Air France Flight 447 report

Daald

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Popular mechanics has a breakdown on what happened to that flight. I was interested myself and this paints a morbid picture.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/pri...ppened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877?page=all

Any pilots in this forum that can comment on it? Have they changed training to emphasize stall training? How about the two operational envelopes in the Air Bus? How about the averaging of the input to the stick control?
 
Daald said:
Popular mechanics has a breakdown on what happened to that flight. I was interested myself and this paints a morbid picture.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/pri...ppened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877?page=all

Any pilots in this forum that can comment on it? Have they changed training to emphasize stall training? How about the two operational envelopes in the Air Bus? How about the averaging of the input to the stick control?
Click to expand...

I am not a pilot but that article and analysis suggests more than simply stall training as a preventative measure. Human factors (failing to communicate, two co-pilots in charge, missing/ignored iterative routines) caused the crash. As I recall, they originally reported a pitot tube issue but that article clarifies that the air speed indicators were operational during most of the critical period. Interesting to note that the stall warning sounded 75 times while the least experienced pilot kept pulling back on the controls.
 
Other planes survived icing of the pitot. If you have enough events like this with enough crews, the odds are that one of them will screw up. When the event started, they should have consulted the manual for the correct procedure to follow.

The whole event took place in about four minutes. I am sure that if they could have stopped time, had a good think about what was happening and discussed it calmly amongst themselves, they would have worked out what they should do and have survived. They didn't have that luxury. The idea that the jet was falling like a stone out of the sky never occurred to the pilot flying.
 
a_unique_person said:
Other planes survived icing of the pitot. If you have enough events like this with enough crews, the odds are that one of them will screw up. When the event started, they should have consulted the manual for the correct procedure to follow.

The whole event took place in about four minutes. I am sure that if they could have stopped time, had a good think about what was happening and discussed it calmly amongst themselves, they would have worked out what they should do and have survived. They didn't have that luxury. The idea that the jet was falling like a stone out of the sky never occurred to the pilot flying.
Click to expand...

They should simply have followed the unreliable IAS procedure. Had they done so, we wouldn't be talking about them now.

Actually, the IAS was only unreliable for ~50 seconds. Had they sat on their hands for a minute, we wouldn't be talking about them now.
 
a_unique_person said:
Other planes survived icing of the pitot. If you have enough events like this with enough crews, the odds are that one of them will screw up. When the event started, they should have consulted the manual for the correct procedure to follow.

The whole event took place in about four minutes. I am sure that if they could have stopped time, had a good think about what was happening and discussed it calmly amongst themselves, they would have worked out what they should do and have survived. They didn't have that luxury. The idea that the jet was falling like a stone out of the sky never occurred to the pilot flying.
Click to expand...
Anybody who, during a percieved emergency, continually holds "Up" elevator is not a pilot. A plane driver, maybe, but not a pilot. Why the hells would you do that?
 
At first I thought that maybe there was some malfunction with the stick. Why wouldn't you say that you are holding back the stick for so long?

This statement removed that doubt though:

02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure!
But I've had the stick back the whole time!
Click to expand...

This was even after the other pilot said I have the control :(

Also note how the other pilot was handling the situation. He was placing small inputs in the system (pushing the stick forward a little bit) to see what would change. Clearly he thought that nobody had any inputs into the system.

02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.
No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert) Alors descends... Alors, donne-moi les commandes... À moi les commandes!
Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!
Click to expand...

This is minutes after Robert had asked to take over controls!
02:11:37 (Robert) Commandes à gauche!
Left seat taking control!
Click to expand...
 
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It seems to be a design fault that the right hand control can over ride the left hand control, and there is no way to tell
 
rwguinn said:
Anybody who, during a percieved emergency, continually holds "Up" elevator is not a pilot. A plane driver, maybe, but not a pilot. Why the hells would you do that?
Click to expand...

^^This

I have some basic, minimal flight training (all in simulators). You never, ever, ever, pull back on the stick when the stall light/indicator starts yelling at you. Heck, even playing flight games, my first instinct in a stall is to push forward. The co-pilot may have been inexperienced, but it's very strange to me that he held that stick back the whole time during warnings...he never should have had that instinct to begin with.
 
MG1962 said:
It seems to be a design fault that the right hand control can over ride the left hand control, and there is no way to tell
Click to expand...
I thought the article said the input from both sticks average out..
However, in an ideal situation, one pilot would assume control and the other would be hands off.. This one guy manged to maintain " stick back ", through most of the event, and resulted in the failure to recover from the stall ..

Here is an article that discusses the Airbus " sticks " , and why they might not be that great of an idea as implemented..

http://msquair.wordpress.com/2011/09/16/pilots-in-the-loop-airbus-and-the-fbw-side-stick/#more-4866
 
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Wonder how unusual it is for the radar to be in the wrong mode, and for them not have request a diversion or looked at the weather maps.
 
Skeptical Greg said:
I thought the article said the input from both sticks average out..
However, in an ideal situation, one pilot would assume control and the other would be hands off.. This one guy manged to maintain " stick back ", through most of the event, and resulted in the failure to recover from the stall ..

Here is an article that discusses the Airbus " sticks " , and why they might not be that great of an idea as implemented..

http://msquair.wordpress.com/2011/09/16/pilots-in-the-loop-airbus-and-the-fbw-side-stick/#more-4866
Click to expand...

Wow is that interesting reading or what? It seems the bigger question is how come it took so long for an accident like this to happen
 
MG1962 said:
Wow is that interesting reading or what? It seems the bigger question is how come it took so long for an accident like this to happen
Click to expand...

Because most pilots in similar situations did the right thing. When the other pilot tried to take control, the Pilot Flying should have let him, as the other pilot was senior to him. The Pilot Flying used an override button to take control back from the other pilot.
 
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LTC8K6 said:
They should simply have followed the unreliable IAS procedure. Had they done so, we wouldn't be talking about them now.

Actually, the IAS was only unreliable for ~50 seconds. Had they sat on their hands for a minute, we wouldn't be talking about them now.
Click to expand...

Which is presumably what other crews have done in similar situations, and lived. If the captain had been in the seat, or the second officer flying, they probably would have lived.
 
This is why I prefer Boeing's FBW, even though it's not really a big deal these days.

With Boeing, the pilots have more feedback. If the left yoke is moved, the right yoke moves also. If the flight computer changes the throttle settings, the throttle levers move, etc. You can see and feel what's going on. You know what the flight computer is doing and what the other pilot is doing.

The stall warning is not only an alarm and an indication on the panel, but the yokes vibrate...the stick shaker.

This is why you will usually see the pilot of a Boeing resting one hand on the yoke. He will instantly know a lot of things just by having that hand on the yoke.

Plus, the pilot of a Boeing FBW aircraft can override the system if necessary to make a maneuver if he needs to.
 
Why would there even be a mode where the inputs are averaged together? I'm not a pilot, but I've been around aircraft my whole life and that doesn't make an ounce of sense to me.
 
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