Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?

[tsig]

The contentious part of the debate seems to me to be that you believe that copying the meatsack is in principle different from copying anything else, for the rest us it's a matter of rather simple arithmetic i.e. 1+2=2.

Is that a mistake or deeper than I think?

 

[Darat]

Is that a mistake or deeper than I think?

It's probably too esoteric for the likes of you no-personal identists to understand the profound point I was making......









Talk about an embarrassing mistake!

 

[IacopoV]

Hi everybody.

I define me to be a materialist because I think that the phenomenon of consciousness needs a material structure (e.g. a brain) to manifest itself. I can say that it is the effect of some electro-chemical reaction in our brain. But then, when I question about the nature of personal identity, I think that if each of us has a different personal identity (i.e., everybody has an individual "instance of consciousness"), then there must be something physical that might allow to distinguish me by a perfect clone of me, otherwise the materialism would fail. Otherwise we have to assume that the "instances of consciousness" are actually always the same one.

PixyMisa said that

Personal identity IS something material. It's brain function.

Maybe this can help to explain my view. I think that a function, or a process, is not something that derive its identity from the object that undergoes that function/process. It is not even something of material. It's just a functionality, as "walking".

As Belzebuddy said, to consider its identity might be just a convention. But then it can well be considered to be always the same (as "the walking faculty").

So I would correct the conclusion of PixyMisa:

Personal identity, such as it is in the real world, is a function of the brain and the body. Two bodies, two brains, two identities.

Personal identity is a function of the brain and the body. Two bodies, two brains, the same function (personal identity or "instance of consciousness").

PixyMisa, you said that

I've given you the arguments, repeatedly. You've just ignored them.

But I would like you give me a reference alternative to plato.stanford.edu, and
and I would like you give me arguments for your preceding assertions:

... there's a problem with "Gibbs_paradox" (see wikipedia).

Nope.

2b) All what can happen one time, can happen many other times.

No. Fail. Stop there.

Why you think that something that we cannot check cannot happen more than once?

It is impossible to know the exact parameters that brought about my birth, or yours

My argument doesn't require to know them. Just require to be be convinced that such unknow parameters are not mystical, but rational, even if they are a quantum superposition due to uncertainty principle.

You derive that "so they must be different". I derive that "so we cannot exclude that they could be identical".

Utter nonsense

Why? I did not write: "So they are identical", I meant "we cannot say if they are different or not".

The perfect replica (which is impossible in at least three different ways) is by definition not a perfect replica because it occupies different spatial co-ordinates and exists under subtly different physical conditions

Ok. I don't agree that position might be relevant, but I will discuss this beyond.

As Beelzebuddy also said:

It doesn't really matter if we're identical or not, we're still different people, you see? But since my pattern is composed of the original bits of worm food, I get to claim to be the original

yy2bggggs said:

If we're talking about the identity of a green rubber ball instead of a person, would we use different rules?

and Pure Argent:

Location is as much a property of matter as chemical makeup

and Dancing David:

The question: I have some table salt, it is here in central Illinois, it is similar to table salt that you have where you are.

Yes?

Now they are not identical when we look at an aggregate, or would you say they are?

Now look at a single grain of salt, the arrangement of the atoms (if we say it is arbitrarily pure and not varied by other minerals). If I have one grain of salt, you have another and they vary in the number of molecules of NaCl, are they identical?

What if they have the same number of molecules but they have different lengths to their major axes, are they identical?

The grain of salt is a structure composed by atoms. If the structure of two grains is different, they are different. If the structure is equal, they are equal. If two crystals of salt are perfectly equals (same elementary particles in the same state) then they can be identified only by their position. The same for two brains. The problem is with personal identity.

THE PROBLEM OF LOCATION FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY:

I am investigating the causes of my own birth, not the causes of the birth of a perfect replica of me that is not me.

I know the physical limit of Uncertainty principle, so I really cannot scan every particles in my body, but the fact that I am here and I am live, demonstrates that exist (at least) one combination of factors that made me born.

