what's the difference between "knowledge" and "belief"?

[phiwum]

The word belief can be used in relation to knowledge or knowing.

What about those things which you know? The things which you know to be true?
How can these things be regarded as belief?

They can be regarded as belief, because I believe each proposition which I know.

A belief is something which one believes. One cannot say, "I know P, but I do not believe P" (except idiomatically). That state of affairs is obviously absurd.

Therefore, if one knows P, then one believes P and hence P is a belief.

That's all.

 

[phiwum]

Hi, phiwum. In the, formally absurd yet informally not uncommon, case of someone who says, "I know P, yet I still can't believe P," would you say that person is using "know" unconventionally*, "believe", both, or neither? (For example: "I know it's raining cats and dogs - literally, cats and dogs falling from the sky as a feature of the weather - yet I still can't believe it [it's raining cats and dogs]." Can assume the person has verified the knowledge in every way she might be expected to, that it is "justified" in that sense; and that she is sincere in describing her belief-state as a lack of belief in P (precisely as an inability to believe P), despite her knowledge that P.)

Funny you should mention this, since I mentioned the same thing just prior to reading your post.

It is apparent to me that, "I know X, but I don't believe it," is just an idiom, a cute way of expressing surprise at X. As far as I know that is the standard way philosophers understand this construct.

I honestly can't imagine a situation in which one claims to know something they literally do not believe.

P.S. was going to make P = "the Pens won", but as a Pens fan, that would be cruel (to a, presumably, Bruins fan). *(referring to the philosophical convention, where knowledge = justified true belief, or close enough, not getting into Gettier et al).

I'm a Pens fan, having lived in Pittsburgh before I came here. I'm not at all sorry about the Bruins' loss.

 

[Navigator]

They can be regarded as belief, because I believe each proposition which I know.
A belief is something which one believes. One cannot say, "I know P, but I do not believe P" (except idiomatically). That state of affairs is obviously absurd.

Therefore, if one knows P, then one believes P and hence P is a belief.

That's all.

That seems ridiculous.

Why should you believe what you know to be true?
There is no point to that.

 

[blobru]

Funny you should mention this, since I mentioned the same thing just prior to reading your post.

It is apparent to me that, "I know X, but I don't believe it," is just an idiom, a cute way of expressing surprise at X. As far as I know that is the standard way philosophers understand this construct.

I honestly can't imagine a situation in which one claims to know something they literally do not believe.

Yes, I agree, I think it's often for humor: "I know it - [double take] - but I don't believe it!"

I was wondering, however, about cases of cognitive dissonance; take the classic case from When Prophecy Fails^WP, where X = "our cult leader's prophecy that the Earth would be destroyed while we were being carried off by a flying saucer wasn't fulfilled"; also cases of fideism^WP, such as Kierkegaard's [paraphrased] "I know God can't exist, but I don't believe God can't exist (moreover, I believe God does exist!)."

Not that cognitive dissonance doesn't involve surprise, one might even call it shock and trauma in the case of failed prophecy, but I think there's an emotional component to belief it reveals; fideism, the believer's belief in what he knows can't be true, would seem to depend on this as well.

I'd express its 'logic' as roughly: "I know X (as a justified belief-hypothetical), but (because I really really don't want to either know or believe x, due to some deep-seated emotional, existential commitment to not-x, let's invent another sort of belief, belief-existential say, and make it superior even to knowledge) but I don't believe X." So, seems another instance of ambiguity (as you & Squeegee discussed earlier), belief two-timing as 'hypothetical' and 'existential'.

I'm a Pens fan, having lived in Pittsburgh before I came here. I'm not at all sorry about the Bruins' loss.

Cool (I'm a fan via Nova Scotian birth, and not at all sorry to know the Bruins lost, and believe it).

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Thank you for all the answers so far. I'm very sorry that I have not being able to discuss the subject, but I have been ultra busy and I was unable to catch up. I think next week I will finally start to answer specific posts that raise interesting questions, or post interesting insights.

Epistemology is a key issue when dealing with both philosophy and science, and I'm convinced about if we don't have a very clear notion about what we are talking about, we are prone to delude ourselves believing we are "on the right path" (so to speak).

 

[phiwum]

That seems ridiculous.

Why should you believe what you know to be true?
There is no point to that.

It is quite simple.

Ask yourself whether it sounds reasonable to not believe what you know to be true? That is truly absurd. Now, why is it absurd? Because "knowing" involves "believing".

It seems to me that you think that believing is a step below knowing, that one believes only that which he doesn't know, but that is not how the words are usually used.

