealing with probability theory, but in each case, affirmed that you know better than the decades to centuries of work that's come before you. You've casually rejected the law of excluded middle the way some people choose a sandwich for lunch.

I just can't see this conversation leading to any fruitful end.

 

[phiwum]

A couple more things.

Facts are, of course, true independently of our experiences. If there is indeed a gold nugget deep under my house, then there is one whether I believe it or not.

But when we say, "Fred knows there is a gold nugget...," we're saying something more than "There is a gold nugget..." We're saying that Fred and this proposition ("There is a gold nugget...") stand in some sort of relation to one another. What is that relation? It is, partly, that Fred assents to the proposition, that is, that Fred at least finds it more likely than not that the proposition is true.

We call such assent "belief". We say that Fred believes there is a gold nugget....

Now, belief by itself doesn't make it knowledge. The traditional characterization of "knows", which will do for us, is the following:

S knows P if and only if
(1) S believes P.
(2) P is true.
(3) S has good reason to believe P.

So, if Fred has, for instance, seen the nugget under my house (perhaps burying it there), and the nugget is still under my house, then Fred knows there is a nugget there.

But the term "believes" used in this way is not in opposition to "knows". It is a necessary condition of knowledge. If one is unwilling to assent that a given statement is at least more likely than not true, then one cannot possibly know that statement.

 

[wrs]

Belief is a conclusion formed due to incomplete knowledge.

Knowledge comes from experience, this is the best kind. Knowledge comes from trusted sources, this is the venue of learning. Knowledge comes from reasoning. This is likely to be the weakest kind because it's easy to start with a false premise and wind up with an erroneous conclusion.

It is best to have all three converge with any given thought.

 

[Navigator]

What's for lunch?

Okay, let's clarify a few things here.

First, a proposition is simply a statement, the sort of thing that is either true or false. Propositions include "1 = 1", "NOT (1 = 1)", "There is a gold nugget thirty-seven feet under my house," and so on.

Now, as far as your usage of "believes" goes, I have two points to make.

(A)
(1) Your usage is quite different than the conventional meaning of "believes".
(B)
Now, definitions of terms like "believes" are generally given by stipulation, so there's nothing inherently wrong with using a different definition -- aside from the fact that you cause needless confusion when one definition has become conventional.
(C)
But, you seem to think that you have the "right" definition and anyone else is wrong. This is, of course, nonsense. The meanings of words are settled by convention and stipulation. Some definitions are more well-suited for their purpose than others, however, and your own usage of "believes" lacks any clear definition at all.
(D)
(2) Your own usage of the term is inconsistent.
We lack a clear definition of "believes" (in the sense you use it), so I have asked you questions about your usage. You have said that both of the following sentences are "untruthful" and hence false.

(a) N believes N is conscious.
(b) N does not believe N is conscious.

(E)
The negations of these two sentences are

(a') N does not believe N is conscious.
(b') It is not the case that N does not believe N is conscious.

If (a) and (b) are false, then (a') and (b') are true. That's what false means. But this is obviously a logical contradiction.

(F)
There's really nothing more to say at this point. You've shown that your own intuitions about belief are inconsistent. You have to go back and fix that inconsistency if you want to discuss anything meaningful at all.

(G)

But, generally speaking, you seem completely certain about your intuitions, with no real consideration or exposure to any of the topics at hand. Clearly, you've never read epistemology, logic or likely anything dealing with probability theory, but in each case, affirmed that you know better than the decades to centuries of work that's come before you. You've casually rejected the law of excluded middle the way some people choose a sandwich for lunch.

I just can't see this conversation leading to any fruitful end.

\

(A) As far as I am concerned, the conversation has been very fruitful.

It has shown me how philosophy works its own particular magic, and how the interchangeability of particular words effectively nullify the clarity of those words.

"I said [________] but I meant [_______] ... you should have realized that!"

Conventionally convenient.

(B) As far as I am concerned, to believe something is true is different from knowing it is true.
At the moment I am involved with interacting with a christian who appears to be using the same argument that you are.

I replied to him last night, telling him about this conversation I am involved with in this thread.
I finished the email with these words.

"So you see this problem of philosophy seems handy for skirting around truthfulness. My problem with your particular interchanging 'belief' with 'knowing' is that you can speak your belief as something you know to be true, when the truth of the matter is you simply believe it to be true.

You can see in the above discussion that this personality appears to be taking a similar stance as you, and he/she and I are no further ahead in resolving the issue so that we can even be on the same page.

