Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Complexity]

I have no interest in "dehumanizing my opposition," but when I read "there's no such thing as qualia" written by someone who's also mentioned he's autistic, it makes me wonder. I know many autistic people. I directed a documentary on the treatment of an autistic child. They often seem a little mechanical, so it's not ridiculous to hypothesize that their experience of qualia might be different, or reduced, from the norm.

I wish you'd learned more, and understood more, about autism before speaking about it.

There are many varieties of autism - more correctly, there are many conditions that get lumped under 'autism' that often have little in common.

I regard your generalizations about autism as unfounded and your conclusions as inept. Sorry, but you really don't have a clue about some of this.

I am a high-functioning person with Asperger's. If you understood anything about the condition that I have, you would not have made such silly statements.

I understand fairly deeply how I differ from neurotypicals in many regards, especially in thought. Some of these differences are deficits (e.g. environmental sensitivity, dislike of crowds, impatience) while others are benefits (e.g. ability to focus, deal with detail, discover patterns, sustained depth, and some different ways of thinking).

You truly have no idea what you are talking about.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I have no interest in "dehumanizing my opposition," but when I read "there's no such thing as qualia" written by someone who's also mentioned he's autistic, it makes me wonder.

Of course it does. But why does it make you wonder? If someone says, "there's no such thing as qualia", and they are not autistic, do you wonder about them? If someone says, "there's no such thing as qualia", and they are autistic, what leads you to say "aha! That must be the autism"?

I know many autistic people. I directed a documentary on the treatment of an autistic child.

I hope you're not hoping that I take this as an indication of your authority on autism; this is as meaningless to me as hearing about someone claim that they directed a documentary on the treatment of gay people.

They often seem a little mechanical, so it's not ridiculous to hypothesize that their experience of qualia might be different, or reduced, from the norm.

So, you're telling me that you hypothesize that autistic people experience qualia differently than us "normal" people (I'm about as far away from autistic as they come), or even that they have reduced qualia.

But: ...

If I'm wrong, I'm wrong, so explain exactly how I'm wrong. Accusing me of a personal attack is a red herring.

First off, I am accusing you of dehumanizing your opposition. How can the subject of dehumanizing your opposition be a red herring when that is, in fact, the subject?

Second, what you said in post #127 is entirely different than what you are hypothesizing here. In post #127, you are saying that autists are less qualified than us normal people to discuss qualia. In post #127, you are saying that autistic are not to be trusted on this subject.

Even if your hypothesis is right, there's no reason to believe that autists are less qualified to discuss qualia. In fact, it's entirely possible that because of your hypothesis, that autists would be more qualified to discuss it.

And even more significant here is the fact that you so easily jump down this line of thought. There's a bit of a sensitivity here to judging autists as a bit more incapable than us normals that is set too high. I don't know what else to call this than dehumanization.

 

[westprog]

Do we define experience as what it is like to be something though?

The reason for using qualia is because experience encompasses a number of things. A rock might experience being thrown. We may doubt (well, a lot of us might) that the rock feels anything about it, or has a being thrown experience, or that being thrown is like anything for a rock.

We know that for human beings, being thrown through the air is like something. We experience something. What we feel like is the difference between us and the rock.

 

[westprog]

It is nothing but an illusion... a magic trick.

The illusion fallacy persists. The experience of an illusion is itself an experience. Something that cannot have a subjective experience cannot experience an illusion.

 

[westprog]

How do you know that?

He can prove it using Turing.

 

[tsig]

The reason for using qualia is because experience encompasses a number of things. A rock might experience being thrown. We may doubt (well, a lot of us might) that the rock feels anything about it, or has a being thrown experience, or that being thrown is like anything for a rock.

We know that for human beings, being thrown through the air is like something. We experience something. What we feel like is the difference between us and the rock.

So humans are different than rocks and that difference is qualia.

 

[Complexity]

He can prove it using Turing.

I agree that feelings are computational processes, but I would love to know how 'he can prove it using Turing'.

Which work of Turing is relevant to this, and what role would it play in a 'proof'?

(Hint: This isn't a question that is subject to proof.)

 

[PixyMisa]

Let me say it this way: An autistic's intuition that qualia does not existent is suspect.

Well, the term "qualia" is meaningless, so they're right there.

What who asserted that experiences don't exist? What exactly did they say?

Seems very odd to me.

I like that analysis, though it could be restated this way: normal people feel the meanings (via qualia) of social interactions, while high functioning autistics dissect them mechanically (sans qualia).

No, not at all. They experience the events, but attribute different meanings to them.

The experiences are different, but everyone has them. It's unavoidable.

