Explain consciousness to the layman.

[westprog]

Yes, and pop the quantum bubble our universe is from the lab it's been created in and we are very much cease to exist. And again, it's entirely beside the point. Why would you think that, when the simulation stops running, the fact that the world it simulated no longer exists somehow makes my point moot, unless you understood nothing of said point ?



Instead of looking for a single part of my post that allows you to avoid having to address my argument, read what I wrote again. Otherwise you're not worth the bother.

You keep repeating the same assertion as if that's all you need to do. If this world is indeed created as a quantum bubble in a lab, that is our reality. We don't get to choose what reality actually is. Any scientist will readily admit that his version of what the universe is not what it actually is. There aren't multiple worlds depending on what our level of access is.

Sometimes I don't get what people are arguing. In this case, I do get what is being argued, and I think it's entirely wrong.

 

[AlBell]

Very, very small children might think that Mario lives inside their Wii, but they pretty soon figure it out.

So that explains Pixy Misa's thoughts

We have a winner!

Yeah but do you know how particles are formed?

If so please tell us, it would be nobel-prize worthy stuff.

I thought there were no particles only their interactions.

Winner again.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

If you believe that the behavior of the physical computations in the simulator machine creates a new world because it mimics a world that its behavior corresponds to... and if we accept that the physical computations in the simulator machine are the same as all others elsewhere (to deny it is to cast aside all physics) -- which is to say, the machine obeys the same laws of physics as every other object in the universe -- then you must believe that the physical calculations (real behavior) of every group of particles in the universe generates an infinite number of new worlds.

No, that doesn't follow. The symbolic representation of the world has to obey the laws of physics with a fidelity high enough that it doesn't affect the target of the simulation, no more.

Since we're talking about consciousness, according to the electrophysiologists compartment models of neurons are good enough to simulate their electrical and chemical (and therefore informational) activity. Since there's no evidence and very little argument that consciousness depends upon quantum thingummies instead of being an emergent property of such neural activity arranged to form a brain, that's probably more than enough physical verisimilitude.

[ETA] Much less sequiter, and frankly bordering on illucidity, is the argument that every particle in the universe must be simulated to simulate any phenomenon comprising some subset of those particles.

 

[Piggy]

Then you need to change your definition, because even while dreaming the visual "pipeline" beyond the eyes is actively engaged.

Yeah, sure, but any impulses in that point of the pipeline are still upstream from conscious awareness, whether we're asleep or awake. So we don't have to concern ourselves with the relationship of these impulses to the current conscious experience of the brain, because there is no such relationship yet.

 

[Piggy]

No, that doesn't follow. The symbolic representation of the world has to obey the laws of physics with a fidelity high enough that it doesn't affect the target of the simulation, no more.

What?

It absolutely follows.

If you think that the physical activity of a simulator machine generates a real instance of a world (otherwise real or imagined) that corresponds with that activity, and if you accept that the particles in the machine act like particles everywhere else in the universe, then you must also think that the physical activity of everything in the universe generates a real instance of every world (otherwise real or imagined) that corresponds with its activity.

And I hate to break it to you, but that's an infinity of real worlds.

Since we're talking about consciousness, according to the electrophysiologists compartment models of neurons are good enough to simulate their electrical and chemical (and therefore informational) activity. Since there's no evidence and very little argument that consciousness depends upon quantum thingummies instead of being an emergent property of such neural activity arranged to form a brain, that's probably more than enough physical verisimilitude.

[ETA] Much less sequiter, and frankly bordering on illucidity, is the argument that every particle in the universe must be simulated to simulate any phenomenon comprising some subset of those particles.

Hate to tell you, but simulating even every particle in the universe would only result in a machine moving in ways that could represent that, but could also represent an infinite number of other things.

I don't know about those theories of consciousness. I do know that progress is being made in examining the role of waves, which cut across the electro-chemical structures of multiple areas of the brain. It's hard not to think that their behavior might provide insight into how inputs are coordinated.

 

[Piggy]

If the neuron processors in a processor-per-neuron brain are synched to the same clock, then a single-processor brain can behave identically. If they are not synched, then a single-processor brain can behave as close as you like to the ppn brain, by using appropriately small time slices. With a small enough time slice, the behavior of the two would be indistinguishable.

