Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Darat]

I never said that you said that it's "impossible for the brain to produce a reference". What I said was that I can apply your argument to the brain, knowing that it does in fact produce reference, and I have no way to stop it from getting that conclusion save special pleading.

This is called a "sanity check", Piggy, not putting words in your mouth. The test of your theory about the impossibility of computers to do X is how well that theory explains an actual impossibility; the way this sanity check works is to apply the argument to something that does in fact do X and see if it concludes that it, too, is impossible. The problem occurs because there's no stopping point in the argument... it plows right through the brain and reaches that conclusion. Unless we add special pleading, of course.

...snip...

Or we recognise that what we thought we were looking at isn't actually what we thought it was.

 

[punshhh]

If you feel all life has a degree of consciousness and intelligence, you might as well say it directly. I think that attenuates the utility of the words to an extreme, but I do like the sound of 'personal chemical integrity' - something we should all maintain

I do consider that all life has a rudimentary consciousness and intelligence, using my definition of consciousness.

However there is no agreed definition in use here. So I am pointing to what we can deduce about the one form of consciousness that we can examine.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Or we recognise that what we thought we were looking at isn't actually what we thought it was.

Well, if I know how the brain does it, I have an explanation. If I have an explanation, it's going to be in terms of the only things I can use to explain things--conceptual entities that have particular behaviors. But once I get there, I can talk about the entity representing a particular intension as if it can map to anything I'd like to map it to. And thus the argument applies, and I conclude it impossible, because it can map to more than one thing.

The problem is that even the intensions we in practice use can be mapped to anything by an observer. The observer's mappings, however, should be a non-sequitur--but for Piggy, it kills the explanation--which means the brain doesn't work this way (where "this way" is whichever way this theory, wlg, explains it).

In practice, though, it's not the guy looking at my brain that performs the association between the cup and the thing I reach out and touch. It's me. So the fact that that guy's brain can assign those symbols however it wants to is irrelevant.

What saves Piggy is that he cannot reach this absurdity, because he doesn't have an explanation for how the brain performs a reference. But what kills Piggy's argument is that it doesn't matter what the explanation ultimately will be--his argument applies and concludes the mappings impossible. I know it necessarily applies because I can actually map any person's intensions to anything in precisely the same way he can map any physical symbol in his android to anything.

So it doesn't really matter if it works how we thought it was, or some other way. We get Piggy's argument applying simply from the fact that some third party knows how it works. Once we get there, to be consistent, we're forced to appeal to how that third party associates symbols.

The fact that I'm declaring that this cup I'm touching is what I mean by my cup doesn't even play into it. In order to get that sort of thing into play, you have to recognize that the android's declaring that the cup it is touching is what it means by cup plays into it.

Incidentally, this entire piece of discussion is about semantics, not consciousness per se. So punshhh in this case is right; we can perform these semantic associations between a sign and a particular extension without conscious awareness.

 

[punshhh]

I never said that you said that it's "impossible for the brain to produce a reference". What I said was that I can apply your argument to the brain, knowing that it does in fact produce reference, and I have no way to stop it from getting that conclusion save special pleading.

This is called a "sanity check", Piggy, not putting words in your mouth. The test of your theory about the impossibility of computers to do X is how well that theory explains an actual impossibility; the way this sanity check works is to apply the argument to something that does in fact do X and see if it concludes that it, too, is impossible. The problem occurs because there's no stopping point in the argument... it plows right through the brain and reaches that conclusion. Unless we add special pleading, of course.

There's nothing to break down when applying your argument to the brain, though. Not only am I forced to conclude that the "right big toe" in that warm fleshy bit could be about anything, but, it's actually right. We have to perform work to figure out how our existing knowledge is a dual of some other thing--a simple reassignment of the same concepts works beautifully a lot more often than our ability to know that the reassignment is possible.

But if I actually reach out and touch a cup, I can say that this is the thing I mean by "my cup". I can pick it up. What is happening here is that I'm referencing the real cup, but I only do that using my brain. My brain has a model of the cup, and that's tied to reality via the percept of the cup, which also happens in my brain, and is related to that model. And it plays into my model of how I move, and how I trigger brain processes, such that when I reach out and touch it, I know that it's touching the thing I mean by the cup.

