Explain consciousness to the layman.

[rocketdodger]

Of course, this is being done all the time with human consciousness, albeit for very small temporal differentials, but even at noticeably relativistic speeds, a consciousness would have no trouble interacting with its local environment (its co-moving frame), despite appearing to be clocked at a very much slower or faster rate relative to a distant observer. I don't see this as being fundamentally different from a fast or slow-clocked artificial consciousness interacting with a similarly clocked virtual environment.

It is reassuring to see that I ain't the only one who thinks relativistic effects are pertinent to this conversation.

 

[dlorde]

It is reassuring to see that I ain't the only one who thinks relativistic effects are pertinent to this conversation.

It seems like a reasonable analogy.

 

[Piggy]

As I said, simple, obvious, and entirely wrong.

A simulation is a dynamic process. Books and films are static data. If you change the starting parameters or processing rules of a simulation you get different results. If you change the starting parameters or processing rules of a book or a film... You can't do that, because they don't have any.

It doesn't matter that it's dynamic. This has been covered.

You can't use enough matter and energy for either A or B to happen, and then claim that A and B both happen, unless your descriptions of A and B are identical.

Period.

As we've seen, the matter and energy needed to explain the "reality" of the "world of the simulation" come from the other necessary component in the system -- the designer/reader's brain.

In other words, the "world of the simulation" is entirely imaginary.

If you want to argue otherwise, you're going to have to come up with a valid argument, not your own metaphysics.

To say that the "world of the simulation" is imaginary conforms with the laws of physics, direct observation and measurement, systems theory, and common sense.

Your "world of the simulation" in the simulator machine conforms with none of these.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Piggy:

There's one fundamental flaw with your argument. Basically, it is this--you have no clue what we're claiming.

It doesn't matter that it's dynamic. This has been covered.

Actually, it does matter, because that is precisely what we're talking about. Of course, you don't know this, because you have no clue what we're talking about.

You can't use enough matter and energy for either A or B to happen, and then claim that A and B both happen, unless your descriptions of A and B are identical.

Period.

You have no idea what the discussion is about, and your "A or B" thing is not even a law of physics. I dare you to introduce your "A or B" rule in the science forum.

As we've seen, the matter and energy needed to explain the "reality" of the "world of the simulation" come from the other necessary component in the system -- the designer/reader's brain.

Who is this "we", and what do you think you're arguing against? No, never mind the latter... I really don't care.

Here's what is being claimed. If there is a simulation, then there is necessarily a set of physical entities that have causal relationships that comprise the simulation. Your straw man aside, that is what is being claimed.

For example, let's look at the marble machine again:

Those rockers exist. Those marbles exist. The influence of gravity on those markers is real. The arrangement of this system is real. The marbles really do cause the rockers to move in precise ways. And none of this is "imagination"--it's all real, baby!

Now, you're imagining that somehow we're talking about what those things represent when we're claiming there's real things there. Not exactly--though there has to be certain rules in order for those things to be able to represent something, it's the actual physical entities there, and the way they interact, that we're claiming is real. And, by golly, they are.

In other words, the "world of the simulation" is entirely imaginary.

In this case, the world of the simulation is made of wood, marbles, and gravitational acceleration.

Your "world of the simulation" in the simulator machine conforms with none of these.

The world of the simulation is the application of the laws of physics. Those marbles fall because they have mass, and there's a gravitational field. The rockers move because they interact with the marbles using photons.

 

[westprog]

A film runs by revealing a sequence of pictures. The content of those pictures does not have a causal relation established by the presentation of them; the only causal relation within the projection of a film is that you're going to be presented what is on the next frame at a particular time, regardless of what is on it.

The simulation that runs, on the other hand, is generating the outcome.
No, a causal relation.

I was, for an hour or so, quite taken with this idea. It seemed like there was a real difference - a complete fundamental difference - between a simulation and the other ways to represent a tornado. Then I fixed on the relevant word. It's funny how often, in these discussions, there's one word which reveals a lot.

