Explain consciousness to the layman.

[rocketdodger]

No, that's not what was said.

Changes in states in the computer have real-world effects. So do changes in states in the paramecium.

Changes in the state of a computer, or any machine or any real object, need no human to interpret them as changes in those objects. They exist independently.

In contrast, when a computer changes state so that the pattern of pixels on a screen in the shape of "120" changes to a pattern in the shape of "140", this requires a human observer who understands the symbol system to imagine "the tornado is increasing in wind speed" if it is to be anything more than a change in pixel patterns.

By comparison, Westprog and I could bet on what the paramecium will do next, and turn the critter into a kind of switch with an outcome of either me handing Westprog some bank notes, or him handing some to me. But all of that is based on activity in our imaginations... it has no effect on the paramecium.

That has nothing to do with anything.

The question was whether the changes in the paramecium have meaning to the paramecium.

Do they?

 

[Piggy]

No, it is not a symbolic representation.

Symbols reference something that is not themselves. The entities in the simulation do not reference things that are not themselves.

There are no such "entities".

There is only the machine, doing what machines do.

It's the output of the machine which is a symbolic representation. And only by interpreting those symbols is it possible to imagine any "entities".

ETA: If these "entities" are real, and not imaginary, then why doesn't your computer get heavier when you simulate a dump truck?

 

[Piggy]

That has nothing to do with anything.

The question was whether the changes in the paramecium have meaning to the paramecium.

Do they?

No, that wasn't the question, but if you want to ask it, I doubt anything has meaning to a paramecium.

 

[rocketdodger]

They are equivalent in the way that matters for this discussion -- they are both symbolic representations.

If you honestly think that a roll of film sitting in a warehouse is equivalent to a computer program, then we are at an impasse.

I don't know where to go from there.

 

[Piggy]

Yes, I did:

The behavior of the set of particles in the computer is isomorphic to that of the particles in the watershed or epidemics.

This does not make the machine any more like a river than it was before.

Now, if the particles in the machine actually behaved like a watershed, it would no longer be a machine capable of running simulations... it would actually be a watershed.

 

[Piggy]

If you honestly think that a roll of film sitting in a warehouse is equivalent to a computer program, then we are at an impasse.

Then we're not at an impasse, because I think no such thing.

 

[rocketdodger]

This does not make the machine any more like a river than it was before.

Now, if the particles in the machine actually behaved like a watershed, it would no longer be a machine capable of running simulations... it would actually be a watershed.

Yeah, we are done here.

If you don't think isomorphic behavior is of any importance then there isn't anything I can say to further this discussion from your perspective. Sorry.

 

[rocketdodger]

Then we're not at an impasse, because I think no such thing.

Then why did you say it?

They are equivalent in the way that matters for this discussion -- they are both symbolic representations.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, that wasn't the question, but if you want to ask it, I doubt anything has meaning to a paramecium.

So they just sit there like rocks, eh?

 

[Modified]

2. Our universe, including ourselves, cannot be a simulation because a simulation is a representation and requires an interpreter to match the actual thing (the media in which the representation is rendered) to what is being symbolically represented.

If a particle-level simulation of our universe existed, the simulated Piggy would make exactly the same arguments that you're making. Entities within the simulation can interpret their own environment; no external observer is required. No "actual thing" is required either. Perhaps "simulation" is not the right word if our universe is running in software on a machine in some universe for which ours is not a representation.

 

[yy2bggggs]

So:

Simulations are real; they have to be, because that's what makes it meaningful to say you have a simulation running at all, versus that you don't.

Simulated entities are real; that's what makes it meaningful to say you are simulating them at all versus that you aren't. And the entities' interactions must be real; that's what makes it meaningful to say your simulation is running versus not running.

If anyone disagrees with any of these points, kindly tell me what it means for me to claim I'm running a simulation--right down to a criteria by which you can judge that I'm lying about it.

Now, simulated entities do differ from their counterparts, at the very least in how they interact (also by definition; if I "simulate" a robot by building one, I didn't actually simulate it--I just built it). Nobody to my knowledge is claiming otherwise.

However, I do disagree with the notion that running a simulation creates another world. It does no such thing. It simply uses the existing world to make a controlled mapping, exploiting the real regularity of real counterparts to achieve a real outcome.

And along these lines, can we drop the silly invented term "objective reality" already? It's just called "reality"; tagging that adjective on is worse than redundant--it's a misnomer.

 

[westprog]

They are equivalent in the way that matters for this discussion -- they are both symbolic representations.

For some reason, you think that the computer changing states somehow fundamentally alters the nature of the representation, so that the thing being symbolized now is, independent of observation.

In reality, of course, the only thing that is independently real is the computer.

But at least we know now what determines your Pinocchio point... the use of a computer!

Not that it makes any more sense, but at least your errors are becoming more comprehensible.

Surely you must accept that if we could increase the frame rate and the accuracy of the pictures to arbitrary precision we would eventually reach a point where the simulation would be as real as the thing it depicts?

 

[westprog]

There are no such "entities".

There is only the machine, doing what machines do.

