Explain consciousness to the layman.

[annnnoid]

We keep pointing out to you that we do not know how the brain does consciousness

Your assertion, unsupported.

...a quote from a book on human brain function written by 5 neuroscientists:


"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."


....I guess it's actually your assertion that is unsupported. These 5 neuroscientists seem to completely agree with !Kaggen. But that's ok...you're just wrong (...or what was it Wolfgang Pauli once said..." not even wrong " ).

 

[PixyMisa]

...a quote from a book on human brain function written by 5 neuroscientists:

Which in no way addresses anything I've said.

I guess it's actually your assertion that is unsupported.

You guess wrong. I've already shown how my model is supported. If you have any cogent questions to ask instead of out-of-context quotes, I'd be happy to answer.

These 5 neuroscientists seem to completely agree with !Kaggen. But that's ok...you're just wrong (...or what was it Wolfgang Pauli once said..." not even wrong " ).

Not at all.

Check this part of that quote you like so much:

Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways.

This is precisely the problem I have addressed. I have offered a precise, consistent, operational definition of conscious, one that accounts at a basic level for every feature we ascribe to consciousness (and that is actually in evidence).

So that quote might be correct with respect to the failings of the general public in discussing this subject, but it is completely incorrect in respect to my position.

 

[annnnoid]

So that quote might be correct with respect to the failings of the general public in discussing this subject, but it is completely incorrect in respect to my position.

The 'general public' ...?????? This is a quote from a book co-authored by a bunch of neuroscientists…some of whom are on the faculty of the University College in London (…remember Geraint Rees [or would you rather forget]….that UCL)

So I guess when you say ‘supported’, you mean supported by you. That’s fine…just so long as we understand. !Kaggen’s statement is also supported though….apparently by the entire neuroscience community. His claim was ‘we don’t know how ‘X’ works’. How else do you establish that something is not known except by referring to others who agree with you (that's called 'supported')?

…and yes…you have offered a “…precise, consistent, operational definition of consciousness, one that accounts at a basic level for every feature we ascribe to consciousness (and that is actually in evidence).” Unfortunately, it flatly contradicts the conclusions of those who make a living studying this stuff…as that quote quite explicitly reveals (…’consciousness can be defined, we know how it works, it can be created in computers, etc. etc.’…).

So I guess what we have to conclude from this…is that the neuroscience community is wrong…and you are right.

Glad we’ve managed to clear that up.

 

[!Kaggen]

No Pixy Misa.
Neurochemistry is not a bias input in a neuron, its your bias input.
Neurochemistry if anything, is consciousness.
The unique feature of consciousness is the ability to create abstractions(representations of reality) from information supplied by the senses. However this ability stands or falls depending on neurochemistry.

This is not because our brain processes reality, its because reality processes our brain.
If no reality(chemicals) gets to our brain no consciousness . You can feed it all the abstractions(neuro-chemical signals) you want you still won't get consciousness.

If you are not prepared to start looking at the source of consciousness in the chemistry of the brain then your not going to get consciousness.

Oh and when are you going to answer my question below?

What I'm saying is that consciousness is not unique to life, but to a certain class of information processing system. Until the last century, the only working examples of such systems were indeed living brains, but that's no longer the case.

All those behaviours by which we distinguish consciousness are now replicated in computers. Still for the most part in a more basic way than in humans, but the difference is quantitative and not qualitative.

So what would a qualitative difference be?

 

[PixyMisa]

The 'general public' ...?????? This is a quote from a book co-authored by a bunch of neuroscientists…some of whom are on the faculty of the University College in London (…remember Geraint Rees [or would you rather forget]….that UCL)

Yes. And they are talking about the general usage of the word, not the specific definition I've offered.

So I guess when you say ‘supported’, you mean supported by you.

Not at all. Read Dennett and Hofstadter and all the people they in turn cite. As I've explained hundreds of times, this is not something I created. It's well-known in the field of cognitive science. Not universally accepted by any means, but it's not something I came up with.

But that doesn't matter. What matters is that you are not addressing the point.