I really don't think that there exist any particular physical condition, but the same property of being conscious. So this is for me an "argument by contradiction", not the explaining of my personal point of view. I want to test your opinion.

Imagine that I had a list with this combination of factors that generates *me*, not just a clone of me.
PixyMisa, this is an "argument by contradiction" so the fact that we really cannot know that list is irrelevant.

Once I had that list, if I could replicate the listed factors in the same way they were at my birth, I could build a copy of me that would be me, not just a copy of me. This seems absurd, so we can imagine something that stops this from occurring. As you all said, to be really me it would be in the same place and in the same time, or alternatively, there must be used some precise elementary particles. This is what really means the "counting argument". To be me, the clone had to born when I was born, in the same place I born, and/or be formed by exactly the same particles that formed me at the moment of my birth.

I use "born" in a general way. You should interpret it as the moment that you think that a conscious being begins to be conscious, even if it was before, after, or at the moment or the real birth.

This would imply that if I was born in another place (even if extremely near), or in another moment (even if extremely near), or if i was composed by some other elementary particles (even if of the same type and the same state), the conscious being that would have born would not be me, but a clone of me with another personal identity. This descend by supposing that the location of the identity of particles were relevant for my personal identity.

Yes? No? Maybe? why?

I don't believe that this is true, but I believe that this should be a consequence of the "counting argument" in a materialist worldview. If you don't agree, can you explain why in a better way than "no", "it fails", "nonsense" and similar?

Thank you.

 

[Nonpareil]

But then, when I question about the nature of personal identity, I think that if each of us has a different personal identity (i.e., everybody has an individual "instance of consciousness"), then there must be something physical that might allow to distinguish me by a perfect clone of me, otherwise the materialism would fail. Otherwise we have to assume that the "instances of consciousness" are actually always the same one.

There is something which separates them. It's just not something that you're willing to accept.

Two identical chemical reactions existing in two separate places are not the same chemical reaction. They're two instances of the same reaction. That's it.

Maybe this can help to explain my view. I think that a function, or a process, is not something that derive its identity from the object that undergoes that function/process. It is not even something of material. It's just a functionality, as "walking".

As Belzebuddy said, to consider its identity might be just a convention. But then it can well be considered to be always the same (as "the walking faculty").

And yet you don't say two things walking are the same thing. Two identical robots walking side-by-side are not the same robot.

Personal identity is a function of the brain and the body. Two bodies, two brains, the same function (personal identity or "instance of consciousness").

Unless you think those two brains are linked somehow, this is nonsense.

THE PROBLEM OF LOCATION FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY:

I am investigating the causes of my own birth, not the causes of the birth of a perfect replica of me that is not me.

I know the physical limit of Uncertainty principle, so I really cannot scan every particles in my body, but the fact that I am here and I am live, demonstrates that exist (at least) one combination of factors that made me born.

I really don't think that there exist any particular physical condition, but the same property of being conscious. So this is for me an "argument by contradiction", not the explaining of my personal point of view. I want to test your opinion.

Imagine that I had a list with this combination of factors that generates *me*, not just a clone of me.
PixyMisa, this is an "argument by contradiction" so the fact that we really cannot know that list is irrelevant.

Once I had that list, if I could replicate the listed factors in the same way they were at my birth, I could build a copy of me that would be me, not just a copy of me.

No, you couldn't. You're assuming your conclusion.

This seems absurd

Yes.

so we can imagine something that stops this from occurring. As you all said, to be really me it would be in the same place and in the same time, or alternatively, there must be used some precise elementary particles. This is what really means the "counting argument". To be me, the clone had to born when I was born, in the same place I born, and/or be formed by exactly the same particles that formed me at the moment of my birth.

Yes. Otherwise it's just another instance of the chemical reaction.