Well, that's over my head on the tech side.

Can you drill down for me?

 

[Leumas]

I want to repeat one point that really needs to be stressed for those who are tempted to believe that "a simulation could become conscious" because an "entity" that exists "in the world of the simulation" might, in some real sense, "become conscious", and that this conscious being in the world of the simulation would believe that it lived in the world which the simulation was intended to represent.

If you find yourself in that camp, consider this....

A simulation is nothing more than a set of physical computations, which is to say some sort of matter and/or energy changing states from moment to moment.

Which is an obtuse way of saying that simulators are objects.

When we run a simulation, what literally happens is that a machine changes state. In other words, an object does what it does.

The only reason it's a "simulator" is because we've set up the way it changes its state (which is to say, the relative position of all its parts) so that a portion of those changes mimic the changes in another system with enough accuracy that we can fast-forward the changes of the simulator system and see what's going to happen to the other system -- which could be real like an engine or imaginary like a fantasy world.

What's important here is that there's no information in either the simulator or in the thing we want to simulate to indicate that the other exists. You can examine each one all you want... you'll never, as a result, be able to figure that out, just like you can't look at a person and decide if they have a twin.

Of course, we could use natural simulators. Like if I only cleaned my house when the moon was full, you could use the moon phase to predict how clean my house would be if you wanted to visit.

Notice that the moon is unchanged by our using it as an information processor, and there's no way anyone can know we've made it into one except by us telling them... which means that its status as such is purely imaginary.

There are a lot of things like that. For instance, a coaster. If it was made to be a coaster, or if someone uses it like one, then it's a coaster. If not, then it's not. There's no coaster molecule. It's an imaginary class of object.

Anyway, we use computers as information processors because we can dictate how they change states, so we can mimic all sorts of stuff.

But here's the thing... the physical universe has no idea which objects we decide to call simulators or information processors.

Consider that.

If you believe that the behavior of the physical computations in the simulator machine creates a new world because it mimics a world that its behavior corresponds to... and if we accept that the physical computations in the simulator machine are the same as all others elsewhere (to deny it is to cast aside all physics) -- which is to say, the machine obeys the same laws of physics as every other object in the universe -- then you must believe that the physical calculations (real behavior) of every group of particles in the universe generates an infinite number of new worlds.

Given that situation, your simulation seems rather superfluous. (ETA: Meaning, if we do live in a maximally rich multiple universe, the simulation can only be redundant.)

But think about that. Accept the one, you must accept the other, or live by your own metaphysics.

Perfect....


Just one thing I would like to add.... CURRENTLY there is no machine that is conscious.

Whether we can or cannot ONE DAY build one is just SPECULATION.

So if we are discussing science FICTION then why get so heated up and bothered about it and deride, abuse and malign people who do not share the same wishful and FICTIVE view about what could perhaps maybe if given the possibility of this or that, one day hopefuly come to be almost as we thought it might be.

Why not admit that it is all an exercise in speculation and whatever view one may hold about the subject is much less valid than what is FACT today.

Sure.... much of the more intelligent science FICTION has become reality.....but....the fact is much more has not...and.... much of what has become reality did not do so in the same way as the fiction.

So why do people who hold this FICTIVE VIEW POINT feel as indignant when we negate it as religious people feel when we deny their equally FICTIVE assertions and wishful thinking?

Why all the hostility and insults and derision? Why can’t we CONJECTURE in a civil manner and realize that speculative ideas are based on assumptions and if there is no way to verify the suppositions then you have to accept (at least tentatively) any counter point of view which is based on CURRENT REALITY and is thus much more likely to be valid than any conjecture.

It is amazing to me how churlish some people are while defending conjecture and suppositions based on nothing more than wishful thinking…..


Besides..... consider this point

NOTHING created animals or their consciousness. It is all an EVOLVED phenomenon.

If we then go about speculating that we can actually CREATE the product of billions of years of evolution in a few decades of playing with some silicon chips then what is to stop a theist saying "aha...there you have your proof of god."

So unless you are willing to cede to the theists their GOD, then you have to at the very least consider that maybe the only way to achieve consciousness is by actually replicating the causes and situations that gave rise to it.​

 

[Piggy]

If you still think the "world of the simulation" is not purely imaginary....

