Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?

[steenkh]

If I understood your position, you still might say: "Each of us is a different process, even if started initially in the same condition, so we have different personal identities". But in this case, a materialist could charge you of being dualist, because he could say: "At the very moment of the beginning of your process, there's nothing of material that would allow us to distinguish your start form the start of another one of us".

Wrong: they occupy different coordinates in space.

You might always say that the place and/or the time were different, but the measures of time and space are only conventions.

The measures may be conventions, but that does not make points in space the same.

Maybe I am repeating the same words written before, so I will try to put it differently: I think that if we want to be strictly materialist, we have to acknowledge that our individual existence depends on a very huge number of factors, maybe on all the particles in our brain, or in our body, or in our observable cosmic horizon, but a finite number of factors. This is the only way to avoid dualism and mantain our individual existence possible.

I have no argument with that.

But if my individual existence depends on a finite number of factors, I cannot exclude that it will be theoretically possible that such finite number of factors may happen more than once and even at the same time. This leaves the theoretical possibility of non-locality, i.e. the possibility that two different individuals shared the same personal identity at the same time.

Wrong: they will also have to occupy the same space.

Obviously while two brains mantain the same configuration at particle level, they must have the same thoughts and the same feelings (and the same convincement about theirselves and their personal identity).

Not necessarily. They will also need to be influenced by the same particles and molecules from the outside, i.e. they need to occupy the same space at the same time.

But at this point there is interesting to imagine the thought experiment of Derek Parfit in "Reasons and persons" (Parfit is an Empty Individualist, so he thinks we have separated personal identities but during our life we gradually change it so we are not the same persona that we are at birth).

I was mentioning this in an earlier post, but I think the question is heavily dependent on how we define personas.

We must imagine that we could separate the two halves of our brain using a switch, and then rejoin them resetting the switch. This is plausible because there are clinic cases of brain scissions to cure serious hepilexia diseases, and even clinic cases of person with only half brain active. I saw a study about this also in Roger Penrose book "The Emperor's new mind".

While the two halves were separated, each of them would control only half of the body, and would wonder about "who" is controlling the other half of the body. After rejoin, the whole self could not even discern if the experience of left half has been lived before or after the one of the right half. The question cannot even be posed, it would be as the time itself were split in two. But he/she could be aware to have lived both the experiences of the two halves.

I am sure the experiment would work as you say, but I do not see any particular consequence for the atheist worldview.

I think that in the case of perfect brain replicas, as even in the teleporting, we can figure something similar, even if there's no final rejoint. To imagine non-locality somehow, we need to imagine that is the time as perceived by our consciousness that has been splitted in two.

If you split the consciousness in two, you will have two different consciousnesses. There is no non-locality involved. If you join them, it is up to philosophers to speculate if you have two consciousnesses in one, or one consciousness with split memories. Again, from an atheistic POV, I see no problem.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, the consciousness itself and the personal identity, at least with the programs that runs today. I think that consciousness require a special hardware, like some studies about consciousness and the brain suggests. (Schwartz, Stapp and Beauregard 2004, Roger Penrose 1989)

Penrose has done no such studies. Neither, as far as I am aware, have Schwartz, Stapp, and Beauregard. They have written papers exposing their complete lack of understanding of quantum mechanics, but no studies.

Actually, "complete lack of understanding" understates the matter. Schwartz, Stapp, and Beauregard not only fail to understand any part of quantum mechanics, they invent an entirely new (and entirely fictional) structure in its place and give it the same name.

 

[PixyMisa]

Excuse me, there is no instant transportation in the universe. now there is some variance for leptons under QM, and it gets really weird.

BUT one of the ingrained properties of a large particle is its position in space (as expressed by the HUP or Schrodinger's equations) and time.

The second thing is that it can not travel at a velocity greater than c the speed of light, therefore within the small margins of HUP, the main constrains is that a particle can not just magically appear from mars here on earth.

It has to travel here, and contingent history is an intrinsic property.

Now the history is not encoded, but given mass, velocity, momentum and composition , those are constrained within HUP to a space time location. That particle on mars is constrained to travel at much less than the speed of light to get from there to earth.

