Beelzebuddy
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Jun 10, 2010
- Messages
- 10,608
I propose a fourth alternative--informational continuity. Specifically, there are certain kinds of things that only I am privy to, and I can develop memories of these sorts of things. In situations where those sorts of memories are genuine, I should have all rights to claim that I remember being that person.
I think this is the critical invariant for continuity, and it dodges all three of your problems. For the Ship of Theseus issue, it really doesn't matter what molecules are in my body--it matters more what the mental states represent, and whether the represented states have a "correct" causal relationship to what they represent. As for the pattern issue, so long as the information got carried, it's not a problem if everything stopped--if you were frozen in carbonite and reconstituted, you still have rights to claim to be the same person.
The cloning part of the infamous teleporter is the "tricky" one, but it's not really too bad if you think about it. This makes two bona fide separate individuals; each should care about the other just as they would their twin. Neither can claim to be the other, because neither is causally linked to the other's subjectivity in the right way. However, both can claim to have been the original, because they were both causally related in the appropriate way to their past counterparts.
This actually seems the least rational, as it does not require even similar material or processing as a human brain, but merely sufficient understanding of such to extract all relevant information. If the teleporter aliens who torture In-goers do so to extract their ssssecretsss, does that make them you? I hope I'm not strawmanning when I answer "of course it doesn't, though they can seriously screw my credit rating at that point" for you, a response which is most easily reasoned by falling back on any of the other alternatives.