Then please, simply imagine yourself running a simulation.

Imagine a fantasy world you'd like to simulate.

OK, got it.

Now you find a computer and you program it to run a simulation of this world.

Which is to say, you set up its components to change in a way that mimics the changes in your fantasy world, to such a degree that you can produce information and images and sounds from it just like any real world, and you can even let it run and "find out" what has happened in this world by looking at a monitor or listening to speakers or reading printouts.

We'll ignore the problematic bits and assume you can produce a simulation of this world down to any level of precision, quarks, whatever.

So what have you done?

Well, you've set up a computer and it's changing states a mile a minute, and you say that some of those state changes are producing a "world of the simulation" which corresponds to a world in your imagination whose changes are the same as the ones the computer is executing but which... and here we leap for no reason because we've already got enough to explain the system but in any case... is somehow not imaginary.

Well, OK, if that "world of the simulation" is not imaginary, if it is in any way real, and if the laws of physics are at all accurate, then every particle in the universe will be behaving like the particles which generate your "world of the simulation".

This is no small fact.

If the particles in our universe -- the kind that make up simulator machines and everything else -- really do create new worlds by performing their physical calculations... if any given group of particles is creating every possible world that could be described by its behavior if we overlaid symbolic values on each change of state... then given the fact that any possible behavior by any set of particles could represent an infinite number of worlds (at least one assumed to be complete, and the rest assumed to be incomplete representations of successively larger worlds to infinity), then our universe is generating an infinity of other worlds all the time, by virtue of simulation.

If you deny that this is happening, you're going to have to explain why the particles in things we choose to use as simulators and information processors obey one set of laws, while all the other particles obey a different set of laws.

Or you're going to have to explain how the physical state of your brain (your imagination) informs the entire universe.

 

[yy2bggggs]

[snip]
So why do simulations work?

...

This decision by the humans (programmers) has no effect on the nature of the computer's physical computations. In other words, if a change in the computer is supposed to mean "a calf was born" or "it got a little hotter" or "dad got home", or "a photon is in a particular location", this is in no way evident from observing the activity of the machine.

Actually, the computer will have a set of primitive operations. This constrains what it can compute. If the program treats certain symbols produced by it the same way, then those are invariants. Given that you establish what the invariant categories are, you can begin to see what sorts of transformations are applied to those invariants by the program. And once you do that, if the problem space is sufficiently complicated, you can get a really good idea of what is being simulated. If it's not complicated, the number of things being simulated is restricted to duals of certain categories.

Mind you, certain kinds of simulations can make these calculations more difficult, but you almost have to try to set the simulations up this way.

Given you have this sort of simulation, though, this type of analysis is possible, and should be revealing. This isn't too different in principle from the traditional approach of solving a Cesarian cipher.

Folks think, no, it's not imaginary, I asked my computer to add these numbers and it did it, that really happened, of course information processing is real, not imaginary!

But wait... that's not really what happened.

It's just as valid to claim that this happens as it is to claim that I multiplied two three digit numbers by going through the standard algorithm. You almost certainly want to pick an example that is not mathematical--you're failing to appreciate just how abstract math is.

If I really multiplied two three-digit numbers by hand, then that machine damned well did add two numbers.

What happened is that a programmer, who knew how the whole "adding numbers" thing worked, set up a physical object -- one that can change states real fast with high predictability -- to change those states in ways that match some logic in his head.

He also set up a means for a person to set off a cascade of state changes which would make the computer light up some lights in a pattern that corresponds to a symbol that will correspond to the solution to the addition problem.

By that argument, I didn't multiply numbers either. What happened is that a teacher, who knew how the whole "multiplying numbers" thing worked, set up an abstract procedure--one that transforms state changes very slowly with high predictability--to transform those states in ways that matched some logic on some ancient mathematician's decayed papyrus.

Problem is, that's still multiplication. And what the computer did, for the same reason, is still addition.

What happened in the meantime is simply that the computer changed in ways analogous to how a system would change if groups of those sizes actually merged.

Sounds like the computer performed addition to me.

All of that was physical computation. There wasn't any "logic" to it, unless you count the laws of physics as logic, because the laws of physics were the only laws affecting how that computer behaved.

