Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Kevin_Lowe]

I think that it has been made exquisitely clear that it does not matter what Harris specifically says, what will be argued are the straw men rather than the content of his ideas.

Linda

As I just pointed out to Bokonon, Harris did indeed claim to have a solution to the is/ought problem and does not have one.

As I have pointed out to you repeatedly, the claim to have solved the is/ought problem is the only interesting thing Harris has said from the point of view of someone up to date on moral philosophy. Bentham, Mill, Singer et. al. have already said everything he is saying on that topic.

There are no straw man, just a strategy of cleaving Harris' claims at the joints. His big, attention-grabbing claim is false. The rest of his claims are nothing new.

Dani, I'm sorry. I am interested in talking about Harris' ideas, but I have been unable to move anyone, yourself included, away from a position which does not seem to reflect these ideas. When Harris specifically contradicts the aforementioned position, instead of attending to it, it is taken to be a sign that Harris or myself is deceitful or a bit stupid. I find myself unable to effectively work against that, so I don't think it will be of any use to you for me to retread the same ground over and over again.

When people contradict themselves it's unreasonable to expect the discussion to just ignore that, especially when what they are contradicting is the big, flashy, book-selling claim they led off their talk with.

What ideas, other than erroneous ideas or borrowed and relabelled utilitarian ideas, do you think Harris had?

For anyone who is interested, I found that reading the book (including the Notes ) and listening to the two lectures Paulhoff referenced earlier (especially the second) very helpful in trying to grasp what Harris is getting at. I agree that he makes it somewhat difficult. I don't know that I've fully 'got' it, but my conception of it does manage to accomplish what he claims. The lectures are long, but they only need listening (not watching).

Bad philosophy can be seductive that way. If you don't understand it, many people conclude that it must be because it is so deep and important. However it's also possible that it's just banal and self-contradictory.

If you don't yet fully grasp what Harris is getting at, it might not be because of any failing on your part, unless you count the assumption that Harris is getting at something new and important as a failing.

If utilitarianism is new and exiting for you, that's wonderful. You would probably enjoy, and get a great deal out of, an introductory moral philosophy course at university, or from sitting down with a good introductory moral philosophy textbook. Such exercises might even teach you something about the most common criticisms of, and or weaknesses of, utilitarianism which I doubt you'll get from Harris.

The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is also a wonderful on-line resource for those interested in independent learning.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Hm, as far as I can see, the is/ought problem can be overcome, in a certain way:

1) Human X has desire Y as determined by neuroscience
2) Z is the most effective way to accomplish Y as determined by science
3) If Human X wants to accomplish desire Y with maximum effectiveness, he should do Z

Both statement 1 and 2 are factual and falsifiable claims. However statement 3 is an "ought" claim, which follows directly from statement 1 and 2. It tells people what they should do, based on nothing but fact. From is follows an ought.

Sorry, but this is not a solution. You accidentally equivocated.

"Moral ought" and "practical ought" claims are two different things that need to be kept separate in your mind. "You ought not to hurt others" is a totally different category of claim to "you ought to tighten the screws every six months with an Allen key".

 

[JoelKatz]

So Joel, you're for morality decided by referendum or sample?

No. Any more than I think we should decide what's red by doing a poll. We may have no other choice, but it's obviously not the best choice.

Let's hope you never find yourself in an environment where most people around you disagree with you as to what the right thing to do is. You'd have to accept that you were 'broken'.

That's right, I would. It's the same thing you would do if you couldn't tell red boxes from green ones but other people could demonstrate that they could do so. Absent a better understanding of color, the only conclusion you could come to (which would be correct in this case) is that you were broken. Of course, you could be wrong in the morality case, but it would be the rational conclusion to come to.

I think sociopaths are 'broken' in some sense, just as colorblind people are. And they to have problems coping in a society built for fully-functioning, normal people. Some day, science will give us the answers just as it did for color.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

No. Any more than I think we should decide what's red by doing a poll. We may have no other choice, but it's obviously not the best choice.

That's right, I would. It's the same thing you would do if you couldn't tell red boxes from green ones but other people could demonstrate that they could do so. Absent a better understanding of color, the only conclusion you could come to (which would be correct in this case) is that you were broken. Of course, you could be wrong in the morality case, but it would be the rational conclusion to come to.

I think sociopaths are 'broken' in some sense, just as colorblind people are. And they to have problems coping in a society built for fully-functioning, normal people. Some day, science will give us the answers just as it did for color.

