I think the ethics here are quite clear: it is wrong to kill a human, no matter if it is found out or not.
Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?
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punshhh
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dlorde
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Welcome to the forum vladi!Hello, I'm very happy to join your forum.
You can't have both a perfect copy and the highlighted difference. If the copying is perfect, either they both know copying has occurred or neither knows. Unless, of course, you're suggesting that the copying is done without the subject's knowledge, and only the 'original' is told about it afterwards... but I don't really see why you introduced this assumption at all; whether either one knows, or both know, or neither, it seems to me that killing either of them after the copy process is problematic.
For me, the essence of the problem is the copy process itself. If one was to surgically dismantle an individual, organ by organ, suspending each organ's function until you had surgically reassembled them so that the individual had full continuity, is that killing him and creating a duplicate? what about dismantling him to individual cells, and then reassembling those cells exactly as before? or disassembling those cells to individual molecules before reassembling them, or breaking the molecules to atoms before reassembling them?
Now suppose you were to assemble not the original atoms, but identical atoms sourced elsewhere? or not the original molecules, but identical molecules made in the lab? or not the original cells, but exact duplicates?
OK, let's suppose that you step in the device knowing only that it will teleport you to another location. You don't know what the device actually does. Then after the "teleportation", the copy sees himself as really transported to the other location, but you see yourself standing where you were before. Then it occurs to you what actually happened and you are killed while thinking "FFFFFFFUUUUUUUUUU.." (as in the popular internet comics)
I didn't deal with the copying process, I just supposed it could happen and discussed the consequences. If this can actually happen I don't know. It seems to me like trying to replace a working engine part by part without stopping it. You can't do it by replacing larger parts, like whole pistons or whole valves, but maybe if you replace their individual atoms one at a time it could be done. Although there remains the problem of accessing atoms of parts that are inside other parts. I honestly am not sure what to think about such replacement. Maybe it again depends on the point of view - if you can't tell whether it is the original or a replacement it really doesn't matter
ETA: I introduced the knowledge of the copying process to highlight that the two instances are in fact separate and not connected in some magical manner and the difference between them is relevant to only one human being in the whole world - the original who has to be killed. I think this answers one of Croc411's question - whether a materialist should agree to step inside such a device. My answer is "no", and I explain why.
I didn't deal with the copying process, I just supposed it could happen and discussed the consequences. If this can actually happen I don't know. It seems to me like trying to replace a working engine part by part without stopping it. You can't do it by replacing larger parts, like whole pistons or whole valves, but maybe if you replace their individual atoms one at a time it could be done. Although there remains the problem of accessing atoms of parts that are inside other parts. I honestly am not sure what to think about such replacement. Maybe it again depends on the point of view - if you can't tell whether it is the original or a replacement it really doesn't matter
ETA: I introduced the knowledge of the copying process to highlight that the two instances are in fact separate and not connected in some magical manner and the difference between them is relevant to only one human being in the whole world - the original who has to be killed. I think this answers one of Croc411's question - whether a materialist should agree to step inside such a device. My answer is "no", and I explain why.
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yy2bggggs
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Welcome! I just want to pick on particular points.Hello, I'm very happy to join your forum.
As discussed previously, "one's brain and body" changes over time--material is replaced constantly--so you can't just define it as a particular lump of matter; or, maybe you can, but in that case, you're going to have to deal with the consequence that we're being slowly "teleported" into waste products in random locations, while material is being replaced from food, liquid, and air being consumed from the environment.
Also, personality isn't static--it can change. As for memories, they're stored in parts of the brain that may or may not be active neurally at any given time, but nevertheless participate in the same respiration processes that work more like the constant water level in a draining sink than a penny on a shelf. And they would be copied anyway.
As for the type of continuity you're talking about, suppose cryogenics finally matures, and you freeze your body. In 100 years your body is unfrozen, and winds up being alive and sentient again. Would you suppose that this is no longer you?
I would use the word "equivalent", not "identical".
Death is not an experience.
Your particular brand of mysticism is nothing but ego, so again, who are you crapping?
dafydd
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Ego and fairy stories.
@yy2bggggs:
I was referring to the particular neurological processes happening in a particular brain as the "personality". In that sense the original and the copy are two brains with two processes running and so two personalities, although equivalent, not one personality.
As for the constant replacing of matter - it's okay as long as the process itself doesn't stop, like rebuilding the running engine atom by atom.
Maybe if the neurological processes don't stop completely while the brain is frozen the "original" you could in fact continue to live after unfreezing. But that would mean that you were not really dead in the first place.