Interesting... so, when I multiplied two three digit numbers, I must not have applied "logic" either, unless you count the laws of physics as logic, because the laws of physics are the only laws affecting how I behave.

 

[Leumas]

[snip]

If the particles in our universe -- the kind that make up simulator machines and everything else -- really do create new worlds by performing their physical calculations... if any given group of particles is creating every possible world that could be described by its behavior if we overlaid symbolic values on each change of state... then given the fact that any possible behavior by any set of particles could represent an infinite number of worlds (at least one assumed to be complete, and the rest assumed to be incomplete representations of successively larger worlds to infinity), then our universe is generating an infinity of other worlds all the time, by virtue of simulation.

[snip]

And not just in computers.... the imaginations of every animal capable of thinking would also be as "validly real".

So we have dog universes where humans serve them as if they were the masters where they work for them like slaves to give them food and medical care and chauffer them around and pick up their poo and bathe them and massage them and......wait....wait..... darn it.... I think I might be living in a universe simulation of my dog's making.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Not at that point in the pipeline, no. When the impulses are at this stage, they are not yet involved in the processes that generate consciousness. Like I said, those are downstream.

Uhm... there are a few problems here.

First off, if this part in the pipeline causes the thing that causes the thing that causes us to become conscious of the face, then it can legitimately be called one of the processes that generate consciousness. After all, part of consciousness is the content, and this would be generating the content.

The second problem is that the entire recognition of the face, and even a high level response to the specific recognition--even to the point of being tailored to that specific face, can occur without ever being consciously aware of it. In other words, it does make sense to say that you saw a face without your becoming aware of it.

 

[Piggy]

Except that consciousness is not the thing, consciousness is the behavior. You've argued that a computer cannot be conscious because it's disconnected with the real world; that all the processes which contributed to the real brain are now abstract symbolic representations that have no influence and are not influenced by the rest of reality. Welp, that's easy to fix.

Well, in that case, I haven't been clear.

What I've said is that a machine can be conscious. We know this because naturally occuring organic machines already are.

The machines which are conscious will perform physical computations, which is to say that they will change state according to the laws of physics, just like our brains do.

If you want any two real machines to produce the same real output, then by God, they've got to produce the same real output.

If you want to build a machine that acts like a smelter, it better produce metal. If you want to build a machine that acts like a fan, it better push some air around. They can be made all kinds of ways, but they have to pony up.

Conscious experience is real. And I mean stub-your-toe-on-a-rock real.

We know this from direct observation, coupled with clear evidence that it is only sometimes real, and is always spatially locatable, which means it exists in spacetime.

If you can observe it, and manipulate it by physical means as can be done in many ways, and you can locate it in spacetime, hard to say it ain't real.

And if it's real, it must be the result of physical computation.

It cannot be the result of symbolic computation (a.k.a. logic, programming, syntax, simulation) because all symbolic computation is an imaginary overlay onto physical computation and exists purely as a state of the brain of a person who understands the symbols.

Which means it demands an interpreter.

Which would bring us right back to our old friend... the little guy inside your head who perceives everything... by means of the little guy in his head....

I wouldn't recommend that route.

 

[Piggy]

Uhm... there are a few problems here.

First off, if this part in the pipeline causes the thing that causes the thing that causes us to become conscious of the face, then it can legitimately be called one of the processes that generate consciousness. After all, part of consciousness is the content, and this would be generating the content.

That may be a philosophical "problem" but quite frankly, it has no bearing on the fact that this set of impulses, at the point it's at in the brain, at the moment when it's at that point, has no effect on the conscious experience of the person whose brain this is.

That's just the physical fact of the matter.

The second problem is that the entire recognition of the face, and even a high level response to the specific recognition--even to the point of being tailored to that specific face, can occur without ever being consciously aware of it. In other words, it does make sense to say that you saw a face without your becoming aware of it.

It absolutely makes sense to say that you saw a face, even if you're not aware of it.

In fact, the reason this particular set of circumstances is so interesting to study is that some folks who are blind can acurately report the moods of faces in photographs they "look" at.

It's only some blind people who do this. If your eyes are damaged, for instance, you can't do this. It's only people who've had damage in the areas of the brain that transmit impulses into areas that have a direct impact on the "shape" of conscious experience.

