Well since you "missed" the subtle provocation...
But you missed most of his post. Or else you give no indication that you care about addressing it. His point was your chronic, well-documented, ongoing inability to understand practically anything having to do with your theory remains at odds with your claim that you can infallibly judge whether certain others are either truthful or "perps." Further, your evasion in admitting error is evidence
per se of your own deception and bias, for which you categorically refuse to take responsibility.
You seem to operate under the delusion that those who read your statements here are unfamiliar with the conventions of scholarship, the practice of historical research, and the expectations of anyone who wants to credibly present a case. You seem to think you're lecturing to a bunch of rubes. That hubris undermines you at ever step, especially when coupled with your often-puerile tone.
You need to quickly come to the realization that the rest of the world is not as dumb as you apparently think they are. We can tell when you're lying. We know your sock puppets. We can tell when you're backpedaling. We remember what you said previously, and will vigorously hold you accountable for it if you suddenly and inexplicably change your mind. You will be fact-checked. We will examine the context of your quotes. We will consult outside authority, and we will apply our own professional expertise.
Why pray tell Loss Leader is it that... the NASA boys soak their astronauts in 100% O2 until the time of the 1967 Apollo 1 fire?
They were in 100-percent oxygen also
after the fire, except briefly during launch, and this was deemed adequately safe. Why? Because
density matters. Gaseous oxygen at 5 psia partial pressure provides a comparable pulmonary experience to sea level atmosphere. The diluent gas is not required in order for the lungs to function properly and for the rest of the body to behave in an acceptable fashion for a short duration.
Similarly 5 psia pure oxygen (i.e., 100 percent) provides putatively no greater a combustion risk than at sea level. However, research conducted after Apollo demonstrated that the diluent gas in Earth-normal atmosphere has a significant enough reduction of ignition risk to warrant the engineering complexity a two-gas environment in subsequent manned space applications.
The danger in Apollo 1 was the
high-pressure gaseous oxygen, not the fact that no diluent gas was present. The cabin atmosphere during the plugs-out test contained more than three times the concentration of oxygen that would be present during flight. The cabin also contained combustibles that were not qualified for flight but were allowed for the test.
Two human factors in engineering come into play here. The first is the normalization of risk -- basically, complacency. If you do something risky and nothing bad happens immediately, you being to accept that risk as tolerable. Hence the prior experience with Mercury and Gemini led engineers and operators wrongly to believe that they were fully competent to manage the risk of high-pressure oxygen environments. In fact they were living dangerously close to the edge and simply hadn't accumulated enough operational cycles prior to Apollo 1 to expose the risk empirically.
The second is the notion of satisficing.
Satisficing is a contrived term in engineering to mean the manipulation of design variables and trade-offs to achieve an acceptable result. It's a portmanteu of "satisfy" and "sacrifice," embodying the principle that in any engineering problem the variables are inherently in conflict; there is no "natural" solution them.
Apollo in 1967 was ruthlessly schedule-driven. People were working very long hours, leading to lapses in judgment, and organizations were being increasingly held to promised delivery dates. Naturally when satisficing toward schedule, quality and function suffer.
Specifically, any engineered object not only has to meet its mission requirements, but also has to meet several secondary and/or intermediate requirements, such as for manufacturability and testability. Being secondary requirements, they are the first to be marginalized when the primary requirement is placed in jeopardy. And more specifically for Apollo, when CSM 012 started falling farther behind schedule, more attention was paid on getting it ready for its flight. The simulator updates were neglected, and the astronauts complained. And most importantly, evaluating the spacecraft's suitability, readiness, and safety
in the test environment were not given enough engineering attention.
This is hard for people to understand who don't work in the industry. Change requests for a large-scale manned product (especially for a First Item model) have to run a gauntlet of approvals according to all sorts of criteria, including safety. Under the breakneck schedule, only evaluations for
flight safety were being performed. There simply wasn't time or manpower to accumulate all the criteria needed to understand
test safety, and then to evaluate all change requests and design features for those criteria.
Hence flammability tests for design and change requests were performed only under flight
conditions, and only with the materials approved for flight, and only under nominal flight conditions (not, e.g., under contingency conditions such as for damaged wiring or leaky cabin refrigerant).
In short, testing is the first thing that gets short-changed when schedules press. It's not a good thing, but it's how engineering happens and it's why Apollo 1 caught fire.
These people are not stupid now are they?
No, but they were in a big hurry and therefore careless, letting a lot of things fall by the wayside in the rush to meet deadlines. And the investigation that followed unabashedly accused several entities of negligence and carelessness and held them responsible for it. Heads rolled at the topmost levels.
Neither NASA nor North American Rockwell were oblivious to the danger. The objections simply hadn't reached a suitable level of action. Memos had already been written. NAR warned NASA that their test procedures exposed the crew and unauthorized combustibles to high-pressure oxygen; NASA said essentially not to worry, they had it covered. The Apollo 1 fire investigation very much turned into a "Who knew what, and when did they know it?" exercise.
I mention with no small grin that one of the memos sitting in Joe Shea's files at the time of the fire was a description of fires that had burned in hospital rooms fed by oxygen-soaked bedsheets, and wondering whether similar dangers existed in the high-pressure spacecraft test environments. Shea's foot-dragging on those hospital incidents and precautions turned out to be the smoking gun that cost him his job.
What are the astronauts doing sitting in oxygen baths?
They're doing the same thing everyone does who, for engineering reasons, has to work in a different-pressure ambient. There are chemical and physiological effects to any of these environments, and managing them becomes one of the tasks the relevant engineers must face. At all times those tasks require satisficing among competing variables of utility, performance, and safety.