Materialism (championed by Darwinists) makes reason Impossible.

[Akhenaten]

double posting, server error

Are you sure it wasn't your other self?

 

[lemurien]

Now, David. Pleasure having discussed with you.


Unknown what you are trying to say.
just says about it all.

 

[lemurien]

Are you sure it wasn't your other self?

if my other self is a beach ball, maybe

 

[Richard Masters]

Well, at least that is one of the claims in the book "I Don't Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist" by Norman Geisler and Frank Turek. Many of you should know of this book as it is the focus of my Evidence thread in the History Forum. The book says this on page 129.

"...if materialism is true, then reason itself is impossible. For if mental processes are nothing but chemical reactions in the brain, then there is no reason to believe that anything is true (including the theory of materialism). Chemicals can't evaluate whether or not a theory is true. Chemicals don't reason, they react.

This is supremely ironic because Darwinists---who claim to champion truth and reason---have made truth and reason impossible by their theory of materialism. So even when Darwinists are right about something, their worldview gives us no reason to believe them---because reason itself is impossible in a world governed only by chemical and physical forces."

I read the book almost from cover to cover (I began to give up toward the end, when I realized the book was made up of fallacy after fallacy).

"Chemicals don't reason, they react". Absolutely right. If you move to a different level of abstraction, then you talk about neurons, which by themselves don't reason either (except in a very elementary level). At the next level of abstraction, neural pathways, you get extremely sophisticated and organized interactions between chemicals.

I've seen Turek argue this at two debates with Hitchens, and although Hitchens (a great writer and debater) did not address the question adequately, Turek's arguments seem sophomoric to anyone who has studied, let alone read about evolution, psychology and neurology.

Now that I've disproven Turek's argument, I hope you will contact him and ask him if he would like to agree to a televised debate.

 

[Richard Masters]

Because a defense of reason by reason is circular, therefore worthless.

It's circular only in a semantic/grammatical sense. In practice, reason is a concept and process by which we evaluate reality, and because it is consistent with reality, there is no reason to think of it as circular except in the way that it tends to accurately reflect reality.

 

[Aepervius]

I never said that the body without the brain would be a person.

As clearly as I could, I tried to say that you need a body and a brain to make a normal functional human being. Also, they have to be connected to each other as they are, with intimate chemical and electrochemical connections.

Your argument about the brain preparate in a jar is a null argument because no such thing exist. Unlike in philosophy, in biosciences you cannot just presume that a preparate or a population or whatever biological entity will function in an expected (especially cave layman's expectations!) way.
No. You have to have some documentation.

What you think just isn't good enough.

Now, let me get this clear.
Are you really saying that consciousness is a human being?

No I am saying that we have no evidence that a human consciousness is anything beyond brain process which was the GIST of this thread before malerin and co added the body mix in. And yes a human with hacked off limb, and no sensory input , deaf and mute would still be a human. What makes us human what-we-are is the processing of our brain, not the body, the body is *optional*.

 

[Richard Masters]

Do atoms possess the quality of being blue?

Does silicon possess the quality of being capable of processing computer code?

Excellent analogies.

 

[Sideroxylon]

If anyone wants to read this tripe in context, have a look here:
http://crossexamined.org/articles-detail.asp?ID=73&Title=Why Trust Reason if You're an Atheist?

 

[Paulhoff]

It is even weirder than that. I have a good friend who was in a motorcycle accident in his 20's. Due to this, he lost an arm. Well, to everyone else, it is apparent he is missing an arm, but it seems like his brain didn't get the message.......

I think you should show your friend this video.

And Malerin you should watch this too.

http://www.ted.com/talks/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind.html


Paul

 

[Hokulele]

Phantom limb pain. Patient who has had his leg amputated can still feel as if there is a leg that hurts. Lesions on the right side of the brain are associated with 'anosognosia' which means that the patient refuses to accept that a body part is paralyzed. Also, he/she can feel that the leg belongs to somebody else and is behaving aggressively trying to get in the same bed with him/her.

