Free will and omniscience

[Tricky]

Formal logic would be appreciated. You have conflated "will" with "must", which I disagree with.

How is "will" different from "must" in this situation? In how many cases is "what you will do" different from "what you must do"? You have never made a good case for this distinction.

If what you "will" do results in exactly the same outcome as "what you "must" do, then you cannot make a good argument that they mean different things.

 

[dafydd]

1) You're the one trying to redefine known words.

2) Omniscience is an impossibility, so we're not actually talking about reality.

Punshhh will come back with his favourite word. If

 

[Chucky]

Yes I accept the point about free will and omniscience being incompatible. I am saying that omniscience is a nonsense from our perspective and if there were a being with it, we would be presumptuous to claim to know anything about it, other than the few occasions where we make decisions.

The distinction between a free choice and a pre-determined choice would become lost in the detail and the difference in cosmic impact between the few choices I was actually realistically likely to chose from might be so slight that there may be space for a genuinely free choice to be made.

Sure, it's nonsense. The one quibble then, that I have with that previous post, is where I quoted one statement that you made above. I don't see how there could be an either / or as an omniscience must know all there is to be known in an absolute sense. Again, that must be so or omniscience goes away. Because its knowledge would be perfect and invariant that leaves no wiggle room whatsoever for any possibility of free will no matter how many choices as all choices and their outcomes would be known.

As to your other point, I'm not sure why we'd need complete knowledge about the full set to know that the set exists if it did. There is no complete knowledge of anything. Yet we can still confirm empirically the existence of things like electromagnetism which was once mysterious and we can conceive of impossibilities which we assume are impossible. We could know some things about it either way. Without knowing everything there is to know about electromagnetism or infinity still allows us to make reasonable assumptions which could be tested. Then again, it's all about the number of angels dancing on the head of a pin, which is irrelevant in itself which I guess makes knowledge of the potential of omniscience irrelevant.

 

[Tony]

Let's be civil, okay? I don't see any reason for anyone to participate in this discussion except that discussing the topic is interesting to them. Do you?

Ok.

But there is no reason to limit the dialogue that way. If it's all hypothetical, it could be God, a crystal ball, an evil toy, a computer program, or whatever.

I have no problem considering other scenarios. My problem is comparing those other scenarios to omniscience.

So your definition of omniscience is knowledge so vast you don't even have to think about it, you know the answer before the question is even asked?

Total omniscience. You would know the question and the answer before the question is even asked.

How does that work? Are you simultaneously thinking every thought possible at the same time?

It works the same way any knowledge works. I know the capital of Texas is Austin. It doesn't mean I am constantly thinking about it.

I think the definition is unnecessarily limited.

It is only limited because that is how Christians have defined god. They are the ones claiming he is all powerful (omnipotent), all knowing (omniscient). It is only now that religious dissenters are allowed to speak and spread their ideas without the threat of death or oppression by the same Christians that they suddenly want to redefine their god to it more logical so they can appeal to the people who know better.

But there is no causal relationship between knowing the decision and making the decision.

There is no decision. That is the point.

Let me say that again because it's really the heart of my argument. You say that foreknowledge of a decision limits that decision

No, I am not. I am saying absolute foreknowledge of the decision means there is no decision.

I understand your argument perfectly...

What changed my mind? The realization that being able to predict a decision didn't have any effect on the decision making process. the person still has free will because they're still the one making the decisions.

That you see it as a prediction and not a state of absolute foreknowledge (which is what omniscience is) tells me you don't fully understand my position.

 

[AvalonXQ]

How is "will" different from "must" in this situation? In how many cases is "what you will do" different from "what you must do"? You have never made a good case for this distinction.

If what you "will" do results in exactly the same outcome as "what you "must" do, then you cannot make a good argument that they mean different things.

I thought my liquor cabinet analogy made a pretty good argument for the distinction.

Being forced to choose X is very different than voluntarily choosing X. It's a different experience that has a different moral effect on the subject.

But, either way, when constructing a logical syllogism, if you want to assert that "will do X" implies "must do X", please include it as a premise of your argument.

 

[dafydd]

How is "will" different from "must" in this situation? In how many cases is "what you will do" different from "what you must do"? You have never made a good case for this distinction.

If what you "will" do results in exactly the same outcome as "what you "must" do, then you cannot make a good argument that they mean different things.

Careful, asking hard questions that force Avalon to confront his beliefs will cause you to end up on his extensive ignore list.

 

[joobz]

I thought my liquor cabinet analogy made a pretty good argument for the distinction.

Being forced to choose X is very different than voluntarily choosing X. It's a different experience that has a different moral effect on the subject.

But, either way, when constructing a logical syllogism, if you want to assert that "will do X" implies "must do X", please include it as a premise of your argument.

Yet, if we accept the omniscience claim, again the script is written. This includes what you think in process of doing. Hence, even hemming and hawing on a choice is part of the play being acted out.

 

[dafydd]

Total omniscience. You would know the question and the answer before the question is even asked.

How frightfully boring that would be.

 

[Brian-M]

But I leave that "tinkering around" stuff out, because it gets too complex. Is an advertising company "tinkering around" when it plants suggestions in your head? Your teachers? Your parents? So I just chuck all of that. You are the summation of all your inputs, mental and chemical, so regardless of where that input came from, it's still "you". And "you" are doing the choosing based on all your inputs.