Rather, to believe is to assent that a proposition is (at least) likely true. If a proposition is true, then it is also likely true.

(I wonder: do you agree that everything which is certainly true is also probably true?)

 

[phiwum]

Yes, I agree, I think it's often for humor: "I know it - [double take] - but I don't believe it!"

I was wondering, however, about cases of cognitive dissonance; take the classic case from When Prophecy Fails^WP, where X = "our cult leader's prophecy that the Earth would be destroyed while we were being carried off by a flying saucer wasn't fulfilled"; also cases of fideism^WP, such as Kierkegaard's [paraphrased] "I know God can't exist, but I don't believe God can't exist (moreover, I believe God does exist!)."

Not that cognitive dissonance doesn't involve surprise, one might even call it shock and trauma in the case of failed prophecy, but I think there's an emotional component to belief it reveals; fideism, the believer's belief in what he knows can't be true, would seem to depend on this as well.

I'd express its 'logic' as roughly: "I know X (as a justified belief-hypothetical), but (because I really really don't want to either know or believe x, due to some deep-seated emotional, existential commitment to not-x, let's invent another sort of belief, belief-existential say, and make it superior even to knowledge) but I don't believe X." So, seems another instance of ambiguity (as you & Squeegee discussed earlier), belief two-timing as 'hypothetical' and 'existential'.

Let's leave Kierkegaard aside for a moment, and talk about the failed prophecy.

By and large, folks react to the failed prophecy by re-interpretation. They do not say, for instance, "Contrary to appearances, the world really did end. Even though I know that it did not." So, it is evident that we don't really mean it when we say, even in times of great emotional crisis, that we know it and don't believe it.

Kierkegaard is a different story. First, it's been decades since I read him and I don't recall him well, but I think his very point was to emphasize the paradoxical nature of the situation. So, I really don't think that he's counterevidence to my claim at all. He's saying that this is a situation which is absurd -- although, he's still saying that, while absurd, it is nonetheless true.

So, Kierkegaard is a very special case. The less I say about him, the better, since I really don't know his writings well at all and I'm likely to misinterpret him.

 

[Navigator]

It is quite simple.

Ask yourself whether it sounds reasonable to not believe what you know to be true? That is truly absurd. Now, why is it absurd? Because "knowing" involves "believing".

Lets take an example of something which is true...a statement of fact that requires no belief.

"I know that I am conscious." ​

Now ask yourself if it is reasonable to believe that you are conscious, even that the fact of the matter is, you are.

Does it make sense to ask yourself, or be asked 'do you believe you are conscious?'

Knowing does not involve believing. It involves being.

When the hammer you use with the nail smacks down on your thumb, do you think 'I believe the hammer has hurt my thumb?'
No?
Rather you know for certain that is what the hammer did.

It seems to me that you think that believing is a step below knowing, that one believes only that which he doesn't know, but that is not how the words are usually used.

I am not particularly interested in 'how the words are usually used' except in uncovering why they are used as they are.
Believing is a different position than knowing, and when the two are conflated
people are confused.

Rather, to believe is to assent that a proposition is (at least) likely true. If a proposition is true, then it is also likely true.

I believe this is ridiculous.
I don't know this is ridiculous.

(I wonder: do you agree that everything which is certainly true is also probably true?)

No.

"Certainty" is not "Probably".

 

[blobru]

Let's leave Kierkegaard aside for a moment, and talk about the failed prophecy.

By and large, folks react to the failed prophecy by re-interpretation. They do not say, for instance, "Contrary to appearances, the world really did end. Even though I know that it did not." So, it is evident that we don't really mean it when we say, even in times of great emotional crisis, that we know it and don't believe it.

Yes, that's a fair assessment. The prophecy appears to have failed, but if we reinterpret it, fudge the criteria for success and failure, it really hasn't. Thus, where X = the prophecy failed: "I know X (under some former interpretation), but I don't believe X (given some new interpretation)." I think that handles this case nicely.

I wonder if it does all cases of cognitive dissonance. "I believe something which implies X, and I believe something which implies not-X", might do as a logical form for cd. Hmm...

I suppose it depends on whether either of the beliefs ever becomes knowledge, whether it works as an example of "I know X, but I don't believe X", that is, and on the strictness of the implication. At the very least, the believer's in trouble with two beliefs (most probable hypotheses) seeming to imply a contradiction; but it might not be accurate to say cd includes cases of "I know X but don't believe X."

