Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?

[Croc411]

Croc, even if all your premises are true, it doesn't prevent someone who is made of matter and a strict materialist from feeling a sense of self preservation.

Yes, but do we have any reason to assume that this is anything else but a trick of evolution?

I do not fear sleep, although exactly the same thing could be happening. I could be getting replaced every night and awake a new copy every morning. But I'm used to that.

I would say: I have ZERO reason to assume that what you just described is not totally equivalent (for every possible purpose in the universe) to what really happens.

If the kind of transportation you describe became a reality, I expect it would follow the same lines. At first rejected, then accepted by some and then by most as the others saw the 'same' person afterwards. As it became a familiar way to get around, only the odd balls would refuse to use it. I don't think the philosophical questions would have much heft in the face of the pragmatic advantage of getting from here to there.

Again, I would say: as a materialist I have ZERO reason to assume that it could (from my subjective viewpoint) matter in any way (because the perceived "me" doesn't really exist), so let's go ahead.

As a marketing tool, I suggest you piggyback on sleep and try the following: "Fall asleep in Paris, and wake up ten minutes later in South Africa." Put them to sleep before you send them.

I think that would make things worse, because then some people would be afraid of breaking the precious *cough* continuity *cough*.

 

[Dancing David]

Ok, and I argue that you then cannot have a materialistic worldview. The premises I stated earlier are:



You obviously disagree with Rule 2 and/or 3. Please tell me which one and why.

2 is wrong, you have to include position in space and time.

 

[godless dave]

Yes, but do we have any reason to assume that this is anything else but a trick of evolution?

No. Why would you think it was? Of course our instinct for self-preservation is something that evolved in animals a long time ago.

I would say: I have ZERO reason to assume that what you just described is not totally equivalent (for every possible purpose in the universe) to what really happens.

Again, I would say: as a materialist I have ZERO reason to assume that it could (from my subjective viewpoint) matter in any way (because the perceived "me" doesn't really exist), so let's go ahead.

How about the fact that the vast majority of cells in the brain, and most of the cells in the rest of the body, don't get replaced? How about the fact that the physical "me" is readily identifiable?

 

[Croc411]

2 is wrong, you have to include position in space and time.

No, because their wavefunctions will eventually overlap. Anyway, the point of 2 is that the particles you consist of cannot carry any information that constitute the subjective "You".

 

[Croc411]

No. Why would you think it was? Of course our instinct for self-preservation is something that evolved in animals a long time ago.

That was my point in reply to marplots. We should not put too much importance into that instinct of self-preservation.

How about the fact that the vast majority of cells in the brain, and most of the cells in the rest of the body, don't get replaced? How about the fact that the physical "me" is readily identifiable?

- We know that the particles these cells consist of do get replaced all the time
- We know that these particles cannot contain any information about the "You"
- We know that we change our spacetime coordinates all the time without considering ourselves a different person afterwards
- We know that our personality and memories change from one moment to another, we don't consider ourselves a different person every moment

So why should a combination of any of those above put an end to our subjective existence, if any single one does not? Makes no sense.

 

[godless dave]

- We know that the particles these cells consist of do get replaced all the time

Do we? I'd like to see a citation for that.

- We know that these particles cannot contain any information about the "You"

No, an individual particle can't. So what?

- We know that we change our spacetime coordinates all the time without considering ourselves a different person afterwards
- We know that our personality and memories change from one moment to another, we don't consider ourselves a different person every moment

So why should a combination of any of those above put an end to our subjective existence, if any single one does not? Makes no sense.

It doesn't.

What puts an end to our subjective existence is if both frontal lobes are destroyed in their entirety. That's where the feeling of "self" is.

 

[Dancing David]

No, because their wavefunctions will eventually overlap. Anyway, the point of 2 is that the particles you consist of cannot carry any information that constitute the subjective "You".

No they won't, if they are in close proximity and the temperatures are really cold, they might overlap. But position and a vector of motion are totally relevant, you can't just wave them away.

So who says they will overlap? (Or why do you think it matters.)

 

[Croc411]

It doesn't.

That's what I'm saying all along. But by refusing to enter the transporter you are implying that it does.

What puts an end to our subjective existence is if both frontal lobes are destroyed in their entirety. That's where the feeling of "self" is.

No, this means that this particular body will stop producing conscious states. And that's it.

 

[marplots]

That was my point in reply to marplots. We should not put too much importance into that instinct of self-preservation.

Aye, but there's the rub. I cannot not put on (nor remove) importance from something that is instinctual. I can no more do that than not use my kidneys. This is the materialist viewpoint -- I am not free to dismiss those very things that make me who I am, or I would be someone else entirely.

Still, no soul is needed for this to happen. Just muscle, bone and nerves.