…and yes…you have offered a “…precise, consistent, operational definition of consciousness, one that accounts at a basic level for every feature we ascribe to consciousness (and that is actually in evidence).”

Okay. Good. Glad we have at least that level of understanding.

So I guess what we have to conclude from this…is that the neuroscience community is wrong…and you are right.

Nope.

What we have to conclude from this is that you managed to find a quote in the philosophy section of a Wikipedia article on the general nature of consciousness that said that the term consciousness as it is generally used is too vague to be useful.

Look at the passage immediately preceding that quote:

Gilbert Ryle, for example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a Cartesian dualist outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or between mind and world. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of individuals, or persons, acting in the world. Thus, by speaking of 'consciousness' we end up misleading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings. More generally, many philosophers and scientists have been unhappy about the difficulty of producing a definition that does not involve circularity or fuzziness.

This is exactly what I have been noting as a problem with everyone in this thread who is disputing the computational approach: That their dispute is founded in a dualist version of consciousness that cannot possibly exist. It is only by abandoning these logically incoherent notions that any progress can be made.

My definition cuts straight through those dualist notions like a buzz saw. If you hold to those dualist notions, even if you do not realise it, this will cause you problems, but those aren't my problems.

 

[PixyMisa]

No Pixy Misa.
Neurochemistry is not a bias input in a neuron, its your bias input.

You're not making much sense here. Neurochemicals external to the neuron act as a bias input just like (but more complex than) a bias input to a transistor; they shift the normal operation of the neuron's switching one way or another.

Look it up. That's what happens.

The unique feature of consciousness is the ability to create abstractions(representations of reality) from information supplied by the senses.

Computers do that all the time. So you have a problem there.

This is not because our brain processes reality, its because reality processes our brain.

No.

If no reality(chemicals) gets to our brain no consciousness .

That doesn't support your previous statement. It doesn't even relate to your previous statement.

You can feed it all the abstractions(neuro-chemical signals) you want you still won't get consciousness.

Evidence?

If you are not prepared to start looking at the source of consciousness in the chemistry of the brain then your not going to get consciousness.

Evidence?

Oh and when are you going to answer my question below?

This is why I keep telling people to go and read Godel, Escher, Bach, and not come back until they're done. It answers all these questions patiently, methodically, and engagingly. It takes 800 pages to do so, but it's 800 pages well-spent.

But I can give you a good example of the qualitative difference, one that's come up several times previously: The sphex wasp, or digger wasp.

The sphex wasp is one of that nasty ilk that paralyses its prey and drags it back to its nest - in this case, a hole in the ground - to act as incubator and food for its offspring.

After finding and paralysing its prey, the sphex wasp will drag it back to its nest, and leaves the prey insect just outside its nest while it inspects the nest to make sure all is well. Then it surfaces and drags the prey into the nest.

However, if, while the wasp is in the nest, a researcher moves the prey insect a short distance away, this is what happens:

The wasp emerges and finds the prey gone. It quickly locates the prey insect and drags it back to the nest, and leaves the prey insect just outside its nest while it inspects the nest to make sure all is well. Then it surfaces and drags the prey into the nest.

However, if, while the wasp is in the nest, a researcher moves the prey insect a short distance away, this is what happens:

The wasp emerges and finds the prey gone. It quickly locates the prey insect and drags it back to the nest, and leaves the prey insect just outside its nest while it inspects the nest to make sure all is well. Then it surfaces and drags the prey into the nest.

However, if, while the wasp is in the nest, a researcher moves the prey insect a short distance away, this is what happens:

The wasp emerges and finds the prey gone. It quickly locates the prey insect and drags it back to the nest, and leaves the prey insect just outside its nest while it inspects the nest to make sure all is well. Then it surfaces and drags the prey into the nest.

However, if, while the wasp is in the nest, a researcher moves the prey insect a short distance away, this is what happens:

The wasp emerges and finds the prey gone. It quickly locates the prey insect and drags it back to the nest, and leaves the prey insect just outside its nest while it inspects the nest to make sure all is well. Then it surfaces and drags the prey into the nest.

However, if, while the wasp is in the nest, a researcher moves the prey insect a short distance away, this is what happens:

....