Kierkegaard is a different story. First, it's been decades since I read him and I don't recall him well, but I think his very point was to emphasize the paradoxical nature of the situation. So, I really don't think that he's counterevidence to my claim at all. He's saying that this is a situation which is absurd -- although, he's still saying that, while absurd, it is nonetheless true.

So, Kierkegaard is a very special case. The less I say about him, the better, since I really don't know his writings well at all and I'm likely to misinterpret him.

You and me both. The absurdity was the immortal christian god dying as I recall; let's see: in general, a paradox = X and not-X. I know X [is true], and I know not-X [is true]. If I know not-X, then, if knowledge is justified true belief, I believe not-X. If I believe not-X, does it follow that I don't believe X, giving me "I know X and/but I don't believe X"? Hmm...

I guess normally it would, but in the context of a paradox, where both X and not-X are true, believing not-X doesn't entail not believing X.

Therefore, you're right; not a counterexample; darn. So much for the depressed Dane. (I was going to try one more odd case, Kant's antinomies, where he deduces X then separately deduces not-X, but I think it fails too, though for different reasons. Unlike SK, IK rejects contradictions as meaning anything except reason has hit the metaphysical wall. Thus, where deducing X normally entails knowing and believing X (likewise not-X), for Kant deducing X and not-X [in separate proofs] means only he can't claim to know either, and won't yield a counterexample. So... so much for the time-pressed German.)

Think I'll check the hockey scores then; maybe the Pens are having better luck...

 

[phiwum]

Lets take an example of something which is true...a statement of fact that requires no belief.

"I know that I am conscious." ​

Now ask yourself if it is reasonable to believe that you are conscious, even that the fact of the matter is, you are.

Does it make sense to ask yourself, or be asked 'do you believe you are conscious?'

We seem to be getting nowhere, but I will try one last time.

Tell me whether you agree with the following:

For any proposition P, either I believe P or I do not believe P.

Please note that when I write, "I do not believe P", I mean the same thing as, "It is not the case that I believe P." I don't mean, "I disbelieve P" or "I believe NOT P."

Now, if you agree with (*), then you are committed to one of the following claims:

I believe I am conscious.

I do not believe I am conscious.

For myself, the second claim is utterly ludicrous. Of course, I believe I am conscious. The fact that you disagree indicates nothing more than that you're using the word in some very different manner, and I see no reason to argue over semantics here.

But do not be surprised when you find that the entire field of epistemology (the study of knowledge) uses the term "to believe" rather more like I use it rather than your own idiosyncratic usage.

"Certainty" is not "Probably".

Anything which is certainly true (i.e. true with probability 1) is also probably true (i.e., true with probability greater than 1/2).

Again, if you think that something which is certain is not also probable, do not be surprised when those who actually write about probabilities use the terms differently than you.

 

[Navigator]

I believe I am conscious.

I do not believe I am conscious.

Try this.

"I do not believe I am conscious - I know I am conscious."

 

[Navigator]

Anything which is certainly true (i.e. true with probability 1) is also probably true (i.e., true with probability greater than 1/2).

Try this:

Anything which is certainly true, is not probably true.

 

[phiwum]

Try this:

Anything which is certainly true, is not probably true.

Use whatever private silly meanings you want, but don''t expect others to deny that an event with probability one is probable.

In each of these cases, you seem to be confused over a certain idiomatic expression. We often say, "That's not X! That's Y!" where Y is a special (more extreme case) of X. We do not literally mean that Y is not part of X, but rather that the fact that it is Y is so noteworthy that we humorously deny that it is X.

"We didn't beat them! We killed them!"

"That's not chocolate! It's brand X (chocolate)!"

"I don't believe that! I know it!"

If you honestly thought that the third statement literally means, "I do not believe P and I know P," then you should happily affirm the following statement:

I do not believe I am conscious.

After all, that's a trivial consequence of the literal reading of a statement you do affirm.

So, I'll ask you again. Is the following statement true?

Navigator does not believe that Navigator is conscious.

Just answer that given question.

 

[Navigator]

Use whatever private silly meanings you want, but don''t expect others to deny that an event with probability one is probable.

In each of these cases, you seem to be confused over a certain idiomatic expression. We often say, "That's not X! That's Y!" where Y is a special (more extreme case) of X. We do not literally mean that Y is not part of X, but rather that the fact that it is Y is so noteworthy that we humorously deny that it is X.

"We didn't beat them! We killed them!"

"That's not chocolate! It's brand X (chocolate)!"

"I don't believe that! I know it!"