I think you're just wrong. Colour exists (in a sense) as objectively measurable photons with exact energies, frequencies and so on. There is no such thing as a quantum of evil or an SI unit of disutility.

I think my earlier analogy that moral philosophy is like logic or maths is a much better one. One day we will understand the neurophysiology behind a mathematician doing maths or a logician doing logic, but that won't tell us whether a proof is sound or an argument valid.

If you value qualities in a moral theory like consistency, or ability to cope with novel situations, then examining the social instincts of primates like us will not get us to a good moral theory. It might explain the moral blind spots we tend to have, but it won't tell us that they are blind spots.

 

[JoelKatz]

I think you're just wrong. Colour exists (in a sense) as objectively measurable photons with exact energies, frequencies and so on. There is no such thing as a quantum of evil or an SI unit of disutility.

We know that now. At one time, we had no idea that color was objectively measurable an that sense. The evidence we had that color was objectively measurable was the same evidence we have now that morality is objectively measurable.

Even before we understood color, it would have been utterly irrational to conclude that color was subjective or that red was whatever someone said red was. The evidence that color was an objective property of the interaction between person, viewing conditions, and object viewed was overwhelming. And we currently have the same evidence for morality.

I think my earlier analogy that moral philosophy is like logic or maths is a much better one. One day we will understand the neurophysiology behind a mathematician doing maths or a logician doing logic, but that won't tell us whether a proof is sound or an argument valid.

But it did with color and it does with morality. Since we didn't know precisely what red was or how people sensed it, all we could do is say that people said it looked red to them, and that therefore red must be something. We could guess that it was almost certainly something about the light, but that was all we could do.

We could use color then without being irrational and we can use morality now. One day, we will have it figured out just as we do for color vision.

If you value qualities in a moral theory like consistency, or ability to cope with novel situations, then examining the social instincts of primates like us will not get us to a good moral theory. It might explain the moral blind spots we tend to have, but it won't tell us that they are blind spots.

I'm not sure what else we have right now. The analogy to investigating color when the only thing we know of that can measure color is a human who says "it looks red to me" is, IMO, a very good one. The type of moral studies and tests you can do are very analogous to the type of color studies and tests you could do and the interpretation of the results issues are similar.

 

[fls]

As I just pointed out to Bokonon, Harris did indeed claim to have a solution to the is/ought problem and does not have one.

As I have pointed out to you repeatedly, the claim to have solved the is/ought problem is the only interesting thing Harris has said from the point of view of someone up to date on moral philosophy. Bentham, Mill, Singer et. al. have already said everything he is saying on that topic.

There are no straw man, just a strategy of cleaving Harris' claims at the joints. His big, attention-grabbing claim is false. The rest of his claims are nothing new.

When people contradict themselves it's unreasonable to expect the discussion to just ignore that, especially when what they are contradicting is the big, flashy, book-selling claim they led off their talk with.

What ideas, other than erroneous ideas or borrowed and relabelled utilitarian ideas, do you think Harris had?

Bad philosophy can be seductive that way. If you don't understand it, many people conclude that it must be because it is so deep and important. However it's also possible that it's just banal and self-contradictory.

If you don't yet fully grasp what Harris is getting at, it might not be because of any failing on your part, unless you count the assumption that Harris is getting at something new and important as a failing.

If utilitarianism is new and exiting for you, that's wonderful. You would probably enjoy, and get a great deal out of, an introductory moral philosophy course at university, or from sitting down with a good introductory moral philosophy textbook. Such exercises might even teach you something about the most common criticisms of, and or weaknesses of, utilitarianism which I doubt you'll get from Harris.

The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is also a wonderful on-line resource for those interested in independent learning.

Yes, you have been very clear on your interpretation of Harris' TED talk.

Linda

 

[bokonon]

As I have pointed out to you repeatedly, the claim to have solved the is/ought problem is the only interesting thing Harris has said from the point of view of someone up to date on moral philosophy. Bentham, Mill, Singer et. al. have already said everything he is saying on that topic.

Big deal. I don't care if something Harris is saying has been said before, any more than you care that something you're saying has been said before. Why should I?

If you prefer to read Bentham, Mill, Singer et al, have at it. Apparently, more people prefer to read Harris these days than the lot of them together. Whether that's due to a livelier writing style, a contemporary perspective, or simply a better publicist, I don't know. To each his own.

What ideas, other than erroneous ideas or borrowed and relabelled utilitarian ideas, do you think Harris had?