Yes. Part of the problem - arguably, most of the problem - with the "Transporter Paradox" is that it asks us to discuss the question of identity in a universe with fundamentally different laws of physics to our own.

 

[marplots]

I have three online identities, one on Yahoo, one on Hotmail, and one on Gmail.

In my brain, I have two. They interleave on a microsecond scale and never intersect or communicate with each other. Let us call them even and odd, for just like the numbers with the same names, my identity flickers between the two states, one on while the other is off and vice versa.

What surprises me is that although both versions share the same history and experiences (at least down to the microsecond scale), they are yet distinct. Something about how the brain works has sorted out what may appear as the same impressions of the outside world into two different conclusions.

I suspect it is because they have different editors of the information coming in. So one might appreciate color more while the second is digging the shapes of things.

One of my identities is an atheist, materialist, pragmatist -- the other enjoys exotic cheeses.

 

[yy2bggggs]

1 - If we think that each of us has his/her individual personal identity, we must presuppose that he/she acquireddeveloped it at a certain moment

FTFY. "Acquired" suggests a dualistic view of things, and presumably that's what you're wanting to complain about.

2 - If we think that two identical brains placed side to side have different identities because located in different places,

Here we diverge. No. We do not think the two identical brains placed side by side have different identities because they are located in different places. They have two different identities for an entirely different reason--because the causal chain between their respective mechanisms is distinct. (Incidentally, ANTpogo and Darat are free to correct me if I'm wrong, but from my reading both are saying the same thing I am)

The causal chain is critical. If I'm to lay claim to a personal identity in a continual sense, I must be able to say with a reasonable burden of believability that I know that I am the same person I remember myself to be. Knowledge depends on causal chains; if the thing I'm claiming to have knowledge about does not actually cause me to come to a belief, then it's guesswork, not knowledge.

So if you're complaining about our reliance on physical location for identity, you're barking up the wrong tree. It's the causal chains, not the location.

 

[steenkh]

The causal chain is critical. If I'm to lay claim to a personal identity in a continual sense, I must be able to say with a reasonable burden of believability that I know that I am the same person I remember myself to be. Knowledge depends on causal chains; if the thing I'm claiming to have knowledge about does not actually cause me to come to a belief, then it's guesswork, not knowledge.

So if you're complaining about our reliance on physical location for identity, you're barking up the wrong tree. It's the causal chains, not the location.

So you think that two clones with identical memories (causal chains) at different locations would be one personal identity? It seems to me that this is what IacopoV has been arguing all the time.

 

[IacopoV]

Hello everybody.


To ANTPogo:

If we speak of things without consciousness (without personal identity), I think that identity is just a matter of choice of the definition. There's a reference on the Theseus Ship on wikipedia. No definitive answer is given, but IMHO in the case of unanimated objects, identity becomes just a matter of convention. But if I think that two identical brains may have two different personal identity, I have to find something to justify this difference, otherwise I am becoming dualist. Appealing to space/time location and/or elementary particles seems to be a very weak position.


To yy2bggggs:

(thank you for the terminology correction in the last post)

I agree with you in the discussion of the scenarios you proposed. But the problem is: what matters for personal identity? Because the brain state of a single brain changes continuously, so we should find something that doesn't change and keeps the personal identity. Before introducing a difference in the environment of W and E, they have exaclty the same brain state X. after introducing the difference, W have the brain state Y, and E have the brain state Z.

So what can we think?

1) The personal identity varies with brain state, so W and E in brain state X have the same personal identity (simultaneusly) but W in state Y has another personal identity and E in state Z has another one (Empty Individualism)

2) The personal identity doesn't depend (only) by the brain state but by something more: maybe the space/time location or by specific elementary particles, or another external condition that may avoid dualism somehow, or some dualistic soul.

3) As you wrote in your successive post, we can consider the causal chain. But in your experiment must we consider it identical for W and E until you introduce a difference or it is differenced only in that moment? In the first case, we need that causal chain were recorded somewhere in the material world to have any influence, otherwise it seems become a dualistic concept. In the second case, we have to presuma the at least one of W and E changes his personal identity in that moment.