Impulses coming from the eyes, way upstream, if they're in a pattern that's like patterns that tend to be reflected off of faces, will come to an electro-physical neural juncture where by virtue of their shape they will fit into a corridor which other kinds of shapes don't fit into.

So to speak.

I like to imagine it like water lapping on hardpack sand, with the sand and the water mutually shaping each other in intricate interlocking channels, but hey, to each their own.

But anyway, due to the biological shaping of evolution, molding critters like water molds stone, the brain has quite literally become neurally shaped so that patterns like those reflecting off faces (whether they are or not) end up triggering cascades down neural pathways which other patterns don't set off.

And the laws of physics are the only rules in operation.

What they do in this case is to set off a cascade of neural activity directly to areas that set off cascades that result in emotional responses.

So a person with this kind of blindness can "look" at a photograph of a happy face, which s/he has no experience of seeing, then judge how s/he feels emotionally in response, and on that basis guess the emotion of the person in the photo.

They're not quite as good as sighted people at correctly judging the emotions of people from photographs, but almost, and significantly better than chance.

In this case, the evolutionary advantage is clear. It's best not to bother our conscious awareness modules about our response to another person's emotions... better to allow a few basic visual patterns to trigger an emotional/physical response, and then if something's wrong consciousness can override.

Easy to see how that would have evolved.

Now if we can get past the virtual world stuff, what's interesting is to consider whether our conscious modules are using the non-conscious ones as information processors.

I mean, what's the difference between me triggering a non-conscious symbolic response in your brain and me doing the same thing with my own brain?

 

[Piggy]

Interesting... so, when I multiplied two three digit numbers, I must not have applied "logic" either, unless you count the laws of physics as logic, because the laws of physics are the only laws affecting how I behave.

If you think you applied logic, then tell me exactly who you think applied logic to what.

And I'm not trying to be cute here. I really do think that's a badly formed statement, if you're trying to talk about what really occurs in the world. Although I think it's a statement about a situation that's worth looking at.

But yeah, at the end of the day, I see no evidence that we need more than the laws of physics (incomplete as our knowledge of them may currently be) to describe any event in the universe, at least the ones we're aware of.

 

[yy2bggggs]

If you think you applied logic, then tell me exactly who

This cohesively singular planning (goal-based behavioral) agent...

you think applied logic to what.

...contingently applied a system of valid inference which resulted in successfully achieving an intended goal. It's contingent because it's possible I made a mistake in my application of inference--that is, at least one of the steps I performed was not a valid one.

But yeah, at the end of the day, I see no evidence that we need more than the laws of physics (incomplete as our knowledge of them may currently be) to describe any event in the universe, at least the ones we're aware of.

Because the application of logic in my case means that a valid system of inference was used to achieve the goal, and the success criteria, depending on the precise intent of the problem, is either coming up with the correct answer, or coming up with the correct answer through correct means.

It's physically possible to fail that goal. We need to, instead, analyze the inference chain to see if that system successfully achieved the goal, as a metric of success (or, in the case where we only care about getting the right answer, minimally just validate it).

 

[Piggy]

Sounds like the computer performed addition to me.

Yeah, I know, it does, doesn't it?

But let's take a look at that phrase... performed addition.

If we want to take it literally, we could imagine that you have 2 dogs in your yard, and I come over to visit with 3 dogs in my truck, and I turn them out in the yard with your dogs, and now you've got 5 dogs in the yard.

That's a real performance of addition.

Now what happens when I hit "2 + 3 = Enter" on my keyboard?

Well, the end result is that a pattern of lights appears on the screen that looks like this: 5

I don't imagine that two of anything has joined three of anything in my machine, so what's up?

The programmer could describe it in terms of variables, values for those variables, if/then rules for changing them, and so on.

But those are metaphoric terms, akin to the post office model of the brain... there are boxes with things in them that change and are read and rewritten and so forth.

And that's because programmers have built comfortable interfaces that make work much quicker by making it human-brain-friendly.

The actual stuff-going-on, however, is not so brain-friendly.

But at the end of the day, the system is set up so that the result of your pressing that series of buttons is the appearance of that pattern of lights on the screen.

And you don't have to actually have 2 of anything or 3 of anything to do it. In fact, there's no way to tell from the behavior of the computer that anything was "added" at all. The display of the symbol really is all that occurred, and all the machine is set up to do.

