Yea, that's how to not give the information wide-spread dissemination--provide it in official documents available to any armchair investigator on the internet...
While this information was actually in official documents available to any arm chair investigator on the internet, it took years to finally put the whole account of why the CIA and FBI HQ had allowed the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks on 9/11. Almost all of the US official reports had been obfuscated, or obscured in some way or critical information was just left out and hidden so no one looking at any one report could see actually see what had taken place at the CIA and FBI HQ prior to the attacks on 9/11.
As I wrote before;
This total sum of this information came from the DOJ IG report, the account of Ali Soufan, by Lawrence Wright in the July 10-17 issue of the New Yorker, the 9/11 Commission report, the CIA IG Executive summary, the Moussaoui trial documents, and other information found in Bob Woodward's book, "State of Denial", on the July 10, 2001 meeting at the White House, and Harpers January 2007 issue, on Richard Blee.
I took all of this material and then aggregated it together to make one coherent account of the intelligence prior to that attacks on 9/11. It took several years of work since I started this in April 2004 and some of the information did not come our until mid-2006, the DOJ IG report in June 2006, the book State of Denial in October 2006, and even the Harpers article on January 2007.
I started with DOJ IG report, officially called “Office of Inspector General, Review of the FBI Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks( November 2004)” , Released publically in June 2006, (un-redacted) since this report by itself was the most complete. This report is about 400 pages long, but used aliases for the names of the people in their report. DE 952B (Alias Names) from the Moussaoui trial listed the translation from the alias names to the real names, with the exception of Margaret Gillespie, she is referred to in the DOJ IG report as Mary.
This report had been originally heavily redacted, meaning large amounts of this report were blacked out. But I was able to un-redact the original report released in November 2004 in just a couple of hours. It turned out that they had used several different redactors and some of the redactors were leaving things in this report that other redactors had taken out. Then I was able to fill in the holes in this DOJ IG report with the account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan by Lawrence Wright.
In effect I combined these two reports. These documents proved that Soufan had contacted the CIA on at least three occasions and asked about the information the CIA had on Walid bin Attash and if they had any information on a al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The CIA had all of this information, including the CIA Yemen Station, the CIA Pakistan Station and the CIA bin Laden unit, Alec Station, but criminally withheld not only this information from Soufan but even the fact that had this information.
The DOJ IG report also confirmed that Tom Wilshire had Ali Soufan’s April request to the CIA even though he had been moved to the FBI ITOS unit in mid-May 2001, and instead of giving Soufan this information, Wilshire asked Corsi to set up a meeting with Soufan's own people, the FBI Cole bombing investigators in New York, on June 11, 2001.
In this meeting Corsi presented the three photos Wilshire had gotten from the CIA of Mihdhar taken at Kuala Lumpur. At that point CIA Officer Clarke Shannon asked Bongardt and his team if the recognized any one in these photos. Since one photo only had Mihdhar and Hazmi in it, the two al Qaeda terrorists on AA 77 that hit the Pentagon it was clear that the CIA only wanted to know if Bongardt and his team in their search for bin Attash, the mastermind of the Cole bombing, had uncovered the information that the CIA had been trying to keep secret, the fact that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting in January 2000 with bin Attash actually planning the Cole bombing
The DOJ IG report also confirmed that Corsi knew the CIA had the photo of Walid bin Attash by at least August 22, 2001, knew this connected both Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing and knew it would be a crime to not pass this information to Bongardt and his team and also a crime to shut down any criminal investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi by Bongardt and his team.
But she and her supervisor, SSA Rod Middleton, did this anyway even knowing that they were committing a major Federal crime, the crime of withholding material information from an ongoing FBI criminal investigation into the murder of 17 US sailors on the USS Cole.