This is also true in regard to you and I. If you are unwilling to admit that what you believe to be true is only what you believe rather than what you know to be true, I have no interest in continuing communication with you."​

As far as my having the 'right' definition (and thus everyone else must be wrong) this is not truthful.
The problem really is in the agreed consensus that the words know and believe can be and are used in interchangeable fashion as if they mean the same thing - seemingly because philosophers haven't been able to get on the same page about it.
Now I suspect that this might have something to do with the possibility that if there were clear definition between knowing truth and believing knowledge, a greater percentage of philosophies would be null and void.

But whatever the reason is, it warrants examination.

(C)
Convention and stipulation are not carved into stone or immovable. Indeed - open minded skepticism and critical thinking techniques are primary tools for stripping/chipping away at convention and stipulation which are based on philosophies of belief.

My own use of belief is pretty simple in definition. Something which is believed without evidence of its truth, or truthfulness.

I think that is clear enough.

(D) This is where you continue to bark like a dog as if I am a sheep needing to be corralled into a place you want me to be.
I have and will continue to speak about knowing, to know what is true. I am not focused upon belief at all, and in this both sentences you offered were answered truthfully by me, because (a) and (b) are both untruthful.

(a) N believes N is conscious.
(b) N does not believe N is conscious.​

And you persist with trying to spin it back to belief, a case of belief...what is with that?

I not only said it was untruthful, but I went a step further and showed how it would be written in order for it to be truthful.

I do not believe I am conscious, I KNOW I am conscious.

Simple.

thus

(a) in truth is 'N Knows N is conscious.'
(b) in truth is ' N does not believe N is conscious, N knows N is conscious'

Drop the 'belief' as it is not necessary. (Convention/stipulation in this regard are based on belief, not truth)

Do you see?

(a) N believes N is conscious.​

If you take the opposing or negative stand:

(b) N does not believe N is conscious.​

It actually does not align with logic. How can someone conscious of their self believe they are not conscious of their self?

(E)

Firstly (a') "N does not believe N is conscious." is illogical. It is a false statement. It is a statement that has no merit.
The only way it could mean anything is to add "N knows N is conscious"

Then this: (b') "It is not the case that N does not believe N is conscious." implies that it is the case that N believes N is conscious, which is still illogical because belief is not necessary. N knows N is conscious.

There is absolutely no need for N to believe N is conscious.

All that is required is that N knows N is conscious.

Therefore:

(a) N knows N is conscious = "N is conscious"
(b) N does not know that N is conscious = 'N is not conscious'

(F) I don’t have beliefs. I know or I don’t know. Belief is illogical. There is nothing I ‘have to do about it.’

(G)
I realise that this is a philosophical thread and I only wanted to know where the truth fits in with this philosophy.
It is true I know little to nothing about philosophy, epistemology and its usefulness.
It is clear that we have nothing further to work with here, I agree.

 

[Navigator]

A couple more things.

"But wait! There's more!"

Facts are, of course, true independently of our experiences. If there is indeed a gold nugget deep under my house, then there is one whether I believe it or not.

Okay.

But when we say, "Fred knows there is a gold nugget...," we're saying something more than "There is a gold nugget..." We're saying that Fred and this proposition ("There is a gold nugget...") stand in some sort of relation to one another. What is that relation? It is, partly, that Fred assents to the proposition, that is, that Fred at least finds it more likely than not that the proposition is true.

When 'we' say "Fred knows there is a gold nugget...," we should be saying this on account of facts. Not on account that Fred has told us that he knows there is.

If Fred has told us there is a gold nugget...," we can say, "Fred told us there is a gold nugget." We know Fred told us. We don't have to believe what he told us is true. We don't have to say, 'We believe Fred told us' (because we know he told us) and we don't have to say 'we believe what Fred told us.' (because we don't know that what Fred told us is true.)

We call such assent "belief". We say that Fred believes there is a gold nugget....

We don't need to say that. Why would we need to say that?

Now, belief by itself doesn't make it knowledge.

Praise the gods! We are maybe getting somewhere...?

The traditional characterization of "knows", which will do for us, is the following:

Ah oh...here comes the convention/stipulation clause.

S knows P if and only if
(1) S believes P.
(2) P is true.
(3) S has good reason to believe P.

Unbelievable!

So, if Fred has, for instance, seen the nugget under my house (perhaps burying it there), and the nugget is still under my house, then Fred knows there is a nugget there.

What has this got to do with:

S knows P if and only if
(1) S believes P.
(2) P is true.
(3) S has good reason to believe P.

?

Even if I changed it to:

F knows P if and only if
(1) F believes P.
(2) P is true.
(3) F has good reason to believe P.