Is the film, then, supposed to be acausal? Do the frames succeed each other without being made to do so? Obviously not. The film progresses from one state to the next. So does the computation. The usefulness of both is that they are physically isolated systems, so that we can safely predict, given initial conditions, what the end state will be.

There is of course a vast difference between a simulation and a film from a human point of view. A human being can run different data in a program - effectively doing different computations. He has limited capacity to change around the film. (Though it's always open to him to run it backwards, switch scenes, etc).

It has nothing to do with the representations. It has to do with the way those representations are produced. As I said before, you can produce a film using causal relations like this--it can be a film of a simulation. But in that case, it's the simulation, not the film, that produces the causal relations. The film just shows you whatever is on the next frame.

ETA: Oh, and you did in one post recognize the difference between a simulation and a film. It just has to sink in that the difference here is in fact a critical difference. You seem to be focused on everything but the difference between a simulation and a film that makes the simulation a simulation and the film a film; namely, the causal relations within a simulation that produce an outcome. Those causal relations are relations between real entities, and that's your real environment.

Come on... just digest it already. Everything is there. Get your mind out of representations and validity and other red herrings, and instead just look at what is there and what it is doing. Yeah, that! The actual entities causing things to happen... see it yet? If you don't, keep referring back to why you would dare call a thing a simulation in the first place. It'll sink in eventually, if you let it.

But it's okay if it doesn't sink in too. We'll continually point to those entities, and the fact that they are directly implied to exist by the fact that we have a simulation. And that they aren't there for the film. And you'll keep saying that we haven't demonstrated the difference for the film, even though this is entirely true about the simulation and the film. And we'll just keep going for another few thousands of posts.

I'm sure we will. I'll continue to regard the film and the simulation as both being physical systems changing state, and you'll continue to see that something extra in the computer, that gives it a soul.

 

[westprog]

Piggy:

There's one fundamental flaw with your argument. Basically, it is this--you have no clue what we're claiming.

Actually, it does matter, because that is precisely what we're talking about. Of course, you don't know this, because you have no clue what we're talking about.

You have no idea what the discussion is about, and your "A or B" thing is not even a law of physics. I dare you to introduce your "A or B" rule in the science forum.

Who is this "we", and what do you think you're arguing against? No, never mind the latter... I really don't care.

Here's what is being claimed. If there is a simulation, then there is necessarily a set of physical entities that have causal relationships that comprise the simulation. Your straw man aside, that is what is being claimed.

For example, let's look at the marble machine again:

Those rockers exist. Those marbles exist. The influence of gravity on those markers is real. The arrangement of this system is real. The marbles really do cause the rockers to move in precise ways. And none of this is "imagination"--it's all real, baby!

Now, you're imagining that somehow we're talking about what those things represent when we're claiming there's real things there. Not exactly--though there has to be certain rules in order for those things to be able to represent something, it's the actual physical entities there, and the way they interact, that we're claiming is real. And, by golly, they are.

In this case, the world of the simulation is made of wood, marbles, and gravitational acceleration.

The world of the simulation is the application of the laws of physics. Those marbles fall because they have mass, and there's a gravitational field. The rockers move because they interact with the marbles using photons.

Which would be impressive if you could point to any physical system where the changes of state aren't governed by the laws of physics. It's the idea that some very limited set of physical systems consist of a world of their own, but all the others don't, that cannot be justified.

If you were all willing to say "yes, this is a world, and so is this and this" then you might have a starting point. Instead, you make special pleas for certain devices and exclude others, on what appear to be entirely arbitrary grounds.

 

[Pulvinar]

One thing we can deduce from the past 96 pages: there are real limits on what can be explained to a layman.