If you honestly thought that the third statement literally means, "I do not believe P and I know P," then you should happily affirm the following statement:

I do not believe I am conscious.

After all, that's a trivial consequence of the literal reading of a statement you do affirm.

So, I'll ask you again. Is the following statement true?

Navigator does not believe that Navigator is conscious.
Just answer that given question.

'Is the following statement true' phiwum asks...

Navigator responds that the statement is untruthful.

 

[phiwum]

'Is the following statement true' phiwum asks...

Navigator responds that the statement is untruthful.

Okay, so it is NOT true that "Navigator does not believe Navigator is conscious."

Hence, it IS true that "Navigator believes Navigator is conscious."

If I have you right, then, you've conceded that one can both know and believe a proposition, contrary to what you previously said.

OF COURSE, you both know and believe that you are conscious. It would be impossible to be otherwise.

 

[Navigator]

Hence, it IS true that "Navigator believes Navigator is conscious."

No. That statement is also untruthful.

The truthful statement is:

Navigator KNOWS he is conscious.

(See? There is no need for the 'belief' bit.)

 

[phiwum]

No. That statement is also untruthful.

The truthful statement is:

Navigator KNOWS he is conscious.

(See? There is no need for the 'belief' bit.)

Is "untruthful" any different than "not true"? (ETA: I.e., "false"?)

Do you deny that, for every statement P,

"Either Navigator believes that P or Navigator does not believe that P."

is true? (Keep in mind that "Navigator does not believe" means "it is not the case that Navigator believes..")

You seem to be defending your rather odd usages by inventing a new truth value (true, false and untruthful). Don't you think that's a fairly drastic measure to avoid admitting error?

 

[Navigator]

Is "untruthful" any different than "not true"? (ETA: I.e., "false"?)

Do you deny that, for every statement P,

"Either Navigator believes that P or Navigator does not believe that P."

is true? (Keep in mind that "Navigator does not believe" means "it is not the case that Navigator believes..")

You seem to be defending your rather odd usages by inventing a new truth value (true, false and untruthful). Don't you think that's a fairly drastic measure to avoid admitting error?

So 'P' is the 'proposition'? Am I reading you correctly here?

 

[phiwum]

So 'P' is the 'proposition'? Am I reading you correctly here?

Yes, P stands for a proposition. In our example, P stands for "N. is conscious".

Now,

Either N believes P or N does not believe P.

is the sentence we've been discussing. The form of this sentence is fairly simple:

Bel(N,P) or NOT Bel(N,P).

This is an instance of the law of excluded middle. You've denied both Bel(N,P) and NOT Bel(N,P), which amounts to saying that this particular instance of the law of excluded middle is false.

That's a fairly radical step. Essentially, you've gone to non-standard logic just so you can interpret belief statements consistent with your opinion that

If N knows P, then N does not believe P.

All I can say is: good luck with that.

ETA: Would you mind answering the questions I asked in the previous post now? Thanks.

 

[Navigator]

Yes, P stands for a proposition. In our example, P stands for "N. is conscious".

Now,

Either N believes P or N does not believe P.

is the sentence we've been discussing. The form of this sentence is fairly simple:

Bel(N,P) or NOT Bel(N,P).

This is an instance of the law of excluded middle. You've denied both Bel(N,P) and NOT Bel(N,P), which amounts to saying that this particular instance of the law of excluded middle is false.

That's a fairly radical step. Essentially, you've gone to non-standard logic just so you can interpret belief statements consistent with your opinion that

If N knows P, then N does not believe P.

All I can say is: good luck with that.
ETA: Would you mind answering the questions I asked in the previous post now? Thanks.

Why? Do you think it will affect me adversely not to believe what the majority believe?

You appear to be taking a philosophical stance in regard to this. I am not.

In your previous post you asked more than 1 Q too.

Q1: Is "untruthful" any different than "not true"? (ETA: I.e., "false"?)

Q2: Do you deny that, for every statement P,

"Either Navigator believes that P or Navigator does not believe that P."

is true? (Keep in mind that "Navigator does not believe" means "it is not the case that Navigator believes..")

You seem to be defending your rather odd usages by inventing a new truth value (true, false and untruthful).

Q3: Don't you think that's a fairly drastic measure to avoid admitting error?

A1. 'False' is different from 'untruthful' in the sense I am using the words. Specifically I am using the word 'untruthful' to denote something which is purposefully proclaimed as true when it is provably not.

A2: Which P are you referring to?

A3: I have no problem admitting error if it can be shown to me that there is error to admit to.
(I know this)