4) The personal identity is illusory. There's a continuity of our lives as stored in our brain memory, but nothing may distinguish our personal identities. This kind of Open Individualism is very different from believing in a supernaturel Cosmic Soul that could behave like God. Doesn't imply any super-power or any global consciousness. It simply reduces the consciousness to a function that has no intrinsic identity.


To Dancing David:

Many of your observation doesn't take account of quantum mechanics.
The problem with "contingent history" is that to be effectively materialistic, we should find where it is recordered. In macroscopic world it is not a problem, but at quantum level two alternative pasts are indistinguishable. Keep in mind the double slit experiment (see wikipedia "Double-slit_experiment").

You may think that you would have not existed if your parent were travelled in anther place after your conception, but anyway the point is if you're the result of a number finite of material condition or not. If yes, you should say why you think that these are impossible to reproduce again. Statically is very improbable, but not impossible. We are just theorizing, we have not to build anything in practical.

The cells in your bones changes every 7 years, not the atoms. Anyway there's a study about it at (I cannot write direct link because of forum policies. See wwwnytimescom 2005 08 02 science 02cell.html). Here you can find that some cells in frontal cortex lasts for a whole life. Moreover, I can tell you that the DNA in such cells has atoms that never changes during that period. So, you may think that your personal identity is linked to the identity of the elementary particle that compose those atoms.

You can find some reference for the problem about identical particles at wikipedia "Indistinguishability"

About your successive observations: I understand that you think that your personal identity maybe influenced by each single atom until you born (or it becomes stable at a certain point of gestation). Then the "contingent history" preserve it for the rest of the life.

I don't agree on considering some specific, individual elementary particle as responsible in determining who you are (i.e., you were another person if one of them would be replaced with another particle of the same type and with the same state), and I don't agree on the relevance of the "contingent history" if it cannot be reduced to something material (e.g. some memories in some brain).


To PixyMisa:

Sorry, my reference was uncomplete. I would mean that I believe that consciousness depends by some quantum effects in brain functioning. This is what Penrose said in "Emperor's new mind", and the study of S.S. & B. proposes. I know that the matter is controversial, and cannot evaluate the quality of their study, but I think that this is the right way. I think that the consciuosness cannot be reduced just to a matter of classical physics. Do you?


To steenkh:

I am not questioning about atheism. I am atheist and materialist. I want to show that Open Individualism doesn't imply some mystical "Cosmic mind" or so, it is just the conclusion that personal identity is an illusory concept, and nothing proves that our perceived different personal identities had to be really different, if not in the same degree I can become different from myself during my life, without changing my personal identity.

I agree that "being in a different space" (and time) is something that influence the state of all the elementary particles that constitutes a living being, but keep in mind that doesn't exist any absolute geometry of spacetime, and we are continuously changing our location in time, without -apparently- change our personal identity.

I agree that being spatially separated is a big hint that two perfect replicas have two different personal identity, but imagine to be one of that replicas. what you could think about your birth? Maybe something like this: "I exist because my body born in these contingent space/time, and if somebody would have moved my growing cells in another place, it would have born another perfect replica, but not me".

I agree that is coherent, but it links your personal identity at the "start time" to a contingent spacetime geometry, that seem have no influence on your personal identity after your birth. It is what you mean?



To everybody:

I am not willing to convince you, I am just searching for weak points in my same argues. So thank you to all of you!

 

[yy2bggggs]

So you think that two clones with identical memories (causal chains) at different locations would be one personal identity?

If it were possible to do, yes. This would be what PixyMisa is explaining in post #99. It's just redundant computing.

It seems to me that this is what IacopoV has been arguing all the time.

No, IacopoV was arguing that clones with equivalent memories at different locations would be one personal identity.

See post #91.

 

[PixyMisa]

To PixyMisa:

Sorry, my reference was uncomplete. I would mean that I believe that consciousness depends by some quantum effects in brain functioning. This is what Penrose said in "Emperor's new mind", and the study of S.S. & B. proposes.