This would imply that if I was born in another place (even if extremely near), or in another moment (even if extremely near), or if i was composed by some other elementary particles (even if of the same type and the same state), the conscious being that would have born would not be me, but a clone of me with another personal identity.

Assuming that its physical makeup is the same, yes.

This descend by supposing that the location of the identity of particles were relevant for my personal identity.

Yes? No? Maybe? why?

Because, unless you think that the two brains are somehow linked, that's the only conclusion that can be rationally reached.

I don't believe that this is true

Why not?

 

[PixyMisa]

Hi everybody.

I define me to be a materialist because I think that the phenomenon of consciousness needs a material structure (e.g. a brain) to manifest itself. I can say that it is the effect of some electro-chemical reaction in our brain.

Sure.

But then, when I question about the nature of personal identity, I think that if each of us has a different personal identity (i.e., everybody has an individual "instance of consciousness"), then there must be something physical that might allow to distinguish me by a perfect clone of me, otherwise the materialism would fail.

NO.

That means that your notion of personal identity is wrong.

Maybe this can help to explain my view. I think that a function, or a process, is not something that derive its identity from the object that undergoes that function/process. It is not even something of material.

Obviously it's material in nature, since it's the behaviour of a material object. This is complete nonsense.

As Belzebuddy said, to consider its identity might be just a convention.

It is.

So I would correct the conclusion of PixyMisa:

Personal identity is a function of the brain and the body. Two bodies, two brains, the same function (personal identity or "instance of consciousness").

No.

PixyMisa, you said that

I've given you the arguments, repeatedly. You've just ignored them.

And I was right. You have.

But I would like you give me a reference alternative to plato.stanford.edu

Yeah. That site, unfortunately, is full of nonsense. If you wish to refer to something specific, copy just the specific bit you wish to reference (that should fall under fair use) and link to the article. Then we can argue your precise point.

and I would like you give me arguments for your preceding assertions:

(Re Gibbs Paradox)

You presented no reason why Gibbs paradox should be relevant. Feel free to do so.

Why you think that something that we cannot check cannot happen more than once?

Look, if you cannot know something, you cannot use it in your argument.

My argument doesn't require to know them.

It requires them to be knowable. This is not the case.

Why? I did not write: "So they are identical", I meant "we cannot say if they are different or not".

It's an argument from ignorance, a logical fallacy.

Ok. I don't agree that position might be relevant, but I will discuss this beyond.

Being in a different location necessarily subjects the "duplicate" to different influences, meaning it is necessarily different.

THE PROBLEM OF LOCATION FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY:

I am investigating the causes of my own birth, not the causes of the birth of a perfect replica of me that is not me.

I know the physical limit of Uncertainty principle, so I really cannot scan every particles in my body, but the fact that I am here and I am live, demonstrates that exist (at least) one combination of factors that made me born.

Which you cannot know, even in principle.

Imagine that I had a list with this combination of factors that generates *me*, not just a clone of me.

NO.

That's impossible.

PixyMisa, this is an "argument by contradiction" so the fact that we really cannot know that list is irrelevant.

NO.

An argument by contradiction cannot begin with an a priori impossible premise.

Once I had that list, if I could replicate the listed factors in the same way they were at my birth

That's also impossible.

I could build a copy of me that would be me not just a copy of me.

That's also impossible, for a different reason.

This seems absurd, so we can imagine something that stops this from occurring.

Pauli exclusion principle.

As you all said, to be really me it would be in the same place and in the same time, or alternatively, there must be used some precise elementary particles. This is what really means the "counting argument". To be me, the clone had to born when I was born, in the same place I born, and/or be formed by exactly the same particles that formed me at the moment of my birth.

Correct.

I use "born" in a general way. You should interpret it as the moment that you think that a conscious being begins to be conscious, even if it was before, after, or at the moment or the real birth.

This would imply that if I was born in another place (even if extremely near), or in another moment (even if extremely near)

Yes.

or if i was composed by some other elementary particles (even if of the same type and the same state)

No, that's a distinction without meaning.

the conscious being that would have born would not be me, but a clone of me with another personal identity.

