On Consciousness

[Roboramma]

No. If events can be reliably measured, they are empirical data.

Right, I think that was my point: if neurobiology gives us access to thought and perception, then those become empirical facts that can be studied.

I understand Skinner's viewpoint and think it makes sense to some extent, but as we develop more tools to study the brain, we have greater access to what previously might have been "private events".

In other words, when you say:

While he aknowledged that thinking, consciousness and perception existed in people, Skinner believed that these private events had no explanatory value and felt that empiricist should study publcally observable behavior.

There's the assumption that "thinking, consciousness and perception" are private events, but as neurobiology advances they become "publicly observable behavior".

 

[annnnoid]

It does and has, dozens of times. Try to pay attention.


You're just plain lying now. And engaging in equivocation and ad hominem attacks at the same time. Tish.

You are, as usual, patronizing, insulting, and rude…but what else is new?

….and you conveniently missed a question. I’m interested in the response so I’m sure tensordyne won’t mind if I remind you of it.

We don't care about this "p-consciousness" of yours. We care about real consciousness in the real world, and real science works just fine for that.

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.

 

[Roboramma]

OK, tell me how you show that the way I experience red is the same as the way you do using what you think science is about.

One way would be to put you in an MRI machine and show you red, then show you blue, notice the differences in your brain's response. Then do the same with me. See if the differences are the same.

Another way is cruder: does the colour red invoke similar emotional and behavioral responses in you as in me? If so, that's evidence that your experience of red is similar to mine.

Each of those is just one small piece of evidence, of course, but they are certainly meaningful.

 

[tensordyne]

Are you a mind reader ? I guess you're not. Who the some people is remains to be seen. It's a prediction. I hope you're not part of it.

I won't be, the scientists will find the physical basis and then the comp position will seem like the unscientific and nutty position it is to most everyone.

The problem is, however, what will be your standard for determining if it's conscious or not ? If you conclude in advance that it is not, for instance, or if you decide on an impossible level of evidence, then you will never be satisfied, and that was my point.

Since the only thing we can be sure of that is conscious is us (most likely invertebrates too). When we figure out the physical basis of consciousness in us that will be evidence enough for me.

And again you speak in unscientific terms, all the while wearing the trappings of science. First, if you could tell a story, you would do so. You don't, therefore you can't. Second, your appeal to emotion and "insight" rather than evidence and reason is noted.

I don't, therefore I can't, huh? That is not very good logic because how can you possibly know what was in my head? I was in the middle of starting a story, but I just realized it would probably be pointless, just like this forum thread.

Yeah, and if I made a bunch of arguments for Special Relativity and someone does not get it, then I say "oh well, I guess you need insight" the response will look pretty similar to the one above.

I also note that you didn't actually address what I wrote. Or rather, you write as though I didn't write what I wrote. I've already told you that science has uncovered things we never would have imagined specifically because A) imagination only works on previous experience and B) science simply doesn't work like imagination.

Uhm, OK. Maybe I lost track of the flow, but I do not see anything wrong with the above. You do need imagination to understand science theories though.

Oh, absolutely. I agree. But the basic idea is as simple as Pixy's "SRIP".

Ah, PixyMisa's SRIP. That is so 1980's, as well as discredited in Cognitive Neuroscience.

Stop that. My brain doesn't parse it, and keeps seeing "computer". I'm also tempted to give you a nasty label just to give you a taste of your own medecine.

What is so nasty about the word comp? You can use the word phys if you want to for me.

 

[PixyMisa]

You are, as usual, patronizing, insulting, and rude

Yes, but I am right and you are wrong.

…but what else is new?

Nothing at all.

….and you conveniently missed a question. I’m interested in the response so I’m sure tensordyne won’t mind if I remind you of it.

Already answered, before he even asked the question.

 

[PixyMisa]

I won't be, the scientists will find the physical basis and then the comp position will seem like the unscientific and nutty position it is to most everyone.

The physical basis is computation. How could it even make sense for it to be anything else? You're talking about information processing taking place in a computer - what do you expect consciousness to be? Cheese? Bedsprings?