My point is that those are not studies. There's no experimentation, no empirical data at all. Indeed, they run counter to both the available empirical data and well-tested theory.

I know that the matter is controversial, and cannot evaluate the quality of their study, but I think that this is the right way.

I can. It's not. (It's not a study at all, as I said, but that aside it's still wrong.)

What S, S & B write about quantum mechanics is simply untrue, and while Penrose doesn't mess up basic physics nearly so badly, his speculations on human mental capabilities are unfounded and his calculations are almost unimaginably off the mark.

I think that the consciuosness cannot be reduced just to a matter of classical physics. Do you?

Absolutely. Of course, there's no need that it be explained entirely in classical terms - we live in a quantum Universe - but waving quantum mechanics about like a magic feather explains nothing.

What exactly is it about consciousness that you think cannot be explained clasically, what evidence do you have that this feature actually exists, and what are your reasons for thinking that it cannot be explained without reference to quantum mechanics?

 

[Darat]

So you think that two clones with identical memories (causal chains) at different locations would be one personal identity? It seems to me that this is what IacopoV has been arguing all the time.

Well for me I just go "1+1=2". I know that seems somewhat simple but that is all we are talking about, if we have one of something and we then make another of the same thing we now have two things. Doesn't matter whether that is "personal identities" or lampshades.

And if the copy of the thing is of high enough fidelity then we wouldn't be able to tell the original from the copy or vice-a-versa if we didn't keep track of their locations.

What I think IacopoV is arguing is that when we create these copies of a person we still only have one person, my very basic arithmetic above shows that is not the case.

 

[PixyMisa]

If we speak of things without consciousness (without personal identity), I think that identity is just a matter of choice of the definition. There's a reference on the Theseus Ship on wikipedia. No definitive answer is given, but IMHO in the case of unanimated objects, identity becomes just a matter of convention.

The same is true of personal identity. It's a pragmatic concept, not a mathematical one. Our identities don't just change, they are change. We identify a given identity as "the same" as a remembered one based on a range of evidence: Behaviour, physical appearance, continuity.

But if I think that two identical brains may have two different personal identity, I have to find something to justify this difference, otherwise I am becoming dualist.

How about just counting them?

As I said above, some specialised computer systems really do have multiple identical identities. When you run a program, three or more copies of it are actually started on identical but separate hardware, each fed identical copies of the input data. The output data of each set of hardware is compared, and if one copy is different from the others, that piece of hardware is marked as faulty and shut down.

The problem is that to do this you need very precisely defined and stable hardware, and rigidly controlled operating conditions.

You can't do that with a human brain. Brains are computers, sure, but they're noisy, unreliable, over-sensitive and chaotic. If you could somehow precisely duplicate the physical state of a given human brain - which is quite impossible in this Universe - the states would instantly diverge the moment you allowed the two brains to begin operation.

Since identity is a process, something that happens in time, you cannot have two brains with the exact same identity under anything like our laws of physics.

And asking us to postulate on the nature of human identity in an imaginary universe with markedly different laws of physics to our own seems pointless to say the least, since those beings would not be human.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

As I said above, some specialised computer systems really do have multiple identical identities.

But assuming those programs were sentient, wouldn't they still have separate locations? Even if they were run on the same hardware, they'd have separate addresses in memory and be identical but authentic individuals.

Assuming we ever do get AI, this is going to be an interesting can of worms.

 

[yy2bggggs]

(thank you for the terminology correction in the last post)

That's not exactly what it is. It's a conceptual correction. I'm just using terminology to distinguish the concepts. That being said, the terminology does have precedent. Just to clarify though, in case this confusion arises, when I say identity in this sense, I mean something other than personal identity.

But the problem is: what matters for personal identity? Because the brain state of a single brain changes continuously, so we should find something that doesn't change and keeps the personal identity.

Sure. I, in practice, have my own set of experiences which establishes a relation to a particular environment, my own particular beliefs about that environment, my own particular desires, and my own particular goals. When I say that I am a different individual than you, what I mean is that you don't think my thoughts nor remember them; you don't see what I'm seeing; and your behaviors are potentially directed to different goals than mine. When I say that I'm the same individual I was in the past, what I mean is that I remember not only what I did, but I remember some of these things that make me say that I'm a different person than you are.