Explain that threshold in a way that will give me ideas on how to add that to my robot.

Add a computer.

Feedback loops are in lots of mechanical and electrical devices, with many nodes comparable to neurons. As more are added to my robot, will it experience more qualia?

It will never experience any qualia; the phrase is double plus meaningless.

If it has computational feedback loops, then what those loops do is experience.

 

[PixyMisa]

How do you know that?

Because they're the product of a computer.

I once programmed an AI game that had a face graphic that showed feelings. When it detected it was winning, it smiled. It frowned when it was losing. It laughed when it won, and cried when it lost. The program had a happiness variable: 5 was neutral, 10 was very happy, and 0 was very sad. Did it experience feelings? If not, what kind of additional functions would I need to program to add them?

Does it know how it feels? Basically, what you need to add is reflective functions so the system can examine and act upon its own state.

 

[Complexity]

Does it know how it feels? Basically, what you need to add is reflective functions so the system can examine and act upon its own state.

He seems to fall into the "I don't know how to do it, so it can't be done." camp. I wouldn't exactly call this the cutting edge of AI work.

 

[westprog]

So humans are different than rocks and that difference is qualia.

It's interesting that this thread has developed into descriptions of what it's like to be other things. I have no idea what it's like to be a worm, say, or a robot. I know what it's like to be a person. I strongly suspect that being a rock is not like anything.

 

[tsig]

So humans are different than rocks and that difference is qualia.

It's interesting that this thread has developed into descriptions of what it's like to be other things. I have no idea what it's like to be a worm, say, or a robot. I know what it's like to be a person. I strongly suspect that being a rock is not like anything.

If your post isn't going to respond to my post I suggest you use the "quick reply" at the bottom of the page.

 

[Mr. Scott]

He seems to fall into the "I don't know how to do it, so it can't be done." camp. I wouldn't exactly call this the cutting edge of AI work.

Strawman, sarcastic, mean-spirited, but I'm not taking it personally.

I never said it couldn't be done. I just don't know how, so I'm asking questions intended to focus on the stress points of the claim that any sufficiently complex computer could be as conscious as we are.

In the process, I may ask questions of a devil's advocate nature without prefacing them as such. Sorry to confuse you. I'll be more clear next time.

I have vivid experiences of qualia but take it on faith that it's an emergent property of our naturally evolved, physical central nervous system. I don't like to take anything on faith, but that's my dilemma right now.

The word "qualia" is well established in the conscious studies community and I'm not yet convinced it should be retired. Indeed, refusing to use the word suggests a veiled attempt to refuse to deal with its issues. Not using the word for something doesn't necessarily make the thing the word stands for disappear.

I had a frustrating debate on this with Massimo Pigliucci, a good skeptical thinker once associated with the JREF.

He suggested in a podcast that consciousness may be uncomputable, and that it may require a carbon substrate. He compared a computer simulation of consciousness with a computer simulation of photosynthesis, that a computer could not produce consciousness just as a photosynthesis simulation would not produce sugar. In so doing, he suggested consciousness (qualia?) may be a physical property. When I asked him to explain exactly how carbon might be responsible for consciousness and how other substrates (silicon computer chips, etc.) couldn't, he just asked if I knew anything but carbon based objects that were conscious. It sounded to me like woo-woo and argument from ignorance. He brushed off the suggestions. I was very disappointed in him.

Can anyone suggest any possible way that carbon might be required for the production of consciousness?

 

[PixyMisa]

I have vivid experiences of qualia

Well, no.

but take it on faith that it's an emergent property of our naturally evolved, physical central nervous system. I don't like to take anything on faith, but that's my dilemma right now.

Why take it on faith at all? Experiences can clearly be mapped to brain activity, and indeed induced by direct stimulation.

The word "qualia" is well established in the conscious studies community

Well, no.

and I'm not yet convinced it should be retired. Indeed, refusing to use the word suggests a veiled attempt to refuse to deal with its issues.

Well, no.

Not using the word for something doesn't necessarily make the thing the word stands for disappear.

We have a perfectly serviceable word for experience that doesn't assume logical impossiblities. It's experience.

I had a frustrating debate on this with Massimo Pigliucci, a good skeptical thinker once associated with the JREF.

He suggested in a podcast that consciousness may be uncomputable, and that it may require a carbon substrate. He compared a computer simulation of consciousness with a computer simulation of photosynthesis, that a computer could not produce consciousness just as a photosynthesis simulation would not produce sugar. In so doing, he suggested consciousness (qualia?) may be a physical property. When I asked him to explain exactly how carbon might be responsible for consciousness and how other substrates (silicon computer chips, etc.) couldn't, he just asked if I knew anything but carbon based objects that were conscious. It sounded to me like woo-woo and argument from ignorance. He brushed off the suggestions. I was very disappointed in him.