Ah, PixyMisa's SRIP. That is so 1980's, as well as discredited in Cognitive Neuroscience.

[citation needed]

What is so nasty about the word comp? You can use the word phys if you want to for me.

No, what you believe in is magic. We'll use that word.

 

[tensordyne]

One way would be to put you in an MRI machine and show you red, then show you blue, notice the differences in your brain's response. Then do the same with me. See if the differences are the same.

Another way is cruder: does the colour red invoke similar emotional and behavioral responses in you as in me? If so, that's evidence that your experience of red is similar to mine.

Each of those is just one small piece of evidence, of course, but they are certainly meaningful.

Excellent! See PixyMisa, the above is how a scientist thinks. The above assumes implicitly that physical systems that are identical (or at least share the same physical characteristics to some extent) will have the same or similar experiences of sensation. This assumption is outside of the normal practice of science. That is why I brought up the principle of uniformitarianism earlier.

The only other way would be to have some machine that allows one to experience what another entity is experiencing, but I know of no such device. Unfortunately, even then the question of how we know that the device actually transfers the experience would come up.

I do not know, tough question.

 

[rocketdodger]

Then why did piggy bring up that a very modern book on cognitive neuroscience has a whole chapter devoted to dispelling the ideas of the Hard-AI crowd?

Did you read the chapter? If not -- end of story.

That goes to his other point he brought up. Computation in nature is ubiquitous. Saying something is computational does not provide any new insight since everything is computational when looked at properly. Plus, computation really is of a different kind than what experience of sensation is.

Computation is about math and abstraction, experience of sensation is about what it feels like to be something. Those are very different categories.

I have explained a dozen times that the "computation" spoken of in the computational model is fundamentally about attractors in physical systems.

That invalidates all your statements about computation. You don't really understand what it is, and neither does piggy.

Yeah... and when someone points out that pulleys and cogs will do, that should be it for the Hard-AI position, done, finito, end of the story. There are humans, we are conscious because we experience sensation. There are no sensors on rope and pulleys. Rope and pulleys do not follow the same physics as we do (well, let me put that better, the physics that applies to us is different in many ways then the physics applying to us). The structure that the rope and pulleys gets put in to determines whether it is computing or not, not any property of the rope and pulleys itself (such as mass, charge...). There are lots of properties that if changed in a humans will cause unconsciousness. They are different.

I just think you don't have much imagination, no offense.

Because for you to state that ropes and pulleys and cogs will not do implies that you are capable of imagining what a system composed of trillions of ropes, pulleys, and cogs would entail.

If you had done so, I don't think your dismissal would have been so casual.

What I think is that you imagined some lame version, like maybe what one would see in a Rube Goldberg machine put together by college kids, and you just reach the conclusion that hey, adding trillions more parts wouldn't change anything.

The above applies the same to modern computers.

The above applies to your conclusion about what applies to modern computers.

All research does not say consciousness comes from computation. The researchers themselves (as per the litany of quotes given by piggy earlier) do not have any solid ideas on that front. So just try and not be nihilistic about not knowing what causes consciousness, because you probably do not.

I already showed that piggy's quotes were mined and taken out of context.

He misrepresents the state of cognitive science and artificial intelligence, plain and simple.

Why don't you just look for yourself? Please, don't just take my word for it. Do some looking on your own.

I do not need to account for it since the relevant concepts are already out there. We are in agreement that focusing on red and just having red somewhere in your visual field are definitely different in a way. The first difference is that when one focuses on something visually, the object of focus, as far as I know, goes in the center of the field. There are probably other differences for which I am not aware of at the moment.

What do you mean you are not aware of the differences?

The difference is that when you focus on something you are consciously aware of it.

I have to question your ability to use introspection as a tool if you don't realize that the conscious awareness of an experience is different from the alternative.

Let me ask you this, I guess -- do you think it would be possible to have conscious awareness of the red frowny face, if there were no experience of red?

 

[PixyMisa]

Excellent! See PixyMisa, the above is how a scientist thinks.

Yes. Of course, this is exactly what I've been telling you; you just haven't been listening.

