Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Edx]

If we develop the capability of moving the conscious process from one physical processor to a different one, there is no reason to believe that we are not successfully moving the person. There is every reason to expect that any method that preserves the process also preserves the person, while any method that destroys the process (such as a full memory wipe) even while preserving the brain effectively destroys the person.

As ive said over and over again, that depends on your perspective. From the perspective of the thing that is destroyed in the process, it doesnt matter that a copy that is exactly the same as it is now living in the universe, while from the perspective someone watching the transport occur there is no difference at all. You are talking about the perspective of the observer and applying to the subject as if its the same thing.

 

[OCaptain]

Well the way it would likely have to work in our reality is that it would take all the information the comprises your being, where all the atoms are and what they're doing (somehow) and then assemble some matter already on the site into you again. But that leaves us with two yous doesn't it? So you just atomize the original.

So what I'm saying is, no I wouldn't.

In kind of a quantum entanglement sort of way? Or am I thinking of something else?

I certainly wouldn't be the first one!!

It brings up in my mind sort of the question of point of view - from the point of view of an observer it may look like the received person is the same as the sent person, but I wouldn't go until they could find a way to verify that there is a continuum of consciousness from one end to the other.

 

[OCaptain]

What color shirt must I wear?

If it's red, I'm staying home.

Brilliant man!

 

[OCaptain]

I dont understand when "teleporting" via data copies, Why sci fi writers feel it is nesseasry to deconstruct the original (why maintain the illusion that the persons matter is actually being transported when its not?) I could just step in have my data sent of say, to Mars complete with all my knowledge and charaterisitics up to that point and the Earth me steps out again continuing my life, while the Mars copy steps out and continues his life. Atomising or Deconstructing the original is just dumb and unnecessary.

Aside from that, as far as I know in any situation where you make a copy of something (including cellular reproduction) there is always some degridation. Wouldn't this degridation be mulitplied everytime you teleported a copy which died and a copy of that copy stepped out?

Thank you, Number 4.

 

[OCaptain]

Process being moved:

I walk out of the transporter and into the next room.


Process being duplicated:

I stand in the transporter, and it briefly hums.

The technician tells me "OK, we confirm you've arrived in the next room so I'm now going to evaporate you. All right?"

But I look around and realise that I'm not in the next room. Some other dude is in the next room. I'm still here, listening to a guy who's just said he's about to kill me and am I cool with that. I sense that I am not cool with that.

I share that sense.

 

[blobru]

Thanks for such a comprehensive reply. I did read through it all.

I would agree that, at a psychological level, there is a useful distinction to be drawn between conscious and unconscious processing.

But at a material level, would you not agree that processing is processing and that thus the whole brain is actually fully conscious?

Nick

I would agree that neurons firing are neurons firing, but not all constitute consciousness (rather like muscles in the legs can synchronize to do other things besides running, or just twitch spasmodically). Consciousness seems only to occur within a certain range of neural oscillation (gamma waves^WP: 25-100Hz); neurons not firing at frequencies within that range (and possibly any outside the synchronous ensembles that may constitute consciousness) wouldn't be "conscious" (contributing to the local activity that is consciousness) then, it seems to me; but again, it's all a manner of speaking ("conscious" as potential contributors to a gamma-range synchronous ensemble [if that's what consciousness is], or part of a larger local system wherein consciousness is happening -- sure, why not).

 

[Nick227]

As ive said over and over again, that depends on your perspective. From the perspective of the thing that is destroyed in the process, it doesnt matter that a copy that is exactly the same as it is now living in the universe, while from the perspective someone watching the transport occur there is no difference at all. You are talking about the perspective of the observer and applying to the subject as if its the same thing.

Well, the body that is destroyed will be unaware of its demise in the moment that it's happening.

Don't you mean that, prior to that event, the mind will likely be concerned with impending death? Because to me that's all we're talking about here, stories in the mind about death.

Rest assured, these stories will be recreated in the copy. In fact, having the memory of walking into the pod and walking out again, the copy may actually have less fear stories than the original! After a few copies it could be quite blazé about the whole thing.

Edx[orig] might need dragging in, kicking and screaming, but Edx#5 could be without a care in the world about it.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Thank you!

I would agree that neurons firing are neurons firing, but not all constitute consciousness (rather like muscles in the legs can synchronize to do other things besides running, or just twitch spasmodically). Consciousness seems only to occur within a certain range of neural oscillation (gamma waves^WP: 25-100Hz); neurons not firing at frequencies within that range (and possibly any outside the synchronous ensembles that may constitute consciousness) wouldn't be "conscious" (contributing to the local activity that is consciousness) then, it seems to me; but again, it's all a manner of speaking ("conscious" as potential contributors to a gamma-range synchronous ensemble [if that's what consciousness is], or part of a larger local system wherein consciousness is happening -- sure, why not).

