Robrob
Philosopher
- Joined
- Aug 29, 2011
- Messages
- 5,497
Hence why they didn't need to test for explosives either.![]()
Or dustification beam residue.
Hence why they didn't need to test for explosives either.![]()
How would they know this unless they spent countless hours testing? They should have left no stone unturned, right?
Looks like lots of SFRM was missing in this shot.....
[qimg]http://i24.photobucket.com/albums/c23/JPPics/9-11/FloorTrusses-FallenSFRMmissing.jpg[/qimg]
Nobody is saying the SFRM would not be knocked off at the impact side. Are you paying attention?
You are going from one extreme to the other. That is a sign of not having a good argument.
Obviously NIST was making an extraordinary claim by saying the fireproofing that was on the other side of the building behind the central core and several stories above the debris field was knocked off due to vibration or flexing. They needed to provide some level of substantiation that it was possible. They didn't and I think the reason no testing was done here was that the test would not support the contention being made.
Not a problem.Thanks Oz. ..
Both points understood....I'll never lose sight of the real situation and as you understand, I'm playing in their realm for the moment using Tony's logic, calculations, and numbers...
There are several of my questions also waiting in the queue - going back a couple of thousand posts. So far Tony has only moved half a step in acknowledging the truth of the big issues I raised in my first couple of posts in the thread. And that was on the OP - before this derail started....I would really like an answer from Tony or Clayton showing me how I am wrong when I arrived at my result using Tony's own numbers and logic. A result that shows the perimeter wall (or walls) should have failed and collapsed.
You are going from one extreme to the other. That is a sign of not having a good argument.
Ok, not a full 0 height drop situation, as the columns were already compressed, but certainly with a dynamic component which made the load equivalent to something between 1 and 2 times the static one. Load redistribution implies movement, do we agree on that?
That needs proof. A bare assertion doesn't cut it. Can you point out the redistributed loads that NIST shows on the east and west wall columns, indicating why they are not enough?
It's your assertion. You defend it.
Nobody is saying the SFRM would not be knocked off at the impact side. Are you paying attention?
You and Christopher7 are wasting your time.
These people don't give a crap about the truth. You deserve a better audience. An audience who will listen to the points you make and tell their friends.
I can handle it from here.
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20% x 1.07 x 1.35 = 29%. So even after impact of the north face and alleged south wall failure the NIST report shows they still had a factor of safety above 3.00 to 1.
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Since the impact did not only sever columns but also affect lateral supports in many ways, there simply is no telling what the overall "factor of safety" was after impact, and much less what the "factor of safety" was fpr subassemblies and individual members.
In a nutshell, designed-for "factor of safety" is only applicable to the as-designed, undamaged and stressed within its designed-for envelope assembly.
Once you slam a plane through it, all those considerations are moot. For example, with floors trusses not providing lateral support but instead imposing a lateral load (by sagging, or by being attached to out-of-plumb columns on the other side) outside the design envelope, how can you expect columns to have any "factor of safety" at all?

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/14/nyregion/14TOWE.htmlIt is important to note that the ASTM E119 test procedure was developed in 1918, and although construction types and building contents have changed over the years, with the exception of a few minor refinements, the basic ASTM E119 overall test criteria has not changed. ASTM E119 is a standardized test method, which provides a means by which the performance of one material can be compared with that of another, under very defined conditions.
Many designers are under the impression that if an assembly on a project site is sprayed in accordance with a UL tested two-hour assembly, that the structure will remain intact for two hours, sustaining little or no damage. This is not necessarily true. How well an actual structure performs relative to the design assembly greatly depends on how closely the fire mimics the ASTM test standard, the actual condition of restraint, and the amount of fireproofing actually applied to the steel. Unfortunately, the amount of fireproofing required to properly protect a building is the subject of some debate.
But the effectiveness of the very material installed in the towers is the subject of much debate among experts and competitors. The spray-on fireproofing chosen by the Port Authority was an early replacement for the asbestos-based materials that were eventually banned.
A competitor whose own cement- like product came to dominate the industry says the material used on the trade center did not stick well and was prone to deterioration.
Lawrence Shapiro, a marketing director at W. R. Grace & Co., said the fiber-based fireproofing — especially the early asbestos-free versions — never had the strength of the cement-like fireproofing that Grace produced.
But according to the chairman of the company that made the fireproofing, a problem arose at the start. James Verhalen, chairman of United States Mineral Products of Stanhope, N.J., said the steel had been allowed to rust during storage.
A review of the history of the buildings shows that even as the steel columns first rose into the sky, problems arose. Wind-driven rains stripped the fireproofing from the framework it was meant to protect, and construction workers had to improvise dams and diverters to channel the water away. The workers then reapplied the fireproofing.
But... Tony...NCSTAR 1-6 page 300 to 304 shows the additional loads put on the east and west walls after impact were about 7% more than their original load and 30 to 35% more on top of that after the alleged south wall failure.
These columns had a 5.00 to 1 factor of safety against gravity. So they were originally only loaded to 20% of their capacity. The NIST after impact and after south wall failure loads would then be
20% x 1.07 x 1.35 = 29%. So even after impact of the north face and alleged south wall failure the NIST report shows they still had a factor of safety above 3.00 to 1.
Still very wrong.NCSTAR 1-6 page 300 to 304 shows the additional loads put on the east and west walls after impact were about 7% more than their original load and 30 to 35% more on top of that after the alleged south wall failure.
These columns had a 5.00 to 1 factor of safety against gravity. So they were originally only loaded to 20% of their capacity. The NIST after impact and after south wall failure loads would then be
20% x 1.07 x 1.35 = 29%. So even after impact of the north face and alleged south wall failure the NIST report shows they still had a factor of safety above 3.00 to 1.
The NIST report does not make a case for failure of the east and west perimeter walls. Unfortunately, this just sails right over the heads of most.
But... Tony...
I am not an engineer, yet even I can see how the average load on a wall is not necessarily the same as the load on an individual column, and that the stress on the east and west walls after the south wall buckled was largely asymmetrical. I know that wishful thinking is powerful, but one would assume that given your profession you would be above that and not make such an obvious mistake.
Still very wrong.
Factor of Safety= Material Strength/ Design Load
If the columns had an FOS of 5.00 to 1 STATIC load, Bazant proved for the North Tower the DYNAMIC kinetic energy force on one column due to impact from the column above from a drop of the first 12 feet = ~ 31 times the design load.
http://www.civil.northwestern.edu/people/bazant/PDFs/Papers/405.pdf
Example. For say, single column design load of 1 kip x 31 = ~ 31 kip design overload > 5 kip FOS .
It doesn’t surprise me that you re-claim a falling column load onto another column 12 feet below is a static load.
Why are you not embarrassed by this blunder.