Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Beelzebuddy]

So an interest in consciousness inextricably leads to a belief in magic - and the only way to have a sensible theory is to find the subject boring?

Did I say any of that?

 

[3bz]

Sure, keeping in mind that I'm not a neurologist or biophysicist!

There are two factors here: The strength of the EM field produced by neurons, and their sensitivity to EM fields.

First point to be made is that neural activity definitely does produce an EM field and neurons definitely do respond to EM fields, so the problem relates to relative field strengths, not a basic error of fact.

A good place to start is to compare EEG^WP and MEG with TMS. The first two sense brain waves; the last alters them with magnetic fields.

From the former article:



These fields generally oscillate in the range of a few tens of hertz, similar to household wiring. However, even when measured within the brain itself, the voltage is on the order of 10,000 times lower than domestic AC.

Field strength falls off with the square of distance. This means any live electric circuit within 100 times the width of your brain will have a similar effect on you as your brain's own electrical fields, and anything closer will be proportionally stronger.

Just sitting around at home - and ignoring high-voltage devices and electromagnets - your brain is constantly exposed to electric fields of similar frequency ranges to the ones it produces and 100 times stronger.

When we compare magnetic fields, the situation becomes even clearer:





An MRI magnet is on the order of 1 Tesla. The brain's alpha rhythm is on the order of 1 picoTesla. (Both measured at the scalp.)

So normal background magnetic noise is about 100,000 times stronger than the brain's own magnetic field, and the field strength required to produce clearly observable effects on neural activity is 10,000,000 times stronger than that.

In all, the field strength required to influence the brain's activity is a trillion times what the brain actually produces.

Guesswork is fine, but not when research on the topic already exists:
http://www.med.yale.edu/neurobio/mccormick/pubs/fields.pdf

 

[Piggy]

PixyMisa's definition of consciousness isn't used by people who actually study consciousness, because people who use his definition don't see consciousness qua consciousness as being worthy of study. Those who do tend to gravitate to one or more magic bean theories.

No, those who do study consciousness tend to gravitate to neurobiology, because that's the field which naturally studies it.

And they're the ones who are making progress, like figuring out how to communicate w/ people who are "locked in" and expanding what we know about NCCs.

If you use PixyMisa's definition, then of course you're not interested in studying what you call "consciousness qua consciousness", because you don't have the tools to study it.

 

[dlorde]

Have a look here

Thanks. Either my recall isn't what it was, or I missed that first time round
So what was the problem with the references in that link?

ETA: What does YYMV stand for?

It's a typo for YMMV (Your Mileage May Vary). Sorry 'bout that.

 

[Piggy]

Humans are fallible and sometimes the safeties fail.

Fortunately for us, the laws of physics don't seem to be as fickle.

The odds of us creating a conscious machine -- or any sort of conscious entity -- by accident, except in the biological sense in which it happens every day, are pretty much nil.

My concern is that the trick, when we figure it out, will have been deceptively simple all along, and suddenly we will find ourselves having to deal with a truly frightening power.

 

[Piggy]

Pixy never claimed that conscious computer programs are a 'peer reviewed scientifically proven fact', only that, because they have SRIP, they are conscious by the definition he provides. I myself have written programs involving SRIP, which are conscious by that definition.

Why do y'all imagine that you get to simply draft your own DIY definition of consciousness, and then say things based on that idiosyncratic definition -- which does not work when applied to the only object we know is capable of consciousness -- and chalk it up as having said something about real consciousness?

Where do you get that?

How do you believe that this can work?

 

[Piggy]

http://www.med.yale.edu/neurobio/mccormick/pubs/fields.pdf

Thanks much for the link to the paper.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

No, those who do study consciousness tend to gravitate to neurobiology, because that's the field which naturally studies it.

Implying that all neurobiologists subscribe to the magic bean theory?

It seems to me both sides of this debate suffer from some implicit appeal to authority. That is, both sides see the existing body of knowledge primarily supporting their argument, except for a few kooks who disagree. Case in point: the multiple times people have cited the neurobiologists' saying that consciousness has "not yet become a scientific term that can be defined" as evidence their their definition is correct.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Why do y'all imagine that you get to simply draft your own DIY definition of consciousness, and then say things based on that idiosyncratic definition -- which does not work when applied to the only object we know is capable of consciousness -- and chalk it up as having said something about real consciousness?

That's not what an operational definition^WP is. You're simply supposed to take it for what it's worth; what is not being said is just as important as what is being said. What's described by a term under an operational definition explicitly includes what is in the definition and does not include what is not in it.

Incidentally, your definition of consciousness per se wasn't quite operational, but you did list some featured you'd like to include in the definition; namely, integration of data. Would you describe this as accurate?

If so, what other features would you like to include in a definition of consciousness?