But you didn't address my question. In my friend's case, there are two different versions of "him", the one we see and the one he experiences. Which is really "him"? If the brain and body really are so intertwined as to make up a single person, how is such a conflict even possible?

 

[marplots]

No I am saying that we have no evidence that a human consciousness is anything beyond brain process which was the GIST of this thread before malerin and co added the body mix in. And yes a human with hacked off limb, and no sensory input , deaf and mute would still be a human. What makes us human what-we-are is the processing of our brain, not the body, the body is *optional*.

I have a hard time imagining what a brain is without the body as context. It seems artificial to me to say the body is just a support mechanism. If I flip it around, the brain becomes an accessory organ that supports the body's demands.

Are you familiar with the variations in mentation that come from being overtired, or hungry, or shot full of adrenalin? The only way I can make the separate brain thing work is if consciousness is treated as somehow a thing that isn't "about" anything.

It seems as if the argument is trying to abstract out a function from a necessary context. My best analogy would be talking about multiplication without bringing in numbers. In, "three times two" does the times have an independent existence?

What does it mean to talk about an operator (consciousness) without an operand?

 

[Hokulele]

I have a hard time imagining what a brain is without the body as context. It seems artificial to me to say the body is just a support mechanism. If I flip it around, the brain becomes an accessory organ that supports the body's demands.

Are you familiar with the variations in mentation that come from being overtired, or hungry, or shot full of adrenalin? The only way I can make the separate brain thing work is if consciousness is treated as somehow a thing that isn't "about" anything.

It seems as if the argument is trying to abstract out a function from a necessary context. My best analogy would be talking about multiplication without bringing in numbers. In, "three times two" does the times have an independent existence?

What does it mean to talk about an operator (consciousness) without an operand?

I think the original argument was about what generates the illusion of "self", or for alternative wording, where the "self" resides. Although it has meandered a bit since then, I believe the original contention was that the "self" is entirely contained in the brain, not the rest of the body. True, the human brain is influenced by what happens to the body (beer!), but those changes must affect the brain in order to affect the "self". Pouring beer on my hand is nowhere near as effective as getting the alcohol into my bloodstream, then into my brain, in terms of affecting my perceptions and reactions.

This is what led to my earlier question about my friend who lost his arm. Since his personal experience of "self" includes an arm, it leads me to believe the brain really is the seat of "self", regardless of what happens to the body.

 

[marplots]

This is what led to my earlier question about my friend who lost his arm. Since his personal experience of "self" includes an arm, it leads me to believe the brain really is the seat of "self", regardless of what happens to the body.

It's an interesting question. My guess is that my "self" has changed in my own lifetime, and I can sort of see that when I read a 30-year old diary. But I cannot say if that is just because my brain aged, or because my body aged too, or even if I rightly remember the narrative.

Even so, I can think of experiences that have changed my beliefs (does that count as part of "self"?) and these experiences were at least partly based on stuff outside of the brain.

The problem seems to be that if something outside of the brain changes anything, then it's a change to the brain as well. What seems to be demanded is something that causes a change in self without a change in the brain. Is that right?

If that's right, my mistake is in thinking that it counts as a different me if I am in the role of father, or boss, or lover. I act differently, I feel differently, but these are all lumped together into some general "self." But any change I experience in selfhood is just a change in the brain, regardless of what caused the change.

It's starting to sound like an argument by definition. "The brain generates self." "Anything that alters the sense of self, alters the brain." VS "The brain experiences self." "Anything that changes the experience changes self." Followed by, "Experiences alter the brain."

I can't see how to distinguish between the two. That's why I like the coupled, holistic view better.

 

[Hokulele]

The problem seems to be that if something outside of the brain changes anything, then it's a change to the brain as well. What seems to be demanded is something that causes a change in self without a change in the brain. Is that right?