It's the output of the machine which is a symbolic representation. And only by interpreting those symbols is it possible to imagine any "entities".

ETA: If these "entities" are real, and not imaginary, then why doesn't your computer get heavier when you simulate a dump truck?

The meaning of the symbols is always something external to the program. For every possible meaning of the symbols, the simulation has a different meaning. External to the simulation, only one interpretation is valid. One number is wind speed, another direction, say. Within the program, no one value is preferable to any other. All the possible simulations are taking place at once, and if one is real, they all are. They reference every quantity that ever existed, or didn't exist.

 

[Piggy]

The meaning of the symbols is always something external to the program. For every possible meaning of the symbols, the simulation has a different meaning. External to the simulation, only one interpretation is valid. One number is wind speed, another direction, say. Within the program, no one value is preferable to any other. All the possible simulations are taking place at once, and if one is real, they all are. They reference every quantity that ever existed, or didn't exist.

Or in other words, if the particle-level simulation of our universe created a twin universe which has some sort of existence independent of our perception / imagination, it would also necessarily create an incomparably vast number of other universes simultaneously.

But these guys may not perceive that, because they've chosen to simplify their world by removing semantics and settling for syntax alone.

 

[westprog]

Or in other words, if the particle-level simulation of our universe created a twin universe which has some sort of existence independent of our perception / imagination, it would also necessarily create an incomparably vast number of other universes simultaneously.

But these guys may not perceive that, because they've chosen to simplify their world by removing semantics and settling for syntax alone.

There's an assumption that the simulation will "know" the values of the symbols it is manipulating, even though they are not defined within the simulation. Even though the only way to define the symbols is in terms of other undefined symbols.

 

[Piggy]

Yeah, we are done here.

If you don't think isomorphic behavior is of any importance then there isn't anything I can say to further this discussion from your perspective. Sorry.

Never said it's of no importance. Just that it doesn't support your argument.

What I'm saying is that we can describe the entire system of the universe, the machine, the simulation, the programmer, and the observer with no reference to any world other than the physical world which contains the machine and the imaginary world in the minds of the programmer and observer.

Isomorphic behavior is necessary to create the simulation. How else are you going to get it?

But you have offered no explanation for how it also demands that we assign any -- any -- sort of reality to a "world of the simulation" apart from the physical universe and the mind of the observer.

The isomorphic behavior does not cause the objects engaging in those mapped behaviors to be identical to one another (unless one object is a physical replica of the other) nor does it create a 3rd object.

The entire system can be understood without any claims to the "world of the simulation" being "real", so why fold in the unnecessary bit?

 

[Piggy]

So they just sit there like rocks, eh?

You've been looking at a kind of paramecium I'm not familiar with.

That's true whether you think they "sit there like rocks" (in which case I wouldn't have made my bet with Westprog on the thing's next move) or that anything "has meaning" or "is meaningful" to them.

 

[Piggy]

If a particle-level simulation of our universe existed, the simulated Piggy would make exactly the same arguments that you're making. Entities within the simulation can interpret their own environment; no external observer is required. No "actual thing" is required either. Perhaps "simulation" is not the right word if our universe is running in software on a machine in some universe for which ours is not a representation.

If a particle-level reproduction of our universe existed, the reproduction Piggy would make exactly the same arguments that I'm making.

But as far as simulations, let's begin with what we agree on, and draw conclusions from that.

How can we succinctly describe the object that will run this simulation, and the kinds of things it will be doing in physical terms? What is it, and what's it doing?

(That's not a leading question, btw, I think you'll have a superior answer to any I would come up with.)

 

[rocketdodger]

But you have offered no explanation for how it also demands that we assign any -- any -- sort of reality to a "world of the simulation" apart from the physical universe and the mind of the observer.

Because you just hinted that you consider the mind of the observer a reality, when actually it is a simulation of reality.

So why not just call all simulations real?

If you want to agree to call nothing real except reality, meaning what is in our minds is not real but merely a simulation of reality, then fine, we can do that.

Are you willing to do that?

The isomorphic behavior does not cause the objects engaging in those mapped behaviors to be identical to one another (unless one object is a physical replica of the other) nor does it create a 3rd object.

I agree.

However I don't think behaviors need to be identical for things like consciousness to emerge, which is rather the point. I think behaviors need to be merely isomorphic for things like consciousness to emerge.

The entire system can be understood without any claims to the "world of the simulation" being "real", so why fold in the unnecessary bit?

Because you continually use the general statement "but the things in the simulation are not real" to forward your arguments.

If you hadn't brought it up, we wouldn't be in this mess.

 

[rocketdodger]

However, I do disagree with the notion that running a simulation creates another world. It does no such thing.

There isn't a formal definition of world that allows you to make such a statement.

Most laypeople would agree that there is a "world" of harry potter, and a "world" of warcraft, and a "world" of any other fiction that has been created by the minds of humans.

In fact I can point out dozens of code objects whose class names actually contain the term "world" in all of the game engines I have worked in.

That being said, if you want to formally define world such that there is only ever one, then be my guest. I would stop using the term if you do, though, because I think it would then have zero utility in normal communication.