Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[AlBell]

Just throw a so-called god in, end of problem.

The only people in this thread who seem to want to talk about god are you, and Linda with her bible.

 

[Sophronius]

How do truths about the mind and how they flourish inevitably lead to truths to be known about good and evil?

He appear to be claiming that good = actions that lead to greater well-fare and evil = actions that lead to less well-fare. He then says that if well-fare can be objectively measured, good and evil can be objectively measured. At least that's how I understand it. I agree that this is overtly simplistic.
Personally, I would rather say that the ability to objectively establish a person's well-fare would help to make a person's morality more internally consistent and more effective at achieving its intended goals. If Harris were to put it like this I wouldn't have a problem with it.

I have a hard time reconciling this statement with his claim of being able to derive an "ought" from an "is". The two claims seem contradictory to me.

I haven't actually seen him claim this. Rather I have seen him claim that it is not an issue for the position he is taking. But maybe I misunderstand. I have yet to read the book.

The decision to value health and seek to maximize it is not a scientific one. Sure, we can use science to achieve that goal, but that only supports the weak claim that science can help us achieve our goals which no one disputes.

Agreed, this bothered me as well. The fact that medicine = science does not mean that the pursuit of better health is motivated by science.

I think the point is that his position can't even construct a logical and consistent argument against a competing morality that is bat-**** insane without resorting to 'but mine is right and yours is wrong'.

No, it is more of a claim that "Your morality is logically inconsistent and does not achieve any of the objectives that it is meant to achieve." This seems quite fair to me. I do have difficulty imagining a functioning morality that does not improve anyone's well being.

@Kuko: I do not like the references to moral truth either, but I don't think he means to use them make any extreme objective claims. I.e. he does not claim to have his hands on any ultimate moral truths.

 

[Kuko 4000]

The only people in this thread who seem to want to talk about god are you, and Linda with her bible.

It is very relevant to Harris's points and real life though.

 

[Kuko 4000]

@Kuko: I do not like the references to moral truth either, but I don't think he means to use them make any extreme objective claims. I.e. he does not claim to have his hands on any ultimate moral truths.

This is true, one of his basic claims is that some of the very popular moral understandings out there are clearly worse than others (even when they all aim for better well-being) and we should not be afraid to point them out more openly and publically (moral relativism). This I think is very important and needs more publicity, I also think that Harris is a great spokesperson for it.

 

[AlBell]

It is very relevant to Harris's points and real life though.

Kewl. If all that's needed is bashing Christianity, why pretend otherwise?

 

[fls]

That preference he is asking for is a disguised "ought" claim, and I'd bet that if you unpacked it that you would find that it's not at all as simple as you and Harris make out.

You can try to soft-pedal this philosophical manoeuvre by framing it with linguistic constructs that minimise its significance ("Harris just asks you to do one teensy little thing, that's all, it's not much to ask, it can't be important") but it doesn't change the fact that you've just asked us to slide from a series of "is" claims to an "ought" claim without a scientific justification for doing so.

Science can give me excellent reasons to do X in terms of satisfying my own personal utility. If I want to experience happy brain states I should do X - no problem there, and not even an "ought" claim.

However what it can't do is give me a reason to care about your wellbeing. Yes we have some degree of empathy for other humans, but not so much that we aren't capable of killing, raping or enslaving our fellow humans, or letting them die out of sight and out of mind when we could save their lives for the price of a cappuccino. Asking people to think or act otherwise requires some kind of philosophical ought claim.

This isn't even particularly relevant. If we are talking about understanding what positions are occupied based on how we act, and whether this moves us towards greater or lesser well-being, then of course you shouldn't care because you are not asking any questions. Harris is talking about how to answer questions, not how to derive questions. If it doesn't matter what position you occupy on the moral landscape, then it doesn't matter to know how your position would change.

If you are not asking, what should I value?, then the moral landscape is irrelevant.