There's no problem accounting for this at all. The only problem here is that given this account, we're forced to conclude that an android can do it. And since you don't want to conclude that, you're left holding your magic beans.

I don't want to interrupt this delightful discourse. But I would like to point out something about consciousness, drawing from my definition*.

What has barely been mentioned in the thread and what is perhaps the crux of the issue is that quality of consciousness which distinguishes a point of presence in the physical realm closely allied with a sense of being (in the present) in the mind and body of the conscious entity.

This quality is present in many animals, including some with very simple intelligence.

Such qualities and there are more seem to be aspects of life and without life are likely to be "soulless" automatons.


*Consciousness = an emergent quality of life forms.

 

[yy2bggggs]

The question yy2bggggs is trying to get you to answer -- and I think everyone else would like to know as well -- is why you think it is impossible for a computer to produce a reference but not impossible for a brain. Given that you freely admit that you have no idea how a brain does it.

That's the elephant in the room, yes. How can Piggy conclude that computation cannot produce reference if he doesn't even know what reference is?

 

[dlorde]

Our brains certainly are not simulator machines in the sense that, say, a flight simulator is a simulator machine -- that is, it's not designed to trigger another brain to imagine things.

No, it simulates reality as a basis for its own actions.

And when we talk about the non-conscious brain, which is where we must begin when we ask how consciousness evolved and how it's generated, then we certainly cannot talk about any simulation taking place (the necessary components are not there).

Doesn't the subconscious brain make use of the simulation (model) of reality that is generated from perception? What else has it to base its projections and actions on?

Yes, there's a cascade of reactions when, say, light bounces off a tree and onto my eyes. There may be an involuntary response, such as squinting, but that involves no simulation of anything.

That sounds like a simple reflex.

And we'd be making a mistake to claim that this cascade of activity in my head "is an image of a tree" or "is a representation of a tree" as far as the work of the non-conscious brain is concerned.

Why? leaving aside the symbolic label 'tree', are you suggesting the subconscious mind can't categorise, can't recognise a tree? Do you think it's only your consciousness that does all this symbolic processing? Do you think you are consciously aware of all this, all the time? Haven't you ever acted on 'autopilot'?

It's only when the brain performs an experience (i.e. when it is "consciously aware of the tree") that we can begin to discuss the performance of colors and textures and smells and such, and only then does it make sense to speak of representations or simulations.

Are you saying there is no experience without conscious awareness of experience? Would you maintain that your subconscious brain cannot experience, and cannot learn?

...the conscious brain does act like a simulator, because the physical activity of the brain is not the same as either the experience it produces or the target of that experience (absolutely nothing about your experience of a tree is present in the tree, and your brain does not behave like a tree).

So, you've changed your mind about this?

.. your brain isn’t a simulator machine.

I would suggest that it isn't the conscious brain that does the simulation; the conscious brain often becomes aware of being misled and/or confused by the poor correlation between the simulation and reality (i.e. subsequent perceptions don't match the model).

 

[Piggy]

Yet that is what your whole argument boils down to - an anthropomorphic metaphor i.e. "conciousness"!

Oh, give me a break.

Your arguments are not even arguments.

 

[Piggy]

"Performing this action" in the neural network results in that toe moving back and forth. What is "that toe"? Well, it's defined by your perception of the toe--which is a representation within that warm fleshy bit between your ears of the toe.

Wrong again.

And conflating again.

A behavior of the brain results, eventually, in a movement of a toe.

What is that toe? It's a flesh-and-blood thing, not a representation.

Now, if you want to talk about your experience of your own toe, that's another ball of wax. But your experience of your own toe is not what your actual toe is.

 

[Piggy]

Well, I see the issue here -- you just redefined "simulation" willy-nilly and expect everyone to understand wtf you are talking about, yet you yourself don't even know.