Correct.

This descend by supposing that the location of the identity of particles were relevant for my personal identity.

Yes.

Yes? No? Maybe? why?

Because that's what identity is. There is no magical identity independent of the material you.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I define me to be a materialist because I think that the phenomenon of consciousness needs a material structure (e.g. a brain) to manifest itself. I can say that it is the effect of some electro-chemical reaction in our brain. But then, when I question about the nature of personal identity, I think that if each of us has a different personal identity (i.e., everybody has an individual "instance of consciousness"), then there must be something physical that might allow to distinguish me by a perfect clone of me, otherwise the materialism would fail. Otherwise we have to assume that the "instances of consciousness" are actually always the same one.

Suppose we had a perfect clone of you. And I'm just about to answer your question, when suddenly, I get confused. Somehow I forgot if I put the clone on the right or the left. Whatever.

So I take the two of you and I put you in a square room, on opposite corners. One of you is in the Northwest corner. The other one is in the Southeast corner. This is a very large room and sound doesn't carry well, so neither of you can hear too good across the room.

If I ask the guy in the Northwest corner which one he is, he should say he is the one in the Northwest corner. If I ask the guy in the Southeast corner which one he is, he should say he is the one in the Southeast corner. If the guy in the Northwest corner ever says he's the guy in the Southeast corner, no matter how similar his brain state is to that guy, then either he's nuts, or he lost his compass.

In other words, you are the brain that is doing the talking. You are the one that hears me when I wander over to your corner and ask you the question.

Personal identity is a function of the brain and the body. Two bodies, two brains, the same function (personal identity or "instance of consciousness").

If you're in the Northwest corner, you are the guy in the Northwest corner, period. Whether or not the guy in the Southeast corner has the same brain state as you is academic; you won't hear me when I'm asking the guy in the Southeast corner which is which, same brain state or not. He's the other guy!

Unless you are him. Then it's reversed.

But you can't be both. Just because your brain is the same state doesn't mean you can magically telepathically hear across the room. And because you can't hear what he hears and he can't hear what you hear, you are different people.

Imagine that I had a list with this combination of factors that generates *me*, not just a clone of me.

So, we're going to create a list with this combination of factors that will generate the guy who submitted post #183 to this thread at 12:53AM on 24 January, 2012. But this list of factors has to generate that person, not just a copy of that person.

Once I had that list, if I could replicate the listed factors in the same way they were at my birth, I could build a copy of me that would be me, not just a copy of me.

If you could replicate the conditions, then count how many people you have, you would have one person. If you get two, then you just made a copy. The defining difference between whether or not that made you or just a copy of you is whether or not when replicating those conditions we got you or we got just a copy of you.

This seems absurd, so we can imagine something that stops this from occurring.

Yes. It seems absurd simply because it is directly contradictory. If you have one thing, and you make that thing, you ipso facto just made that thing in the first place. If you have one thing, and you make that thing, and wind up with two things, you just made a copy.

This would imply that if I was born in another place (even if extremely near), or in another moment (even if extremely near), or if i was composed by some other elementary particles (even if of the same type and the same state), the conscious being that would have born would not be me, but a clone of me with another personal identity. This descend by supposing that the location of the identity of particles were relevant for my personal identity.

Suppose you were born somewhere else. Then I can take this guy who was born somewhere else, and perhaps put him in the Northwest corner of my room. After that, I can take... wait. There's nobody left? Who do I put in the Southeast corner of the room?

It appears there's only one person in the room. So there's nobody to compare him to. And yet you compared him to yourself... how did you do that? Perhaps someone is committing a reification.

