On Consciousness

[dlorde]

... in a way a plane emulates a bird flying, in the sense that it flies, like a bird, but it does not fly like a bird.

Quite; time flies like an arrow; fruit flies like a banana.

 

[dlorde]

IIRC, modern jet fighters require computers to actually fly, and cannot be effectively flown by a human; Airbus craft have also reached that point.

Not to mention remotely piloted drones, operated as if flying with a simulator...

 

[rocketdodger]

I have found it annoying in the extreme myself. If you talk about the sensation of red they will talk about how many nanometers of light red corresponds to, which part of the brain gets activated when red is experienced (if you are lucky), etc., etc... without once acknowledging that red is first encountered and only then are objective ideas associated with it. In terms of epistemology, sensation is primary! There are major consequences to studying consciousness because of this fact.

Comp.lit want to start with objective ideas because that is a method that has worked so well in the past for science. Think of the world 'out there' as being the real center of attraction and come up with various ideas to encompass what is observed about it. When it comes to sensation and consciousness, it is no longer about 'out there', it is about 'in here'.

I wonder, I remember that on a video linked by Zeuzzz the topic of mirror neurons as it relates to autism was brought up. I do not think of comp.lits as dumb (just not wise per se), it seems like they do not have a full Theory of Mind or something (like my supposed autistic people missing mirror neurons, if such is the case). We could test this by doing autopsy studies of people who self-describe to various ideas associated with comp.lit (for it to be a real study the sample would have to be randomized as much as possible, so that the participants will be representative of the whole populace and not just comp.lit, but you get my drift I hope).

When the people in the study die, make note of how well developed the mirror neuron areas are in the various brains (or at least, observations of that kind). If the comp.lit's in the survey have less well developed mirror neuron areas than the rest of the participants, it would hopefully show them they are missing something from the conversation (I can not a priori get rid of the possibility that the mirror neurons in the comp.lit's are more developed than average as a possibility, but given their collective behavior, I find the possibility slim; however, that is the beauty of science, you can be shown to be wrong if you are intellectually honest).

Perhaps then comp.lits will listen if such was shown, but I doubt it. Like an ignorant blind child they want to tell everyone else with vision they are wrong, there is nothing going on. I would rather talk with those who have eyes that see (speaking metaphorically here, I have nothing against blind people).

What an utterly stupid post that was.

Here let me show you some code that is capable of translating that post for fresh viewers:

while ( true ) {
print ( "blah" );
print ( " " );
}

 

[Belz...]

There are many reasons why vinyl and digital media may sound different

Not the least of which are scratches on the damned vinyls...

 

[Belz...]

Quite; time flies like an arrow; fruit flies like a banana.

Actually, fruit flies fly better than bananas.

 

[Belz...]

Comp.lit want to start with objective ideas because that is a method that has worked so well in the past for science.

Yes. Seriously, that's all there is to say about that: Yes.

Think of the world 'out there' as being the real center of attraction and come up with various ideas to encompass what is observed about it. When it comes to sensation and consciousness, it is no longer about 'out there', it is about 'in here'.

And thinking in terms of 'in here' has worked so well in the past !

 

[Fudbucker]

And our world is just a bunch of subatomic particles running around. Your point ?

My point is that a bunch of 1's and 0's doesn't fly. A collection of subatomic particles does. If a simulated plane can't fly, then why would a simulated brain think?

The object "plane" in the simulation.

The fact that you put plane in quotes, says everything. It's not a real plane. It won't get you to New York from LAX. Why do you believe a "brain" would think or be conscious?

Depends on your point of view. If you're in a simulation, you could never tell the difference.

Do you think it's possible we're in a simulation?

You are making a huge mistake, which is to assume that all these things are the same thing. If consciousness is computational, which it seems to be, then simulating consciousness creates consciousness. Think of it like this: when my computer makes a calculation, it doesn't actually add numbers, nor does it do so on a piece of paper with a pencil. And yet it calculates just as fine as I can, and faster, too. It doesn't 'simulate' calculations.