If a sense of continuity is part of the package, and I think it is for a sense of self (see: Damasio, "Self Comes to Mind" for an excellent argument), then I cannot think my way past it -- not because I am too dumb or too stuck in my opinions, but because I am constitutionally unable to.

 

[vladi]

The bitch is when you take all the old planks and reassemble the original ship. Now you have two Ships of Theseus, but which is the Ship of Theseus?

Then the ship, assembled from the old planlks will be a copy, because it came into existence later, while the original ship existed and functioned all along, even though it was was being repaired all the time.

Ok, and I argue that you then cannot have a materialistic worldview. The premises I stated earlier are:

I don't think so. I think I agree with all the rules.

And still, after the copying process there will be two separate human beings, although equivalent in every way, but still two of them with two separate uninterrupted brain processes, separate consciousnesses, separate selves. You can cut the arm of the "original" and he will experience the pain but the "copy" will not. From the point of view of the "original, " the "copy" is just another human being living separate life. The "original" can still die and it will be the end of his life and his personal identity as he experiences it But as far as everyone else is concerned, his personal identity will continue to live in the "copy". But in fact, the "copy"'s life started just moments ago. I consider every complete interruption of brain processes to be irreversible death. When you die you cease to exist, everything just disappears, time stops and there is no more "you", so you can't just "wake up" from death, i.e. resurrect. If you woke up then you were either not dead, but in some kind of sleep or your life just started with or without pre-recorded memories.

 

[Complexity]

I would like to put you all in a transporter...

Croc411. You are wrong. I know you think you are right, that you have constructed an inescapable trap, but you are wrong.

You'd be somewhat more correct if you wrote 'premisses', but not nearly enough.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Well, my opinion is discussed above, possibly ad nauseum.

If at T=30 seconds he remembers being at T=0, then according to him he is the same person.

Agreed.

But what if at T=15 seconds he was instantly copied? At that moment there will be two humans with two senses of self and each of them will consider himself to be the same person as at T=0 sec. Then one of them dies. His life ends there, it's over for him. His sense of self disappears. He doesn't begin to sense the other human as himself.

Also agreed to the above, with the caveat that the one that dies must be alive enough to formulate at least one coherent thought. This I believe takes some time (somewhere along the lines of tens to hundreds of milliseconds maybe?)

Let's just say that if it happened to you and you were the original you would know...

I think the only thing that meaningfully flags one of these as the original is just a pragmatic way to perform the assignment in this particular phrasing of the hypothetical (namely, we consider the original to be the one at the same location). My opinion is that both copies would legitimately be the same person as the one at T=0, but not the same as each other (that is, "the same as" in this sense is not a transitive relation).

 

[steenkh]

No, because their wavefunctions will eventually overlap.

So you claim that the particles in my computer, and the particles in your computer are the same? That the fact that some of them are located in your computer, and others in mine does not matter?

Anyway, the point of 2 is that the particles you consist of cannot carry any information that constitute the subjective "You".

Since particles in our computers definitely carry information, you are clearly wrong.

 

[vladi]

Also agreed to the above, with the caveat that the one that dies must be alive enough to formulate at least one coherent thought. This I believe takes some time (somewhere along the lines of tens to hundreds of milliseconds maybe?)

Both of them can stay alive for as long as we wish. They may even look at each other, have a conversation and still neither one will agree to have himself killed.

I think the only thing that meaningfully flags one of these as the original is just a pragmatic way to perform the assignment in this particular phrasing of the hypothetical (namely, we consider the original to be the one at the same location).

I consider the "original" to be the one that existed before and was the source of information for the copying. The only differences between the "original" and the "copy" is the moment each began to exist and that they exist separately, at different space/time coordinates.

My opinion is that both copies would legitimately be the same person as the one at T=0, but not the same as each other (that is, "the same as" in this sense is not a transitive relation).

Exactly. And just because they are both the same as the person at T=0 doesn't mean they have some magical connection between them or that they share one consciousness.

 

[godless dave]

That's what I'm saying all along. But by refusing to enter the transporter you are implying that it does.

Because entering the transporter means my frontal lobes - me - will be destroyed, and I will no longer exist.

No, this means that this particular body will stop producing conscious states. And that's it.

Correct. And this particular body is me. It doesn't hold me, it doesn't contain me, it is me.

 

[Croc411]

Aye, but there's the rub. I cannot not put on (nor remove) importance from something that is instinctual. I can no more do that than not use my kidneys. This is the materialist viewpoint -- I am not free to dismiss those very things that make me who I am, or I would be someone else entirely.

Still, no soul is needed for this to happen. Just muscle, bone and nerves.

Not sure that I get what you mean here. I acknowedge that our sense of self-preservation is a vital part of what makes us what we are, and we are in no way perfectly rational beings (wouldn't be fun anyways ...).