I hope anyone who's gotten this far in this thread also has time to read Aaron Sloman's excellent paper summarizing the subject:

http://www.worldscinet.com/ijmc/02/0201/S1793843010000424.html

 

[yy2bggggs]

Which would be impressive if you could point to any physical system where the changes of state aren't governed by the laws of physics. It's the idea that some very limited set of physical systems consist of a world of their own, but all the others don't, that cannot be justified.

You're reading too much into the terminology.

Take a step back. Look at what you're doing right now. You're reading a forum. The forum per se consists of posts, arranged on multiple pages. You can go from page to page. You can submit a post, and for a time can edit your own post. While on a page you see only a portion of the page--you can move your mouse to a scroll bar and scroll up and down, or you can push "page up" or "page down"; when you scroll up, the visible part of the page goes down, and when you scroll down, the visible part of the page goes up, as if you're looking at it with a window. Click on a page and you get to another topic.

The proof that this isn't all imagination is that you don't know what I post until you go through a bunch of rigamaroo in order to put my latest post on the visible portion of the screen, and read it. But whatever you read in that post is something that I put there--there's a causal relation between my typing this post and your reading it. Likewise, I have to go scroll over to put your post on the visible portion of my screen and read it to figure out what you reply--so even though I know what I type, I don't know what you type. So the thing isn't all in my head either. If it's "imaginary", then, I wonder who exactly is imagining it.

Now nobody anywhere believes that when I view your post, then scroll up above it, that somewhere beneath my computer screen your post is hanging around. Piggy might think we think that, but he's just lost.

What we do think is that there is an entire system, complete with physical causes, where every last detail--including the fact that you tend to see the same forum that I see--is implemented. This kind of thing needs a name. It's not an imaginary world, because no one person is imagining it, and the states are not being held in minds; they're being held on a series of machines. It is, instead, a large number of abstract states and relations.

It is indeed physical, because there's something real outside of your head that is holding onto these states, and the only place where real things exist is the physical world. But the forums are an abstract object. So we just call this the "world of the simulation".

The only problem here is that you don't like that term. Doesn't matter if you like it--it needs a label, and that's the one we're using. If you come up with a better label, that's fine, but I see nothing wrong with this label, so long as you believe us when we say over and over what we do and don't mean by it. And to ignore the thing altogether is a bigger mistake, because there is definitely something going on here worth discussing.

If you were all willing to say "yes, this is a world, and so is this and this" then you might have a starting point. Instead, you make special pleas for certain devices and exclude others, on what appear to be entirely arbitrary grounds.

There are no special pleas here. We're just trying to tell you what's happening.

A "world of simulation" is simply a term we give to things like this forum that you're posting on right now. There are no properties we're attributing to this thing that this forum doesn't legitimately have.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Is the film, then, supposed to be acausal?

No. Back up:

A film runs by revealing a sequence of pictures. The content of those pictures does not have a causal relation established by the presentation of them; the only causal relation within the projection of a film is that you're going to be presented what is on the next frame at a particular time, regardless of what is on it.​

It's there. See?

I said the film was causal, and indeed it is. But it's only causal in that way. If you see a film of a guy skating and performing a perfect triple axle, the credit for the perfect triple axle goes to either the guy who actually performed it and was filmed, or the special effects guy that made it look like he did. The film itself didn't cause the triple axle.

It did, however, cause something, and that legitimately belongs to the film (and to you, because films exploit optical illusions). It caused you to perceive a guy performing a triple axle.

Do the frames succeed each other without being made to do so?

Since this isn't being claimed, your point's a bit wasted.

A human being can run different data in a program - effectively doing different computations. He has limited capacity to change around the film. (Though it's always open to him to run it backwards, switch scenes, etc).

We can always point to the sequence of those particular images and say that because those images per se were on the film, the illusion of a perceived motion of a man performing a triple axle is produced--and that's legit. But that's all the film is doing--showing a sequence of pictures.

But if we want to discuss how that sequence of images of a man performing a perfect triple axle got onto that film, we need to look outside the film. The film only holds images--it doesn't generate them.