Yech. That's a category error, and one we see all too often around here. And when you called on it, he tried to shift the burden of proof. I'm disappointed in him too.

Can anyone suggest any possible way that carbon might be required for the production of consciousness?

No.

 

[Mr. Scott]

This guy has done awesome work:

Dr. V.S. Ramachandran, Director of the Center for Brain and Cognition at UCSD, discusses consciousness, qualia, and self.

 

[PixyMisa]

That's a pretty good run-through, except he's using the bad word.

 

[westprog]

If your post isn't going to respond to my post I suggest you use the "quick reply" at the bottom of the page.

I addressed the point you made, such as it was.

 

[Mr. Scott]

That's a pretty good run-through, except he's using the bad word.

Maybe I could use argument from authority and say, if the Q word is good enough for Ramachandran, then it's good enough for me. Slap me why don't you.

I've watched Dennett's lecture for the third time now, and it seems he spends more time (almost all the time) telling us what consciousness isn't than what it is. He never uses the Q word. It's still a terrific lecture BTW.

Something odd happened to me once regarding tooth pain, surely one of the most intense pains commonly experienced.

Ordinarily, pain is accompanied by an extreme desire and struggle to be free of the pain. It can be ruinous to the enjoyment of life.

What I experienced once or twice was the sensation of tooth pain with the complete absence of it's uncomfortableness and imperative to be relieved. It was a very matter-of-fact "hmmm, that's some intense tooth pain. I suppose a dentist ought to see if something needs fixing." But absolutely no discomfort or misery. Just it's matter-of-fact presence. I've heard laughing gass has this effect: you still feel the pain, but it doesn't bother you.

So, why can't we call the pain qualia? Or the agonizing imperative to be free of pain? Before I learned the Q word I called it "sensation." It just seems like "experience" is a flaccid word for it. I think "experience" is too general, while "qualia" is more specific.

Do you think there could be such a thing as experience without qualia?

 

[PixyMisa]

Maybe I could use argument from authority and say, if the Q word is good enough for Ramachandran, then it's good enough for me. Slap me why don't you.

Whap!

I've watched Dennett's lecture for the third time now, and it seems he spends more time (almost all the time) telling us what consciousness isn't than what it is. He never uses the Q word. It's still a terrific lecture BTW.

Yes, my view on the Q word is partly taken from Dennett.

Something odd happened to me once regarding tooth pain, surely one of the most intense pains commonly experienced.

Ordinarily, pain is accompanied by an extreme desire and struggle to be free of the pain. It can be ruinous to the enjoyment of life.

What I experienced once or twice was the sensation of tooth pain with the complete absence of it's uncomfortableness and imperative to be relieved. It was a very matter-of-fact "hmmm, that's some intense tooth pain. I suppose a dentist ought to see if something needs fixing." But absolutely no discomfort or misery. Just it's matter-of-fact presence. I've heard laughing gass has this effect: you still feel the pain, but it doesn't bother you.

Ketamine does that too - it's what's known as a dissociative anaesthetic. You still feel the pain, it just doesn't bother you.

Which offers an interesting insight into how experiences work - if we can separate out something so fundamental to the experience of pain by administering a simple chemical, it really blows a hole in the philosophical concept of qualia.

So, why can't we call the pain qualia?

As I've said repeatedly, the word was defined and is commonly used as an explicitly dualist term for subjective experience.

Do you speak of souls, or demons, except metaphorically?

Or the agonizing imperative to be free of pain? Before I learned the Q word I called it "sensation." It just seems like "experience" is a flaccid word for it. I think "experience" is too general, while "qualia" is more specific.

And it asserts a logical contradiction.

Do you think there could be such a thing as experience without qualia?

The notion of qualia being logically incoherent: Sure. Absolutely.

 

[Wowbagger]

As I've said repeatedly, the word was defined and is commonly used as an explicitly dualist term for subjective experience.

Clearly, not everyone is using the word in that way.

If "Qualia" is used to mean "conscious experience" rather generically, it's a perfectly valid word; and more specific than "experience", which would include things that were not part of consciousness (most dreams, for example).

If someone thinks qualia can only be "explained" in some dualist manner, that is their problem. If we can better explain how the "sensation of qualia" arises in non-dualist terms, then that's our task.

But, there are more important things to discuss, regarding consciousness, than if we should use the Q word, or not.
Consciousness is a complex thing, and not easily explainable to the layman. But, I think this thread is getting out some good ideas in that direction. Let's continue with that, if we can!