Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Piggy]

Not "become conscious". They would be conscious.

No matter how consciousness arises, as long as it is a physical process, that conclusion is inescapable.

If you believe that, then you agree with me.

If consciousness is generated by a physical process, then it can be generated by an analogous physical process.

Which is why conscious machines are not impossible in theory (even if they turn out to be impossible for us to actually build in the real world).

The problem with y'all's "world of the simulation" scenario, however, is that you propose that a machine which isn't physically designed to work like the brain -- but merely to simulate it, which is not at all the same thing -- will produce the consciousness.

This is clearly wrong.

 

[Piggy]

But you don't need to say it is imaginary, either.

If you actually knew wtf we meant by "world of the simulation," or even just "simulation," you might realize this.

In particular, the "world of the simulation" is a bunch of transistors inside a computer. Are you going to claim that these transistors are imaginary, now? I didn't think so.

The "imaginary" part is that, for instance, an entity in that world -- which is just a series of current differences in the transitors where the entity is transiently located in the computer -- should be interpreted as a monster or a ball or whatever else we want to see in the world of the simulation.

But that is the interpretation of the world of the simulation, not the world of the simulation. The world of the simulation is a bunch of transistors.

And I don't think it is particularly enlightening to point out that an "interpretation" is obviously observer dependent, which is what you have been ranting about from day one -- you just don't understand the distinction between the simulation and the interpretation of the simulation.

Then explain what you mean clearly and fully.

If you're saying that the use of virtual machines somehow indicates that computers can be programmed to be conscious, then explain how that happens.

That's all you have to do.

You can complain that I haven't understood something you've failed to lay out, but I don't see what good it does you.

Now here's where you contradict yourself:

But that is the interpretation of the world of the simulation, not the world of the simulation. The world of the simulation is a bunch of transistors.

That being the case, I expect you to stop referring to a "conscious person" inside the "world of the simulation" who perceives that simulated world.

Because when you observe the "bunch of transistors" there is no such person, no such world.

The behavior of those transistors has no function other than what they are physically doing, and what they are physically doing is not the same as what a person's body does, or what the objects in our world do.

The conflation is on your side, not mine.

 

[Piggy]

I'm sorry, I honestly don't see anything controversial in the corrected version aside from the independent issue of whether or not you agree that the necessary causal relationships for consciousness could exist between voltage and current differentials.

If you can manage to get those machine parts doing whatever it is that a brain does to make consciousness happen, then sure, you've got a conscious machine.

No problem.

If we knew how the brain is doing it, we could determine if it's possible for us to actually design and build something similar.

As it is, we can't produce those designs.

 

[Piggy]

The stuff in your computer is transistors. While running a program there are localized differences in current and voltage, that lead to other such differences, in an endless cascade. The causal relationships between all of those changes is easy to see. This is all plain fact.

Whether or not someone wants to interpret those voltage and current differences as a given "thing" is irrelevant to the fact that they are real. Whether or not you want to interpret them as a simulated tornado or anything else is irrelevant. What is relevant is that they are there, they are real, and there are relationships between them.

And if those voltage and current differences exhibit the relationships necessary for consciousness, then they would be conscious. You might disagree on just what is necessary, but you can't disagree that *if* they exhibit those relationships, *then* they are conscious. This is just simple logic, piggy.

That's right.

But it's also true that consciousness is a function of a physical organ, and all our current research clearly indicates that all the physical stuff matters.

You can't simply abstract and "run the logic" of the abstraction and get the real effect in real spacetime.

To do that, you need a functional replica, and computers are not that.

 

[Leumas]

And in case you didn't get it, my earlier post about wishing I had a friend like Data was a joke. I am quite aware that Data is a fictional character and that conscious machines like Data do not exist. I was trying to suggest in a humourous way that if such a machine did exist, he might be able to sort out this thread using a silly simplistic analogy just like they do on Star Trek.

I am sorry... I must have misunderstood you when you said earlier

Would the fact that Data can have dreams and nightmares be evidence of his consciousness?

So you see based on the above appeal to “fact” as “evidence” I assumed that when you said

I just wish I had a friend like Data who could sort it all out with a simplistic analogy, kind of like pushing a lump of dough through a pasta strainer...

You were seriously wishing upon a “fact” that can be presented as “evidence” to counter the argument which you erroneously or deliberately claim

needs a soul?

I am glad you have clarified that you do in fact know the difference between science FICTION and reality and that the fictive character Data is not “fact” and therefore cannot have “dreams and nightmares” and that FICTIVE ASSUMPTIONS about a fictive character having any kind of anything do not constitute any “evidence” of any sort whatsoever against any position of any kind even if it is wrong.