What science can't do is give me a reason to prefer one distribution of utilities over another. Concepts like "fairness" or "justice" aren't scientific ideas. Once again we have some kind of inbuilt ideas about fairness and justice but not such strong or universal ones that there is clearly one way of distributing benefits and harms that everyone agrees is best. Once again picking between different distributions requires some kind of philosophical ought claim.

What science can't do is establish utilities as commensurable or incommensurable, or establish an objective scale to weigh them by. If it saves one billion, billion, billion people from a minor itch is it okay to torture you to death, if enough itches add up to more disutility than being tortured to death? How many kittens is it okay to kill to save the life of one toddler? Can I kill you if it gets me a billion dollars? A billion billion? What if it gets me my own personal planet full of whatever I want and eternal life to enjoy it?

If we reduce the population of stray cats in order to reduce the incidence of congenital toxoplasmosis, isn't the distress of babies suffering from disability or death or the distress from considering the death of kittens relevant to the question? Nobody is suggesting a utility scale.

I suspect Harris uses the name because he wants to attract attention and sell books, even if the claim he is making is philosophically bankrupt.

I suspect that it comes from his background in philosophy. Books on the same kinds of subject from economists get called 'neuro-economics'. Those from doctors get called 'public health'. Etc.

However the name is correct because what you are doing is moral philosophy, albeit bad moral philosophy that tries to pass itself off as science.

Denying that the "is/ought" problem has anything to do with your body of facts is simply erroneous.

The is/ought problem has you in its teeth the second you try to get from "it is a fact that humans like certain things" to "therefore we should act on this fact in some way for reasons other than pure personal self-interest".

As I think I've shown, exactly what you "should" do once you know about these brain states and things is also not scientifically demonstrable, and you have do to some additional philosophy before you can get to a moral system that can handle non-trivial problems.

I agree that the description of the moral landscape does not tell you that you should ask questions of it. This is relevant to those who ask, "what should I value", just like medicine is relevant to those who ask "how can I be healthy?"

Linda

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

Should we kill grey squirrels to protect red squirrels?

Straw-man.

Paul

It's not a straw man, it's one of an infinite number of moral questions about the well-being of conscious creatures that science can't answer.

Personally I like my tools to be of practical value rather than just look nice.

It seems others are happy to just engage in intellectual masturbation.

 

[Earthborn]

My answers may not be the "right" answers, but we can discuss them in the framework Harris has outlined.

If we discuss them in the framework Harris outlined, your answers are certainly not the right answers. If we assume that grey squirrels and red squirrels are about equally conscious creatures, and we notice that in places where red squirrels are being displaced by grey squirrels the greys are thriving where the red are merely hanging on, we can only conclude that the overall well-being of squirrels would diminish if we start killing the grey ones. By saying that the greys need to be killed to protect the reds, you are claiming that the well-being of red squirrels far outweighs the well-being of the grey squirrels and there is AFAIK nothing in Harris' framework that allows one to claim one race is morally superior to another.

When it comes to songbirds and cats, it may be that cats are more "conscious" than songbirds, so it is not obvious that cats' well-being should suffer in favour of the well-being of songbirds.

If we assume that bees are not conscious in a way that is relevant to morality and on the issue of killer bees versus European bees only the well-being of humans needs to be considered, it still doesn't mean killer bees should be killed. Killer bees can be handled with sufficient care, they produce more honey arguably contributing to human well-being.

We can take the body of facts about the functioning of the human body and get Medicine.

I find the comparison with medicine quite strange. Medicine is not just a body of facts about the functioning of the human body; that would be human biology. Medicine has an obvious moral component; it is not just about how the body is, but also what it should be and what should not be allowed to exist in it. I think most doctors recognise that these judgements of what "ought" to be cannot be derived from the way the body "is". That means that medicine cannot be used as template for what a "science of morality" might be. The problems a "science of morality" would have are unsolved in medicine. Also problematic for Harris' claims is that medicine in the West tends toward relativism, even subjectivism. "Pain is what the patient says it is."

It is true that doctors can use science to determine which treatments contribute to longevity or "quality of life", but often a choice has to be made between the two. Science does not help us with such a moral dilemma.