This might mean that I might chicken out from entering the transporter if push comes to shove, but no way in hell does it mean that I have to base my default worldview on it. Especially not if this worldview is incoherent and/or there are simpler alternatives. Occam's Razor FTW.

If a sense of continuity is part of the package, and I think it is for a sense of self (see: Damasio, "Self Comes to Mind" for an excellent argument), then I cannot think my way past it -- not because I am too dumb or too stuck in my opinions, but because I am constitutionally unable to.

Yes, of course it's part of the package. It's what makes us feel all warm and cuddly about our life. But it works backwards only, not forwards. It's an effect, not a requirement.

 

[Croc411]

And still, after the copying process there will be two separate human beings, although equivalent in every way, but still two of them with two separate uninterrupted brain processes, separate consciousnesses, separate selves. You can cut the arm of the "original" and he will experience the pain but the "copy" will not.

Yes.

From the point of view of the "original, " the "copy" is just another human being living separate life.

Not quite. From the point of view of the "original, " the "copy" is another human being that's almost identical to himself. Let's say 99% him.

The "original" can still die and it will be the end of his life and his personal identity as he experiences it But as far as everyone else is concerned, his personal identity will continue to live in the "copy". But in fact, the "copy"'s life started just moments ago. I consider every complete interruption of brain processes to be irreversible death. When you die you cease to exist, everything just disappears, time stops and there is no more "you", so you can't just "wake up" from death, i.e. resurrect. If you woke up then you were either not dead, but in some kind of sleep or your life just started with or without pre-recorded memories.

Sorry vladi, but this would require something about the "You" that is non-reproducible in principle (Rule 1.2). I will never accept that as materialistic. This is nothing but the age-old soul concept in disguise.

 

[Croc411]

So you claim that the particles in my computer, and the particles in your computer are the same? That the fact that some of them are located in your computer, and others in mine does not matter?

Yes, if you look at only the particles themselves it doesn't matter. If their basic properties are the same, they ARE the same for all practical purposes. You could switch them freely between my and your computer without changing anything.

Since particles in our computers definitely carry information, you are clearly wrong.

Huh? So you seriously wanna tell me that it's not the particular configuration of interchangeable particles hat carries the information but the particles themselves?

 

[marplots]

Huh? So you seriously wanna tell me that it's not the particular configuration of interchangeable particles hat carries the information but the particles themselves?

Both.
Here's an example:
7/3 = 2.3333333333...

Are all the threes in that the same? Where does the information lie?
In one sense they are the same. In another they are not. Some information is carried by the digit, some by the position, some by the context.

Even the fact that the whole thing is posted here is part of that web, as is the history of numbers, our agreement on what black squiggle means what and on, and on.

I don't think that particles are discrete in the way you mean, but even if they were, it's still a problem. For example, lets say we have two atoms of Cesium 137. Under your proposition, they are identical and indistinguishable. Now, we watch them for awhile and one decays. Can we still say they were the same before that happened or does the "what happened" reach back in time so that now we know they must have been different? Certainly, without any outside agency, they followed different paths. In your example, how would you ever know, without following your groups of particles in detail, whether they truly started out the same in the sense you want?

Here are two atoms of Cesium 137. One will decay before the other. Are they the same?
(If I've botched the physics and radioactive decay is driven by outside forces, then none of the above really works well. In that case, sorry.)

 

[Croc411]

Both.
Here's an example:
7/3 = 2.3333333333...

Are all the threes in that the same? Where does the information lie?
In one sense they are the same. In another they are not. Some information is carried by the digit, some by the position, some by the context.

I just took two of the 3s out from the sequence. Here they are: 3 3

The sequence now reads: 2.3333333333...

Now you tell me where I took them from!

I don't think that particles are discrete in the way you mean, but even if they were, it's still a problem. For example, lets say we have two atoms of Cesium 137. Under your proposition, they are identical and indistinguishable. Now, we watch them for awhile and one decays. Can we still say they were the same before that happened or does the "what happened" reach back in time so that now we know they must have been different? Certainly, without any outside agency, they followed different paths. In your example, how would you ever know, without following your groups of particles in detail, whether they truly started out the same in the sense you want?

Where did I state that two particular indistinguishable particles have to stay that way forever? Of course they can decay, can be annihilated, can have their basic properties changed etc.

Here are two atoms of Cesium 137. One will decay before the other. Are they the same?
(If I've botched the physics and radioactive decay is driven by outside forces, then none of the above really works well. In that case, sorry.)

So you can tell in advance which one of the two atoms will decay first? Then I guess you're a sure-fire candidante for the nobel prize and we have to rewrite our physics books. At least that is how I understand that decay thingie.

After one decays they do not have the same properties anymore (at least different mass now), so of course they are now distinguishable.