Well, I was using the phrase "tinkering around" informally. My original definition on this thread was "Freedom from interference with the internal decision making process". Propaganda and advertisements are external inputs that can be used by the internal decision making process, but don't directly interfere with it. Whether or not chemicals interfere with this might not be as clear cut. Maybe I should add the qualifier "deliberate external" to "interference"?

ETA: But then again, I'm not really attempting to make a formal definition here, merely convey a basic idea. So it's probably best not to over complicate a working definition with too many qualifications and clarifications.

 

[GeeMack]

I thought my liquor cabinet analogy made a pretty good argument for the distinction.

It was pretty feeble.

Being forced to choose X is very different than voluntarily choosing X.

With the existence of a magical atemporal omniscient being, X will be chosen. The "chooser" may perceive free will, but since the outcome of the perceived choice is a given, it's not really free will at all.

It's a different experience that has a different moral effect on the subject.

As others have tried to explain to you, and regardless of your apparent unwillingness to understand those explanations, the different moral effects can only be what-ifs with the existence of a magical atemporal omniscient being. You were going to choose X.

 

[Tricky]

I thought my liquor cabinet analogy made a pretty good argument for the distinction.

Being forced to choose X is very different than voluntarily choosing X. It's a different experience that has a different moral effect on the subject.

But, either way, when constructing a logical syllogism, if you want to assert that "will do X" implies "must do X", please include it as a premise of your argument.

There is no distinction whatsoever.

Is there EVER any difference in the outcome? If not, then there is no effective difference in what you call them. In order for free will to exist, there has to be some possibility of variable outcome.

 

[Tricky]

Well, I was using the phrase "tinkering around" informally. My original definition on this thread was "Freedom from interference with the internal decision making process". Propaganda and advertisements are external inputs that can be used by the internal decision making process, but don't directly interfere with it. Whether or not chemicals interfere with this might not be as clear cut. Maybe I should add the qualifier "deliberate external" to "interference"?

Just toss that stuff out and allow any input. You'll just wind up trying to define "deliberate" . Even a person who is being tortured still has the ability to make choices, but because of the input, the "optimum" choice changes.

ETA: But then again, I'm not really attempting to make a formal definition here, merely convey a basic idea. So it's probably best not to over complicate a working definition with too many qualifications and clarifications.

Understood. My definition is informal and meant for discussion purposes only, not for writing a dictionary. I just thought you had a hobby of collecting these things.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Is there EVER any difference in the outcome? If not, then there is no effective difference in what you call them.

Again, the resulting action by the agent is not the only result. The experience of the agent is also an important result, and that will differ depending on whether the action is chosen or forced.

In order for free will to exist, there has to be some possibility of variable outcome.

There is.
A and B may both be possibilities; they are still both possibilities even if some being has foreknowledge as to which one will be chosen.
Reality is not a Bayesian probability model.

 

[Belz...]

Again, the resulting action by the agent is not the only result. The experience of the agent is also an important result, and that will differ depending on whether the action is chosen or forced.

No one said it was forced. It simply is.

 

[GeeMack]

Again, the resulting action by the agent is not the only result.

Yes, it is. Unless you're redefining omniscience again, or moving the goalposts to add some kind of forked timeline or multiple universe scenario or some such nonsense.

The experience of the agent is also an important result, and that will differ depending on whether the action is chosen or forced.

Absolutely not. Now you're just being sily. The experience of the agent is singular. It's not different from anything other than what-ifs. What-ifs are not components of reality.

There is.
A and B may both be possibilities; they are still both possibilities even if some being has foreknowledge as to which one will be chosen.

No. If some being has foreknowledge as to which one will be chosen, that one is the only possibility. In simplest terms: You are wrong.

Reality is not a Bayesian probability model.

Correct. In the hypothetical situation that some magical atemporal omniscient being exists, that being knows the outcome of any particular situation. It's a given, before the illusion of choice is applied by the agent, and after that alleged choice has been made. A and B are not both possibilities. It was going to turn out the way the omniscient being knew it would.

 

[Tricky]

Again, the resulting action by the agent is not the only result. The experience of the agent is also an important result, and that will differ depending on whether the action is chosen or forced.

Only if the agent is aware of being forced. How would the agent possibly know what is predestined? Sorry. This explanation only holds water if the mortals know as much as the omniscient being.

 

[dafydd]

Only if the agent is aware of being forced. How would the agent possibly know what is predestined? Sorry. This explanation only holds water if the mortals know as much as the omniscient being.

We do know as much as this imaginary being. After all, he/she/it is a human creation.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Only if the agent is aware of being forced. How would the agent possibly know what is predestined? Sorry. This explanation only holds water if the mortals know as much as the omniscient being.

That's a good point. The real question has to do with the difference between a being with actual free will and a being with only the illusion of free will.

 

[Tricky]

That's a good point. The real question has to do with the difference between a being with actual free will and a being with only the illusion of free will.

How can any human possibly tell the difference?

 

[Belz...]

That's a good point. The real question has to do with the difference between a being with actual free will and a being with only the illusion of free will.

Ditto Tricky's question.