I'm assuming nothing except that brains are conscious. I'm questioning the assertion that brains are computers, that machines are conscious, that simulated brains will be conscious. It all rests on the belief that consciousness is computational, which is simply asserted as if it's been proven.

I just said that.

Please don't cut off my quotes. You've done that before in this thread.

 

[Fudbucker]

Never mind - I was hinting at the inherent contradiction in your statement, "if the brain is a computer (or a kind of computer), it's working in non-computerlike ways". If the brain is a computer, then it's working in computer-like ways by definition.

Yes, that was stated badly. My point is that a brain doesn't operate like a computer, doesn't load programs, doesn't operate in strict binary, doesn't store information like a computer, is capable of things no computer can do, neurons are not like transistors, etc.

Brains compute, but it takes more than sharing one property to be equivalent to something (or be a kind of something). Again, a Cheetah can travel 70 mph, but its not a car or kind of car.

What about the computers below, posted by Pixy earlier - do you think they are working in non-computer-like ways?

To which I'll add this.

They are all working in computer-like ways because they are computers.

Of course they can think and feel. Do you believe IBM's Watson and Deep Blue defeated the world's best thinkers in their fields at their own game without thinking?

I don't know. I keep hearing it asserted, but I'm not convinced. Perhaps they can think in some strange fashion. But where do you draw the line? Does a digital watch think? Did ENIAC? An abacus? I suspect "think" will become so trivialized (like "compute") that nearly everything in the universe can be said to "think".

How are you so sure that computers feel? There's only one thing we're sure that "feels" and that is in your skull. The rest is speculation. It's strange to see skeptics so sure about this.

and how do you think the computers that control systems from cars to factories, from washing machines to power stations, can do that if they can't feel stuff?

Why would they have to feel anything to control systems? When did that become a prerequisite? A simple mercury thermostat can control a heating and cooling system. Is it a computer? Does it feel? Again, I think you're trivializing the word and it will eventually include just about anything.

I don't believe they're yet conscious by my preferred definition, but by Pixy's preferred definition they are. What is your preferred definition of consciousness? does it allow for artificial consciousness?

I don't have a definition. I'm looking at ones that are offered. That's why I think it's a "hard problem". I think artificial consciousness is possible, but you'll need something similar to an artificial brain to pull it off.

It computes, so it's a computer, and we currently know of it. You may not have realised that there were so many different forms of computer, and that the brain was one, but now you know

I know there are more kinds of computers than I thought!

 

[Fudbucker]

Exactly what is the difference between imitating and simulating?

They're probably not that far apart in meaning. I think Belz started talking about imitation. In either case, neither an imitation nor simulation is the same as the thing being imitated or simulated.

Is computer Solitaire a game of cards if it doesn't have a real pack of cards? is playing onscreen computer chess a game of chess if it doesn't have a physical board or pieces? (is the computer opponent a chess player?)

Solitaire and chess don't refer to physical things. They're abstract sets of rules and goals. A computer can "play" chess in the same way it can "do" sums: by crunching numbers. A brain, however, is a physical thing. Therefore, everything it does is a physical process. You can try to simulate it, but you'll simply have a simulated brain doing simulated things. You can't just assert that simulated brains will do the same things as real brains. In fact, the opposite should be true: simulated things can't do real world physical processes (simulated planes can't fly).

Is the simulation of a wall clock currently on my screen a clock?

It's a simulation of a wall clock. By definition, a wall clock is a physical thing. A clock, however, is anything that can tell time. You can have a computer run a non-simulated clock, but you can't have a computer run a non-simulated grandfather clock.

Since a brain is, by definition, a physical thing, a computer can't "run" a brain.

It certainly tells the right time.

Independent of an observer?

 

[trebor]

Since a brain is, by definition, a physical thing, a computer can't "run" a brain.