ETA:Otherwise it would mean that resurrection is possible and if we assume that there was an omnipotent and omniscient God, who could "record" or "know" your brain at the moment of your death, then he would be able to somehow reconstruct it at later time, "raise you from the dead" and bring you to judgement for your sins and blah-blah
I don't really have a complete view about the subject I just recently began to think about it and that's what I have come to so far. I most probably am missing something, so it's good to have someone else's opinion on what I think.
I was referring to the particular neurological processes happening in a particular brain as the "personality". In that sense the original and the copy are two brains with two processes running and so two personalities, although equivalent, not one personality.
As for the constant replacing of matter - it's okay as long as the process itself doesn't stop, like rebuilding the running engine atom by atom.
I really don't know. I tend to think that it may no longer be you, because if the processes in your brain stops completely after freezing, you die. I think that "death" may be reversible only if the particular process, that represents your personality is not completely stopped. It depends on the definition of death, too. I refer to death as the irreversible death like when the brain is completely and irreversibly destroyed, so that no process can go on in it. Even if it became possible to unfreeze the brain and restart the process it will be a different process, although equivalent to the original. Somebody will come to life who will look like you, think like you, remember your past life, talk like you, but the "you" who originally experienced the freezing will be dead.
Maybe if the neurological processes don't stop completely while the brain is frozen the "original" you could in fact continue to live after unfreezing. But that would mean that you were not really dead in the first place.
ETA:Otherwise it would mean that resurrection is possible and if we assume that there was an omnipotent and omniscient God, who could "record" or "know" your brain at the moment of your death, then he would be able to somehow reconstruct it at later time, "raise you from the dead" and bring you to judgement for your sins and blah-blah
OK, agreed, English is not my native language so I may be confusing some words occasionally.
Fair enough. My point was to emphasize that the being actually dies.
I don't really have a complete view about the subject I just recently began to think about it and that's what I have come to so far. I most probably am missing something, so it's good to have someone else's opinion on what I think.
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yy2bggggs
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Not sure exactly what you mean by personality then, so I may or may not agree
. Agency is a word I use sometimes... is that what you're referring to? "Personality" generally refers to particular traits that a person has--like preferences, tendency towards aggression (and over which topics), and so on.Does it have to be a particular kind of process? The copying involved in the teleportation would be a process too.
Furthermore, the brain doesn't quite work like an engine; in an engine, you have a piston that is constantly moving, with fuel being injected into a chamber and ignited with a spark, and so on. In the brain, sometimes a particular neuron is firing, and sometimes it isn't. The set of neurons that fires constantly change. And it rewires itself. And the particular way that it fires changes as a result of chemistry affecting particular neurons differently than other particular neurons (or the whole network in particular ways). In other words, the actual processor, processes, and processing components change constantly; versus the engine, where it simply runs in a loop until the gas tank empties.
How can I tell that's not happening anyway, in the normal course of events? All I know is that I look like me, think like me, remember my past life, talk like me, and so on.
Ah, it's not a native English thing here, it's a technical issue (that is, in informal general terms, you're using "identical" properly for a native English speaker; in this context, however, we need to make a distinction, and there's a precedent for particular usage of identical versus equivalent).
Your use of "personality" above, however, is non-standard English.
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I mean my experience of me being alive as opposed to how others experience me being aliveNot sure exactly what you mean by personality then, so I may or may not agree
I mean the process of brain function.
You can't tell
You actually can't be sure that "instant copying and destruction of the original" hasn't happened to you in the past How can you? The original may have died, his body disposed of and you may be the copy that has come to life instantly carrying all the memories and previous experience of the original. It may have happened some night while you (the "original" you) was sleeping and unaware of what was happening. After the copying the "copied" you (i.e. the present you) just continued to sleep and woke up without knowing what happened. Anyway it will be of importance only to the original but he is now dead I think it is possible IF WE ASSUME that such instant copying is possible. But even in this case the original has to die and his body be somehow disposed of.
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yy2bggggs
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Ah, your sense of self.
Why is that special? Especially, why is it special if you hold that:
In fact, I think there's a bigger problem than whether or not you can tell that you are the same person. Before we get there, we have to know if the very concept of being the same person even makes sense. So how would you make sense out of this concept? Under what conditions is a guy at T=30 seconds the same as the guy at T=0 seconds?You can't tell
If at T=30 seconds he remembers being at T=0, then according to him he is the same person. He actually can never be another person, according to himself (except probably if he is mentally ill).
If I see him as being the same person, then for me he is the same person.