What's really interesting is that you're excluding a lot of features by saying that our brain uses the same circuits in non-conscious processing as it does in conscious processing, and I find no problems with this sentiment. But I don't see the operational criteria here, save for a general ability of a person to report on something (and even this isn't a great criteria, because it doesn't recognize the opportunity for error--so even those within the fields that study it form operational definitions which aren't what I would like, and may not even be what they would like). For example, if I simply include your integration criteria as an essential element of consciousness, I cannot call those processes I am not aware of non-conscious processes.

Keep in mind nothing, not even the billions of dollars we're saying is being spent studying consciousness, guarantees that there even is an operational definition of consciousness that can be found that fits what we like. This is especially noteworthy if there is no currently agreed upon operational definition by those researchers. So this really is a legitimate problem, and just slinging mud at PixyMisa doesn't address it.

As an operational definition, PixyMisa's definition does at least refer to what my mind is doing when I say that it is conscious. It also requires me to say that things are conscious that I wouldn't normally call conscious. But so long as he only claims consequences that fit with that definition, there's nothing you can object to, save that his definition doesn't fit what you'd like to describe.

 

[westprog]

Have a look here

I did a quick skim of the first paper on the list. (And it's a long list). It did indeed deal with human-computer interaction, and with consciousness - but I could find no mention in it of standalone computer consciousness. What it does say is

Activity theory considers computers as a special kind of tool mediating human interaction with the world.

Just finding this out took rather longer than I would have wished. The paper may be relevant to the issue of standalone machine consciousness, but if it is, I couldn't see it.

Any paper that mentions computer and consciousness in the title is considered worth a look. Naturally, such a blunt approach is unlikely to produce anything of interest.

If I were particularly fair-minded, I might read through all those papers until I came across something that countered the arguments I was making. Sadly, I'm not. I'll continue to just argue my own side, in spite of being given hints on how to contradict myself.

 

[westprog]

PixyMisa's definition of consciousness isn't used by people who actually study consciousness, because people who use his definition don't see consciousness qua consciousness as being worthy of study. Those who do tend to gravitate to one or more magic bean theories.

So an interest in consciousness inextricably leads to a belief in magic - and the only way to have a sensible theory is to find the subject boring?

Did I say any of that?

My paraphrase seems to be what you are actually claiming. You said not worthy of study, which I interpreted as "boring". You said that people who do find consciousness worthy of study tend to gravitate to magic beans. I can't see any other interpretation. The implication seems to be that the only way to find out the truth about consciousness is not to study it.

 

[PixyMisa]

Guesswork is fine, but not when research on the topic already exists:
http://www.med.yale.edu/neurobio/mccormick/pubs/fields.pdf

Interesting, I'll have to read it more closely before I respond in any detail.

But you need to read it yourself, because they're not talking about natural fields operating across the brain, they're talking about induced fields over distances measured in microns.

And it doesn't at all address my point that such fields in vivo are established to have no effect.

 

[westprog]

Implying that all neurobiologists subscribe to the magic bean theory?

It seems to me both sides of this debate suffer from some implicit appeal to authority. That is, both sides see the existing body of knowledge primarily supporting their argument, except for a few kooks who disagree. Case in point: the multiple times people have cited the neurobiologists' saying that consciousness has "not yet become a scientific term that can be defined" as evidence their their definition is correct.

If an authority is claiming that there is no consensus on a subject, I'd be inclined to believe that authority. One has to be careful, of course. There are non-authorities promoting non-existent dissent in fields such as climate change and evolutionary theory. However, if the authorities in question are reputable in the field, it would be perverse to disbelieve them if all they are claiming is that there is disagreement. That's a fairly weak claim.

If "my side" had a definition of consciousness that we were touting as complete and well understood, then this would indeed be weak support for it. I don't believe we are. I think we are making tentative, working suggestions about consciousness, which don't involve conflating a definition with an explanation.

 

[PixyMisa]

If the experts in the field disagree with you, simply conjure up your own definition to suit yourself.

They don't disagree with me, Piggy. They point out that the term consciousness is used many conflicting ways, and even within cognitive science there's no single accepted definition because there's no agreement on exactly where to draw the boundaries.

And once again, this is not my definition. It's the definition I use. To assert that it is something I came up with would be dishonest for me, and it's just as dishonest for you.

 

[dlorde]

Why do y'all imagine that you get to simply draft your own DIY definition of consciousness, and then say things based on that idiosyncratic definition -- which does not work when applied to the only object we know is capable of consciousness -- and chalk it up as having said something about real consciousness?

Where do you get that?

How do you believe that this can work?

As far as I'm concerned, there is no consensus definition, so I'm prepared to consider any plausible definition. Dennet & Hofstadter make a plausible argument for this one (with the caveats I already mentioned). That you don't feel it 'works' for known consciousness isn't my problem; I read your posts, and haven't seen anything that seems like a reasonable counter-argument or a more useful definition.

 

[Piggy]

Implying that all neurobiologists subscribe to the magic bean theory?