A brain is a physical thing, a computer is a physical thing... why can't a computer be a brain or a brain be a computer?

A brain, however, is a physical thing. Therefore, everything it does is a physical process.

A computer is a physical thing. Therefore, everything it does is a physical process.

Perhaps a better definition of what you mean by the word 'physical' is needed.

 

[steenkh]

Yes, that was stated badly. My point is that a brain doesn't operate like a computer, doesn't load programs, doesn't operate in strict binary, doesn't store information like a computer, is capable of things no computer can do, neurons are not like transistors, etc.

Do you know how a computer operates? Nobody claims that the brain works like a PC, but it nevertheless is a computer because it computes. Not all computers load programs, and some computers like neural networks do not even have a program to start with. And why on Earth do you expect that all computers work in strict binary? How do you think computers store information? What is it that the brain can do that a computer cannot do that is relevant to the discussion? Obviously, computers cannot get haemorrhages, and they cannot yet move your limbs, but neither is necessary for being conscious.

And finally, why do you think it is a clever argument that neurons are not like transistors? Neurons in a neural network are also not like transistors.

 

[AlBell]

...

some computers like neural networks do not even have a program to start with.

...

Is this statement true? Some years ago a computer-code driven "neural net" had surrounding code which contained various variables. Through multiple training runs the code in operation set those variables to the best values, that is, trained the neural net.

 

[dlorde]

Yes, that was stated badly. My point is that a brain doesn't operate like a computer, doesn't load programs, doesn't operate in strict binary, doesn't store information like a computer, is capable of things no computer can do, neurons are not like transistors, etc.

You seem wedded to the idea that a computer must load programs, operate in strict binary, and have transistors (I struck out the nonsense), and feel the brain doesn't operate like a computer because it doesn't (explicitly) do/have those things.

Yet you seem happy to accept that all the other examples of computers we supplied are working in computer-like ways, despite having none of the attributes you suggest disqualify a brain, and despite generally having even less in common with digital computers than a brain does...

I think a rational independent observer would see a problem with this contradictory viewpoint. Can you not see it?

Perhaps they can think in some strange fashion. But where do you draw the line?

Good question. It might help to define precisely what you mean by 'think' - in terms of function.

Does a digital watch think? Did ENIAC? An abacus? I suspect "think" will become so trivialized (like "compute") that nearly everything in the universe can be said to "think".

You must make up your own mind - where do you want to draw the line? Consider animals - which animals think? mammals? birds? fish? insects? molluscs? hive organisms? (e.g. termite mounds, ant nests, bee hives, wasp nests)? What must something that thinks be capable of? what would you say is the most primitive animal that thinks, and why do you think that?

How are you so sure that computers feel?

They are able to respond to changes in their environment.

It's strange to see skeptics so sure about this.

Why? Isn't the ability to sense and respond to the environment 'feeling' it? If not, what precisely do you mean by 'feeling'?

Again, I think you're trivializing the word and it will eventually include just about anything.

So, again, what does 'feeling' mean?

I don't have a definition. I'm looking at ones that are offered.

You'll have difficulty discussing it without a definition - as I have tried to point out above, with 'computer-like', 'thinking', & 'feeling'.

I think artificial consciousness is possible, but you'll need something similar to an artificial brain to pull it off.

What does that even mean? something 'similar' to an artificial brain? or an actual artificial brain? And what do you suppose an artificial brain would be like?

Would you deny it was conscious if it used transistors, or binary logic, or if it came in a number of large boxes?

I know there are more kinds of computers than I thought!

Well maybe you'll come to some understanding of what they have in common (it clearly isn't transistors, binary logic, or explicit stored programs), and why the brain is also a computer.

 

[dlorde]

Solitaire and chess don't refer to physical things. They're abstract sets of rules and goals.

What about consciousness - is that a physical thing?

You can't just assert that simulated brains will do the same things as real brains.

What's the difference between simulated thinking and consciousness and real thinking and consciousness?