 

[marplots]

It sounds like the arguments in here are between the conceptual and the actual. One team would have personal identity be a process thing, much like the process of addition in 2 + 3 = 5. The plus there serves as an analogy for the process. The argument then follows that with identical numbers the process would be the same and give an identical result. In other words, plus in one equation is not just the same as in another, not just similar, but identical. There's only one "plus" to go around. So these aren't just two instances of the same thing, they are the same thing: 2 + 3 = 5 and 2 + 3 = 5.

In the other camp, where I live, the concept isn't enough. There has to be actual things involved. So, for example, the "plus" is a different entity in every instance, even when I am adding like things together. The concept is fine, but fails in practice. Adding actual oranges together is different when the oranges are different because the material world is deeply connected and not translocatable -- unlike concepts are.

It might have to do with how I think of concepts in my head. If I think about blue, I am convinced that I'm thinking the identical thing I thought yesterday and would think tomorrow if I thought about blue. In fact, I cannot create (in my head) two instances of the same concept and distinguish them. Concepts feel that way. My contention is that reality doesn't match that.

 

[PixyMisa]

Right. It's like an algorithm. Algorithms are conceptual; they don't do anything until they're instantiated in a running computer program.

The concept of identity is not an identity.

 

[Dancing David]

I don't believe that this is true, but I believe that this should be a consequence of the "counting argument" in a materialist worldview. If you don't agree, can you explain why in a better way than "no", "it fails", "nonsense" and similar?

Thank you.

I will discuss this with you, but I suggest you stop and use original material each time you post. I know you have published a monograph on the web but it would rally help if you stay in a conversational mode rather than wandering all over the place.

The biggest problem is that you keep just making false dichotomies out the wazzoo , assertion after assertion after assertion.

the second issue I see is that you are also changing the topic at every turn, now instead of discussing materialism, you keep changing the topic. So for clarity, if you want to talk about these other issues, then start another thread that is not about materialism.

 

[Dancing David]

IcopaV-

This insistence on talking about identical copies is a huge problem and why you need to start a new thread.

There is no way to make identical copies of things. If you really has read about QM and particle physics, you would now this. So I suggest that you start a new thread and focus on what you want to talk about.

It seems you are obsessed with pursuing the ideas related to making identical copies. This is not an implication of materialism and or naturalism and therefore is not germane to the actual discussion. Which is about materialism.

 

[punshhh]

IcopaV-

This insistence on talking about identical copies is a huge problem and why you need to start a new thread.

There is no way to make identical copies of things. If you really has read about QM and particle physics, you would now this. So I suggest that you start a new thread and focus on what you want to talk about.

It seems you are obsessed with pursuing the ideas related to making identical copies. This is not an implication of materialism and or naturalism and therefore is not germane to the actual discussion. Which is about materialism.

Perhaps his question can be interpreted this way.

Suppose a replica of the entire universe was made with precise accuracy. Would the IcopaV in the copy universe be the same IcopaV in the original universe?

If determinism is correct they would be indistinguishable/identical.

 

[Nonpareil]

Perhaps his question can be interpreted this way.

Suppose a replica of the entire universe was made with precise accuracy. Would the IcopaV in the copy universe be the same IcopaV in the original universe?

If determinism is correct they would be indistinguishable/identical.

If the two universes were actually reproduced with one hundred percent accuracy, yes, they would be both indistinguishable and identical. But they would not be the same thing.

 

[Darat]

Perhaps his question can be interpreted this way.

Suppose a replica of the entire universe was made with precise accuracy. Would the IcopaV in the copy universe be the same IcopaV in the original universe?

If determinism is correct they would be indistinguishable/identical.

It's just the teleportation idea a tad larger - the answer remains the same whether it is universes or apples you are copying: 1+1=2*.







*Had my maths double checked by a 5 year old this time!

 

[PixyMisa]

Suppose a replica of the entire universe was made with precise accuracy.

You what?

 

[Darat]

You what?

Think "Twilight Zone"!

 

[PixyMisa]

My head is broken. The inanities have gone transfinite.

 

[tsig]

Perhaps his question can be interpreted this way.