Look at these two quotes you force me to dig from your mega post:



So you are saying the simulation "runs on" the simulator, and the simulator "runs" the simulation, but that the simulation is taking place "in" the brain of the observer?

Man I am really confused now...

I agree that you are confused.

And if you would simply stop conflating reality and symbols, your confusion would end.

The simulation requires both a simulator and a designer/observer to work, or even to exist.

Replications do not.

There is no way around that.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Wrong again.

And conflating again.

It's not wrong. You're just ignoring the most important part of it.

A behavior of the brain results, eventually, in a movement of a toe.

But the reference isn't on your foot--it's in your brain. Your brain is doing the defining, not your foot. Your brain has to recognize that toe, or there is no reference.

The referencing is done by the brain, not the toe.

What is that toe? It's a flesh-and-blood thing, not a representation.

No representation, no reference. Your confusing the intension and the extension. If you kill me, there's no more reference to my toe.

But the toe is still there.

Now, if you want to talk about your experience of your own toe, that's another ball of wax. But your experience of your own toe is not what your actual toe is.

That's your straw man, yep. I used quotes for a reason, though.

There's definitely a conflation going on here, but not on this end. I know the difference between a reference and a referent.

 

[rocketdodger]

And if you would simply stop conflating reality and symbols, your confusion would end.

I don't know what you mean, I haven't even mentioned "symbols" in any of my posts, other than when I quote "symbolic logic," which I also don't even know what it means.

I bet you are going to tell me that even though I don't know what you are talking about, I am still doing it. Eh?

The simulation requires both a simulator and a designer/observer to work, or even to exist.

Ok, that is fine.

But then what do you want to call the stuff happening in the computer after the programmer goes home for the night ?

I mean, it is different than what was happening in the computer before the programmer started it up. I can prove it is different, by just showing you that the computer uses more energy while it is doing this stuff. So at the very least we can call it something, do you not agree?

Replications do not.

There is no way around that.

But there is something about this that I think you still haven't addressed.

If I run a simulation of a tornado, and I output the results to a huge screen, from a distance the photons coming from the screen are almost identical in behavior to the photons coming from the tornado. If you want I can even add a pretty sky, a forest in the background. Then the photons coming from a given chunk of the horizon -- where the screen is -- are almost identical in behavior to the photons that would be coming from that chunk of the sky if there were no simulation + screen.

And I don't mean "identical" just to a human observer. They have very similar wavelengths and hence very similar energy, they are aligned in very similar ways, their numbers are very similar, etc. For all practical purposes the simulation has led to a change in the photons bouncing around our world that is very similar to the change that a real tornado makes.

So what do you call that, if it isn't "working?" Even more to the point, what do you call that, if not "existing?"

Saying that something which is producing some actual changes to the world, changes that are very similar to some of those than a tornado would cause, is neither "working" nor "existing" seems absurd to me.

I really want to hear your answer to this because I honestly don't see how your entire argument holds water even in such an easy to imagine scenario. Maybe I am crazy, I dunno.

 

[yy2bggggs]

To phrase this another way, Piggy, there's a feedback loop between what our brain causes the toes to do and what the brain perceives it is doing, and this allows the brain to infer that its own action is about the thing it perceives. The actual toe is part of this loop--that's part of how this kind of reference works. But you cannot stop at the toe wiggling in an account of reference. You must keep going until you get to the brain knowing that it is wiggling.

 

[tsig]

Man I wish I knew how to include that laughing dog gif.

I feel bad for yy2bggggs because he took the time to not only read your mega post but also to respond inline, which probably took him at least 30 minutes. And you are writing it off with this "I'm afraid it's a non-starter" dodge?

But I hope he takes some comfort in knowing that it was a very good response and anyone who takes the time to read it will instantly forget everything you said in your mega post.



Well, he isn't talking about vending machines. He is talking about consciousness and symbolic logic.

You don't think the terms "recognizes," "tokens," and "values" have anything to do with consciousness and/or symbolic logic?

It's in the Smilies under Special.

