Explain consciousness to the layman.

[!Kaggen]

Yeah but do you know how particles are formed?

If so please tell us, it would be nobel-prize worthy stuff.

I thought there were no particles only their interactions.

 

[rocketdodger]

I was under the impression (apparently mistaken) that impulse -> beat, and that this was all the heart did. I don't remember my heart doing anything but beating at regular intervals.

It isn't that simple, but even if it was, what about the cells that make up the heart? And the organelles that make up them?

Biological life is centered around the ability to react to a wide set of environmental states with a smaller set of behaviors.

When I hit a rock with a hammer, the impact translates into smaller internal states as well, but saying a rock computers makes the word a bit useless.

It depends on the rock.

If there are areas of low integrity, such that no matter where you hit the rock it always fractures along those zones and ends up in one of 3 possible states, then you have a switch.

If the rock fractures differently each time you hit it, then you don't.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

If you want to claim that representations become real when sufficiently rich in detail, then please, explain the mechanism by which that happens.

Normally I would rise to a strawman of this level, hopefully optimistic that you are genuinely misunderstanding my position instead of obtusely dissembling, but between your and westprog's posting styles, I doubt I'd get a word in edgewise. Allow me instead to merely assert that you are mistaken, and let you figure out exactly how for yourself.

 

[rocketdodger]

Oh, this is going to be fun....

The components of the machine running the sim changed.

Again, no need to appeal to any mysterious other worlds.

The supposed "house" and "tornado" are all in the imagination of the observer, and the machine is in the real world. That's sufficient to account for every feature of the larger system.

You don't get it.

I am not asking you "what" changed.

I am asking you to describe how the things that changed, changed.

 

[rocketdodger]

Better yet, if the behavior of the computer does exhibit qualities of the systems it simulates, then point them out.

That's a much easier and more direct way of dealing with that issue.

In what ways does a computer begin to behave like a river when we run sims of watersheds?

In what ways does a computer begin to behave like a disease when we run sims of epidemics?

The behavior of the set of particles in the computer is isomorphic to that of the particles in the watershed or epidemics.

Not subjectively. Objectively.

If I programmed such a simulation, and made it very accurate, and then killed myself and every other intelligence in the universe, the behavior of the simulation and the real watershed would continue with the same isomorphism until the end of time -- the transforms necessary to go from <simulation behavior> to <watershed behavior> would remain constant.

This is NOT what happens with a rock or a bowl of soup. If you can find a transform between a bowl of soup and a watershed, such that for one instant the soup is a simulation of the watershed, that transform is invalid in the next instant, and you would need to find another one. If all humans were removed, so that nobody was updating the transforms, the soup would rapidly cease to have any isomorphic relationship to the watershed at all. In other words, the behavior is not isomorphic. For behavior to be isomorphic the transforms can't vary from state to state.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, you don't got anybody.

The change in state of a paramecium is similar to the change in state of the computer running the sim -- that happens in reality.

Yet for a tornado simulation, there is no "change in the tornado" outside the imagination of the viewer of the simulation.

Contrast this with a weather box in which we can instigate actual tornadoes. Those real tornadoes do what all tornadoes do, with or without observation.

Look at what you just said.

You claim the change in the paramecium is similar to the change in the computer.

But westprog said the change in the computer has no meaning without a human to interpret it.

So are you now claiming that without a human around to interpret it, the change in a paramecium is meaningless -- to the paramecium ? I don't claim it has meaning to a human, since a human wouldn't be there. I claim it has meaning to the paramecium. Namely, the change probably allows it to continue doing whatever paramecia do. You don't think that is meaningful to the paramecium?

 

[rocketdodger]

No, you are quite wrong about that.

Not long ago, someone tried to play the "particles are strictly informational" card in a science thread and was quickly shot down.

The interactions indicate that there is indeed something there to be interacting... and we can describe various attributes of different kinds of particles which give us reason to call them different names... your philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the implications of QM.

In short, the subatomic world does not need to be made of any kind of "material". And that fact, startling as it is to many folks, changes nothing about questions in our macro world, like "What causes consciousness?"

Um, that was exactly my point -- that the <something> that is there to be interacting could be merely data in a simulation that we are inhabiting.

Then you go on to confirm that the subatomic world doesn't need to be made out of any kind of "material." Yes, I agree. It could be made out of data in a simulation we are inhabiting.

Thanks.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, I'm not.

Um, yeah, you are.

Well, let me rephrase that -- there hasn't been a single monist in any of the threads I have participated in that shares your view.

So that makes you like 1/50. I guess that isn't a big sample size, but I wager it is still statistically significant.

 

[westprog]

I thought there were no particles only their interactions.

We have had numerous models of how matter works, and I expect that we will have a lot more. None of these models have changed how the world actually is. We find out about particles by the way that they impinge on our consciousness, and we make up stories about them. Just like with the computer, or the brain.

 

[Piggy]

But look at all the clever people who agree!

I did feel for a while that I was proposing a position that nobody else shared. It's now clear that I'm not alone. I've also found that there are serious commentators on the matter who share my misgivings about the supposed orthodoxy - which is only an orthodoxy among a small group of philosophers and programmers.

Quite right... it's nothing close to orthodoxy among folks who actually study consciousness.

In fact, the team that is building a brain simulation down to the neuron level are quick to insist that the result will not be a working brain, but merely a representation of a brain.

According to RocketDodger, either they are wrong, or there is some "Pinocchio point" of representational accuracy at which the things being simulated do become real.

Of course, in RocketDodger's particle-level simulation, either his massive particles will be massless (which means they're not actual massive particles at all) or the simulation of any fairly large system of massive particles (a dump truck, for example) will cause the computer running the simulation to crash through the floor.