But what if at T=15 seconds he was instantly copied? At that moment there will be two humans with two senses of self and each of them will consider himself to be the same person as at T=0 sec. Then one of them dies. His life ends there, it's over for him. His sense of self disappears. He doesn't begin to sense the other human as himself. No one except him knows how he felt in his last moments but I guess he was not very happy, because his existence was about to end. And now he doesn't know anymore because he is dead. That someone else, equivalent to him will continue to live has been cold comfort for him I guess
But for everyone else life continued. From the point of view of the "copy" nothing happened to his (the "copy"'s) sense of self.Let's just say that if it happened to you and you were the original you would know... Only you although not for long
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Beelzebuddy
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Oh yeah, this thread. I should probably pick up where I left off, but eh, we were talking in circles anyway.
It looks like vladi is arguing for a solid type 2, where there must be continuous neural activity to establish personal continuity.
Of particular use to you, vladi, might be the Ship of Theseus paradox, since you described it explicitly a couple of posts ago. I don't know if that's exactly what you want, since you also said a person who was frozen and restarted would not be the same person, but it is a good bit of background material for type 1 conventions.
It looks like vladi is arguing for a solid type 2, where there must be continuous neural activity to establish personal continuity.
Of particular use to you, vladi, might be the Ship of Theseus paradox, since you described it explicitly a couple of posts ago. I don't know if that's exactly what you want, since you also said a person who was frozen and restarted would not be the same person, but it is a good bit of background material for type 1 conventions.
I think that as long as the ship doesn't cease to exist in any moment and in any moment there are not two ships, I consider the rebuilt ship to be the same ship for all purposes. And it is easier with the ship, because it has no sense of self.
I said it would not be the same person IF we consider neurological activity to stop completely when frozen. In light of the last posts I may now say that the unfrozen person's sense of self will not be THE sense of self of the frozen person, although it will look the same for all purposes. A sense of self will die at the moment of freezing a new sense of self will come to life who will feel that he continues to live after the unfreezing but still the first "self" died and doesn't exist anymore.
Actually I think I'm arguing for type 3, although not exactly as you stated it. No one will care if the original is killed, except the original himself. For everyone else (including the copy) the copy will be the original.
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Beelzebuddy
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The bitch is when you take all the old planks and reassemble the original ship. Now you have two Ships of Theseus, but which is the Ship of Theseus?
Croc, even if all your premises are true, it doesn't prevent someone who is made of matter and a strict materialist from feeling a sense of self preservation. This reaches past logic and reason and gets into psychology and biology. As a materialist, I have to accept that my material body and brain may produce something that is not always rational.
You are asking a question along the lines of, "Should a penguin learn to fly?"
Maybe it should, but it's constituents do not allow it to do so. In the same way, I may not be able to think logically and with conviction about things that concern my sense of continuous self.
Materialism has little to do with it. We are what we are. Whether my anxiety about being reconstituted elsewhere stems from a soul or whether it is just the result of my (strictly material) brain, the answer would be the same. Your question doesn't discriminate between the two philosophical stances.
[edited to add] -- I propose the real "what would happen" comes down to habit. I do not fear sleep, although exactly the same thing could be happening. I could be getting replaced every night and awake a new copy every morning. But I'm used to that.
If the kind of transportation you describe became a reality, I expect it would follow the same lines. At first rejected, then accepted by some and then by most as the others saw the 'same' person afterwards. As it became a familiar way to get around, only the odd balls would refuse to use it. I don't think the philosophical questions would have much heft in the face of the pragmatic advantage of getting from here to there.
As a marketing tool, I suggest you piggyback on sleep and try the following: "Fall asleep in Paris, and wake up ten minutes later in South Africa." Put them to sleep before you send them.
You are asking a question along the lines of, "Should a penguin learn to fly?"
Maybe it should, but it's constituents do not allow it to do so. In the same way, I may not be able to think logically and with conviction about things that concern my sense of continuous self.
Materialism has little to do with it. We are what we are. Whether my anxiety about being reconstituted elsewhere stems from a soul or whether it is just the result of my (strictly material) brain, the answer would be the same. Your question doesn't discriminate between the two philosophical stances.
[edited to add] -- I propose the real "what would happen" comes down to habit. I do not fear sleep, although exactly the same thing could be happening. I could be getting replaced every night and awake a new copy every morning. But I'm used to that.
If the kind of transportation you describe became a reality, I expect it would follow the same lines. At first rejected, then accepted by some and then by most as the others saw the 'same' person afterwards. As it became a familiar way to get around, only the odd balls would refuse to use it. I don't think the philosophical questions would have much heft in the face of the pragmatic advantage of getting from here to there.
As a marketing tool, I suggest you piggyback on sleep and try the following: "Fall asleep in Paris, and wake up ten minutes later in South Africa." Put them to sleep before you send them.
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