It seems to me both sides of this debate suffer from some implicit appeal to authority. That is, both sides see the existing body of knowledge primarily supporting their argument, except for a few kooks who disagree. Case in point: the multiple times people have cited the neurobiologists' saying that consciousness has "not yet become a scientific term that can be defined" as evidence their their definition is correct.

I don't know of anyone publishing who subscribes to the theory that it's not a behavior of the brain, meaning the result of the brain's physical-energetic functioning.

In other words, although it's a very different phenomenon from any other sort of phenomenon we know of, it is a spacetime event, and it is therefore caused by the same interactions of matter and energy that cause all other events.

Where you might find room for a "magic bean" in that is beyond me.

Unlike the computational literalists, we do not add a redundant computational layer to the physical computations (much less imagine that it can create real worlds). We simply stop with the physical computations.

The comp.lits say brain -> logic -> consciousness.

We say brain -> consciousness.

And the idea that there are two valid camps here is a bit ridiculous, when only one camp is actually studying the phenomenon. (The other camps are working with non-conscious objects and/or abstractions, and while both endeavors are essential to brain research, they are only useful if they are based on observation of the brain and confirmed against observation of the brain.)

The neurobio definition of consciousness is the "right" one because it is useful and productive. You can use it to design experiments on live conscious brains, which get measurable results. You can use these results to design further experiments and make progress by testing and rejecting hypotheses.

PixyMisa's definition is "wrong" because it cannot be used to design any useful experiments that tell us anything... or even to understand existing experimental results.

 

[Piggy]

Interesting, I'll have to read it more closely before I respond in any detail.

But you need to read it yourself, because they're not talking about natural fields operating across the brain, they're talking about induced fields over distances measured in microns.

And it doesn't at all address my point that such fields in vivo are established to have no effect.

No, that was part of what I was asking about, so it's relevant.

 

[Piggy]

If an authority is claiming that there is no consensus on a subject, I'd be inclined to believe that authority. One has to be careful, of course. There are non-authorities promoting non-existent dissent in fields such as climate change and evolutionary theory. However, if the authorities in question are reputable in the field, it would be perverse to disbelieve them if all they are claiming is that there is disagreement. That's a fairly weak claim.

If "my side" had a definition of consciousness that we were touting as complete and well understood, then this would indeed be weak support for it. I don't believe we are. I think we are making tentative, working suggestions about consciousness, which don't involve conflating a definition with an explanation.

And let's do keep in mind that as recently as 2009 MIT was publishing a widely used graduate level text in neurobiology, in which the most audacious claim was to be making contributions "toward a theory of consciousness" (italics mine).

In the section on consciousness, no author claims that there is any such theory (or concordant scientific definition) and several of them explicitly discuss the fact that there is not one.

That is a fact not to be taken lightly.

 

[annnnoid]

And let's do keep in mind that as recently as 2009 MIT was publishing a widely used graduate level text in neurobiology, in which the most audacious claim was to be making contributions "toward a theory of consciousness" (italics mine).

In the section on consciousness, no author claims that there is any such theory (or concordant scientific definition) and several of them explicitly discuss the fact that there is not one.

That is a fact not to be taken lightly.

Just to update the quote from Human Brain Function ( found here ) since it was written about 7 years back…an informal survey of UCL neuroscience faculty concludes that only one out of eleven suggest any change in the quote (no Geraint Rees this time Pixy)…the rest all agree with it. IOW …status quo.

The issue obviously isn’t that Pixy has taken the initiative to undertake his own theory of consciousness (or to promulgate someone else’s)…the issue is that it is a clearly biased position (comp lit), it is a position predicated on the objective of legitimizing that perspective (rather than the objective of understanding the subject…consciousness), it is a position that…based on up-to-date responses…flatly contradicts the general consensus on the issue, and it is a position that is metaphysically untenable:

To even speak of the brain as performing "information processing" is highly problematic, and the only viable definitions will also assert that stars and oceans are performing information processing.

(and then there's this issue of dualism...which Pixy's theory confirms and condemns contemporaneously ... but that's a trifle)


.....but...when it comes to stirring the pot and / or provoking lively discussion (and pushing the thread to the brink of mod shut-down), well, hats off to Pixy!

 

[PartSkeptic]

The thread has moved on quickly, but on internet/machine consciousness.

I think Piggy sums it up well

The odds of us creating a conscious machine -- or any sort of conscious entity -- by accident, except in the biological sense in which it happens every day, are pretty much nil.

My concern is that the trick, when we figure it out, will have been deceptively simple all along, and suddenly we will find ourselves having to deal with a truly frightening power.

While SkyNet may be possible and getting closer, I do think (like some posters) that critical mass required for self-aware consciousness of a computer is probably a long way off.

The military may have projects with networked linked AI to assist fast moving battle decisions, and then the "accident" may occur. As it did in the movie Eagle Eye where a computer decides logically that it is more moral than humans, and uses machines, video cameras, satellites and drones for control.

I worked on computerized vending machines that used cellphone technology to place orders for re-stocking itself. Feed me, says the machine.