 

[tsig]

At the moment, yes. With research, those ways become less mysterious. And although with regard to consciousness the brain's ways are much less mysterious than they were a generation ago, we still don't have answers to the most important questions. Of course, one is free to pretend otherwise and simply believe that these problems have been solved when they haven't, but that leads one into a territory rife with dragons.

What do you think is the most important question?

 

[Piggy]

But the reference isn't on your foot--it's in your brain. Your brain is doing the defining, not your foot. Your brain has to recognize that toe, or there is no reference.

This is why I can't have conversations with you.

You don't appear to even try to follow the flow of thought.

What I'm doing here is to distinguish between what's going on in the brain and what's going on in the toe.

As usual, you simply ignore half of that equation.

Whenever I try to have discussions with you, this is where it ends up, with anything I say about the real world re-interpreted as if that is not what I had intended to discuss.

Yes, what you're saying makes sense if you happen to be talking about something that I wasn't discussing.

 

[Piggy]

What do you think is the most important question?

The two most important questions are:

What exactly is the brain doing when it performs any given experience? (Which is to say, what are the neural correlates of experience?)

Why is any given nueral correlate associated with the particular experience it correlates with, rather than some other experience, or none at all?

 

[Piggy]

To phrase this another way, Piggy, there's a feedback loop between what our brain causes the toes to do and what the brain perceives it is doing, and this allows the brain to infer that its own action is about the thing it perceives.

It's a bit more complex than that.

First, it's more of a feedback system, with loops in loops in loops, but I'm sure you know that.

More importantly, only part of the brain can "infer that its own action is about the thing it perceives"... most of the brain has no idea and doesn't care.

And even the part that is aware that "my toe is moving" isn't actually aware of anything that's actually true about the toe. It performs an experience which allows it to interact with the world and help control the body, but all of that experience is unique to the performance of the organ.

The actual toe is part of this loop--that's part of how this kind of reference works. But you cannot stop at the toe wiggling in an account of reference. You must keep going until you get to the brain knowing that it is wiggling.

Yes, but let's look at the middle part of this scene here.... Most of the brain has no concept of any toe or any wiggling. And the part that does has a lag of at least a half second.

In other words, even in the brain, there is no "reference" until late in the game.

 

[Piggy]

I know the difference between a reference and a referent.

And that's part of your problem.

You're viewing the entire system in terms of references and referents.

This is a rather 19th century way of looking at the brain.

As the light bouncing off a tree hits my eyes and causes cascades of neural activity, there is, at first, no reference to anything... there is only physical behavior caused by other physical behavior.

For the same reason, there is no "image of the moon" reflected on a pond until and unless someone's there to consciously see it.

Once my brain performs the experience of seeing a tree, however, then we can start speaking about referents and references... although I still would not recommend it.

If I dream about a tree, what is the "referent" of that experience?

 

[Piggy]

That's the elephant in the room, yes. How can Piggy conclude that computation cannot produce reference if he doesn't even know what reference is?

As I've said, if you insist on viewing the process through this prism, you are going to distort your view of what's going on.

These terms carry a lot of baggage.

And the unconscious brain doesn't have any storage bins to hold it, I'm afraid.

 

[Piggy]

Why? leaving aside the symbolic label 'tree', are you suggesting the subconscious mind can't categorise, can't recognise a tree? Do you think it's only your consciousness that does all this symbolic processing? Do you think you are consciously aware of all this, all the time? Haven't you ever acted on 'autopilot'?

Are you saying there is no experience without conscious awareness of experience? Would you maintain that your subconscious brain cannot experience, and cannot learn?

There's no reason for the subconscious mind to "recognize" a tree as a tree, and if it could, it's difficult to see what consciousness evolved to do.

But that said, our non-conscious minds are engaging in imagination constantly.

It's just that our non-conscious brain has no way of knowing or understanding or caring about what it is imagining.

And we know that our non-conscious minds can learn. That's been proven in the lab.

As for experience, no, there is no experience -- which I've been using as shorthand for "conscious experience" on this thread -- without consciousness, because consciousness = experience = experiencer.