Obama -- despite the recommendations of his national security advisers to the contrary -- is apparently adamant we will not get involved in Syria.
President Obama doesn't even want to supply weapons. Only non-combat support. (e.g food, first-aid, etc.) .
Washington insiders believe there is very little political capital to be gained by an American President in interventions. An example they gave was Clinton in Bosnia. The mission was very successful yet Clinton got very little political credit from that.
Many people in the Administration believe there is very little upside to intervening in Syria and all kinds of risks.
Nice points.
FWIW, Clinton's problems in Somalia preceded Bosnia. That mess made it very difficult to get support for ops in Bosnia, particularly under the inane dual key UN RoE or under UN command. In time, he sorted that out politically thanks to the Bosnian Serbs going out of their way to paint themselves as the bad guys, a few atrocities and mass killings being critical to that. The Kosovo thing was, from where I sat (aside: I was involved in a small part in the initial Op Plan drafts (some of the annexes to the Op Plan) in 98) politically wrong on this level: NATO out of area ops were new, and the sixteen nations of NATO subjecting Serbia (see this through non-American eyes, if you can) for seventy days of air attack painted NATO and its political posture in a new and (to some) disturbing light.
I was never convinced that the alleged rights of Albanians and Kosovars were an American strategic interest, nor that our intervention in an internal matter in Serbia was necessarily justified. Contra my opinion, however, the juxtaposition of the Bosnian/Yugoslavia break up and its civil war had made it easy, political momentum wise, to retain Serbia as the problem to be solved in that area. There are some points pro that position that are valid.
We had some success working with Russia in Bosnia. The Kosovo bit, however, screwed the political progress we'd made with Russia in terms of warming up through Partnership for Peace and a few other initiatives.
On the other hand, it gave the USAF a chance to claim that you can win a war purely with air power. <-- That, had long lasting bad effects within the DoD and US political circles, which were made obvious by the Iraq War. The silver bullet nitwits used that as a talking point while a lot of us who disagreed got shouted down. Further Remarks Censored, because I have long considered D Rumsfeld to be in the Silver Bullet camp, and his advice sadly was far too loud in the Iraq (and to a certain extend Afghanistan) operational development. Sure, he was Sec Def, but he was tone deaf in all the wrong places.
Secretary Gates was not keen on intervening in Syria. I hope Secretary Hagel learns from his example.
So? All my best opinions come from retards.
For the sake of posterity.
