Explain consciousness to the layman.

[westprog]

Which is why I've been talking in terms of the transformation or translation of input streams to an output streams.

I think it is relevant. You said "When you emulate any real thing in software... you've turned a real thing into an imaginary one". I'm saying this isn't necessarily so. When one microprocessor emulates another in software, it is just a language translation; whether it is done hard-coded on-chip or in RAM makes no difference. The same algorithm using the same instruction set can run on both processors identically. The same principle applies to one microprocessor emulating multiple others by time-slicing or other means.

I'm trying but failing to see what imaginary thing you think I've substituted for what 'real' thing.


Great - that's what I wanted to do.

Exactly what simulation are you referring to? I talked about replacing neurons with functionally equivalent chips running neuron algorithms, which you accepted, and replacing groups of those chips with a single mutli-tasking chip that emulates them - still running the original neuron algorithms on each virtual processor. What has become imaginary?

Eh? the inputs going into such a black box are not physical calculations, they are just modulated signals, e.g. electrical pulses. That apart, would you accept such a black box replacement part for, say, the visual cortex (assuming we could handle all the necessary inputs and outputs)?

Well of course. We want a brain that works. My point is that if you can replace all the biological neurons with neural processors running neuron algorithms, you can also virtualise all those processors, and run the same neuron algorithms on a single multi-tasking processor. [In practice, sufficiently powerful hardware would be a problem, but the killer would probably be the timing considerations].

So, in theory, we can have a brain emulation running on a single physical processor with memory, and apart from the I/O subsystem, everything else would be software or data.

Bear in mind that such a system would not be the same thing as a simulation of the brain. It would be an actual artificial brain. Whether or not a biological neuron can be replaced by an electronic two-state component is an interesting idea. So far it hasn't been possible, but one imagines that there are many thousands of paraplegics who'd love to try out such a system, and that's where the initial research will happen. Replacing brain tissue would be orders of magnitude more difficult.

 

[ufology]

Yes this is the future (although I would omit the word spiritual which is a loaded word).

In my previous post I mentioned the "architecture of mind", this is the future as was realised in the past by people who trained and disciplined their minds through meditation and contemplation.

Once the architecture of intelligent machines is established we (or perhaps they) will move on in leaps and bounds.

Agreed on the use of "Spiritual" in the title of his book, but it gets his point across about not being able to tell the difference from that particular perspective ( that they would be every bit as "spiritual" as we are. ) Perhaps they ( the machines ) will move on in leaps and bounds but maybe not. First they have to able to reproduce, and for that we'd have to allow them to do so. They would for some time be dependent upon an environment we created, whereas we can, if need be, still revert to living without machines in the nature we evolved from.

 

[Belz...]

If we've reached the point of agreement isn't that a good thing?

You'd think so, but I tend to be careful when people are agreeing with me while saying that they disagree.

 

[rocketdodger]

Piggy is not alone, I would agree that a simulation of the whole universe would not contain a consciousness.

This is because it is a coded interpretation from a limited perspective of the universe, housed in a chip on the table.

I am not saying consciousness cannot be generated synthetically, or that it cannot in principle be generated in some form digitally. But the digital form would be very unlike the way a human experiences it and would be confined to a virtual realm.

I remind you of what I said a while back, if you are simulating physical consciousness you will need to simulate a timespace in order to capture any kind of dimensional experience.

First, you told me you aren't really a monist anyway.

Second, obviously a full simulation of the universe would include a "simulation of timespace in order to capture any kind of dimensional experience."

 

[rocketdodger]

Bear in mind that such a system would not be the same thing as a simulation of the brain. It would be an actual artificial brain.

Oh, really?

So now that you are backtracking so far, would you care to tell everyone what criteria you use to distinguish a "simulated" brain from an "artificial" brain?

 

[rocketdodger]

It's certainly true that computers are tools which in association with human minds can perform calculation and analysis that the human minds can't do by themselves - hence the belief that they are doing it when the humans aren't involved.