It still doesn't fit.

What about:

F knows P if and only if
(1) F believes knows P. (P= The gold nugget is under your house.)
(2) P is true. (because F set it up that way himself)
(3) F has good all reason to believe know P. (as being true).

But the term "believes" used in this way is not in opposition to "knows". It is a necessary condition of knowledge.

^Perhaps try another more accurate example.

If one is unwilling to assent that a given statement is at least more likely than not true, then one cannot possibly know that statement.

^I won't ask you for an example. You have convinced me I know I am on the right path.

 

[phiwum]

\

(A) As far as I am concerned, the conversation has been very fruitful.

It has shown me how philosophy works its own particular magic, and how the interchangeability of particular words effectively nullify the clarity of those words.

"I said [________] but I meant [_______] ... you should have realized that!"

Conventionally convenient.

On the contrary, I've been utterly explicit in how I've used terms. It is you who still lacks a definition of "believes", while still clinging to literally inconsistent claims.

(B) As far as I am concerned, to believe something is true is different from knowing it is true.[...]
[/QUOTE]

I'll skip this, since it bears no relevance I can see.

As far as my having the 'right' definition (and thus everyone else must be wrong) this is not truthful.
The problem really is in the agreed consensus that the words know and believe can be and are used in interchangeable fashion as if they mean the same thing - seemingly because philosophers haven't been able to get on the same page about it.
Now I suspect that this might have something to do with the possibility that if there were clear definition between knowing truth and believing knowledge, a greater percentage of philosophies would be null and void.

This is a plain statement that you have not understood anything.

"Knows" and "believes" are not synonyms and I've never said that they were.

My own use of belief is pretty simple in definition. Something which is believed without evidence of its truth, or truthfulness.

You've used "believed" in the definition of "belief" in a thoroughly opaque way.

You've also reduced "belief" to mere guess. I believe the Pens will make the playoffs this year, but according to you, this doesn't count as a belief, because I have some evidence in its favor.

(D) This is where you continue to bark like a dog as if I am a sheep needing to be corralled into a place you want me to be.
I have and will continue to speak about knowing, to know what is true. I am not focused upon belief at all, and in this both sentences you offered were answered truthfully by me, because (a) and (b) are both untruthful.

(a) N believes N is conscious.
(b) N does not believe N is conscious.​

And you persist with trying to spin it back to belief, a case of belief...what is with that?

I not only said it was untruthful, but I went a step further and showed how it would be written in order for it to be truthful.

I do not believe I am conscious, I KNOW I am conscious.

Simple.

thus

(a) in truth is 'N Knows N is conscious.'
(b) in truth is ' N does not believe N is conscious, N knows N is conscious'

Drop the 'belief' as it is not necessary. (Convention/stipulation in this regard are based on belief, not truth)

Do you see?

(a) N believes N is conscious.​

If you take the opposing or negative stand:

(b) N does not believe N is conscious.​

It actually does not align with logic. How can someone conscious of their self believe they are not conscious of their self?

No, I don't see at all. Previously, you said (a) was false (or "untruthful", which entails that it is false). Do you stand by this?

If both (a) and (b) are false, then we have a contradiction. Do you see that?

(E)

Firstly (a') "N does not believe N is conscious." is illogical. It is a false statement. It is a statement that has no merit.
The only way it could mean anything is to add "N knows N is conscious"

You previously told me that it is untruthful, and hence false, that "N believes N is conscious."

If that sentence is false, then it follows that "N does not believe N is conscious," is true.

If you can't see that, we really have nothing to discuss.

(F) I don’t have beliefs. I know or I don’t know. Belief is illogical. There is nothing I ‘have to do about it.’

Well, bully for you!

 

[phiwum]

F knows P if and only if
(1) F believes knows P. (P= The gold nugget is under your house.)
(2) P is true. (because F set it up that way himself)
(3) F has good all reason to believe know P. (as being true).

Honestly, this suggestion is sufficient for me to give up on this conversation.

With all due respect, you clearly do not have even a rudimentary grasp of the logic necessary to follow this conversation. I don't mean to insult you, but it's clear that I've wasted my time trying to explain these things.

If you can't see the problem with trying to characterize "F knows P" by using "F knows P" as clause (1), there really is nothing more to say.

 

[ynot]

Knowledge is knowing - Belief is believing – End of story.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

After all this, a few forum regulars will still maintain that academic Philosophy is useless, despite yet another multi-page thread where people try to figure out first year Philosophy for themselves and get into a huge muddle.