I'm sure we will. I'll continue to regard the film and the simulation as both being physical systems changing state,

See above. This point hasn't quite been digested.

and you'll continue to see that something extra in the computer,

Do you mean something like this?:

There is of course a vast difference between a simulation and a film from a human point of view.

that gives it a soul.

Wrong guy. I'm the one who is unconvinced that you made an argument against a computer having consciousness. This is a completely different position.

 

[Piggy]

Piggy:

There's one fundamental flaw with your argument. Basically, it is this--you have no clue what we're claiming.

Actually, it does matter, because that is precisely what we're talking about. Of course, you don't know this, because you have no clue what we're talking about.

You have no idea what the discussion is about, and your "A or B" thing is not even a law of physics. I dare you to introduce your "A or B" rule in the science forum.

All very nice.

But no, it makes no difference that it's a dynamic representation, because it's still a representation. There are no Pinocchio points, I'm afraid.

Who is this "we", and what do you think you're arguing against? No, never mind the latter... I really don't care.

Here's what is being claimed. If there is a simulation, then there is necessarily a set of physical entities that have causal relationships that comprise the simulation. Your straw man aside, that is what is being claimed.

That's not anything I've ever objected to.

I don't believe anybody has.

But I'm wondering if maybe you're not fully aware of what other folks in the computational camp have been claiming lo these many years.

In any case, of course that's true. No one's claiming otherwise.

For example, let's look at the marble machine again:

Those rockers exist. Those marbles exist. The influence of gravity on those markers is real. The arrangement of this system is real. The marbles really do cause the rockers to move in precise ways. And none of this is "imagination"--it's all real, baby!

Now, you're imagining that somehow we're talking about what those things represent when we're claiming there's real things there. Not exactly--though there has to be certain rules in order for those things to be able to represent something, it's the actual physical entities there, and the way they interact, that we're claiming is real. And, by golly, they are.

Yeah, but by golly, you're not saying anything there that makes any difference.

The machine is real, the marbles are real, the parts really move, marbles really fall. I don't sense any disagreement in the room about that.

And when you talk about this physical system "representing" some other system, we don't disagree either... unless you side with Pixy and Dodger and begin claiming that the representation can be the context for anything we might describe as "real" in any way.

Once you do that, of course, you've left physics and are off in metaphysics.

In this case, the world of the simulation is made of wood, marbles, and gravitational acceleration.

The world of the simulation is the application of the laws of physics. Those marbles fall because they have mass, and there's a gravitational field. The rockers move because they interact with the marbles using photons.

You're using the term "world of the simulation" here in a different way from Pixy and Dodger and others, who claim that there can be conscious beings inside such a world who perceive that world as the universe they inhabit.

As you state clearly in your post, which I'm glad you've made, only the marble machine is real, although we use it to represent other things.

The things they represent may exist somewhere, or may be imaginary, it doesn't matter.

We have set up the representation, which isn't in the machine -- only the machine is in the machine -- but rather it is in our minds when we observe the machine and read the representation.

Pretty simple stuff, no?

 

[Piggy]

Now nobody anywhere believes that when I view your post, then scroll up above it, that somewhere beneath my computer screen your post is hanging around. Piggy might think we think that, but he's just lost.

What we do think is that there is an entire system, complete with physical causes, where every last detail--including the fact that you tend to see the same forum that I see--is implemented. This kind of thing needs a name. It's not an imaginary world, because no one person is imagining it, and the states are not being held in minds; they're being held on a series of machines. It is, instead, a large number of abstract states and relations.

It is indeed physical, because there's something real outside of your head that is holding onto these states, and the only place where real things exist is the physical world. But the forums are an abstract object. So we just call this the "world of the simulation".