I hope you get the point. No matter how many times the researcher moves the prey insect, the wasp's behaviour will not vary. It has no capacity for reflection into its own processes.

That ability, that fundamental mental flexibility that separates complex animals from insects, that's what consciousness is when you trim away all the confusion.

If you were a sphex wasp, you would never stop reading this post, not even if you starved to death in the process.

 

[punshhh]

I have explicitly and repeatedly pointed out that self-referential information processing systems have access to an entire class of behaviours that are not available to information processing systems that are not self-referential. They are qualitatively different.

This is your baby, it behaves like a conscious being would be expected to behave, its is a good mimic.

Is it conscious?

Who knows, its certainly not alive.

Can you explain in what way it is conscious?

Once you introduce self-reference, though, there are no new structures left to introduce. Beyond that the differences are strictly quantitative.

On the one hand you've got a fairly simple self referencing computer.

On the other hand you've got a primitive life form, lets say one of the first single cell critters to evolve.

They are both carrying out fairly simple and similar functions of acting as a single unit, a kind of distinct entity. They are sampling their environment and responding and are in some way integrating their response in their sampling behavior. They have a rudimentary self awareness.

"beyond that the differences are strictly quantitative" as you say.

If we extrapolate the quantitative ability of the two systems what are we left with?

A fully developed sentient human on the one hand,

On the other hand a highly developed sentient computer, or do we. Wait a minute, in fact we haven't progressed from the primitive scenario.
We haven't extrapolated the quantitative.

Also I have only focused on the information processing of the scenario and non of the other differences, of which there are many.

That's why I've been posting my definition over and over for years.

I did address your definition at the beginning. That I didn't see what it had to do with consciousness as experienced by humanity.

Could you expand on that? What sort of overlay? What does it do? I won't ask you to propose how it works, but if you have an idea, I'm interested in that too.

I am short of time right now, I will give more considered responses in the week.
I will say though that I expect the conscious overlay to be something to do with the neurochemistry, if one limits oneself to what can be scientifically tested.

But if you think there's something to consciousness beyond my definition, please tell me what that is, as specifically as possible.

I have already stated that consciousness approximating what is experienced by humanity appears to be an emergent property of life, being alive. Not being a computer.

 

[Leumas]

The 'general public' ...?????? This is a quote from a book co-authored by a bunch of neuroscientists…some of whom are on the faculty of the University College in London (…remember Geraint Rees [or would you rather forget]….that UCL)

So I guess when you say ‘supported’, you mean supported by you. That’s fine…just so long as we understand. !Kaggen’s statement is also supported though….apparently by the entire neuroscience community. His claim was ‘we don’t know how ‘X’ works’. How else do you establish that something is not known except by referring to others who agree with you (that's called 'supported')?

Yes.... it appears to be only supported by Pixy since no one has responded to the questions posed in this post.... I can only conclude that none here on this forum at least support Pixy's claim or if they do support it they are not willing to admit it.

If I am wrong and there are any here who do support Pixy's conclusions based on his definition please take a moment and respond to these questions.

Ok…. I am really interested to find out how many on this forum believe that

at least some of the applications typically found on a modern computer are conscious

is a peer reviewed scientifically proven fact and that

I've written such programs myself.

Also

do you think computer consciousness is in any way remarkable?

Do you think that the above achievement is so mundane and common place so as to warrant no special considerations or attention whatsoever in history or among academia at least on par with inventing the airplane or the transistor or silicon chip?

Einstein got the Nobel prize in Physics for discovering the photoelectric effect but do you think that no one on the Nobel Prize committee thinks that the person who managed to break the artificial intelligence (AI) sound barrier and achieved consciousness in a computer is worthy of even a newspaper article or say in Times or Newsweek?

So I guess what we have to conclude from this…is that the neuroscience community is wrong…and you are right.Glad we’ve managed to clear that up.

Well, UCL and Oxford and a few universities here in the USA like say MIT and Stanford might be surprised to know about the fact that we currently have such an operational understanding to be able to create computer programs that are in fact conscious and that it is so run of the mill that even Pixy can create computer programs that are conscious.