 

[tensordyne]

The physical basis is computation. How could it even make sense for it to be anything else? You're talking about information processing taking place in a computer - what do you expect consciousness to be? Cheese? Bedsprings?

An EM field based phenomena. Even if it is not the EM field, I am sure it will be something else of a physics origin because computation can only address behavior. Hey, I am not the one who believes pulleys and wheels can be conscious (lulz).

[citation needed]

Uhm, piggy already provided plenty. For the rest, just read a textbook on Cognitive Neuroscience and note that they do not talk much about running computer programs.

No, what you believe in is magic. We'll use that word.

Of course, you can say what you want. Since I am not an admin I will not have much to say about it either.

 

[PixyMisa]

An EM field based phenomena.

How? How does that make any sense at all?

First, consciousness is an informational process, one of complex references to abstract representations. The only way you can do that is through computation. Anything else is a non-starter.

Second, we know perfectly well what is going on with the EM field in the brain. We can measure it, we can influence it, and it is physically impossible for the gross EM field to be causally linked to consciousness. You can drown it in interference without affecting consciousness at all.

It's a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is somehow used for
signalling or synchronisation between neurons. It's just not true.

It's not a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is the cause of consciousness. It's like proposing that earthworms cause thunderstorms. On the Moon.

Even if it is not the EM field, I am sure it will be something else of a physics origin because computation can only address behavior.

Two points here that have already been explained to you dozens of times: First, computation is physical; second, everything is behaviour.

Uhm, piggy already provided plenty.

Nope. He quotemines and misrepresents; what he doesn't do is cite.

For the rest, just read a textbook on Cognitive Neuroscience and note that they do not talk much about running computer programs.

So? That objection just means that you still don't know what a computer is.

 

[Zeuzzz]

Magic? Seems a bit of a weird word to call something scientifically accepted.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uyw5y_tHEM
John Kounios: The neuroscience behind epiphanies

Einstein used to say that he came here to the Institute for Advanced Studies simply for the privilege of walking home with Kurt Godel. And what was it that held this most unlikely of couples together. On the one hand you’ve got the warm and avuncular Einstein and on the other the rather cold, wizened and withdrawn Kurt Godel. The answer for this strange companionship comes I think from something else that Einstein said.. He said that "God may be subtle but he’s not malicious." And what does that mean? Well, it means for Einstein is that however complicated the universe might be there will always be beautiful rules by which it works. Godel believed the same idea from his point of view to mean, that God would never have put us into a creation that we could not then understand.


The question is, how is it that Kurt Gödel can believe that God is not malicious? That it’s all understandable? Because Gödel is the man who has proved that some things cannot be proven logically and rationally. So surely God must be malicious? The way he gets out of it is that Gödel, like Einstein, believes deeply in Intuition - That we can know things outside of logic, maths and computation; because we just intuit them. And they both believed this, because they both felt it. They have both had their moments of intuition, moments of sudden conceptual realisation that were by far more than just chance.

Has there been an AI computer developed that shows similar intuition or signs of altruism and empathy?

According to my notes, Gödel’s response went as follows: It should be possible to form a complete theory of human behavior, i.e., to predict from the hereditary and environmental givens what a person will do. However, if a mischievous person learns of this theory, he can act in a way so as to negate it. Hence I conclude that such a theory exists, but that no mischievous person will learn of it. In the same way, time travel is possible, but no person will ever manage to kill his past self. Gödel laughed his laugh then, and concluded, The a priori is greatly neglected. Logic is very powerful. Apropos of the free will question, on another occasion he said: There is no contradiction between free will and knowing in advance precisely what one will do. If one knows oneself completely then this is the situation. One does not deliberately do the opposite of what one wants.

 

[PixyMisa]

Magic? Seems a bit of a weird word to call something scientifically accepted.

Well, it would be if it were, but it's not so it isn't.

 

[tensordyne]

Not interested in the rest of the post but the following two parts piqued my interest.

I have explained a dozen times that the "computation" spoken of in the computational model is fundamentally about attractors in physical systems.

Do tell, I love fractals and strange attractors and all that, if that is what you are referring to. It would be interesting perhaps to hear a hypothesis on consciousness related to fractals.

