I agree that Harris makes his case in a way that is confusing. However, he does make specific statements in the book that allow one to make better sense of those passages which seem equivocal.
"First, I want to be very clear about my general thesis: I am not suggesting that science can give us an evolutionary or neurobiological account of what people do in the name of "morality." Nor am I merely saying that science can help us get what we want out of life. These would be quite banal claims to make..." (holding mine) (page 28)
That is, he is not arguing the weak claim that science can inform our moral decisions.
"It seems to me, therefore, that there are at least three projects that we should not confuse:
1. We can explain why people tend to follow certain patterns of thought and behavior (many of them demonstrably silly and harmful) in the name of "morality."
2. We can think more clearly about the nature of moral truth and determine which patterns of thought and behavior we should follow in the name of "morality."
3. We can convince people who are committed to silly and harmful patterns of thought and behavior in the name of "morality" to break these commitments and to live better lives." (page 49)
He goes on to expound on these points in greater detail (which also distinguishes that he is making a strong claim), but notes that, at present, science mostly concerns itself with the first, and that this is all but irrelevant to 2 and 3. That is, a description of what we do in the name of morality isn't a description of what we ought to do, because it isn't relevant, not because of the is/ought issue.
Democracy Simulator, I also wonder about the answer to Kuko's question, as it is hard to see how someone who has read the book would consider Kevin Currie-Knight's review the best review of the book to date. Although, it is better than Pugliucci's in that it doesn't contain the plethora of fallacious arguments. But Kevin's review only makes some sense if he did not read the notes. And this is not a trivial problem, as Harris' Notes section by size is almost a quarter of the book. Some of the notes simply refer to the references (which are another 40 pages), but much of it is expository, containing some of his best and most detailed explanations. Otherwise, how do you explain Kevin's complaint that Harris seems unaware of the existence of Mackie's book, when Mackie's book is referenced in numerous places and Harris discusses some of Mackie's ideas in greater detail, except by the observation that these references are found in the notes, rather than the body of the book?
ETA: Maybe this gets explained in the comments. I only read the first page of them, because it seemed to consist of others pointing out (quite rightly) that Kevin seems to have missed the point of what Harris was getting at, and I didn't feel like slogging through several pages of that. I'll do it if you tell me it gets better, though.
Linda
"First, I want to be very clear about my general thesis: I am not suggesting that science can give us an evolutionary or neurobiological account of what people do in the name of "morality." Nor am I merely saying that science can help us get what we want out of life. These would be quite banal claims to make..." (holding mine) (page 28)
That is, he is not arguing the weak claim that science can inform our moral decisions.
"It seems to me, therefore, that there are at least three projects that we should not confuse:
1. We can explain why people tend to follow certain patterns of thought and behavior (many of them demonstrably silly and harmful) in the name of "morality."
2. We can think more clearly about the nature of moral truth and determine which patterns of thought and behavior we should follow in the name of "morality."
3. We can convince people who are committed to silly and harmful patterns of thought and behavior in the name of "morality" to break these commitments and to live better lives." (page 49)
He goes on to expound on these points in greater detail (which also distinguishes that he is making a strong claim), but notes that, at present, science mostly concerns itself with the first, and that this is all but irrelevant to 2 and 3. That is, a description of what we do in the name of morality isn't a description of what we ought to do, because it isn't relevant, not because of the is/ought issue.
Democracy Simulator, I also wonder about the answer to Kuko's question, as it is hard to see how someone who has read the book would consider Kevin Currie-Knight's review the best review of the book to date. Although, it is better than Pugliucci's in that it doesn't contain the plethora of fallacious arguments. But Kevin's review only makes some sense if he did not read the notes. And this is not a trivial problem, as Harris' Notes section by size is almost a quarter of the book. Some of the notes simply refer to the references (which are another 40 pages), but much of it is expository, containing some of his best and most detailed explanations. Otherwise, how do you explain Kevin's complaint that Harris seems unaware of the existence of Mackie's book, when Mackie's book is referenced in numerous places and Harris discusses some of Mackie's ideas in greater detail, except by the observation that these references are found in the notes, rather than the body of the book?
ETA: Maybe this gets explained in the comments. I only read the first page of them, because it seemed to consist of others pointing out (quite rightly) that Kevin seems to have missed the point of what Harris was getting at, and I didn't feel like slogging through several pages of that. I'll do it if you tell me it gets better, though.
Linda
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