In fact I might even hazard a guess that these people may find that a conscious computer is quite a remarkable achievement and do NOT think that it is so mundane and common place so as to warrant no special considerations or attention whatsoever in history or among academia.

I am sure they would be quite disappointed that they have not achieved what Pixy has managed to achieve in his lab and being good sports might admit that the person who managed to break the artificial intelligence (AI) sound barrier and achieve consciousness in a computer is worthy of a newspaper article or the Nobel Prize they have been aiming for in all these years of research that they have dedicated their professional lives to.


I actually myself think that all these neuroscientists that said

...a quote from a book on human brain function written by 5 neuroscientists:


"We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature."
....I guess it's actually your assertion that is unsupported. These 5 neuroscientists seem to completely agree with !Kaggen. But that's ok...you're just wrong (...or what was it Wolfgang Pauli once said..." not even wrong " ).

Might find this “precise, consistent, operational definition of consciousness, one that accounts at a basic level for every feature we ascribe to consciousness (and that is actually in evidence)” to not quite include them in the “we” part since by that definition a cockroach is conscious and I might hesitantly guess that some of them at least might also agree that the kind of “features they ascribe to consciousness” might be a little more complex.

Ah... I forgot to mention that this operational definition is in fact circular. See if you can spot the circular reasoning in it.

 

[PixyMisa]

This is your baby, it behaves like a conscious being would be expected to behave, its is a good mimic.

Right.

Is it conscious?

Yes.

Who knows, its certainly not alive.

Which, as we've already established, is certainly not relevant.

Can you explain in what way it is conscious?

It exhibits all the behaviours of a conscious being.

In what way is it not conscious? How can it exhibit those behaviours without being conscious?

On the one hand you've got a fairly simple self referencing computer.

Computer program, but yes.

On the other hand you've got a primitive life form, lets say one of the first single cell critters to evolve.

Or a modern equivalent, sure.

They are both carrying out fairly simple and similar functions of acting as a single unit, a kind of distinct entity. They are sampling their environment and responding and are in some way integrating their response in their sampling behavior. They have a rudimentary self awareness.

Nope. The computer program is self-aware; the single-celled organism is not. See my description of digger wasp behaviour above: The digger wasp, a relatively complex multi-cellular organism, has no self-awareness.

That's what you're missing. You cannot extrapolate from the single-celled organism, or even from the sphex wasp, to a human. There's a qualitative gap. That self-referential computer program is closer to the human mind than the wasp is.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Well if you reduce the content to whatever you think might make your case then I suppose you can say this.

I’m just saying that if you want to understand the underpinnings of the phenomenon, the actual process, it might not be sufficient to say that the content describes it best. Even this definition (consciousness = thoughts and emotions), vague as it is, treats consciousness as an abstraction, as an inference rather than as experiencing – which is already accounted for by having thoughts and emotions. I.e., there’s nothing extra added to the subjective definition (or subjectivity, except how it actually feels like to think/say it) by saying “= consciousness”.

I don’t think it’s unreasonable to inquire if the mechanism that allows for experiencing can be described/explained differently than experiencing itself.

Not sure what your saying?

The mp3 analogy is useful in this regard. If I want to understand music I might be better off just listening to the file. If I want to understand how the file itself gives rise to music, listening isn’t enough. They require different levels of explanation. And this applies to consciousness as well.

With different resolution levels the phenomenon under investigation appears differently. That requires different operational definitions when investigating further. Thus we are also going to have different kinds of explanations. But only a few of them might be generalizable to the whole spectrum.

Yes we use abstractions, but we never say our abstractions are what we abstracted from. This is reserved for Pixy Misa's theory of consciousness.
Also his abstraction of consciousness is missing some key components. The main and quite possibly the only component of consciousness, Neurochemistry.

Where is the difference here: Consciousness = thoughts and emotions?

Of course neurochemistry is involved in human consciousness. (Even in the definition Pixy has put forward here: It is the general explanatory principle which is more abstract, as it should be; what it physically corresponds to in the human system is actualized by neurochemistry.)