 

[bokonon]

It seems others are happy to just engage in intellectual masturbation.

Is that what Feynman called "the pleasure of finding things out"?

 

[fls]

I find the comparison with medicine quite strange. Medicine is not just a body of facts about the functioning of the human body; that would be human biology.

I am flattered that you thought I was capable of providing a complete description of medicine in five words. But I am afraid that your high opinion of me was mis-placed. My statement was meant as a generality.

Medicine has an obvious moral component; it is not just about how the body is, but also what it should be and what should not be allowed to exist in it. I think most doctors recognise that these judgements of what "ought" to be cannot be derived from the way the body "is".

Huh?

Whether I ought to give antibiotics is most certainly derived from an understanding of what happens to the body when infected with pneumococcus.

That means that medicine cannot be used as template for what a "science of morality" might be. The problems a "science of morality" would have are unsolved in medicine. Also problematic for Harris' claims is that medicine in the West tends toward relativism, even subjectivism. "Pain is what the patient says it is."

It is true that doctors can use science to determine which treatments contribute to longevity or "quality of life", but often a choice has to be made between the two. Science does not help us with such a moral dilemma.

I suspect that you would be quite surprised to discover what actually takes place in the practice of medicine and medical research. Symptoms, such as pain are amenable to much more detailed investigation (including objective measures) than "what the patient says it is". Similarly, comparisons are regularly made between quantity and quality of life.

Linda

 

[bokonon]

If we discuss them in the framework Harris outlined, your answers are certainly not the right answers. If we assume that grey squirrels and red squirrels are about equally conscious creatures, and we notice that in places where red squirrels are being displaced by grey squirrels the greys are thriving where the red are merely hanging on, we can only conclude that the overall well-being of squirrels would diminish if we start killing the grey ones. By saying that the greys need to be killed to protect the reds, you are claiming that the well-being of red squirrels far outweighs the well-being of the grey squirrels and there is AFAIK nothing in Harris' framework that allows one to claim one race is morally superior to another.

That isn't necessarily true.

If the presence of one grey squirrel in an area results in the death of five red squirrels, for instance, one might be morally encouraged to cull the greys even if both varieties had equal weight.

In addition, the well-being and relative consciousness of the squirrels is only one variable.

There is also the well-being of those who enjoy watching red squirrels cavort more than they enjoy watching grey squirrels cavort, the well-being of those who value squirrel diversity, the well-being of those who are horrified at the thought of cute little furry creatures being killed no matter what color they are, the well-being of creatures which eat squirrels, etc.

When it comes to songbirds and cats, it may be that cats are more "conscious" than songbirds, so it is not obvious that cats' well-being should suffer in favour of the well-being of songbirds.

If we assume that bees are not conscious in a way that is relevant to morality and on the issue of killer bees versus European bees only the well-being of humans needs to be considered, it still doesn't mean killer bees should be killed. Killer bees can be handled with sufficient care, they produce more honey arguably contributing to human well-being.

See, even you eventually got around to considering human well-being in your calculations too.

As I say, my answers my or may not be correct, but I think "the well-being of conscious creatures" provides a useful framework in which to discuss the questions.

 

[Earthborn]

No, it is more of a claim that "Your morality is logically inconsistent and does not achieve any of the objectives that it is meant to achieve."

Before one criticises another's morality for being "logically inconsistent", one has to make sure one's own morality is itself logically consistent. That is not so easy to do. I certainly never succeeded in creating a logically consistent moral framework that does not produce ridiculous answers in extreme situations. (And I score very highly on this moral parsimony test).

I am also fairly sure that someone whose moral framework consists of "I only care about my own lusts. I don't care when others suffer." will have far less difficulty keeping their morality free of logical inconsistencies.

 

[AlBell]

.... I think "the well-being of conscious creatures" provides a useful framework in which to discuss the questions.

Raise an army, conquer the world, and the populace might heed your discussions.