As far as I can tell, that is indeed the issue. I believe this is a challenge more for those who believe in some sort of soul, where the "self" is entirely discrete from body/brain/materialism. In other words, people like DOC.

 

[Paulhoff]

Hokulele, have you watched the video?

Paul

 

[Hokulele]

Hokulele, have you watched the video?

Paul

Yep, I read the book too, long after my friend lost his arm. It made the whole strange thing understandable.

 

[Malerin]

I read the book almost from cover to cover (I began to give up toward the end, when I realized the book was made up of fallacy after fallacy).

"Chemicals don't reason, they react". Absolutely right. If you move to a different level of abstraction, then you talk about neurons, which by themselves don't reason either (except in a very elementary level). At the next level of abstraction, neural pathways, you get extremely sophisticated and organized interactions between chemicals.

I've seen Turek argue this at two debates with Hitchens, and although Hitchens (a great writer and debater) did not address the question adequately, Turek's arguments seem sophomoric to anyone who has studied, let alone read about evolution, psychology and neurology.

Now that I've disproven Turek's argument, I hope you will contact him and ask him if he would like to agree to a televised debate.

How so?

 

[Malerin]

No I am saying that we have no evidence that a human consciousness is anything beyond brain process which was the GIST of this thread before malerin and co added the body mix in. And yes a human with hacked off limb, and no sensory input , deaf and mute would still be a human. What makes us human what-we-are is the processing of our brain, not the body, the body is *optional*.

Actually, we do. NDE's, veridical OBEs, past life recollections of children, universality of religious experience, reports of certain paranormal acticities by reliable witnesses, etc.

 

[lemurien]

Actually, we do. NDE's, veridical OBEs, past life recollections of children, universality of religious experience, reports of certain paranormal acticities by reliable witnesses, etc.

There is nothing in the phenomena you mention that could not be created by the brain. In fact, NDEs and OBEs can be triggered stimulating the temporal areas of the cortex. These areas are connected to the vestibular organs that sense our position in space.

Malfunction creates bizarre experiences that are known to pilots and astronauts in weightlessness situations.

Universal religious experience is not universal but seems to be connected to a certain imbalance imbalance in the dopaminergic tracts of the brain. Different populations show diferences in religiosity.

Children can be made to remember things that never happened. Adults have gone to jail because of some over-enthusiastic psychologist had decided that they were abusing their children sexually.

If you look at the probabilities only, would you put your money on an entity that nobody thus far has been able to detect or measure or a brain malfunction? Or which one do you think you'll meet first walking down a street, a holy man or a liar?

 

[Malerin]

I'm not claiming anything. It's a hypothetical: assume there's a mechanical neuron that is functionally identical to a biological neuron. Assume that we can stop your brain acticity without killing you and replace one of your neurons with a mechanical neuron. All synaptic connections are preserved. Are you still you? If no, how are you still you when one of your neurons dies? If yes, how about if I replace two neurons... three? 50 million? At what point are you no longer you?

If you could recreate the exact replica, Than I would think you would still be you. Afterall, using your words, it is an exact replica. as such, as you are your brain, you haven't changed.

Haven't changed? You no longer have a biological brain. Isn't that a change?

So let's explore this idea that "you" are still "you" after I completely swap out your biological neurons for their functionally equivalent mechanical counterparts.

Let's say I keep the biological neurons around, and after I'm done replacing all the neurons in your brain, I take the old biological neurons (which you've admitted are no longer "you") and reconstruct your old brain. Which one is you?

See Ship of Theseus.

Let's go one step further, Let's say you made an exact replica of me and killed the original. That would still be me.

No, that would be "an exact replace of you". You were the original, which was killed. If you weren't, then you would have the incredibly odd view that "you" refers to two people: the replica and the original.

See teleportation and personal identity.

I think you have the harder problem of telling me how the soul transfers from the original to the replica.

Why would I make that claim?