Before introducing a difference in the environment of W and E, they have exaclty the same brain state X. after introducing the difference, W have the brain state Y, and E have the brain state Z.

You cannot describe the states as different, because I specifically set up the problem such that you don't know if there is a difference or not. This is critical, but realistic; we do not come with a gods-eye view of the world, only a subjective one. So we can only infer things based on what we know. All I did in this scenario was set up a situation where it's plausible that the brain states are equivalent in every way. From there, we have to figure out if they are.

That's where the main problem arises with the above invariants. I can infer facts about my environment, because I'm connected to it. But I cannot infer facts about the environment in the other laboratory. Does E see the same thing I do? The fact that I answer maybe instead of yes highlights the critical difference; it is the same exact difference that compels me to think that you are a different individual than I am.

1) The personal identity varies with brain state, so W and E in brain state X have the same personal identity (simultaneusly) but W in state Y has another personal identity and E in state Z has another one (Empty Individualism)

What you're trying to say here is simply that if W and E are in the same brain state that they are equivalent under the concept of personal identity. You're better off just saying that directly, because what you in fact said does not follow. What you said was that personal identity varies with brain state; in other words, if W and E are not in the same state, then they are not equivalent under the context of personal identity. It does not follow from this that if they are in the same then they are.

2) The personal identity doesn't depend (only) by the brain state but by something more: maybe the space/time location or by specific elementary particles, or another external condition that may avoid dualism somehow, or some dualistic soul.

It's unclear what you mean here.

3) As you wrote in your successive post, we can consider the causal chain. But in your experiment must we consider it identical for W and E until you introduce a difference or it is differenced only in that moment?

Let's say before the split, we'll call you P. So P causally leads to W, and P causally leads to E. W remembers "being" P, in the sense that W remembers things about P that we already claimed was part of the distinction between P and other people, such that we would grant P with a meaningful concept "personal identity". So we can say that W is the same person as P.

In like fashion, we can say that E is also the same person as P.

But we cannot say that W is the same person as E, because, again, given how we came up with the meaningful concept of "personal identity", W and E are distinct individuals. Note that this means that equivalence, in this sense, is not transitive. That's fine--don't panic. We get to have systems like this.

In the second case, we have to presuma the at least one of W and E changes his personal identity in that moment.

There are changes not only in that moment, but all of the time, constantly. This is what ANTpogo meant when saying that it's dynamic. What we're describing by personal identity is simply what changes constitute something we're going to call the same person, and what changes don't constitute that.

4) The personal identity is illusory.

Illusory in which sense though? There are very specific implications to the concept of personal identity that I outlined, and we even make use of them; even you make use of them. That's why you're trying to convey something to me in this very thread; you believe you have to phrase it just right in order for me to understand it, because you believe I'm not privy to your thoughts. But you believe that you have figured this out over a period of time, so you believe that there's something persistent about your thoughts.

Do you believe the entire act of developing your view of open individualism is illusory? Do you believe you are attempting to convince me of this view, or that this is illusory as well?

 

[Dancing David]

Hi IacopoV

Many of your observation doesn't take account of quantum mechanics.

If you review my actual statements you will see that I made express reference to the framework I was using, I said that leptons were a special case and the HUP and Schrödinger’s equations provided variance. Which only applies to the QM scale.

The problem with "contingent history" is that to be effectively materialistic, we should find where it is recordered.

Nope, see that is silly, objects occur in space time, and in fact I noted that past positions are not inherently recorded in the objects. It doesn't matter. they still have discrete positions and velocities at certain times. the fact that a crystal of quartz is not encoded for x,y,z at t, does not mean it whizzes around.

In macroscopic world it is not a problem, but at quantum level two alternative pasts are indistinguishable. Keep in mind the double slit experiment (see wikipedia "Double-slit_experiment").

Nope that is an expression of the wave nature of all particles and does not apply to much in the macroscopic world.