It is also true that the behavior of a computer can be isomorphic to far more systems than the behavior of a rock can be isomorphic to.

That has nothing to do with whether humans are involved or not.

 

[rocketdodger]

I would like you to explain how in I(O) I(A) causes I(B) without in S(O) S(A) causes S(B). That is, how can an information overlay contribute to causality?

My point is that in all cases it IS actual machine parts that are involved in the causal sequence, even if a given observer needs an informational overlay to see it.

But yes, I am speaking about the machine parts. The transistors of the computer.

So now answer this:

If there is a simulation of a neural network running on a computer, and in the real neural network a neuron fires due to the integration of signals from other neurons, is there not an isomorphic causal sequence that takes place in the transistors of the computer? And isn't that causal sequence in the transistors of the computer just as "real" as the corresponding sequence in the actual neural network? Meaning, isn't something like "voltage from transistor X caused transistor Y to switch" just as "real" as whatever happens in the neural network?

Piggy, you never responded to this post of mine.

 

[dlorde]

We could do the same thing to a human being, as in The Matrix. It will just be creating an imaginary world, though - no different in principle to reading a film or watching a book. If someone (or something) believes it to be a true reflection of reality, then he has been deceived. The person or thing will of course have a set of rules relating to his local environment, but this is no different to the set of rules for crossing the road or being elected to Congress. They sit on top of the laws of nature, they don't override or replace them.

Yes, The Matrix is an obvious exemplar. Clearly I'm not saying that from our perspective it's not virtual (I prefer 'virtual' to 'imaginary' here, because although it is a product of the imagination, it has been realised as a computer model). It would be different from a film or a book in being interactive. However, from the perspective of the entities perceiving and experiencing it, it is the world - it is as objectively real to them as our reality is to us (although probably not quite so detailed ), and it could quite conceivably have entirely different 'laws of nature'.

It seems to me that it would only be a deception if we lead the entities to believe that this was our world, our reality (as in my previous example). If we feel this might be an ethical problem, we could inform the entities that it was a virtual world, not like our own.

This raises the ethical and moral questions of how artificial conscious entities should be treated - would they have a right to perceive and experience our world?

 

[westprog]

Yes, The Matrix is an obvious exemplar. Clearly I'm not saying that from our perspective it's not virtual (I prefer 'virtual' to 'imaginary' here, because although it is a product of the imagination, it has been realised as a computer model). It would be different from a film or a book in being interactive. However, from the perspective of the entities perceiving and experiencing it, it is the world - it is as objectively real to them as our reality is to us (although probably not quite so detailed ), and it could quite conceivably have entirely different 'laws of nature'.

It seems to me that it would only be a deception if we lead the entities to believe that this was our world, our reality (as in my previous example). If we feel this might be an ethical problem, we could inform the entities that it was a virtual world, not like our own.

This raises the ethical and moral questions of how artificial conscious entities should be treated - would they have a right to perceive and experience our world?

Objectively real? No. Subjectively real, perhaps. Objectively, they would have the same laws of nature that we have. It is highly probable that out subjective interpretation of the laws of nature is not objectively complete. The truth is still out there.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

This raises the ethical and moral questions of how artificial conscious entities should be treated - would they have a right to perceive and experience our world?

An ineresting idea I'd never thought of explicitly, thank you. It would be entertaining to work through all the crinkly details of what such a right would involve in the care and feeding of such an artificial intelligence.

 

[dlorde]

Bear in mind that such a system would not be the same thing as a simulation of the brain. It would be an actual artificial brain.

This is why I emphasised the importance of the distinction between emulation and simulation earlier. I think much of the confusion and disagreement in this thread has been due to them being used interchangeably.

Whether or not a biological neuron can be replaced by an electronic two-state component is an interesting idea. So far it hasn't been possible, but one imagines that there are many thousands of paraplegics who'd love to try out such a system, and that's where the initial research will happen.