Oh please do explain.

Make sure you use lots of capital letters and bright colours.

And I am sure you will keep using ad hominems and equivocations and red herrings while complaining that people are abusing you because they quote your very own posts.

 

[Piggy]

An open question to all of the anti-computationalist crowd:

In a very restricted view, assume that "consciousness" is what we call it when a person steps out of the way of a car or when a person sees red after looking at a red wall, things like that.

Would you say that the important thing going on there, in the context of consciousness, is that the person moved out of the way of the car, or that the oncoming car caused them to move out of the way?

Would you say that the important thing going on there is that the person saw red after looking at a red wall, or that looking at the red wall caused the person to see red?

Meaning I want to know whether you all think the behaviors of the things or the causal relationships between the behaviors of the things is more important.

None of that makes sense to me. I don't see that you're asking anything answerable here.

 

[Piggy]

So when humans aren't around the world doesn't exist?

The world exists, but sound and color and smell and such don't exist outside of conscious brains.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's an issue because once you start talking about behaviors "we don't particularly care about", then you're dragging the observer back into it.

The fact is, without the observer who knows how to use that machine symbolically, it is, for all intents and purposes, just like a rock.

Wait -- without an observer who knows how to use lifeforms symbolically, they are just like rocks?

Huh?

 

[rocketdodger]

That's right.

But it's also true that consciousness is a function of a physical organ, and all our current research clearly indicates that all the physical stuff matters.

Yeah but not like you seem to think it does.

In particular, the biggest piece of research at all -- observing dead people -- clearly shows that although dead neurons are still neurons, they just don't work correctly.

So I will leave it to you to figure out the difference between living neurons and dead neurons. Hint -- it isn't that one is a neuron and one is not, since they are both neurons.

 

[dlorde]

I am pretty sure that means "within a range of frequencies that the average human is capable of hearing"

Not even that, as in "sounds that only a bat can hear". I don't see the problem of having a sound when there's no-one around to hear it. It could be recorded via a microphone for later playback, or it might otherwise influence the environment in a recoverable way, but OTOH it might not, or you might never know; it's just the name for compression waves in air. It doesn't cease to exist just because you're not there.

 

[rocketdodger]

That being the case, I expect you to stop referring to a "conscious person" inside the "world of the simulation" who perceives that simulated world.

Because when you observe the "bunch of transistors" there is no such person, no such world.

Well, that is my interpretation. Furthermore it is the interpretation of any other human observer. So... those are the terms I use. It is a shortcut for saying "voltage and current differentials that exhibit behavior isomorphisms to a conscious person, among a larger set of voltage and current differentials that exhibit behavior isomorphisms to our external world."

The behavior of those transistors has no function other than what they are physically doing, and what they are physically doing is not the same as what a person's body does, or what the objects in our world do.

That isn't quite correct.

Yes, they do physically different things.

However, the causality between behaviors in the transistors and behaviors of a person's body or objects in our world is isomorphic.

And that means, for instance, if one of the simulated people tripped on a simulated rock, and a real person tripped on a real rock, it would be the same kind of relationships between their behaviors. In particular, both the simulated person and real person would be caused to trip, because of the respective obstacle in their respective worlds.

And if you dispute this, with your observer dependent nonsense, then I have to ask you what you think the transistors running the simulation are doing if not causing behavior changes in each other. Causality isn't observer dependent, piggy.

 

[dlorde]

It's generally agreed that a computer simulation of X will not actually produce X for any given property or system.

Is it? What about a computer simulation of a chess board, chess player, or a calculator? Doesn't those simulations provide the substantive features of chess boards, chess players, and calculators (i.e. a framework for a game of chess, a player of chess, & a device for mathematical calculation respectively) ?

If that's not quite what you meant, can you clarify?

This is something generally considered too obvious to need pointing out. A tornado is the example we're currently using, and it hardly needs to be stated that a computer simulation of a tornado is not a tornado.

ISTM that a tornado is not one of the things that computers can simulate adequately to have the substantive features of the original in the real world.

 

[rocketdodger]

If you can manage to get those machine parts doing whatever it is that a brain does to make consciousness happen, then sure, you've got a conscious machine.

Well I happen to hold the view that what a brain does to make consciousness happen is transition from state to state based on the current state, a specific set of rules, and input.

So in my view any system that is capable of transitioning from state to state based on the current state, the same set of rules, and input, is capable of being conscious just like our brains.

I hold that the actual state when viewed in isolation is completely irrelevant. I hold that the only important factor is the series of transitions, and why the transitions occurred. Meaning I don't even think the configuration of the system is important other than just to support the state transitions.