 

[Piggy]

Normally I would rise to a strawman of this level, hopefully optimistic that you are genuinely misunderstanding my position instead of obtusely dissembling, but between your and westprog's posting styles, I doubt I'd get a word in edgewise. Allow me instead to merely assert that you are mistaken, and let you figure out exactly how for yourself.

I can only respond to what you post. If you intend something other than what you type, I have no way to know.

 

[Piggy]

You don't get it.

I am not asking you "what" changed.

I am asking you to describe how the things that changed, changed.

Let's back this up:

RD: Assume you have a simulation, with a simulated tornado and a simulated house. The simulation is always running. One night a tech looks at the screen and sees that the house is still standing. The next morning he checks, and somehow the house is now destroyed, and the tornado is gone. What happened?

P: The symbols changed.

RD: How did they change?

P: The components of the machine running the sim changed.

So you see, I did answer your question. How did the symbols change? They changed when the components of the machine running the sim changed. As far as I know, that's the only way for it to happen.

Ok, so now you seem to want a description of how the states of computer components change.

May I ask you why?

The reason I'm curious is because it should be irrelevant.

Let's say I'm watching a Disney movie on film. The images change. How do they change? They change because of the action of the projector, not because some "world of the film" exists in which these beings actually live.

Now, we could drill down from there into how a projector works, but why?

All we need to know is whether or not we're dealing with a symbolic representation (like a film or a computer simulation) or a non-symbolic reproduction (like a baby or a new house).

Of course, if you believe that delving into the electro-physical activity of a computer is going to help your case, then by all means, explain yourself. It will be a lot quicker than trying to get me to make your case by playing a game of 20 questions.

 

[Piggy]

The behavior of the set of particles in the computer is isomorphic to that of the particles in the watershed or epidemics.

Not subjectively. Objectively.

If I programmed such a simulation, and made it very accurate, and then killed myself and every other intelligence in the universe, the behavior of the simulation and the real watershed would continue with the same isomorphism until the end of time -- the transforms necessary to go from <simulation behavior> to <watershed behavior> would remain constant.

To which the inevitable follow-up question is: "So what?"

Even if your simulation is accurate enough to perfectly track the behavior of the real-world watershed forever, this does not generate a Pinocchio point at which the simulated watershed it becomes real rather than symbolic.

It is still a symbolic representation.

Nor have you indicated in any way how the machine running the sim would take on any characteristics of a watershed as a result of performing the simulation.

 

[Piggy]

Look at what you just said.

You claim the change in the paramecium is similar to the change in the computer.

But westprog said the change in the computer has no meaning without a human to interpret it.

No, that's not what was said.

Changes in states in the computer have real-world effects. So do changes in states in the paramecium.

Changes in the state of a computer, or any machine or any real object, need no human to interpret them as changes in those objects. They exist independently.

In contrast, when a computer changes state so that the pattern of pixels on a screen in the shape of "120" changes to a pattern in the shape of "140", this requires a human observer who understands the symbol system to imagine "the tornado is increasing in wind speed" if it is to be anything more than a change in pixel patterns.

By comparison, Westprog and I could bet on what the paramecium will do next, and turn the critter into a kind of switch with an outcome of either me handing Westprog some bank notes, or him handing some to me. But all of that is based on activity in our imaginations... it has no effect on the paramecium.

 

[Piggy]

Um, that was exactly my point -- that the <something> that is there to be interacting could be merely data in a simulation that we are inhabiting.

Circular reasoning.

How do we know that simulated worlds could be real? Because our world could be a simulation! How do we know this? Because, after all, simulations could be real.

To say that our world "could be made of data" is, I submit, an empty statement, a mere string of words.

 

[Piggy]

Um, yeah, you are.

Well, let me rephrase that -- there hasn't been a single monist in any of the threads I have participated in that shares your view.

So that makes you like 1/50. I guess that isn't a big sample size, but I wager it is still statistically significant.

That's fine, but I don't give a rat's backside about "monism" or any of your philoboxes.

My argument stands on its own.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

I can only respond to what you post. If you intend something other than what you type, I have no way to know.

I have already typed what I intended, and intend what I typed. You are welcome to review my previous posts. The last one was several pages back.

 

[rocketdodger]

Let's say I'm watching a Disney movie on film. The images change. How do they change? They change because of the action of the projector, not because some "world of the film" exists in which these beings actually live.

The images you see change.

The images on the film do not.

How can you seriously think that is equivalent to what goes on inside a computer?

 

[rocketdodger]

To which the inevitable follow-up question is: "So what?"

Even if your simulation is accurate enough to perfectly track the behavior of the real-world watershed forever, this does not generate a Pinocchio point at which the simulated watershed it becomes real rather than symbolic.

It is still a symbolic representation.

No, it is not a symbolic representation.

Symbols reference something that is not themselves. The entities in the simulation do not reference things that are not themselves. Neither do the particles that make up the memory banks of the computer that is running the simulation. There is no symbolism anywhere, until a human interprets the results.

Nor have you indicated in any way how the machine running the sim would take on any characteristics of a watershed as a result of performing the simulation.

Yes, I did:

The behavior of the set of particles in the computer is isomorphic to that of the particles in the watershed or epidemics.

 

[Piggy]

The images you see change.

The images on the film do not.

How can you seriously think that is equivalent to what goes on inside a computer?

They are equivalent in the way that matters for this discussion -- they are both symbolic representations.

For some reason, you think that the computer changing states somehow fundamentally alters the nature of the representation, so that the thing being symbolized now is, independent of observation.

In reality, of course, the only thing that is independently real is the computer.

But at least we know now what determines your Pinocchio point... the use of a computer!

Not that it makes any more sense, but at least your errors are becoming more comprehensible.