You may think that you would have not existed if your parent were travelled in anther place after your conception,

I am disappointed, you did not actually read what I wrote.

but anyway the point is if you're the result of a number finite of material condition or not.

depends upon the scale and the fineness of the measurements.

If yes, you should say why you think that these are impossible to reproduce again.

Why should the reoccurrence of events involving 10x 10⁷⁰objects be reproducible, where did I make that statement?

Statically is very improbable, but not impossible. We are just theorizing, we have not to build anything in practical.

The cells in your bones changes every 7 years, not the atoms.

Sigh some of that calcium stays with you for about that long or if reabsorbed then longer.

Anyway there's a study about it at (I cannot write direct link because of forum policies. See wwwnytimescom 2005 08 02 science 02cell.html). Here you can find that some cells in frontal cortex lasts for a whole life.

that does not mean that their constituents atoms and molecules do not change over, they do, and so the calcium you have varies on where the food you consumed came from, which was my point about contingent history.

Moreover, I can tell you that the DNA in such cells has atoms that never changes during that period. So, you may think that your personal identity is linked to the identity of the elementary particle that compose those atoms.

If we are talking about the identity of a physical body yes, 'personal identity' is still vague and undefined by you.

You can find some reference for the problem about identical particles at wikipedia "Indistinguishability"

Nope you can present it if you wish and we can discuss it, particles do not need recording to have contingent history.

About your successive observations: I understand that you think that your personal identity maybe influenced by each single atom until you born (or it becomes stable at a certain point of gestation). Then the "contingent history" preserve it for the rest of the life.

I called you on your vague usage of personal identity. the physical identity of bodies is what starts that beginning of some vague undefined personal identity.

I don't agree on considering some specific, individual elementary particle as responsible in determining who you are (i.e., you were another person if one of them would be replaced with another particle of the same type and with the same state), and I don't agree on the relevance of the "contingent history" if it cannot be reduced to something material (e.g. some memories in some brain).

Uh huh, sure, so you are just engaging in more false arguments about positions I did not take because you did not define your term of personal identity.


Hello again, you will find that you have to define your usage in discussion here, particles and bodies do have contingent history.

Do the silicon atoms in a piece of granite swap places with those in other quartz bearing mineral half a world away?

 

[Croc411]

One problem. You're not dealing with continuity of the self.

Not a problem here. You see this is a bit difficult, because everyone here has his own definition of continuity. But that thought experiment can deal very well with your definition of continuity.

Transitions A to B, B to C, and C to D are non sequiturs.

What thesis is non sequitur to what premise?

You can add it easily, with at least a hypothetical form of Alzheimer's, though it's still not exactly what you need to do.

Yes, it's not perfect. But it doesn't have to be. The point here was not to make you into a perfect copy of me.

Let's back up. We're not merely talking about "continuity" in the sense of continuous transformations. What we are talking about is continuity of the self. Before we get into that, let's discuss what the self is.

We are separate agencies. I have thoughts, and you have thoughts. I see things, and you see things. But I do not think your thoughts, nor do you think my thoughts. I cannot see what you're currently looking at, and you cannot see what I'm currently looking at. We each have our own respective set of subjective states. (This also gets into intentions and so on, but I'll leave that topic for another day).

Now as well as having separate experiences, we remember separate experiences; furthermore, we remember our own experiences. Not only do I not think your thoughts, but I do not remember thoughts that you have (that you don't express); and likewise, you don't remember thoughts that I have (that I don't express). I cannot remember what you see and you cannot remember what I see. But I can remember some of my thoughts, and remember some of the things I see; and you can remember some of your thoughts and some of what you see. (Ignoring for now how flawed some of these memories can be...)

In other words, just as I am a separate agency from you, I remember being a separate agency from you. And I remember being a particular agency with particular experiences--particular thoughts, particular sights, and so on. In other words, in the past, there was a separate agency; in the present, I remember "being" that agency, in that I remember some of the things that this agency to the exclusion of all other agencies was privy to. And that is the continuity of the self.