 

[bokonon]

Raise an army, conquer the world, and the populace might heed your discussions.

Or, just ignore the mewling dismissals from those who can't be bothered to read it, and watch it gain traction with all the people who don't have is-ought tunnel vision.

 

[AlBell]

Try N. Korea first.

 

[Dani]

Our moral values are part of a body of facts, and so are as amenable to being made use of by the scientific method as any other fact.

In this sense, gods are part of a body of facts.

The body of facts which includes the brain states of conscious creatures will be different in the presence of our existence that it will be in our absence.

And how is it relevant?

I mean the standard definition of "preferred" - chosen over another. This also is part of a body facts which includes the brain states of conscious creatures.

"Preferred", in a scientific context, must have a scientific justification. That's obvious, and that's why I used the example of Parsimony.

"Preferred", as in "I prefer red over blue" is as scientific as "I prefer Allah over Zeus".

Well, it's like how we call the creature who supposedly set off a spark which imbued the universe with its physical properties almost 14 billion years ago and hasn't been heard of since "God", even though it doesn't have anything in common with the sky daddy raining hellfire and love down on humans while micro-managing their daily lives who got the name first.

There's an easy solution to this. If you don't think it's the same, don't refer to it as morality. If you want to talk about something that isn't morals, go ahead.

They represent the tools you describe above applied to a particular body of facts.

Sorry. Can you explain what you're exactly talking about?

Like 'up' and 'down'.

Bad analogy. Up and down are physical references.

It was an example of science answering a health question to reach a conclusion. Substitute a moral question, "does killing someone who works on a Sunday change the position occupied on a moral landscape?", and it becomes an example of science answering moral questions by referring to facts, rather than the words of bronze-age men.

Once you have defined what the moral landscape is, that's easy. The problem is that it's just utilitarianism, and it's nothing new.

It's the directionality provided by discovering whether someone would rather not be hit on the head with a hammer.

And that's an almost universal fact. That we should care about the well-being of conscious creatures doesn't follow from this.

It wouldn't be a description of "we behave this way". "We behave this way" is a small part of the map of the general descriptor "well-being". To call something "good" or "bad" simply adds another dimension to this map, just like the presence or absence of disease adds another dimension to the map of "health". We could make it so that the presence of disease and disability represents more health, just like we could make it so that brain states associated with suffering could represent more well-being. What is being said is that behaving in a particular way changes position occupied in the direction of being hit on the head with a hammer. It is true that if someone does not betray in any way that there is a choice to be made between getting hit on the head with a hammer or not, that science does not supply that choice. Harris suggests that perhaps it can be noticed that we do betray ourselves.

And this is a concession which is easier ask for than to concede parsimony or logic. It is far easier to cling to a bit of illogic than not to duck.

And of course, this is altogether different from those who agree with the concession, but choose to disregard it. Who here hasn't taken more pieces of chocolate than they should (to enjoy optimal health).

We don't like being hit on the head with a hammer. In a consequentialist sense, if we know that a certain decision will lead to a situation where we will suffer, we tend to avoid making such decision. Science can help us find out what the outcome of a certain decision will be, or what decisions are better to achieve a goal.

It doesn't matter how easy is to make a concession. That doesn't make it scientific.

 

[Sophronius]

Before one criticises another's morality for being "logically inconsistent", one has to make sure one's own morality is itself logically consistent.

No, that is a common fallacy. "You are not allowed to criticise others unless you are perfect". Clearly nonsense. Examining your own morality is advisable regardless of whether you criticise others. Examining the morality of others is fine regardless of whether you criticise your own. That said, hypocrisy does tend to get frowned upon.

That is not so easy to do. I certainly never succeeded in creating a logically consistent moral framework that does not produce ridiculous answers in extreme situations. (And I score very highly on this moral parsimony test).