My feeling is that we would need to be careful about what we called consciousness here. Are you using the term to denote what "you / I / illusory self" are consciously aware of? IIRC this used to be termed "access consciousness."

I am personally using the term to denote any coherent processing activity going on in the brain. Not just that which this illusory self appears to be aware of!

I know Bernard Baars has been busy with why, if two near-identical strands of processing are taking place right next to each other in the brain, one is "conscious" and the other not.

Nick

 

[dlorde]

Well, the body that is destroyed will be unaware of its demise in the moment that it's happening.

Don't you mean that, prior to that event, the mind will likely be concerned with impending death? Because to me that's all we're talking about here, stories in the mind about death.

Rest assured, these stories will be recreated in the copy. In fact, having the memory of walking into the pod and walking out again, the copy may actually have less fear stories than the original! After a few copies it could be quite blazé about the whole thing.

Edx[orig] might need dragging in, kicking and screaming, but Edx#5 could be without a care in the world about it.

Yes, it does seem to be a matter of who knows what and when. Assuming the transporter data collection can be non-destructive, if the subject is rendered insensible in some way before the transfer sequence, and only revived if it fails, then all is good. If the original subject is not rendered insensible or is revived after a successful transfer, big problems.

Some of the problems with the transporter seem to involve our everyday notions of death or murder (irreversible cessation of brain function, deliberate irreversible cessation of another's brain function). These don't directly account for the person as a brain process - they haven't needed to be that specific, but with the transporter, it becomes apparent that what counts is that the process is preserved without loss (halted and resumed is OK), so death & murder would need to be redefined in terms of the process supported by brain function rather than brain function per-se.

When the original and one or more duplicates exist simultaneously, their processes will begin to differ from the moment each resumes, so any one of them can die or be murdered (by [deliberate] irreversible cessation of brain process).

The ethical & legal status and rights of duplicates and revived 'backups' (process state snapshots) is another matter...

 

[Edx]

Well, the body that is destroyed will be unaware of its demise in the moment that it's happening.

Don't you mean that, prior to that event, the mind will likely be concerned with impending death? Because to me that's all we're talking about here, stories in the mind about death.

Rest assured, these stories will be recreated in the copy. In fact, having the memory of walking into the pod and walking out again, the copy may actually have less fear stories than the original! After a few copies it could be quite blazé about the whole thing.

Edx[orig] might need dragging in, kicking and screaming, but Edx#5 could be without a care in the world about it.

Nick

The biggest problem with your position is that it requires us to think fundamentally different about what we believe to be important about life.

What is it about life that we consider to be valuable? Why is murder something thats considered wrong? Why does it matter if anyone dies at any time for any reason? The answer should be you're taking away someones life and we value life because we value our own. And why do we value our own life? Because from our own perspective we want to continue to experience, if we're dead then we have no experiences. If we care so little about life that we're totally fine with killing people and ourselves over and over again and being okay with it simply because there are copies being created, then life itself is meaningless and valueless and there is no reason why I shouldnt kill anyone if I feel like it.

And btw you still apparently ignored or missed my entire point despite quoting it in your reply. It doesnt matter what the copy thinks, I wont think anything ever again. Imagine if you had a brother/clone that was exactly like you in every way even down to memories, if someone killed you, then you're still just as dead as you would be if he didnt exist. It doesnt matter if from the perspective of the observer there is no difference and nothing is lost, from the perspective of the subject they are being killed and that is very different.

 

[Edx]

Process being moved:

I walk out of the transporter and into the next room.


Process being duplicated:

I stand in the transporter, and it briefly hums.

The technician tells me "OK, we confirm you've arrived in the next room so I'm now going to evaporate you. All right?"

But I look around and realise that I'm not in the next room. Some other dude is in the next room. I'm still here, listening to a guy who's just said he's about to kill me and am I cool with that. I sense that I am not cool with that.

Ok Im going to give you fair warning, do not watch this if you want to not be spoiled by what happens in The Prestige (also has more weight if you have watched the whole movie)

http://youtu.be/XHKan75x7GI?t=1m36s

But this is exactly the point. At the moment you are copied you are no longer the same person you are two independent entities.

 

[Edx]

As noted above it would seem like such a waste to destroy the original. So there are now two of you. So what? So long as both you existing doesn't cause a rift in the universe or something I say carry on.