I just think you don't have much imagination, no offense.

None taken. As long as you are being honest, I am happy.

Because for you to state that ropes and pulleys and cogs will not do implies that you are capable of imagining what a system composed of trillions of ropes, pulleys, and cogs would entail.

If you had done so, I don't think your dismissal would have been so casual.

What I think is that you imagined some lame version, like maybe what one would see in a Rube Goldberg machine put together by college kids, and you just reach the conclusion that hey, adding trillions more parts wouldn't change anything.

The above is not what I thought at all. I did not have to consider complexity because there is nothing about it that is important to the question of the basis of consciousness (the experience of sensation version of consciousness, just in case there is confusion).

 

[PixyMisa]

The above is not what I thought at all. I did not have to consider complexity because there is nothing about it that is important to the question of the basis of consciousness (the experience of sensation version of consciousness, just in case there is confusion).

What is the basis for this assertion?

 

[tensordyne]

You seem to be seeing red.

Not sure if I should laugh but the above at least made me smile.

 

[tensordyne]

How? How does that make any sense at all?

The configuration of the EM field inside a Faraday cage will determine what is experienced. The question would then be to figure out which configurations lead to which experiences (that is where the scientific method would come in).

Information processing can help in determining what the field configuration will be, in as far as how such processing influences the field's configuration. If the EM field is what consciousness is as a physical substrate, then the processing can only configure the field that leads to consciousness (an important question on its own, of course), not create consciousness itself, as that is the job of the field!

First, consciousness is an informational process, one of complex references to abstract representations. The only way you can do that is through computation. Anything else is a non-starter.

You are stuck in your own abstractions PixyMisa. It is a hypothesis that computation leads to consciousness (my version, not yours, in your version you must do computation of some kind, I agree). That is all it is.

Second, we know perfectly well what is going on with the EM field in the brain. We can measure it, we can influence it, and it is physically impossible for the gross EM field to be causally linked to consciousness. You can drown it in interference without affecting consciousness at all.

I love this one. So I guess you have not heard of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). For the following video skip ahead to 11:29 if you want to see it in action.



Or here is an interesting one.

It's a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is somehow used for signalling or synchronisation between neurons. It's just not true.

That does not seem to be what the newest research says.



Since I am sure you will not want to watch the whole video, just go to about 12:00. Also check out 21:00.

It's not a valid scientific hypothesis that the gross EM field is the cause of consciousness. It's like proposing that earthworms cause thunderstorms. On the Moon.

The above is not a valid argument for anything.

Two points here that have already been explained to you dozens of times: First, computation is physical; second, everything is behaviour.

The spin of an electron is not behavior. The mass of a watermelon is not behavior. Your consciousness is not behavior. The very word consciousness itself is not a verb word (behavior), it is an adjective word (property).

So? That objection just means that you still don't know what a computer is.

A computer is a system that is Turing Complete. Does not change anything.

If you were correct then cognitive neuroscientists would study running computer programs to help figure out how consciousness works. They would do this because it should not matter whether they study running programs or the brain, as the brain and the computer running the program would only be different in terms of complexity (why am I repeating your own position back to you?). Since they do not, nothing in the argument is invalidated as such.

 

[Zeuzzz]

Has there been an AI computer developed that shows similar intuition or signs of altruism and empathy?

bump

 

[tensordyne]

I have to forgive McFadden for saying in the video "the reference frame of a photon" since there is no such thing according to physics (he is not a physicist after all but a biologist). He was getting kind of out there in that part of the talk in the video I linked to earlier. Oh well, the rest is pretty solid in terms of science (except parts of the question and answer, but that is not McFadden's fault because it was some of the posers of the questions who went into woo land).

Interesting idea though this CEMI as far as I can tell.

 

[tensordyne]

bump

I do not know about altruism or empathy (I am not sure how one would even establish the same) but I know of no computer program that ever created a math theorem that is not the result using a set of already known axioms and combining them together. In other words, a computer has never passed the "mathematician writing a paper in a math journal" type of Turing test, as far as I know at least (CYA).