The only problem here is that you don't like that term. Doesn't matter if you like it--it needs a label, and that's the one we're using. If you come up with a better label, that's fine, but I see nothing wrong with this label, so long as you believe us when we say over and over what we do and don't mean by it. And to ignore the thing altogether is a bigger mistake, because there is definitely something going on here worth discussing.

There are no special pleas here. We're just trying to tell you what's happening.

A "world of simulation" is simply a term we give to things like this forum that you're posting on right now. There are no properties we're attributing to this thing that this forum doesn't legitimately have.

But here's the problem with that.

Folks like Pixy and Dodger go way beyond this.

As does anyone who claims that "people" who are "inside" a "simulation" like this could really in some way "become conscious" and begin to "perceive" the "world of the simulation" as the world in which they live.

I'm not the one saying that the "post is hanging around" when it's offscreen.

What Westprog and Leumas and I and others are simply saying is that when the "post" is offscreen, there is no "post" at all.

What this means is that the "post" only exists when someone's reading it... otherwise, it's just a meaningless garble.

A garble which began as a thought in someone's head, yes, but it's no longer a thought and it's no longer in someone's head and it only means anything if someone who knows how to read it reads it.

The same is true of your simulation.

So yes, we can talk about a "world of the simulation", and as I've said many times before, it's not only useful but often necessary.

But once you start talking about the things inside a "world of the simulation" running real-world objects or becoming conscious... then you've move away from physics and into metaphysics.

What's real is the simulator.

The world of the simulation is indeed in your head.

 

[westprog]

A garble which began as a thought in someone's head, yes, but it's no longer a thought and it's no longer in someone's head and it only means anything if someone who knows how to read it reads it.

This is why I brought in the book about tornadoes. Everyone agrees that the book contains information. However, nobody* thinks that this information has any significance except as interpreted by a human being. If a book isn't being read, it might as well be blank. For some reason, people don't think this about computer programs. They think that the information, and the informational processes, have some kind of human independent existence.

IMO, the workings of the computer have the same informational significance as the showing of the film. It's informational because people are getting information from it. If nobody looks at the film, it's not carrying information. Nor is the simulation.

I've yet to see any property assigned to the simulation that doesn't also pertain to the film, or even the book. If the processes in the simulation are supposed to be able to produce consciousness, then why not the film?

I should also note that this special property (and I'm still unclear what it's supposed to be) applies to a tornado effect produced by Sonic as much as a forecasting tool from the National Weather Centre. It also isn't supposed to apply to a high-definition film about tornadoes from National Geographic.

 

[westprog]

No. Back up:

A film runs by revealing a sequence of pictures. The content of those pictures does not have a causal relation established by the presentation of them; the only causal relation within the projection of a film is that you're going to be presented what is on the next frame at a particular time, regardless of what is on it.​

It's there. See?

And the causal nature of the simulation is no different. It takes a starting state, and produces images (or other output). The simulation doesn't produce anything that is not entirely inherent in its starting conditions and data, exactly as with the film.

I said the film was causal, and indeed it is. But it's only causal in that way. If you see a film of a guy skating and performing a perfect triple axle, the credit for the perfect triple axle goes to either the guy who actually performed it and was filmed, or the special effects guy that made it look like he did. The film itself didn't cause the triple axle.

It did, however, cause something, and that legitimately belongs to the film (and to you, because films exploit optical illusions). It caused you to perceive a guy performing a triple axle.
Since this isn't being claimed, your point's a bit wasted.
We can always point to the sequence of those particular images and say that because those images per se were on the film, the illusion of a perceived motion of a man performing a triple axle is produced--and that's legit. But that's all the film is doing--showing a sequence of pictures.

But if we want to discuss how that sequence of images of a man performing a perfect triple axle got onto that film, we need to look outside the film. The film only holds images--it doesn't generate them.
See above. This point hasn't quite been digested.