This report also confirmed that FBI Agent Gillespie had found out from the INS that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US on August 22, 2001 and gave this information to FBI Deputy Chief of the ITOS unit and former CIA bin Laden Deputy Chief Tom Wilshire and to FBI IOS HQ Agent Dina Corsi. This report confirmed that this information went back to the rest of the CIA on August 22, or August 23, 2001, including Blee, Black and Tenet, who already knew that Mihdhar and by association, Hazmi would be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda operation, because of Tom Wilshire's July 23, 2001 email
The other documents added the following information, (highly summarized below):
The document “CIA requests changes to staff statement #10”, this connects the CIA Yemen station to the request of the photos on Mihdhar and bin Attash from the CIA bin Laden unit in late December 2000. The CIA Yemen station had requested these photos and then had the CIA/FBI joint source identify bin Attash from his Kuala Lumpur photo on January 4, 2001 and then in spite of the fact that Soufan had made an official FBI request for this same information from this CIA station on November 2000, never gave this information to Soufan.
State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, described the meeting at the White House on July 10, 2001, between Tenet, Black, and Blee, and Rice Handily and Clarke about the fact a huge al Qaeda attack was just about to take place likely inside of the US.
The 9/11 Commission report, the information on the meeting between Corsi and NSLU attorney Sherry Sabol, that shows that Sabol told Corsi that Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar because the NSA information in her EC to start a FBI intelligence investigation had no connection to any FISA warrant.
The Moussaoui trial documents: Confirmed that CTC managers were told by Tom Wilshire on July 23, 2001, that Mihdhar would be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack, DE 939. Also described the fact that Corsi had denied FBI Agent Robert Fuller permission to contact Saudi Arabian Airlines to get Mihdhar’s credit card number when his investigation of Mihdhar has stalled on September 5, 2001 because he did not have this credit card number, DE 650. Also had translation of DOJ IG report alias names to the real names, DE 952b.
The CIA IG Executive Summary, places direct responsibility for the attacks on 9/11 squarely on Tenet, Gannon, Black and others at the CIA. Says that 50-60 people at the CIA knew about the travels of Mihdhar and Hazmi and never gave this information to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing. The actual CIA IG report has never been released, it appears to prevent criminal prosecutions of CIA officers and managers.
Harpers January 2007, article by Ken Silverstein. Stated that Richard Blee was very close to Black and that Blee had not only been Chief of the CIA bin Laden unit but Chief of the CIA Rendition unit as well. This meant when the information on Khalid Sheikh Mohamed went to the CIA on June 12, 2001, to the Rendition unit, it would have gone very quickly to Black and then from Black to Tenet.
It was never my goal to slam any one agency or person but produce the most accurate account of 9/11 that I could. This effort took several years of effort. When I first embarked on this effort I thought I would just find that the CIA and FBI HQ were just incompetent, not that they had committed major crimes to allow the attacks on 9/11 to take place. I was primarily focused on the question, why after 19 months had the CIA, and later the FBI HQ not given the information on Mihdhar and Hazmi to the FBI Cole bombing investigators so they could find these al Qaeda terrorists before they had time to carry out a horrific attack inside of the US particularly when both the CIA and FBI knew that these terrorists were inside of the US in order to take part in a massive al Qaeda attack that would cause mass American causalities. This just did not make any sense.
In effect, why did the CIA and FBI HQ allow the al Qaeda terrorists to murder almost 3000 people in the attacks on 9/11?
It was only after I started to assemble the whole picture of what had taken place at the CIA and FBI HQ that I was able to see the complete picture, a picture which made me almost physically sick to my stomach. This was not the picture that I had originally started out to find.
Notice even though this information was all there it took years and thousands of hours to finally put it all back together again. Ask yourself why should someone have to go to at least 6 reports many of them hundreds of pages long and written with alias names so it was almost impossible to connect the dots with this one report, and many defense exhibits entered in the Moussaoui trial, in order to put the account of 9/11 back together again in one place.
While this information was all there it is clear that each report left out critical details so on one could actually see the whole picture from just one single report. In fact unless they had all of the reports that I just listed, and went through each one with a fine tooth comb, they would have left out some critical piece of this puzzle.
Maybe this explains why even though all of this information was provided in official documents available to any armchair investigator on the internet, there was no way to give this information wide-spread dissemination, without first a huge effort to put the account of 9/11 back together again.