Thanks for the link, but I got stuck at question 15:

"A situation arises where you can either save your own child from death or contact the emergency services in order to save the lives of ten other children. You cannot do both, and there is no way to save everyone. Which course of action are you morally obliged to follow?
1) your own child
2) The 10 other children"

I have no option to say that I am not morally obligated to choose either. No option to skip and no planet X. :/

I am also fairly sure that someone whose moral framework consists of "I only care about my own lusts. I don't care when others suffer." will have far less difficulty keeping their morality free of logical inconsistencies.

This is true. Logic is, of course, not the only thing that's important in life. However, there are those people who do care about others yet act in a manner that hurts people. For example, you can have someone who holds the following beliefs:

1) I want to make everyone happier!
2) Black people are inferior and should be beaten whenever possible.

One can see how belief number 2 contradicts with number 1. Here, a logical inconsistency can be pointed out and a "better" moral framework can be created. Purely on objective grounds.

 

[Dani]

This is true. Logic is, of course, not the only thing that's important in life. However, there are those people who do care about others yet act in a manner that hurts people. For example, you can have someone who holds the following beliefs:

1) I want to make everyone happier!
2) Black people are inferior and should be beaten whenever possible.

One can see how belief number 2 contradicts with number 1. Here, a logical inconsistency can be pointed out and a "better" moral framework can be created. Purely on objective grounds.

True. Or something closer to Harris' concerns:

1) Women and men should be equal in rights.
2) We shouldn't judge other cultures.

 

[annnnoid]

Harris seems to be still flogging the same old dead horse. His grand objective…a science of meaning….without the meaning. Now he’s got neuroscience credentials so he can pretend to look ever deeper for the origins of being. Unfortunately, neural scanning is still fairly rudimentary (as I argued to death at one of the more pointless religion boards) so it is entirely debatable what it brings to the table beyond the startling insight that there exist neural correlates for cognitive states (and we still don’t know much about which correlates correspond to which states). Does this say the slightest thing about morality beyond everything everyone already knew? Nope. Does this give Harris the ability to pretend he’s saying a whole bunch more? Yup.

As Beth very succinctly put it:

How do truths about the mind and how they flourish inevitably lead to truths to be known about good and evil?

He’s still desperately searching for his rational holy grail. Problem is, it can’t be found without going where only religion dares to tread…and he’d rather stick pencils in his eyes than risk extending even the slightest possibility of credibility to religion or any version thereof. So what does he do…he creates a religion in all but name to proselytize through. What it comes down to, very simply, is that life and the world are one great big incomprehensible mystery. We require forms/constructs/symbols/practices within which and by through which to live and achieve further insight into who/what we are. Religion exists (explicitly and implicitly)…whether Harris wants to admit it or not. Moving the goalposts isn’t going to turn his lump of coal into a diamond.

Scott Atran had this to say about his approach at a previous conference where the two squared off:

I find it fascinating that among the brilliant scientists and philosophers at the conference, there was no convincing evidence presented that they know how to deal with the basic irrationality of human life and society other than to insist against all reason and evidence that things ought to be rational and evidence based. It makes me embarrassed to be a scientist and atheist.

On the subject of the scientific understanding of human nature (Harris’s holy grail) and the idea that scientists are any more qualified to adjudicate moral or any human issues (another popular Harris polemic)…Noam Chomsky had this to say:

It should be obvious to everyone that by and large science reaches deep explanatory theories to the extent that it narrows its gaze. If a problem is too hard for physicists, they hand it over to chemists, and so on down the line until it ends with people who try to deal somehow with human affairs, where scientific understanding is very thin, and is likely to remain so, except in a few areas that can be abstracted for special studies.
On the ordinary problems of human life, science tells us very little, and scientists as people are surely no guide. In fact they are often the worst guide, because they often tend to focus, laser-like, on their professional interests and know very little about the world.

So much for the moral superiority of scientists.

 

[Paulhoff]

The only people in this thread who seem to want to talk about god are you, and Linda with her bible.

Well then, please tell me where are all these morals coming from, and why is it every Christian I know always tells me that without a so-called god, we can't have any.

And if you think that isn't at the root of other's morals here just because they haven't said it yet, may I be the first to welcome you to earth.

Paul