If you put a DVD in a player and switch it on, it will generate images, by any reasonable definition of "generate images". In fact, the process of generating an image from the digital data compressed in MPEG format on the disc might be extremely similar to the process of running a simulation. A DVD played is undoubtedly a computer, and the images are stored as changes to the previous version. I suppose that one could get in a tangle about whether a DVD can be said to create a world like a simulation given that it uses a computational process. I don't get into that tangle because I don't think that there's a world of the simulation, or the DVD, or the videotape, or the strip of film with a light shining through it. They all generate images, using a predefined processes. The information stored is retrieved when seen, or
otherwise experienced, by a human being.

Maybe the reason that the point hasn't been digested is that it is not, in fact, digestible.

Do you mean something like this?:

I've always said that the significance of the simulation and the film and the book are as interpreted by human beings. The difference is not objective or physical.

 

[westprog]

One thing we can deduce from the past 96 pages: there are real limits on what can be explained to a layman.

I hope anyone who's gotten this far in this thread also has time to read Aaron Sloman's excellent paper summarizing the subject:

http://www.worldscinet.com/ijmc/02/0201/S1793843010000424.html

It seems like another attempt to separate out the aspects of consciousness which are difficult and interesting, and to present it as a data processing issue.

 

[yy2bggggs]

But no, it makes no difference that it's a dynamic representation, because it's still a representation. There are no Pinocchio points, I'm afraid.

Actually, this is the exact opposite of what is true. It makes no difference that it's "still a representation", because being a representation is neither here nor there. Would you consider a pawn in a game of chess conscious? If not, consider that you can play chess using live people. And one of those live people can be a representation of that pawn. Being a representation in the sense you're describing is actually the irrelevant feature.

What's relevant is the fact that there are real physical entities interacting with each other--the thing that makes it a dynamic system. Because that is something that's not just a matter of representation--that's a matter of real things doing real things. And real things doing real things does make us conscious. Now you might not think that those particular real things doing those particular real things can generate a conscious mind, but that's another argument. And you're quite welcome to make that argument--at least then you'll actually be addressing the point.

The problem here is, you don't even know what it is the opposition is arguing. The fact that you think being a representation is the relevant feature and being a dynamic one is the irrelevant one strongly demonstrates that you haven't a clue what is even being argued in the first place.

That's not anything I've ever objected to.

I know you don't object to it, but that's not the issue. The issue is that you don't realize that this thing you don't object to as being real is the thing these people are claiming is real.

But I'm wondering if maybe you're not fully aware of what other folks in the computational camp have been claiming lo these many years.

But of course you're wondering that, because you have gotten it wrong all these years. And this isn't a "tu quoque"; I've seen these people explicitly deny your impression of "what other folks in the computational camp have been claiming [all] these many years." And call me silly, but I think they're a better reference on what they're claiming than you are.

Yeah, but by golly, you're not saying anything there that makes any difference.

Sure it does. It makes all of the difference in the world.

And when you talk about this physical system "representing" some other system, we don't disagree either... unless you side with Pixy and Dodger and begin claiming that the representation can be the context for anything we might describe as "real" in any way.

But this directly contradicts your statement above, because if you really do think those marbles, the gravitational attraction, and the rockers are real, then I have news for you. That is a context for something that we have just agreed on is real in precisely the way you agreed on it.

You're using the term "world of the simulation" here in a different way from Pixy and Dodger and others, who claim that there can be conscious beings inside such a world who perceive that world as the universe they inhabit.

No I'm not. You just haven't understood their claim over all of these years. The way I'm using the term "world of the simulation" is the way they're using it--they're just claiming that the requisite relationships are all it takes to generate a conscious entity, and that the things that relate to each other aren't so relevant. Whether you believe this or not is another story, but you're not at the point to where you even have the argument right yet.

The things they represent may exist somewhere, or may be imaginary, it doesn't matter.

They are using the word "represent" in a different way than you might think. See the above. The physical marbles falling into that machine relate in very particular ways--it is the ways that they relate that are critical to the arguments the computational camp are advancing.