 

[Leumas]

Nope. The computer program is self-aware; the single-celled organism is not. See my description of digger wasp behaviour above: The digger wasp, a relatively complex multi-cellular organism, has no self-awareness.

Wasps can reproduce themselves and can SELF-HEAL damaged parts. Don't you call this self referential? Isn't the process of reproducing a copy of itself a Self Referential Process? Doesn't it have to refer to itself to reproduce parts of itself? Does it also take some parts of the environment to actually recreate those NEW cells it created? In other words it CREATES NEW elements of itself out of the chemicals and elements in its surroundings.

So a computer program is self aware because it can refer back to the program code it is running and modify it according to another block of code that is part of the program....right? Or are you saying that the program can create out of the blue its own code with which to modify the code that it is currently in need of replacing and it does that just like that without first running some code that specifies the procedure for how to do that?

A self-referential (adaptive) program can rewrite its own code by copying another bit of code from another area of its memory (or some other storage) or it can create a piece of replacement code according to an algorithm (set procedure) that is in itself a set piece of code in another section of the program.

A computer cannot ingest or consume anything external to its own self and then modify this to create new or replacement parts of itself.... unless say you enable it to refer to some network server where it can copy code from a storage device on the server....... but in this case SOMEONE had to put that code there..... and it is CODE not some random ones and zeros that it manages to reorganize into coherent code all by itself out of the blue.


Any way....how is that different from DNA or a wasp or an Ameba?

A wasp that can HEAL from an injury is doing precisely a self referential procedure.

• It is referring to its parts that have been damaged (self aware??)
• It then recognizes the fact that they are damaged (self aware??)
• It then refers to something in itself (??) to figure out how to reconstruct the damaged parts (self aware and thinking???)
• It then performs another entirely separate SUB-PROCEDURE that is also in itself a self referential process which is the process of REPLICATING bits of its DNA to recreate NEW cells and parts that are done according to an algorithm (DNA+RNA) and using chemicals that are part of its nutritional intake.
• In that process it has also modified and organized elements in the world around it to create an entirely new thing (parts of itself) or entirely new organism running all by itself (its children).

So if as you rightly said a wasp is not self aware but the above procedure it carries out is actually more complex and more self referential and adaptive than any computer is, then why do you call the computer conscious but not the wasp?

 

[Leumas]

This is why I keep telling people to go and read Godel, Escher, Bach, and not come back until they're done.

That is a clever move...... because most likely they will never come back having lost consciousness while trying to make heads or tails out of what is said in that amazing tome.

I almost lost all hold on reality after reading that book and till today I am not sure what they were saying.

So may I suggest that you give us some quotes and page references from this book that in fact support your conclusions.

If you can please give us page references at the very least. I am looking at the book right now in my hands and I cannot recall where they anywhere support your assertions. I do admit I have read the book a million years ago and almost lost consciousness entirely for ever due to doing so. I am glad I am not in a coma right now as a side effect of reading that book.

So no.... I do not advice anyone to read that book unless you have a very strong constitution and extremely strong hold on reality.

Instead what I advice is that you PixyMisa if you can please give us quotes and page references to paragraphs that support your claims.

Also while you are at it please do the same for Daniel Dennette since I also have read many of his books and I think he does not support your claim at all. At the very least I am sure that he would not support your claims that are quoted in this post. But I haven't read all his books and the ones I read were a while ago and due to having read GEB my brain was fried anyway.

So please give us quotes along with book names and page numbers to which we can refer so that we can see for ourselves how if at all Dennette and GEB support your claims.


WARNING.... I am serious about GEB.... if you don't want to risk permanently damaging your brain then do not read it.... it is fine to read bits here and there but to sit in one go and read it will be hazardous to your mental health... … However it is a very effective cure for insomnia and in small doses less harmful maybe (??) than some manmade soporiferous drugs

 

[psionl0]

The computer program is self-aware; the single-celled organism is not.

Uh Oh! My eyebrows are going up again!

Surely you must agree that there is something lacking in the definition of consciousness if an inanimate object gets to be considered self-aware before a living thing does.

 

[Belz...]

Semantics

It's a very important distinction, in fact.