Suppose a replica of the entire universe was made with precise accuracy. Would the IcopaV in the copy universe be the same IcopaV in the original universe?

If determinism is correct they would be indistinguishable/identical.

They would be indistinguishable because that was the condition you set.

 

[Dancing David]

Perhaps his question can be interpreted this way.

Suppose a replica of the entire universe was made with precise accuracy. Would the IcopaV in the copy universe be the same IcopaV in the original universe?

If determinism is correct they would be indistinguishable/identical.

Who said the universe is deterministic (in the philosophical train track sense)?

Causal does not mean deterministic. yes, if some improbable exact moment could be created, then at that exact improbable time they would be the same.

they would be divergent before and after that moment,

 

[Dancing David]

Dancing David:


The grain of salt is a structure composed by atoms. If the structure of two grains is different, they are different. If the structure is equal, they are equal. If two crystals of salt are perfectly equals (same elementary particles in the same state) then they can be identified only by their position.

That is also incorrect, first off, yes they do have separate positions, so under materialism they are not the same. They will not have the same environment , fields, gravity, etc… And the state of the particles (much less the atoms) will immediately diverge. They will go to different states in the quantum sense, the Brownian wiggles will be different.

The same for two brains.

Nope, again you just keep assuming that they will stay the same, this is just not tue, they will immediately diverge from each other. The process will start to diverge and there will be greater and greater divergence.

I think you really have not done more than read some wiki about the double slit experiment, have you?

The problem is with personal identity.

well I am not sure you have define that yet, let us see shall we. Without a definition there isn’t any problem.

THE PROBLEM OF LOCATION FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY:

I am investigating the causes of my own birth, not the causes of the birth of a perfect replica of me that is not me.

I know the physical limit of Uncertainty principle, so I really cannot scan every particles in my body, but the fact that I am here and I am live, demonstrates that exist (at least) one combination of factors that made me born.

Existed, not exist. The factors that led to your birth and development are in the past. Now the past tense in Italian is different, perfect and imperfect and all that. Yest it is existeded, the factors that led to your birth and development are in the past, they are not an imperfect past either. They are gone, not to return.

I really don't think that there exist any particular physical condition,

Well really, so you don’t think consciousness is an emergent or dependant process of neural activity?

What other alternative do you have? There are plenty of physical conditions in that brain. Are you denying biochemistry or just not explaining yourself very well?

but the same property of being conscious. So this is for me an "argument by contradiction", not the explaining of my personal point of view. I want to test your opinion.

burden of proof, you say consciousness is the same, period. So it is not an argument by contradiction you stated:
“the same property of being conscious”

This is yours to defend and explain, it also means your either deny neurochemistry and biochemistry or that you don’t really have a theory of what ‘consciousness’ is. It is not abstracted and floating around, it is a rubric for brain processes.



Imagine that I had a list with this combination of factors that generates *me*, not just a clone of me.

Uh huh, and this works how, see here you are in a thread about materialism talking about imaginary things.

Your brain is not just a bunch of factors, it has a growth and structure, cells grow, develop and die. As do the neural structures.

So your are not discussing materialism are you?

PixyMisa, this is an "argument by contradiction" so the fact that we really cannot know that list is irrelevant.

Nope welcome to JREF, you can assert a negative but not prove it.

Once I had that list, if I could replicate the listed factors in the same way they were at my birth, I could build a copy of me that would be me, not just a copy of me.

Nope, it would immediately diverge from you(0), you have to keep all the factors that influence you(1) exactly the same and by the rule of physics and biology that is not going happen. A neuron following an enzyme gradient is not going to develop the same way in you(0) and you91), nor are other parts of the two yous. They will diverge and not be the same.

This seems absurd, so we can imagine something that stops this from occurring. As you all said, to be really me it would be in the same place and in the same time, or alternatively, there must be used some precise elementary particles.

Um and a host of other random, semi-random, near random and chaotic processes.