We have set up the representation, which isn't in the machine -- only the machine is in the machine -- but rather it is in our minds when we observe the machine and read the representation.

But the machine is an instantiation of a process. It has to perform all of the steps right by properly applying some sort of rule--such is the trick to getting the machine to do what we want.

The representation, in the sense you're using it, is merely our means of exploiting what the machine does. In the particular case where we build the machine, we know what it does because we built it--but the same idea is employed in "natural machines" that we didn't build in the first place.

So we have calculators and chess games. And we have radiometrics and dendrochronology. In all cases, you just have a system where there are parts that are regularly applying rules, and so long as you map your representations to the behaviors properly, it works precisely because these rules are applied.

What do you make of the notion that the number of rings in a tree's cross section indicates its age in years?

 

[yy2bggggs]

IMO, the workings of the computer have the same informational significance as the showing of the film. It's informational because people are getting information from it. If nobody looks at the film, it's not carrying information. Nor is the simulation.

Is the tornado itself carrying information? If not, where does information come from?

 

[yy2bggggs]

And the causal nature of the simulation is no different.

You're wobbling back and forth. You said you recognize that there's a big difference between a simulation and a film. Now you're saying there's no causal difference.

What, then, is the difference? You explain it to me this time.

 

[Piggy]

Actually, this is the exact opposite of what is true. It makes no difference that it's "still a representation", because being a representation is neither here nor there. Would you consider a pawn in a game of chess conscious? If not, consider that you can play chess using live people. And one of those live people can be a representation of that pawn. Being a representation in the sense you're describing is actually the irrelevant feature.

What's relevant is the fact that there are real physical entities interacting with each other--the thing that makes it a dynamic system. Because that is something that's not just a matter of representation--that's a matter of real things doing real things. And real things doing real things does make us conscious. Now you might not think that those particular real things doing those particular real things can generate a conscious mind, but that's another argument. And you're quite welcome to make that argument--at least then you'll actually be addressing the point.

Holy moly, this is exactly what we've been arguing this whole time.

This is precisely what we've been talking about -- whether "those particular real things doing those particular real things can generate a conscious mind"... and this is the first time you seem to be even remotely aware of that fact.

In fact, this is the only question that matters. Any representational function that anyone might have hung onto those real things doing real things, well, they just don't matter.

And your "live people" example makes no difference at all. Unless you believe that using "live people" actually makes them into chess pawns in some objective sense, whereas using bits of non-living material does not.

 

[Piggy]

No I'm not. You just haven't understood their claim over all of these years. The way I'm using the term "world of the simulation" is the way they're using it--they're just claiming that the requisite relationships are all it takes to generate a conscious entity, and that the things that relate to each other aren't so relevant. Whether you believe this or not is another story, but you're not at the point to where you even have the argument right yet.

No, I understand the claim. We don't see that part differently.

The problem is, though, that the evidence is squarely against them.

(Not that y'all have to deal with any such evidence as long as you stick to your fields.)

I'm reading Sloman's paper that was linked up thread, on phenomenal versus access consciousness, and making notes. So far it's not looking good for Sloman.

And I've seen a lot of references here to what Sloman's discussing regarding virtual machines, but so far no coherent argument that it relates to consciousness at all.

At the moment, Sloman is claiming that a failure to understand a phenomenon well enough to properly model it is therefore a failure to identify the phenomenon... sounds familiar.

 

[Piggy]

They are using the word "represent" in a different way than you might think. See the above. The physical marbles falling into that machine relate in very particular ways--it is the ways that they relate that are critical to the arguments the computational camp are advancing.

I'm not saying that the parts of the machine don't relate in those ways.

Of course they do.

It wouldn't work the way we want it to if it didn't.

So no one is disputing that.

But they also relate in all sorts of ways that you're ignoring because they're irrelevant to the way you want to use the machine.