Since a brain is, by definition, a physical thing, a computer can't "run" a brain.

Category error. The brain supports processes using a neural network biological switches; consciousness is a process. An electronic computer can support processes using a network of electronic switches; both computer and brain are physical things. If you're suggesting that consciousness is a process the brain can support but a computer can't, I'd like to know why you think that.

Independent of an observer?

Yes; it is not credible that it tells the correct time when being observed but not when unobserved - particularly as the underlying mechanism has no such flexibility and cannot detect whether it is observed (what an odd question ).

 

[dlorde]

What about consciousness - is that a physical thing?

What's the difference between simulated thinking and consciousness and real thinking and consciousness?

Category error. The brain supports processes using a neural network biological switches; consciousness is a process. An electronic computer can support processes using a network of electronic switches; both computer and brain are physical things. If you're suggesting that consciousness is a process the brain can support but a computer can't, I'd like to know why you think that.

Yes; it is not credible that it tells the correct time when being observed but not when unobserved - particularly as the underlying mechanism has no such flexibility and cannot detect whether it is observed (what an odd question ).

 

[Fudbucker]

You seem wedded to the idea that a computer must load programs, operate in strict binary, and have transistors (I struck out the nonsense), and feel the brain doesn't operate like a computer because it doesn't (explicitly) do/have those things.

When you look at the set that makes up "computer", they are all essentially collections of mechanical binary switches. That's where the computing occurs, would you agree? Do you think a brain is a collection of binary switches?

Yet you seem happy to accept that all the other examples of computers we supplied are working in computer-like ways, despite having none of the attributes you suggest disqualify a brain, and despite generally having even less in common with digital computers than a brain does...

I'm not aware of any examples of computers that have been given that aren't binary collections of mechanical switches. Far different than a brain. So far, what seems to convince people that a brain is a computer is that it computes. That just establishes it's like a computer, does one thing that a computer also does.

You must make up your own mind - where do you want to draw the line? Consider animals - which animals think? mammals? birds? fish? insects? molluscs? hive organisms? (e.g. termite mounds, ant nests, bee hives, wasp nests)? What must something that thinks be capable of? what would you say is the most primitive animal that thinks, and why do you think that?

You left off the mercury thermostat I asked you about. It controls a complex heating/cooling system. Are you comfortable claiming such a thermostat feels? If such a simple device can feel (or think), than just about anything can.

As to your question, I would say that something can think if it has a sufficiently advanced nervous system. I know that's a bit of a dodge.

They are able to respond to changes in their environment.

What do you mean by "respond"? A rock can "respond" to a change in environment by warming or cooling. Iron atoms "respond" if you bring a magnetic field into the environment. This is what I mean by a trivial definition that results in almost everything feeling/thinking.

Why? Isn't the ability to sense and respond to the environment 'feeling' it? If not, what precisely do you mean by 'feeling'?

The subjective feelings we experience. Pain feeling bad is a good example.

You'll have difficulty discussing it without a definition - as I have tried to point out above, with 'computer-like', 'thinking', & 'feeling'.

Well, we have our own conscious experience to guide us, but it's hard to formulate that into a definition. That doesn't mean I cant critique other definitions. If someone claimed consciousness was just adding numbers together, I could definitely say they were wrong.

What does that even mean? something 'similar' to an artificial brain? or an actual artificial brain? And what do you suppose an artificial brain would be like?

Strike the similar part. An artificial brain would be like a brain, but made out of non-organic components. I don't see why it wouldn't be conscious.

Would you deny it was conscious if it used transistors, or binary logic, or if it came in a number of large boxes?

Nope.

Well maybe you'll come to some understanding of what they have in common (it clearly isn't transistors, binary logic, or explicit stored programs), and why the brain is also a computer.

When it can be proved that computers can think/feel/and are conscious, I would be sympathetic to such a claim.

 

[Fudbucker]

What about consciousness - is that a physical thing?