Its fairly useless to have two of you, at the moment you are copied you've just cloned an exact replica of yourself and from that moment you are two serrate entities that just happen to be very similar. Its like having an identical twin, does it matter less if someone kills one of you than if they killed someone who does not have an identical twin?

 

[Nick227]

When the original and one or more duplicates exist simultaneously, their processes will begin to differ from the moment each resumes, so any one of them can die or be murdered (by [deliberate] irreversible cessation of brain process).

The ethical & legal status and rights of duplicates and revived 'backups' (process state snapshots) is another matter...

Absolutely. If you end up with two of the same person, I don't think you could just kill one. Maybe the transporter company should be liable for some huge payout to both, to help them deal with the situation. It would be a nightmare - partner, kids, friends, etc, plus the psychological stress of having 2 of you. Madness!

Nick

 

[Nick227]

The biggest problem with your position is that it requires us to think fundamentally different about what we believe to be important about life.

I don't see that as being necessarily a bad thing. If everyone on the planet had been through the transporter 5 or 6 times I think the whole way we think about death would change.

And btw you still apparently ignored or missed my entire point despite quoting it in your reply. It doesnt matter what the copy thinks, I wont think anything ever again.

It's not that I'm ignoring it. It's simply that this point isn't valid under materialism. But it is not easy for the human mind, in its usual state of conditioning, to deal with the reality of what materialism says about the self.

Regarding what you write... there is not a "you" that is doing the thinking now. Never has been. It's just a story, a social construct, which is being mistaken for reality.

There are thoughts. These thoughts are being created by a brain configured to behave as though it has an inner self which is "doing" the thinking. But this is actually fantasy. All that's happening is that the mind is attending to thoughts and thus reinforcing the belief that there is somewhere an "I" that is having these thoughts. A "centre of narrative gravity", as Dan Dennett put it. There isn't, as materialism and brain research make very, very clear.

But when the brain is stuck in this conditioned behaviour around its beliefs of self, it is utterly convinced that there is something tangible that must be being lost in the Transporter. "But I am going to die!" it protests. "Can't you see, for God's sake. I am going to die! Why don't any of you see this?"

I figure by the 5th time through you'll be cool with it.

Nick

 

[Edx]

I don't see that as being necessarily a bad thing. If everyone on the planet had been through the transporter 5 or 6 times I think the whole way we think about death would change.

And the only logical consequence of that would be that life has no meaning, we can kill anyone and it doesnt make a bit of difference. Death has no meaning so life has no meaning. Which begs the question as to why should we bother to care about conciousness at all. What is there to care about if we see it this way? Why do we care about saving lives? Why should we care when someone dies? Why should you care if someone kills you?

It's not that I'm ignoring it. It's simply that this point isn't valid under materialism. But it is not easy for the human mind, in its usual state of conditioning, to deal with the reality of what materialism says about the self.

You keep calling it materialism, but you are the one saying that you will somehow continue to live if your brain is dead just because an exact copy is wandering around that thinks just like you did. Thats not materialism, thats trying to justify magical thinking. As I asked Travis, if you had an identical twin, does it matter less if someone kills one of you than if they killed someone who does not have an identical twin? According to your logic, it does matter less, because your twin is mostly or more the same as you are than someone who doesnt have a twin.

I figure by the 5th time through you'll be cool with it.

If someones been convinced (fooled) into think they're not really going to die and they're going to open their eyes on the other side, than thats just delusion and irrelevant. The copy will only perceive thats what has happened, but the copy never actually experienced any of that, the actual person stepping into the teleporter closes their eyes and dies, the same way anyone dies if they die today without stepping in a teleporter.

 

[Edx]

Absolutely. If you end up with two of the same person, I don't think you could just kill one. Maybe the transporter company should be liable for some huge payout to both, to help them deal with the situation. It would be a nightmare - partner, kids, friends, etc, plus the psychological stress of having 2 of you. Madness!

Why couldnt you kill one of them? According to you it shouldnt matter to anyone not even the person being killed.

 

[Nick227]

And the only logical consequence of that would be that life has no meaning, we can kill anyone and it doesnt make a bit of difference. Death has no meaning so life has no meaning.

I don't see it like this at all. Dying will continue to be a big thing, but our concept of self will change.

You keep calling it materialism, but you are the one saying that you will somehow continue to live if your brain is dead just because an exact copy is wandering around that thinks just like you did. Thats not materialism,

I'm afraid it is. "You" is just a process.

As I asked Travis, if you had an identical twin, does it matter less if someone kills one of you than if they killed someone who does not have an identical twin? According to your logic, it does matter less, because your twin is mostly or more the same as you are than someone who doesnt have a twin.