Don't know, don't care. I don't imagine much that appears in Scientific American every month is new, but I still enjoy reading it.

If utilitarianism is new and exiting for you, that's wonderful. You would probably enjoy, and get a great deal out of, an introductory moral philosophy course at university, or from sitting down with a good introductory moral philosophy textbook. Such exercises might even teach you something about the most common criticisms of, and or weaknesses of, utilitarianism which I doubt you'll get from Harris.

Or from you either, apparently.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Yes, you have been very clear on your interpretation of Harris' TED talk.

Linda

That's an interesting construction that could be taken to imply there is reason to believe my "interpretation" is not the plain fact of what he said, but which avoids having to present any argument whatsoever that we should "interpret" him differently.

If that is not your intended implication, perhaps you could clarify? If it is your intended implication, perhaps you could present an argument to the effect that we should "interpret" him differently?

Big deal. I don't care if something Harris is saying has been said before, any more than you care that something you're saying has been said before. Why should I?

If you prefer to read Bentham, Mill, Singer et al, have at it. Apparently, more people prefer to read Harris these days than the lot of them together. Whether that's due to a livelier writing style, a contemporary perspective, or simply a better publicist, I don't know. To each his own.

In that case we have nothing to disagree about (except possibly about whether or not the appeal to popularity is a fallacy).

Or from you either, apparently.

I've discussed them in this thread already actually, so apart from being an irrelevant cheap shot this is also simply wrong.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

We know that now. At one time, we had no idea that color was objectively measurable an that sense. The evidence we had that color was objectively measurable was the same evidence we have now that morality is objectively measurable.

I'm pretty sure this is wrong too. We have good philosophical reasons to believe that moral claims simply cannot be true or false, because they do not make any testable claims whatsoever. You can make testable claims about colour.

Even before we understood color, it would have been utterly irrational to conclude that color was subjective or that red was whatever someone said red was. The evidence that color was an objective property of the interaction between person, viewing conditions, and object viewed was overwhelming. And we currently have the same evidence for morality.

No. The opposite, actually.

But it did with color and it does with morality. Since we didn't know precisely what red was or how people sensed it, all we could do is say that people said it looked red to them, and that therefore red must be something. We could guess that it was almost certainly something about the light, but that was all we could do.

We could use color then without being irrational and we can use morality now. One day, we will have it figured out just as we do for color vision.

I'm not sure what else we have right now. The analogy to investigating color when the only thing we know of that can measure color is a human who says "it looks red to me" is, IMO, a very good one. The type of moral studies and tests you can do are very analogous to the type of color studies and tests you could do and the interpretation of the results issues are similar.

Such tests are purely exercises in descriptive morality. You can figure out why primates have the behavioural instincts they do, but it cannot ever in theory prescribe moral behaviour.

If you think that descriptive morality is all there is to morality you're what's referred to as a moral nihilist. It's a perfectly coherent position, it's just not much use.

 

[Sophronius]

Sorry, but this is not a solution. You accidentally equivocated.

"Moral ought" and "practical ought" claims are two different things that need to be kept separate in your mind. "You ought not to hurt others" is a totally different category of claim to "you ought to tighten the screws every six months with an Allen key".

I actually answered that in the paragraphs following the bit you quoted. I don't think there's any fundamental difference. Moral claims are simply just another expression of preference for certain behaviour, albeit one that people often wish enforced upon other people.

The only real difference that I can see is that with strictly moral claims, people feel a certain irrational indignation whenever other people won't obey they moral rules. People feel that their morals are true regardless of practical considerations or what other people thing about them. However I see absolutely no rational reason to give moral claims special standards. If someone wants other people to behave according to their (moral) rules, they should supply practical arguments in favour of it, otherwise there's no reason to prefer theirs to any other's.

I suppose that makes me a moral nihilist, but what other sensible position is there?

 

[Paulhoff]

If that is not your intended implication, perhaps you could clarify? If it is your intended implication, perhaps you could present an argument to the effect that we should "interpret" him differently?

I heard him make no absolute statements that could not be changed.

Paul

 

[fls]

That's an interesting construction that could be taken to imply there is reason to believe my "interpretation" is not the plain fact of what he said, but which avoids having to present any argument whatsoever that we should "interpret" him differently.

If that is not your intended implication, perhaps you could clarify? If it is your intended implication, perhaps you could present an argument to the effect that we should "interpret" him differently?