This is what really means the "counting argument". To be me, the clone had to born when I was born, in the same place I born, and/or be formed by exactly the same particles that formed me at the moment of my birth.

Did you develop in isolation, really?

Your body just grew up in a nano second, you never learned anything? Your body never grew? You never had experiences? You never ate a meal, you never were injured or sick?

Seriously, these things all impact the way you(0) are in this moment, so your alleged argument is what?

It is more than counting, your body is not just there in an instant, your brain is not just static.

I use "born" in a general way. You should interpret it as the moment that you think that a conscious being begins to be conscious, even if it was before, after, or at the moment or the real birth.

that is irrelevant.

This would imply that if I was born in another place (even if extremely near), or in another moment (even if extremely near), or if i was composed by some other elementary particles (even if of the same type and the same state), the conscious being that would have born would not be me, but a clone of me with another personal identity.

Nope this is where you are wrong and making essentially a strawman argument.
The brain does not grow according to a blue print.

The brain grow as cells develop and follow enzyme gradients, then they structure develop and grow in place. Also there is conditioning, some cells die.

You are greatly mistaken about so many things, you(0) and you(1) will not have the same brains as you grow. Two separate paths of development and exposure, two separate paths of exposure , learning and conditioning
.

You two will NOT have the same brain structures at the fine level, you will not even have your retinas develop the same way, not your optic nerves, nor your visual cortex. The patterns of sensation and perception that create the visual field they experience will NOT be the same.

This descend by supposing that the location of the identity of particles were relevant for my personal identity.

Yes? No? Maybe? why?

No, like you(0) but very different in crucial ways. I think you need some basic biology before you try to understand what you are saying.

I don't believe that this is true, but I believe that this should be a consequence of the "counting argument" in a materialist worldview.

Well you really don’t seem to understand the materialist perspective so, no.

I think you need to start with the way that a human begins, then develops in the womb, then more about neuroanatomy and developments, neurotransmission and biochemistry.

Just at a general level.

But your impression of what materialism means and has as a POV is very lacking.

If you don't agree, can you explain why in a better way than "no", "it fails", "nonsense" and similar?

Thank you.

As I stated very early on, you seem to lack knowledge of what materialism entails.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Hi everybody.

I define me to be a materialist because I think that the phenomenon of consciousness needs a material structure (e.g. a brain) to manifest itself. I can say that it is the effect of some electro-chemical reaction in our brain.
Yes.

But then, when I question about the nature of personal identity, I think that if each of us has a different personal identity (i.e., everybody has an individual "instance of consciousness"), then there must be something physical that might allow to distinguish me by a perfect clone of me, otherwise the materialism would fail. Otherwise we have to assume that the "instances of consciousness" are actually always the same one.
There is something physical. You. This includes your brain and the electrochemical activity generated in your brain, the peptides moving in your brain, the electromagnetic fields associated with those molecules, the quantum fluctuations happening in the area of spacetime through which your brain is moving at any instant, your height above sea level, your proximity to the Andromeda Galaxy and your exact angular momentum rmeasured relative to any three quasars.
(Some of these factors don't actually matter a whole heck of a lot, but remember that you are constantly moving in spacetime and any clone would be subject to quite different gravitational stresses .)

A simpler example.
All instances of 1 are similar. The "oneness" of 1 is the same, whether the 1 is on Mars or the Moon. In this case, you might accurately say that all onenesses are one. There is only a single instance of oneness. (Or twoness). But as soon as you add physical reality to abstract concepts like 1, everything changes.

1 cow is not 1 horse.
1 cow is not even 1 cow. It is 1 DIFFERENT cow, because if it is not different, then there can be only 1 cow.

As I understand you, this is where you are going wrong:-
Because you suppose two personal identities are in every way the same, you conclude there is only one personal identity.*


Which would be right if the two were the same.
But they are not the same.
Which is all we are trying to tell you.

* I notice you do not assert that if two identical clones exist, there is only a single left kneecap. Why is that?