It's a physical process.

What's the difference between simulated thinking and consciousness and real thinking and consciousness?

Obvious: one is simulated and the other is real.

Category error. The brain supports processes using a neural network biological switches; consciousness is a process. An electronic computer can support processes using a network of electronic switches; both computer and brain are physical things. If you're suggesting that consciousness is a process the brain can support but a computer can't, I'd like to know why you think that.

The same reason real plants can perform photosynthesis and simulated plants can't. A physical brain produces consciousness. There is no artificial analogue yet to physical brains. In the future, who knows.

Yes; it is not credible that it tells the correct time when being observed but not when unobserved - particularly as the underlying mechanism has no such flexibility and cannot detect whether it is observed (what an odd question ).

When you say "tells" time, if there's no observer, who is the clock "telling" time to? A physical clock is simply an object that moves (or vibrates) at a certain frequency. For that to have any meaning (e.g., "telling time"), you need an observer. This goes back to the simulation debate: what is a simulation without an observer? Just a collection of pixels flashing off and on. Beyond that: just a collection of switches switching on and off.

 

[trebor]

When you look at the set that makes up "computer", they are all essentially collections of mechanical binary switches.

Expect of course those which are not.
Ternary computers have already been pointed out in this thread for example...

What about consciousness - is that a physical thing?

It's a physical process.

Is a transistor changing state a physical process? How about a thermionic valve, when that switches is it a physical process?

 

[rocketdodger]

Is this statement true? Some years ago a computer-code driven "neural net" had surrounding code which contained various variables. Through multiple training runs the code in operation set those variables to the best values, that is, trained the neural net.

If it is an artificial neural network running on a computer, the program runs the neural network, so technically it is still a program.

If it is a physical neural network, then no, there is no "program."

 

[PixyMisa]

When you look at the set that makes up "computer", they are all essentially collections of mechanical binary switches.

I've struck out the bit that has already been explained to you as incorrect.

Computers are networks of switches.

That's where the computing occurs, would you agree? Do you think a brain is a collection of binary switches?

Yes.

I'm not aware of any examples of computers that have been given that aren't binary collections of mechanical switches. Far different than a brain.

One of the examples I gave you was built out of neurons. Real biological neurons, extracted from leeches.

Another example was Conway's Game of Life, a cellular automata system which is Turing-complete.

So far, what seems to convince people that a brain is a computer is that it computes. That just establishes it's like a computer, does one thing that a computer also does.

No, that establishes that it is a computer. That is how we define "computer".

You left off the mercury thermostat I asked you about. It controls a complex heating/cooling system. Are you comfortable claiming such a thermostat feels?

See Dennett, who discusses this in detail. A thermostat is aware, but not conscious. So it depends on your definition of "feel".

What do you mean by "respond"? A rock can "respond" to a change in environment by warming or cooling. Iron atoms "respond" if you bring a magnetic field into the environment.

No; response is a switching process. Animals do this, and some plants. Machines do it, of course. Rocks don't.

Well, we have our own conscious experience to guide us, but it's hard to formulate that into a definition. That doesn't mean I cant critique other definitions. If someone claimed consciousness was just adding numbers together, I could definitely say they were wrong.

How?

Strike the similar part. An artificial brain would be like a brain, but made out of non-organic components. I don't see why it wouldn't be conscious.

Why would there be any difference between an artificial brain and a computer performing the same operations?

When it can be proved that computers can think/feel/and are conscious, I would be sympathetic to such a claim.

Well, that was easy!

Obvious: one is simulated and the other is real.

And presented with the results of the two, how would you distinguish them?

And if you can't, how can you assert that there is a difference?

The same reason real plants can perform photosynthesis and simulated plants can't.

Category error.

When you say "tells" time, if there's no observer, who is the clock "telling" time to?

There's nothing magical about an observer; observation is just interaction. If the clock hand moves, the clock is telling time.