"Running", for instance, is not composed of actual objects but of the motion of objects. The same thing is true for "eating" or "reading". "Thinking" or "being conscious" are also actions. So it's a bit odd for you to compare them to objets that are composed of other objects and then claiming they must also be composed of stuff.

 

[Leumas]

Uh Oh! My eyebrows are going up again!

Surely you must agree that there is something lacking in the your definition of consciousness if an inanimate object gets to be considered self-aware before a living thing does.

fify a little


Not to mention a living thing as complex as a wasp that can

Wasps can reproduce themselves and can SELF-HEAL damaged parts. Don't you call this self referential? Isn't the process of reproducing a copy of itself a Self Referential Process? Doesn't it have to refer to itself to reproduce parts of itself? Does it also take some parts of the environment to actually recreate those NEW cells it created? In other words it CREATES NEW elements of itself out of the chemicals and elements in its surroundings.
[snip]

A wasp that can HEAL from an injury is doing precisely a self referential procedure.

• It is referring to its parts that have been damaged (self aware??)
• It then recognizes the fact that they are damaged (self aware??)
• It then refers to something in itself (??) to figure out how to reconstruct the damaged parts (self aware and thinking???)
• It then performs another entirely separate SUB-PROCEDURE that is also in itself a self referential process which is the process of REPLICATING bits of its DNA to recreate NEW cells and parts that are done according to an algorithm (DNA+RNA) and using chemicals that are part of its nutritional intake.
• In that process it has also modified and organized elements in the world around it to create an entirely new thing (parts of itself) or entirely new organism running all by itself (its children).

So if as you rightly said a wasp is not self aware but the above procedure it carries out is actually more complex and more self referential and adaptive than any computer is, then why do you call the computer conscious but not the wasp?

 

[Belz...]

Bickery Barkery
Posts getting Snarkery
To AAH where they'll
Rot in the Darkery.

Billower Bellower
Better get Mellower
'Cause if they don't
I see cards getting Yellower.

Now if that doesn't work I don't know what will.

Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: Tricky

Snif... who knew that evil witchery could be so beautiful !

 

[PixyMisa]

Uh Oh! My eyebrows are going up again!

Surely you must agree that there is something lacking in the definition of consciousness if an inanimate object gets to be considered self-aware before a living thing does.

Why, exactly?

As I said to punshhh and !Kaggen, the sphex wasp is very much alive and has no self-awareness whatsoever. It cannot do what a simple reflective computer program is capable to do - use a heuristic to see if it might be stuck in a harmful loop and jump out of it.

Again, this is covered in depth in Godel, Escher, Bach. Everyone needs to read that book. Even if you completely disagree with its key point on the nature of consciousness, it's an enlightening and entertaining look at the work of three geniuses in three different fields.

 

[psionl0]

the sphex wasp is very much alive and has no self-awareness whatsoever.

i'm not so sure that being governed mostly by instinct instead of changes to its environment disqualifies the sphex wasp from the self awareness stakes but I agree, it is borderline.

 

[psionl0]

Not to mention a living thing as complex as a wasp that can
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?p=8099829#post8099829

So, to summarize, a wasp has no self-awareness but its body has many self-aware parts?

 

[PixyMisa]

i'm not so sure that being governed mostly by instinct instead of changes to its environment disqualifies the sphex wasp from the self awareness stakes but I agree, it is borderline.

I'd say that on the contrary, it's a clear-cut disqualification.

It's aware of its environment, but it has no awareness of its own behaviours. Reflection, self-reference, self-awareness, consciousness, mind - call it what you will, the wasp doesn't have it, but the computer program does, and so do we.

So, to summarize, a wasp has no self-awareness but its body has many self-aware parts?

Certainly it's possible for a system to have self-aware parts but display no overall self-awareness. But in this case, it's not at all evident that any parts of the wasp are self-aware.

Go back to the behaviour of the sphex wasp when faced with repeated unexpected events. It responds to stimuli in non-trivial ways, but it has no capacity to analyse and modify its responses.

How exactly are the parts of the wasp different to the whole wasp in this respect?

Again, I suggest you read Godel, Escher, Bach. It covers all of this with elegance and clarity and many, many examples.