You can see (by which I mean you won't) how utterly useless this exercise has been for me when after 25 pages of arguing that he has been interpreted incorrectly, I am met with this.

Linda

 

[AlBell]

Yes, you have been very clear on your interpretation of Harris' TED talk.

Linda

Indeed. Kevin's posts offer many of the few points of clarity in the entire thread.

 

[Kuko 4000]

Such exercises might even teach you something about the most common criticisms of, and or weaknesses of, utilitarianism which I doubt you'll get from Harris.

The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is also a wonderful on-line resource for those interested in independent learning.

I guess you missed the quote I posted from the Moral Landscape a few pages back where Sam Harris links to the criticism of utilitarianism (consequentialism), it is by the way, the same exact source as your own link.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=6920027&postcount=1298

12. Consequentialism has undergone many refinements since the original utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. My discussion will ignore most of these developments, as they are generally of interest only to academic philosophers. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides a good summary article (Sinnott- Armstrong, 2006).

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/

 

[Paulhoff]

Indeed. Kevin's posts offer many of the few points of clarity in the entire thread.

Seems you are right, Kevin is clear on not seeing Sam clearly.

Paul

 

[AlBell]

Seems you are right, Kevin is clear on not seeing Sam clearly.

I see that Kevin's points were not rebutted by the quote. Do you?

 

[Paulhoff]

I see that Kevin's points were not rebutted by the quote. Do you?

Where do you see that Sam's TAM talk and other talks he has on the subject aren't open ended.

Paul

 

[AlBell]

Well, it's the usual crapola when people try to discuss defining morals.

Combat with feather pillows.

 

[Paulhoff]

Well, it's the usual crapola when people try to discuss defining morals.

Combat with feather pillows.

If you are on an island by yourself, are there any morals.

Paul

 

[Dani]

The analogy between morality and color is nearly perfect.

At one time, all we knew about color was that people agreed that the sky looked somehow different from grass. We could test color -- people with normal vision could distinguish cubes of different 'colors' by looking at them. Under some circumstances, the sky was described by blue, but not always. And if someone swore that the sky looked the same color as wood to them (under normal conditions) all we could do is tell them that they were lying or somehow broken.

We could infer that color was probably due to some difference in the light coming from things. But we had no idea what property of the light it could possibly be. We had no way to measure colors -- it just "looked red to me" and that was the best we could do. Things might look red under one lighting condition and orange under another.

This is where we are with morality. We have widespread agreement that, for example, torturing children for pleasure is "wrong". We don't really know what "wrong" is. We know it's something about the act, and we know how to use it (you don't do it, you punish it, etcetera), but we aren't 100% sure what it actually is measuring, how, or why.

Nevertheless, it is is virtually inconceivable that there wasn't something objective behind it. Otherwise, this widespread agreement is inexplicable. The person who claims he sees nothing wrong with torturing children for pleasure is like the person who says the sky looks brown to him as it looks blue to us standing right next to him. We can't prove it, but he is clearly different or broken.

I believe that at some point in the future, we will understand morality scientifically as an objective property of a conscious act just as color is a property of an object. Just as color depends objectively on lighting conditions, morality may depend objectively on properties such as the full circumstances of the act (including the society it takes place in, at least to some extent). Just as people are reasonably accurate judges of some colors but far from perfect, so are people reasonably accurate judges of some aspects of morality.

I don't think the analogy between morality and color is that good. To begin with, there is widespread agreement on some extreme cases where there is practically no moral debate, but disagreement on many particular cases. To follow the analogy, there is widespread agreement on what's black and white, but disagreement on what's yellow, green, blue, red, orange, violet and all the cromatic spectrum in varying degrees in relation to the two referential points. The differences between our respective moral values are not comparable to the differences between our respective color perception. We hardly debate about colors, while we debate about morals all the time.

Second. Our relationship with color is perceptual, while our relationship with morality is conceptual. This is a very relevant difference. Through our perception we can observe things and we assume that what we perceive exists independently of us. We can observe light and measure it in different ways. We haven't observed morality in that sense. Morality is as objective as anthropocentrism: they are ideas that arise within human minds. That is all the objectivity there is from a purely perceptual, empirical point of view. So no, it's very conceivable that there is nothing objective behind it. Neuroscientific investigation is really interesting in providing correlations to our perceived states of mind. It can help us physically locate what produces a state of mind, but doesn't tell us anything about what exists independently of us unless we want to engage in circular reasoning.

I might have more objections, but first I'd like to know what do you mean by "objective property of a conscious act".