 

[mijopaalmc]

After all this, a few forum regulars will still maintain that academic Philosophy is useless, despite yet another multi-page thread where people try to figure out first year Philosophy for themselves and get into a huge muddle.

Have you learned nothing?

It's not philosophy; it's just logic and common sense.

 

[punshhh]

When 'we' say "Fred knows there is a gold nugget...," we should be saying this on account of facts. Not on account that Fred has told us that he knows there is.

If Fred has told us there is a gold nugget...," we can say, "Fred told us there is a gold nugget." We know Fred told us. We don't have to believe what he told us is true. We don't have to say, 'We believe Fred told us' (because we know he told us) and we don't have to say 'we believe what Fred told us.' (because we don't know that what Fred told us is true.)

Don't get distracted by the word belief. In this context (ie justified true belief), the word belief is defined thus;

Belief = to accept a truth, as true.

(please correct me if I am wrong, I am no authority on these things)

I understand your revulsion to the word, which I share by the way. I would replace it with acceptance of truth, or known truth.

Going back to the OP, there is only one truth which is known beyond any doubt.

Namely, that something exists.

Any other truth, apart perhaps from some mathematical axioms, is not so certain. This is where notions like belief (as defined above) are introduced.

Going back to knowing, might I suggest that knowing is inextricably linked to experience and as such delves into metaphysical considerations.

Perhaps a phrase like; I know, therefore I know I know, can illustrate the phenomena.

 

[phiwum]

Don't get distracted by the word belief. In this context (ie justified true belief), the word belief is defined thus;

Belief = to accept a truth, as true.

Too narrow.

We believe all sorts of false stuff. "S believes P" just in case S finds that P is more likely true than not, or S accepts that P is true, or something similar. But belief is not a guarantee of truth.

On the other hand, that P is true is a necessary condition for knowing P. One cannot know something false -- at least, not in the way that philosophers use the term "to know". (Believing P is also a necessary condition for knowing, given how philosophers use both terms.)

 

[ynot]

Belief = to accept believe a truth an unproven, as true.

(please correct me if I am wrong, I am no authority on these things)

Corrected

 

[phiwum]

Corrected

You can, I suppose, use the word "belief" however you wish, but this is not the usual meaning of the term in epistemology, the study of knowledge and belief.

To believe is to assent that a claim is more likely true than not. I believe all sorts of certainties, according to this usage. For instance, I believe that pi is less than four.

In any case, this is a little better post than your "knowledge is knowing, belief is believing, end of story" silliness, but not by too much. (Hint: you don't get far in defining belief in terms of believing, unless you're going to mention what "believing" means.)

 

[ynot]

You can, I suppose, use the word "belief" however you wish, but this is not the usual meaning of the term in epistemology, the study of knowledge and belief.

You can wallow in the musings philosophy if you wish. I prefer the realities of science.

To believe is to assent that a claim is more likely true than not.

Tell believers that fly planes into buildings full of people, blow themselves and innocent bystanders up, torture and persecute those that don’t share their belief, (etc.), that their belief is merely “more likely true than not”. People that water down the meanings of belief and knowledge so they become interchangeable are merely trying to convince themselves and others that their beliefs are knowledge.

I believe all sorts of certainties, according to this usage. For instance, I believe that pi is less than four.

Wallowing philosophical rubbish - If you KNOW a mathematical system in which pi is less than four then you KNOW that pi is less than four according to that system. Belief is redundant.

In any case, this is a little better post than your "knowledge is knowing, belief is believing, end of story" silliness, but not by too much. (Hint: you don't get far in defining belief in terms of believing, unless you're going to mention what "believing" means.)

That you may believe this is true doesn’t mean you know it is true.

 

[phiwum]

You can wallow in the musings philosophy if you wish. I prefer the realities of science.

I have attempted to describe to you a common meaning of "believe", but you are not interested. You prefer to persist in the literally ignorant view that this wood has only one "correct" meaning, as if words' meanings are objective facts.

I won't bother to try to explain to you how language works. But I would like to say two things.

First, you should not pretend that your own pathetic attempt at defining "belief" comes from science. This is patent nonsense.

Second, I never once claimed that belief and knowledge are the same thing, nor that any one belief is as good as another, so don't pretend otherwise.

 

[ynot]

you don't get far in defining belief in terms of believing

I believe I hear a cuckoo clock. Must be time to go . . . Bye.

 

[phiwum]

(Hint: you don't get far in defining belief in terms of believing, unless you're going to mention what "believing" means.)

I believe I hear a cuckoo clock. Must be time to go . . . Bye.

Somehow, you missed the rest of the sentence. I've bolded it for you.

You didn't do that on purpose, did you?