You can, hypothetically, remove those memories by changing my brain states. If you do, you remove the continuity of the self. Right there in scenario #1, before you get to your "problems" of #2 and #3.

But I might also add, that you're going to have a hell of a time making my brain state match yours by simply removing experiences. There's no way you can just make me forget this, forget that, forget that, and so on, and wind up making my brain state match yours. To do that requires some addition; Alzheimer's just won't do. You're going to need some neurosurgery for that one. So if you want to argue that you can make me go from state A immediately to state E and that therefore I am the same as you, you don't get to do that with a scenario #1.

You can, however, involve a neurosurgeon and perform this sort of transformation. If you like, you can perform it very gradually; take your 70 years, and slowly transform my brain state into you.

Once you do that, the entity you get winds up being a version of you. Though it's not going to see what you see, and so on, so it'll diverge quickly (the problem with universal symmetries--they're only applicable in general in principle; in particular, move me one foot to the left, and I see something different than you). Nevertheless, if you want to argue that because you can slowly transform me into you, then we're both the same, then you're simply committing the fallacy of the heap.

You can simply replace scenario #1 with one of your liking where some transformation takes place but the continuity according to your definiton is not lost. Scenario #3 will always constitute a complete break in continuity (death). Disregard #2.

The point of the whole thought experiment is that we have the EXACT same person (including subjective self) at state E in scenario #1 and #3. One time we get there with a break in continuity and one time with continuity preserved. So this shows that continuity CANNOT have an effect on the persistence of your subjective self.

So there you have it. Continuity of the self involves, by my account, an actual memory tie to your "being" a former self--specifically, a former particular agency in the world. Continuous transformations from one person to another simply changes the self from one person to another, if you do it. (And if you want to build a chimera brain, you'll just get a chimera self).

So you think that in scenario #1 the continuity was ended while the guy was slowly transforming, similar to what had happened if he had died?

 

[Croc411]

Now consider your mind, a different project altogether. Our overall architecture may be very similar, but the devils' in the details: we have no common codebase whatsoever. What you and your branches might see as a useful and general commit is so much jibberish to me. Our similarity is 0%.

See where I'm coming from?

Yes, I do. Among the 7 billion people on earth you won't find a single one you could consider similar to yourself, not by a long shot. But one small addition: our similarity is not exactly 0%. It's a very small fraction of a percent. For instance we both know how the night sky of planet earth looks like.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Yes, I do. Among the 7 billion people on earth you won't find a single one you could consider similar to yourself, not by a long shot. But one small addition: our similarity is not exactly 0%. It's a very small fraction of a percent. For instance we both know how the night sky of planet earth looks like.

No we don't. Though the same visual image enters our corneas, it's encoded differently in our retinas, processed differently in our visual cortices, and interpreted differently in our parietal lobes. The pattern of neurons that indicate a pretty night sky in your mind would be total gibberish in mine, and vice versa. There is no similarity at that level between us.

 

[PixyMisa]

But assuming those programs were sentient, wouldn't they still have separate locations? Even if they were run on the same hardware, they'd have separate addresses in memory and be identical but authentic individuals.

Actually, the programs would be access the exact same memory addresses at the exact same time; that's how precise this technique is.

As I noted, that sort of thing just can't be done with a human bran.

Assuming we ever do get AI, this is going to be an interesting can of worms.

Yep.

 

[AlBell]

Sorry, AlBell forgets a simple principle, from inside the universe there is no way to tell the ontologies apart.

A idealistic, theistic or materialistic ontology will be indistinguishable.

If you feel that they can be distinguished, then please explain. It is a moot point, we could be butterfly dreams, BIVs, godthought or dancing energy.

All exactly the same.

Behaviors differ: see "atheist=ontology materialist" vs "not-atheist=ontology ??? (or could be illogical ontological materialist rather than logical idealist)".

I understand you don't agree. We must be reading different posts.

 

[AlBell]

There's your problem.

Identity is a process, not a thing. It exists in time.

Does time actually exist? Per recent tv shows there seems to be some discussion on that point by a few intelligent men and women.

No, I have no literature cite, but if 'time existing' is 'iffy' you may well know more about it than I do.