This is not accurate. Twins exist at the same time.

It has nothing to do with twins. It's that one body is replaced with an identical body, they do not co-exist.

If someones been convinced (fooled) into think they're not really going to die and they're going to open their eyes on the other side, than thats just delusion and irrelevant. The copy will only perceive thats what has happened, but the copy never actually experienced any of that, the actual person stepping into the teleporter closes their eyes and dies, the same way anyone dies if they die today without stepping in a teleporter.

Would be great at this juncture to have an actual transporter to hand. We could grab you and hurl you in (are you a big guy, Ed?), push the button and ask Ed #2 what he feels about it. A few more times and I reckon you'd be cool with it.

There's nothing like actual experience to change the mind. Otherwise we'll be rattling on all day.

Nick

 

[Recovering Agnostic]

And the only logical consequence of that would be that life has no meaning, we can kill anyone and it doesnt make a bit of difference. Death has no meaning so life has no meaning. Which begs the question as to why should we bother to care about conciousness at all. What is there to care about if we see it this way? Why do we care about saving lives? Why should we care when someone dies? Why should you care if someone kills you?

If I'm happy to exchange one £50 note for another one, why does it follow that I'd be happy to burn one for no reason?

 

[Edx]

If I'm happy to exchange one £50 note for another one, why does it follow that I'd be happy to burn one for no reason?

Once again, you are taking the observers perspective and applying that to the subjects perspective and saying its the same.

If you could make an exact copy of your son or daughter or partner (pick your favourite), and two were standing next to you one of them fresh out the replicator, would you be happy to shoot the old one in the head, because the copy exists?

Or lets say you make an exact copy of yourself and you stood there looking at each other, if your copy picked up a gun and shot you in the head, would you be happy with that idea because your copy exists?

 

[Edx]

I don't see it like this at all. Dying will continue to be a big thing, but our concept of self will change.

Still failing to address the critical issue. Here' it is again: If death has no meaning then life has no meaning. Which begs the question as to why should we bother to care about conciousness at all. What is there to care about if we see it this way? Why do we care about saving lives? Why should we care when someone dies? Why should you care if someone kills you right now?

I'm afraid it is. "You" is just a process.

It is only "me" from the perspective of an observer. If I step into a replicator and a copy walks out and we both stand there looking at each other, from that point we are two distinct entities. He isnt me and I am not him from our points of view, and neither of us want to die just because the other exists. It doesnt matter at all to either of us that if one were to die no one could tell the difference.

This is not accurate. Twins exist at the same time.

It has nothing to do with twins. It's that one body is replaced with an identical body, they do not co-exist.

lol totally irrelevant. Your whole claim is that it doesnt matter because your conciousness is the same. If you could step into a transporter and after you were scanned they shot you in the head and you died, then only 30years later your copy walked out of the machine, does that mean you didnt really die back then and why would it be any different if someone just murdered you right now? From your perspective you're just as dead regardless. Or maybe you step into a replicator and can see your copy before they kill you, you claim thats fine and dandy because there'd still be an arrangement of matter that is just like you in the universe. The only reason the idea of a teleporter has to kill you first is that it has to dismantle your body in order to scan you, but if it didnt have to do that then you could just have a copy of you created without you having to die. Now according to everything you've said so far, killing either of you does not matter because at least one of you is still alive.

Regarding twins we can apply it there and realise that you only value distinct personalities, if they are exactly the same we can get rid of one and it doesnt matter. That is why you dont care about killing the copy or the original in the scenarios above, because they are "the same". But the logical conclusion of this idea is that killing an identical twin isnt as bad as killing someone without a twin for the same reason.

Would be great at this juncture to have an actual transporter to hand. We could grab you and hurl you in (are you a big guy, Ed?), push the button and ask Ed #2 what he feels about it. A few more times and I reckon you'd be cool with it.

Once again you keep ignoring the issue of perspective.

From my perspective you just murdered me, and I think nothing ever again.

Ed2 only feels like he safely stepped out the other side but he never actually experienced any of what he thinks he did, his memories and body are merely copies and he didnt exist before you pressed the "ENERGISE" button. He is like creating an identical twin clone and then you saying well its okay if you klil the other one because one of them is still alive and thats all I care about.

There's nothing like actual experience to change the mind. Otherwise we'll be rattling on all day.

But if that happened you wouldnt be talking to the same entity, you'd be talking to a copy that only feels like it went through it safely because the memories were copied also. Rationally my copy would be just as much against it as I would be because it would realise what it believes is an illusion and you just murdered me, and if you threw my copy into the same machine it would know it would also die.