Now you know my full position, and why I think computers can be conscious.

If you think brains do more than transition from state to state like that, then fine. But you can't argue with my logic, only the premise, because my logic is correct.

 

[dlorde]

When no one is observing the simulator, it's impossible to say there's any simulation going on.

There's only the machine changing states.

When anything in nature is unobserved, it's impossible to say there's anything particular going on - there's only nature changing states... (except you don't know that unless you're observing).

 

[dlorde]

... you propose that a machine which isn't physically designed to work like the brain...

I would suggest that the machine is physically designed to work like the brain - i.e. a single physical processor may well be sufficient (in principle) to work like the brain, given an adequate and sufficient software architecture, memory, data, and I/O support.

You may not agree that it is physically designed to work like the brain, but that's a different argument

 

[westprog]

But the program does cause data to transform in particular ways, and that's where you find your causal relations. All you're doing here is pointing out, in terms of our marble computer, that putting a rocker here doesn't cause the next rocker to be there. And while correct, it's irrelevant. We're going to have something corresponding to the tornado in the computer, and something corresponding to the house. That's not going to be code--it will be data.
But playing the film still doesn't result in the image of the tornado making the image of the house move.

Nor does running the program. There are elements in the program which may or may not correspond to elements in the world being simulated. It's unlikely to be a one-to-one correspondence.

 

[Brainache]

I am sorry... I must have misunderstood you when you said earlier

​

So you see based on the above appeal to “fact” as “evidence” I assumed that when you said

​

If you had bothered to put that post in context, you might have seen that that post was a response to someone asking: "how could we tell if a machine was conscious?". So, using an example of a hypothetically conscious machine, I was asking if dreams and/or nightmares would be considered evidence of consciousness.

You were seriously wishing upon a “fact” that can be presented as “evidence” to counter the argument which you erroneously or deliberately claim

​

I am glad you have clarified that you do in fact know the difference between science FICTION and reality and that the fictive character Data is not “fact” and therefore cannot have “dreams and nightmares” and that FICTIVE ASSUMPTIONS about a fictive character having any kind of anything do not constitute any “evidence” of any sort whatsoever against any position of any kind even if it is wrong.

Let me try this without any confusing hypothetical analogies for you:
Q:How could we tell if a machine was conscious?

A: Not sure, but would dreams/nightmares count as evidence?

I still didn't get an answer, but if you've finished demonstrating how enormously clever you are by needing to have every analogy and pop-culture referrence explained to you, maybe you could offer an opinion?

And I am sure you will keep using ad hominems and equivocations and red herrings while complaining that people are abusing you.

You make several snarky posts about how stupid people must be to not be able to tell the difference between fiction and reality, but you can't even put the posts in context and recognise a hypothetical unless it is explicity explained to you.

Maybe you need to use even bigger type and more blue. That might help, what with me being so stupid and all...

 

[westprog]

Is it? What about a computer simulation of a chess board, chess player, or a calculator? Doesn't those simulations provide the substantive features of chess boards, chess players, and calculators (i.e. a framework for a game of chess, a player of chess, & a device for mathematical calculation respectively) ?

If that's not quite what you meant, can you clarify?

ISTM that a tornado is not one of the things that computers can simulate adequately to have the substantive features of the original in the real world.

The things that a computer can fully simulate to be equivalent to the thing itself are things that are already in the digital realm. An e-book is a book. Online poker is poker. That's because a book is already a digital object, and can be transcribed without loss. The fundamental rules of poker can be digitised. However, a simulated tennis game is not tennis, because tennis isn't part of the digital world*.

Computers are just the latest thing to operate in the digital world, which was invented as a convenient fiction to pretend that different things could be treated as if they were the same thing.

*The digital world is of course not to be considered another world - merely a way to look at our world.

 

[tsig]

Reminds me of the question: "if a tree falls in a forest and no body is around to hear it... does it make a sound?"

The correct answer is no. For a sound to register ears are required.


I dunno. What does the similarity do when the observer goes home for the night?

So when humans aren't around the world doesn't exist?

How drunk is too drunk to post?

Nice, an insult instead of an answer.

 

[westprog]

I would suggest that the machine is physically designed to work like the brain - i.e. a single physical processor may well be sufficient (in principle) to work like the brain, given an adequate and sufficient software architecture, memory, data, and I/O support.

You may not agree that it is physically designed to work like the brain, but that's a different argument

Whatever the similarities may be, it's fairly clear that the physical processes going on in the brain are very different from those going on in the computer.