Now what happens when I ask my buddy "What's two plus three?"

The sound waves hit his ear, cause cascades of electrochemical reactions, which are in a pattern that sets off a rather narrow but strong chain of responses, and based on a kind of neurological erosion, his mouth says "Five" and probably sometime as he hears himself say it, he becomes aware -- there is currently no theory how -- not only that he's saying "Five" but that he means "five".

Which is where it gets interesting.

 

[Piggy]

This cohesively singular planning (goal-based behavioral) agent......

You think such a thing exists?

contingently applied a system of valid inference which resulted in successfully achieving an intended goal. It's contingent because it's possible I made a mistake in my application of inference--that is, at least one of the steps I performed was not a valid one.

Wait a minute, if that thing exists, where did it get whatever this is, and to what was it applied?

There is no answer to any of this, of course, just like there's no answer to where the steam is in my head.

 

[Piggy]

By that argument, I didn't multiply numbers either. What happened is that a teacher, who knew how the whole "multiplying numbers" thing worked, set up an abstract procedure--one that transforms state changes very slowly with high predictability--to transform those states in ways that matched some logic on some ancient mathematician's decayed papyrus.

Problem is, that's still multiplication.

That's not a bad description. Your repetition of the tables as a schoolkid is probably what set up the physical system so that the sound "five" would come out of your mouth without your brain even bothering to check if it was the right sound to make.

And see, this is the interesting part.

We seem to be using each other's brains as information processors, and our own brains as information processors.

And it seems to be the conscious modules that are doing it.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I don't imagine that two of anything has joined three of anything in my machine, so what's up?

Doesn't matter. I don't believe 197 of anything matched up with 203 of anything when I multiplied the two to get 39991 (sorry for picking an easy example, but what's fun is that I get to use a non-standard algorithm here).

But nevertheless, when I, in my head, said (200-3)*(200+3)=(200^2-3^2)=40000-9=39991, I really did multiply numbers. Why? Because those numbers have names, according to a convention that we set out. And the goal of multiplication is to find the name of the number that is the product of the two numbers we just named. And that's exactly what I did.

I did not perform the math directly. I cheated. I used a trick--an algorithm I learned--in this case, one I learned in algebra class. But the standard multiplication algorithm is also a trick--it's just as much a cheat. But it's multiplication.

This is because, in mathematics, how you get the answer isn't as important as simply getting the answer in a valid way. There is no single proper way to get the answer; any valid way that you use to get the answer is legitimately performing mathematics.

This is why I'm telling you it's a bad example. Anything that works in a dual space that maps to the problem space, where you use the dual to perform the work, counts as doing the work.

The computer is cheating too. But the way that it's cheating is no different than the way I just cheated. As such, to call what it is doing adding is exactly as valid as it is calling what I did above multiplication.

We could even note that the assignment of digits in the computer--this one being "0" and this one being "1", is arbitrary. And that's fine--but it's exactly as arbitrary as the assignment of the digits 0 through 9 that we make.

The actual stuff-going-on, however, is not so brain-friendly.

But we're not talking about the brain friendliness of what the computer did. We're talking about the addition-ness of what it did. So comparing how brain-friendly the computers processes were to how brain friendly the thing I did above was is a non-sequitur; we should, instead, compare how "math friendly" the computer's addition was versus how "math friendly" our brain friendly addition was.

And that's what I was doing--if my product of two three digit numbers is something you're going to call math, then you have to call what the computer did math as well.

Now what happens when I ask my buddy "What's two plus three?"

Bad example. What in fact happens when you ask your buddy what two and three is, is that your buddy recalls five using rote memorization deeply engrained into him since grade school. But ask the same buddy to multiply 197 by 203, and he'll do something entirely different.

Both are mathematical.

 

[yy2bggggs]

You think such a thing exists?

Yes.

Wait a minute, if that thing exists, where did it get whatever this is, and to what was it applied?

Where did it get what exactly?

There is no answer to any of this, of course, just like there's no answer to where the steam is in my head.

I'm not sure I agree. There's a category in my head--I know because I can recognize it, which means that it is invariant under a condition. There are rules for transformations of the category, and together those two constitute a set of rules about which the goal can be stated.

That's all there is to assert.