We were getting close in 2003, I'd be surprised if it hasn't been done somewhere by now...

Replacing brain tissue would be orders of magnitude more difficult.

Indeed. I can see simple neural circuits being replaced with equivalent electronics in animal brains, but I can't see much beyond simple interventions in humans any time soon (e.g. the kind of relatively crude stimulation being explored for Parkinsons and epilepsy).

 

[rocketdodger]

I would like for someone to define exactly what is meant by "objective."

If all an agent can ever have access to is its subjective perception of its environment, I question how "objectivity" can ever be arrived at other than as a net agreement among the subjectivity of multiple agents.

If that is the case, then why is our perception of our world "objective" while the simulated agents' collectively agreed upon perception of their world isn't.

???

 

[ufology]

Objectively real? No. Subjectively real, perhaps. Objectively, they would have the same laws of nature that we have. It is highly probable that out subjective interpretation of the laws of nature is not objectively complete. The truth is still out there.

More on this below.

 

[ufology]

Yes, The Matrix is an obvious exemplar ...This raises the ethical and moral questions of how artificial conscious entities should be treated - would they have a right to perceive and experience our world?

A question dealt with in many science fiction shows. Among one of the best is this example from Star Trek TNG.

 

[Belz...]

I would like for someone to define exactly what is meant by "objective."

If all an agent can ever have access to is its subjective perception of its environment, I question how "objectivity" can ever be arrived at other than as a net agreement among the subjectivity of multiple agents.

If that is the case, then why is our perception of our world "objective" while the simulated agents' collectively agreed upon perception of their world isn't.

???

Because ours is the "real" world, duh !

 

[Belz...]

A question dealt with in many science fiction shows. Among one of the best is this example from Star Trek TNG.

I think we're discussing reality, in fact.

 

[ufology]

I think we're discussing reality, in fact.

Ouch ... nice pun. It was intentional right?

 

[dlorde]

Objectively real? No. Subjectively real, perhaps. Objectively, they would have the same laws of nature that we have.

They would have no experience or perception outside the virtual world; to them, the laws of nature would be the laws governing the behaviour of the elements of the virtual world they perceive.

On encountering a Bishop Berkeley-style message from us that his world is virtual and has no material existence, the Dr. Johnson consciousness would strike his virtual foot with mighty virtual force at a large virtual rock, from which it would rebound, sending the sensation of a stubbed toe to him, and exclaim "I refute it thus!".

 

[rocketdodger]

They would have no experience or perception outside the virtual world; to them, the laws of nature would be the laws governing the behaviour of the elements of the virtual world they perceive.

On encountering a Bishop Berkeley-style message from us that his world is virtual and has no material existence, the Dr. Johnson consciousness would strike his virtual foot with mighty virtual force at a large virtual rock, from which it would rebound, sending the sensation of a stubbed toe to him, and exclaim "I refute it thus!".

You might not know this, but westprog has already stated that if we are Dr. Johnson consciousnesses then we are not really conscious..

So at least he is consistent, although I am not sure I understand the utility of calling ourselves "not really conscious" if we are conscious of our consciousness nonetheless.

 

[westprog]

This is why I emphasised the importance of the distinction between emulation and simulation earlier. I think much of the confusion and disagreement in this thread has been due to them being used interchangeably.

I agree. I think that what you proposed, albeit theoretical, is quite different to running a computer program. It would be a different form of cyborg.

We were getting close in 2003, I'd be surprised if it hasn't been done somewhere by now...

Indeed. I can see simple neural circuits being replaced with equivalent electronics in animal brains, but I can't see much beyond simple interventions in humans any time soon (e.g. the kind of relatively crude stimulation being explored for Parkinsons and epilepsy).

I think the fact that it is such a tricky problem shows just how difficult this area is. I suppose that it will have to be solved someday though. When we find out what's involved in replacing a neuron, we'll know a great deal more about the workings of the brain.